GREEN v. HAWKINBERRY et al

Filing 51

ORDER denying 42 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Magistrate Judge Cynthia Reed Eddy on 2/6/2015. (bsc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MUWSA GREEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEBRA A. HAWKINBERRY, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 2: 13-cv-1208
United States Magistrate Judge
Cynthia Reed Eddy

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Presently before the Court is the Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 42) filed by
Plaintiff, Muwsa Green, and the Response in Opposition filed by Defendants (ECF No. 47). For
the reasons that follow, the Motion will be denied.1
Background
Plaintiff, Muwsa Green (“Plaintiff” or “Green”), is a state prisoner committed to the
custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) and currently confined at the
State Correctional Institution at Fayette, Pennsylvania (“SCI-Fayette”). Plaintiff generally
alleges the denial of his First Amendment rights to freely exercise his religion by being denied a
“kosher bag” in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act
(“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C § 2000cc-1(a). The claims and relief sought in this motion closely
parallel the claims and relief made by Green in his Amended Complaint. Green seeks no
specific equitable relief in the motion, but rather seeks compensatory and punitive damages.

The parties have consented to jurisdiction by the undersigned Magistrate Judge. See ECF
Nos. 13 and 20.
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Standard of Review
Inmate pro se pleadings, like those filed here, which seek extraordinary, or emergency
relief, in the form of preliminary injunctions are governed by Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and are judged against exacting legal standards. As the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained:
Four factors govern a district court’s decision whether to issue a preliminary
injunction: (1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of
success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will be irreparably injured by
denial of the relief, (3) whether granting preliminary relief will result in even
greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) whether granting the preliminary
relief will be in the public interest.
Gerardi v. Pelullo, 16 F.3d 1363 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting SI Handling Systems, Inc. v. Heisley,
753 F.2d 1244, 1254 (3d Cir. 1985)).
A preliminary injunction is not granted as a matter of right. Kerschner v. Mazurkewicz,
670 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1982). It is an extraordinary remedy. Given the extraordinary nature
of this form of relief, a motion for preliminary injunction places precise burdens on the moving
party. As a threshold matter, “it is a movant’s burden to show that the ‘preliminary injunction
must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm.’” Emile v. SCI-Pittsburgh, 2006 WL
2773261 at *6 (W.D.Pa. 2006) (quoting Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 91
(3d Cir. 1992)). Thus, when considering such requests, courts are cautioned that:
[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should
not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of
persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (emphasis
deleted). Furthermore, the Court must recognize that ‘an [i]njunction is an
equitable remedy which should not be lightly indulged in, but used sparingly and
only in a clear and plain case.’ Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland
Typographical Union #53, 520 F.2d 1220, 1230 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428
U.S. 909 (1977). As a corollary to the principle that preliminary injunctions
should issue only in a clear and plain case, the Court of Appeals for the Third
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Circuit has observed that “upon an application for a preliminary injunction to
doubt is to deny.” Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Braddock, 90 F.2d 924, 927
(3d Cir. 1937).
Emile, 2006 WL 2773261, at *6.
Accordingly, for an inmate to sustain his burden of proof that he is entitled to a
preliminary injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, he must demonstrate both a
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits and that he will be irreparably harmed if the
requested relief is not granted. Abu-Jamal v. Price, 154 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1998). If the
movant fails to carry this burden on either of these elements, the motion should be denied since a
party seeking such relief must “demonstrate both a likelihood of success on the merits and the
probability of irreparable harm if relief is not granted.” Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir.
1989).
These limitations on the power of courts to enter injunctions in a correctional context are
further underscored by statute. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 limits the authority of courts to
enjoin the exercise of discretion by prison officials, and provides that:
Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend
no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a
particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any
prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn,
extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and
is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.
The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or
the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
With respect to preliminary injunctions sought by inmates, courts are also instructed that:
Preliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than
necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be
the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm. The court shall give
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substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a
criminal justice system caused by the preliminary relief and shall respect the
principles of comity . . . in tailoring any preliminary relief.
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2).
Furthermore, it is well settled that “[t]he purpose of a preliminary injunction is to
preserve the status quo, not to decide the issues on the merits.” Anderson v. Davilla, 125 F.3d
148, 156 (3d Cir. 1997). Therefore, in a case such as this, where the inmate-“Plaintiff’s request
for immediate relief in his motion for preliminary injunction necessarily seeks resolution of one
of the ultimate issues presented in [the] . . . Complaint, … [the] Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that
he will suffer irreparable harm if he is not granted a preliminary injunction, because the ultimate
issue presented will be decided either by this Court or at trial. As a result, Green’s motion for
preliminary should be denied. Messner, 2009 WL 1406986, at *5.
In assessing a motion for preliminary injunction, the court must also consider the possible
harm to other interested parties if the relief is granted. Kershner, 670 F.2d at 443. In addition, a
request for injunctive relief in the prison context must be viewed with great caution because of
the intractable problems of prison administration. Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir.
1995). Finally, a party who seeks an injunction must show that the issuance of the injunctive
relief would not be adverse to the public interest. Emile, 2006 WL 2773261, at * 6 (citing
Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Corp., 269 F.3d 1149, 1154 (10th Cir. 2001)).
Discussion
Judged against this exacting standards, Green’s motion for injunctive relief fails. At the
outset, the Court notes that in the past, inmates have frequently sought preliminary injunctive
relief compelling prison officials to take certain actions with respect to them during the pendency
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of a lawsuit. Yet, such requests, while often made, are rarely embraced by the courts. Instead,
applying Rule 65's exacting standards courts have frequently held that prisoner-plaintiffs have
not shown that they are entitled to use a motion for preliminary injunction as a vehicle to compel
prison officials to provide them with some specific relief and services pending completion of
their lawsuits. See, e.g., Wesley v. Sec’y PA Dep’t of Corrections, 569 F. App’x 123 (3d Cir.
2014); Goodwin v. Glunt, 2013 WL 5202088 (W.D.Pa. 2013) (denying inmate preliminary
injunction); Messner v. Bunner, 2009 WL 1406986 (W.D.Pa. 2009) (denying inmate preliminary
injunction); Brown v. Sobina, 2008 WL 4500482 (W.D.Pa. 2008) (denying inmate preliminary
injunction);

Emile, 2006 WL 2773261, *6 (W.D.Pa. 2006) (denying inmate preliminary

injunction).
The Court finds that the motion for injunctive relief in this case is wanting in several
respects. First, the claims in the motion are largely duplicative of the claims in the Amended
Complaint. In this case, much, if not all, of the injunctive relief sought by Green directly relates
to the merits of the ultimate issues in this lawsuit. Since the ultimate issues in this lawsuit are
inextricably intertwined with the assertions in this motion for injunctive relief, a ruling on the
motion might be perceived as speaking in some way to the ultimate issues in this case. In such
instances, the Court should refrain from prematurely granting such relief.
Next, while the Court does not in any way diminish Green’s complaints, it finds that he
has not shown an immediate irreparable harm justifying a preliminary injunction. See, e.g.,
Rivera v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrections, 346 F. App’x 749 (3d Cir. 2009). It appears that as
of November 24, 2014, Green’s request for a Religious Accommodation has been granted. See
Defs’ Response, Exh. 1 (ECF No. 47-1). Further, Green does not allege the type of irreparable
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harm which warrants a preliminary injunction. In this regard, when considering this benchmark
standard for a preliminary injunction, it is clear that: “Irreparable injury is established by
showing that Plaintiff will suffer harm that ‘cannot be redressed by a legal or an equitable
remedy following trial.’ Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d
Cir. 1989) (‘The preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from
harm’). Messner, 2009 WL 1406986, at *4. In this context, the word irreparable has a specific
meaning and connotes “that which cannot be repaired, retrieved, put down again [or] atoned for .
. .”. Acierno v. New Castle County, 40 F.3d 645m 653 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Thus,
an injunction will not issue “simply to eliminate the possibility of a remote future injury . . . .”
Acierno, 40 F.3d at 655 (citation omitted). Therefore, where an inmate-plaintiff is alleging that
damages may be an adequate remedy, a preliminary injunction is often not appropriate since the
inmate has not shown that he faces immediate irreparable harm. Rivera v Pennsylvania Dep’t of
Corrections, 346 F. App’x 749 (3d Cir. 2009); Rush v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 287
F. App’x 142 (3d Cir. 2008).
Applying these legal standards in a case such as this, where “Plaintiff’s request for
immediate relief in his motion for preliminary injunction necessarily seeks resolution of one of
the ultimate issues presented in [the] . . . Complaint, . . . [the] Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that
he will suffer irreparable harm if he is not granted a preliminary injunction, because the ultimate
issue presented will be decided either by this Court, . . ., or at trial. As a result, Plaintiff’s motion
for preliminary injunction should be denied.” Messner, 2009 WL 1406986, at *5.
Third, to the extent that Green seeks to enjoin non-parties in this litigation it is clear that
“[a] non-party cannot be bound by the terms of an injunction unless the non-party is found to be
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acting ‘in active concert or participation’ with the party against whom injunctive relief is sought.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d).” Elliott v. Kiesewetter, 98 F.3d 47, 56 (3d Cir. 1996). The Court finds that
Green has not made the threshold showing required for injunctive relief from non-parties, which
is what he seeks here, in part, as he has not shown that these non-parties are “acting ‘in active
concert or participation’ with the party against whom injunctive relief is sought. Fed.R.Civ.P.
65(d).” Elliott, 98 F.3d at 56.
Finally, the Court notes that Defendants’ interests and the public interests in penological
order could be adversely effected if the Court began dictating the treatment for the Plaintiff, one
inmate out of thousands in the state prison system.

Therefore, consideration of “whether

granting preliminary relief will result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and . . .
whether granting the preliminary relief will be in the public interest,” Gerardi v. Pelullo, 16 F.3d
1363, 1373 (3d Cir. 1994), also weighs heavily against Green in this case.
For all these reasons, the Court finds that Green has not demonstrated a likelihood of
success on the merits, and has not shown that he suffers an irreparable harm. Moreover, the
motion is procedurally flawed, and granting this extraordinary relief could harm the public’s
interest and the interests of the opposing parties. An assessment of the factors which govern
issuance of such relief under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure weighs against
Green and compels the Court to find that the motion should be denied.
Conclusion
For all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction will be
denied. An appropriate Order follows.

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AND NOW, this 6th day of February, 2015,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction is
DENIED.

s/ Cynthia Reed Eddy
Cynthia Reed Eddy
United States Magistrate Judge
cc:

MUWSA GREEN
HV-5362
SCI Fayette
Box 9999
LaBelle, PA 15450-0999
(via U.S. First Class Mail)
Sandra A. Kozlowski
Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General
(via ECF electronic notification)

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