N'JAI v. US ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY et al
Filing
257
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER indicating that, for reasons more fully stated within, Plaintiff's Motion for Peremptory Challenge 239 is denied; that Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration styled as her Objections to the Memorandum and Order Document 237 Filed 4/15/2016 240 is denied. Signed by Judge Nora Barry Fischer on 6/14/16. (jg)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JACQUELYN B. N’JAI,
Plaintiff,
v.
GARY BENTZ, CONNIE BENTZ, and C.A.
BENTZ LLC,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 13-1212
Judge Nora Barry Fischer
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
I.
BACKGROUND
Presently pending before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Jacquelyn B. N’Jai’s (“Plaintiff” or
“N’Jai”) Motion for Peremptory Challenge, (Docket No. 239), and Motion for Reconsideration,
which were part of her “Objections to the Memorandum and Order Document #237 Filed
4/15/2016 and Request for Reconsideration.” (Docket No. 240).
By way of background, the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order on April 15,
2016, (Docket No. 237), in response to several motions and requests for relief filed by Plaintiff.
(Docket Nos. 221, 222, 223, & 224). Subsequently, on May 10, 2016, Plaintiff filed the instant
Motion for Peremptory Challenge, (Docket No. 239), asking that her case be reassigned from
this Court, and that no additional matters in this case or any other subsequent cases filed by
Plaintiff be assigned to this Court.1 (Docket No. 239 at 1). On the same day, Plaintiff also filed
her “Objections to the Memorandum and Order Document #237 Filed 4/15/2016 and Request for
Reconsideration,” wherein she asks the Court to “revisit” her previous orders. (Docket No. 240
at 5). Also, on the same date, Plaintiff filed a brief in support of her Objections, (Docket No.
1
This Court has presided over a number of matters brought by Plaintiff since 2007. See for example, N’Jai v. Floyd,
et al., 2:07-cv-1506-NBF; N’Jai v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Pub. Educ., 2:10-cv-1323-NBF.
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241), and a “Fact Status Update Regarding the EPA Information That the Bentz Defendants
Sought to Have the Court Withhold from Plaintiff.” (Docket No. 242).
Defendant CA Bentz, LLC filed a Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Peremptory Challenge and her Objections to the Memorandum on May 23, 2016. (Docket No.
244). On the same day, Defendants Gary and Connie Bentz (“the Bentz Defendants”) filed their
Response. (Docket No. 245). In turn, Plaintiff filed a “Sur Reply to the Defendants [sic] Motion
and Brief in Opposition [Doc. 244 and 245], to Her Peremptory Challenge and Request for
Reconsideration Supportive Brief,” (Docket No. 249), and the similarly titled, “Sur Reply to the
Defendants [sic] Motion and Brief in Opposition [Doc. 244 and 245], to Her Peremptory
Challenge and Request for Reconsideration,” (Docket No. 250). The first Sur Reply focuses on
Plaintiff’s Motion for Peremptory Challenge while the second focuses on her Motion for
Reconsideration. Therein, she reiterated her previous positions. In accordance with the Court’s
order, (Docket No. 251), Defendant C.A. Bentz, LLC filed its Response, (Docket No. 255), and
the Bentz Defendants filed theirs. (Docket No. 256).
Having considered all of the parties’ filings and the relevant authority, Plaintiffs’ motions
are ripe for disposition. The Court now turns to Plaintiff’s Motion for Peremptory Challenge.
II.
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
Plaintiff’s Motion seeks recusal of this Court from this and any additional cases to be
filed by Plaintiff. (Docket No. 239). Plaintiff avers that her motion is based on the entire record,
past cases with the Court, and 28 U.S.C. § 455. (Docket No. 239 at 1; Docket No. 249 at 1). In
an attached Declaration in Support of Motion for Peremptory Challenge, (Docket No. 239-1),
Plaintiff states that this Court is prejudiced against her, and believes that she cannot have a fair
and impartial trial hearing before this Court.
2
While she references 28 U.S.C. § 455 in her Sur Reply, (Docket No. 249 at 1), Plaintiff
originally stated that her Motion was based on the “Code of Civil Procedure Section 170.6 {or
whatever appropriate Section is for Pennsylvania}.”2 (Docket No. 239 at 1). Therefore, this
Court will consider both possible statutory bases, 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455.
Although the legal standard of recusal is the same under each provision—bias—the provisions
differ slightly.
Section 144 requires federal district court judges to recuse if a party timely files a
sufficient affidavit, setting forth factual statements showing the judge has personal bias or
prejudice against a party. 28 U.S.C. § 144. An affidavit that puts forth conclusory statements and
opinions, however, is insufficient and does not require recusal under § 144. Hill v. Carpenter,
323 F. App'x 167, 170 (3d Cir. 2009). Section 455 applies regardless of whether a party files a
formal motion and affidavit for recusal, and requires recusal when a judge's impartiality “might
reasonably be questioned,” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), or “[w]here [she] has a personal bias or prejudice
concerning a party.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1).
The test for recusal is an objective one and requires recusal where a “reasonable person,
with knowledge of all the facts, would conclude that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.” In re Kensington Int'l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 301 (3d Cir. 2004). The bias required
before recusal is warranted under either § 144 or § 455 “must stem from an extrajudicial source.”
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 544, 554, (1994). Moreover, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit has made it clear that “a party's displeasure with legal rulings does not form an
adequate basis for recusal.” Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278
(3d Cir. 2000). The Circuit reinforced the point that disqualification and recusal should not be
methods of “judge shop[ping].” In re Earl A. Pondexter, 2013 WL 5229973, at *1 (3d Cir. Sept.
2
The referenced Code of Civil Procedure Section 170.6 is a California statute.
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18, 2013). In order to establish the level of bias necessary to require recusal, facts that arise
during the course of litigation are usually insufficient. Further, “opinions formed by a judge on
the basis of events occurring in the course of prior proceedings do not constitute a basis for a bias
motion under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455(a) and 455(b)(1), unless they display a deep-seated
antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Atwell v. Schweiker, 274 F. App'x 116,
117 (3d Cir. 2007).
Applied to this case, Plaintiff has not met the standard for recusal under either § 144 or
under § 455. First, under § 144, although Plaintiff filed a document titled “Declaration in Support
of Motion for Peremptory Challenge,” it is a conclusory in nature in that it asserts this Court “is
prejudiced against the Plaintiff.” Thus, Plaintiff's proffered grounds for recusal do not trigger
recusal under § 144. Hill, 323 F. App'x at 170.
Second, recusal is not required under § 455's objective standard. Plaintiff's arguments are
all rooted in this case and in previous legal proceedings. (Docket No. 239 at 1; Docket No. 249 at
1-6). She raises no allegations of bias that have an extrajudicial source, and also fails to assert
facts indicating that this Judge holds a deep-seated antagonism that would prevent fair
adjudication. Atwell, 274 F. App'x at 117.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held,
[T]he District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying N'Jai's request for
recusal. . . . N'Jai alleged that Judge Fischer was biased because she had ruled
against her in a previous case. We have held, however, that an unfavorable ruling
is not a basis for recusal. Securacomm Consulting, Inc, 224 F.3d at 278. In
addition, recusal was not warranted based on the inquiry from a deputy in Judge
Fischer's chambers to an attorney for the NAACP regarding the status of a
pleading. Cf. In re Kensington Int'l. Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 305 (3d Cir.2004) (“We
do not hold that ex parte communications alone—in the absence of any conflict of
interest—require recusal.”).
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N'Jai v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Pub. Ed., 487 F. App'x. 735, 738 (3d Cir. 2012). The Third Circuit's
ruling that recusal was not required in a previous case bolsters this Court's conclusion that
recusal is not required now.
III.
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
While not specifically styled as such, Plaintiff has essentially brought a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Court’s April 15, 2016 Memorandum Opinion and Order. (Docket No.
237). “‘The purpose of a motion for reconsideration . . . is to correct manifest errors of law or
fact or to present newly discovered evidence.’” Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v.
Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906,
909 (3d Cir. 1985)). “Because of the interest in finality, at least at the district court level,
motions for reconsideration should be granted sparingly; the parties are not free to relitigate
issues the court has already decided.” Williams v. City of Pittsburgh, 32 F.Supp.2d 236, 238
(W.D. Pa. 1996).
It is well established that the party seeking reconsideration must show at least one of the
following: (1) change in controlling law; (2) availability of new evidence; or (3) need to correct a
clear error of law or of fact, or to prevent manifest injustice. Howard Hess Dental Lab., Inc. v.
Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 251 (3d Cir. 2010). This is a high standard. Paytas v.
Kindred Hosp.—Pittsburgh—North Shore, LLC, 2014 WL 3420469 at * 2 (W.D. Pa. July 14,
2014) (citing Berry v. Jacobs IMC, LLC, 99 F. App’x 405, 410 (3d Cir. 2004)). Motions for
reconsideration should not be used by parties as an attempt to reargue or re-litigate old matters or
to express disagreement with a Court’s ruling. See E.E.O.C. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 2012 WL
1150799, at *6-7 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 5, 2012) (citations omitted).
In her Objections, Plaintiff contends that she is entitled to relief from this Court's April
15, 2016 Memorandum Opinion and Order; however, she has not shown a change in controlling
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law or any manifest errors of law or fact in the Court’s rulings. Indeed, Plaintiff has provided the
same evidence that was available to the Court and which the Court has previously considered
before issuing its April 15, 2016 Memorandum Opinion and Order. (Docket Nos. 240 & 250).
Thus, it appears that Plaintiff is trying to relitigate issues the Court has already decided.
Moreover, the Court is given wide discretion to manage its docket and individual cases
including discovery.
Trial courts exercise “substantial discretion” over discovery. Stich v.
United States, 730 F.2d 115, 117–18 (3d Cir.1984) (“[T]he conduct of discovery is also
committed to the sound discretion of the district court.”). Issues relating to the scope of
discovery permitted under the Rules rest in the sound discretion of the court. Harris v. Pa. Bd. of
Prob. & Parole, 2013 WL 5551206, *2 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 2013) (citing Wisniewski v. Johns–
Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir.1987)).
Likewise, Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which was amended as of
December 1, 2015,3 provides that the Federal Rules “should be construed, administered, and
employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action and proceeding.” FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (2015) (emphasis added). See Harris v.
Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 2016 WL 1660203, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2016) (Fischer,
J.). Of note, all parties agreed to the February 5, 2015 Case Management Order, (Docket No.
126), which outlined a timetable for discovery in this case.
The Order was only entered
following a Case Management Conference wherein all parties and lead trial counsel participated.
(Docket Nos. 124 & 131).
Given the discretion that the Court has over discovery, the mandate to construe and
administer the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in order to ensure a “just, speedy, and
3
The Court notes that the 2015 version of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to this ongoing action to the
extent practicable. See FED. R. CIV. P. Refs & Annos (Order of April 29, 2015) (“the foregoing amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall take effect on December 1, 2015, and shall govern in all proceedings in civil
cases thereafter commenced and, insofar as just and practicable, all proceedings then pending.”).
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inexpensive determination,” the Court’s Case Management Order, and for the reasons stated
above, the Court will not reconsider its April 15, 2016 Memorandum Opinion and Order.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion for Peremptory Challenge, (Docket No. 239) and Motion
for Reconsideration, which was part of her “Objections to the Memorandum and Order
Document #237 Filed 4/15/2016 and Request for Reconsideration,” (Docket No. 240), are
DENIED, and an Order follows.
V.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 14th day of June, 2016, upon consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for
Peremptory Challenge, (Docket No. 239); Plaintiff’s Objections to the Memorandum and Order
Document #237 Filed 4/15/2016 and Request for Reconsideration, (Docket No. 240); Plaintiff’s
Brief in Support, (Docket No. 241); Plaintiff’s Fact Status Update Regarding the EPA
Information that the Bentz Defendants Sought to Have the Court Withhold from Plaintiff,
(Docket No. 242); Defendant CA Bentz, LLC’s Brief in Opposition, (Docket No. 244); the
Response of Defendants Gary and Connie Bentz, (Docket No. 245); Plaintiff’s Sur Replies to
Defendants’ Brief and Response in Opposition, (Docket Nos. 249 & 250); Defendant C.A.
Bentz, LLC’s Response to Plaintiff’s Sur-Replies (Docket No. 255); and the Bentz Defendants’
Response to Plaintiff’s Sur-Replies, (Docket No. 256);
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Peremptory Challenge, (Docket
No. [239]) is DENIED.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration styled as her
Objections to the Memorandum and Order Document #237 Filed 4/15/2016 (Docket No. [240])
is DENIED.
s/Nora Barry Fischer
Nora Barry Fischer
United States District Judge
Date:
June 14, 2016
cc/ecf: All counsel of record
Jacquelyn B. N’Jai
nj0216@aol.com
and
P.O. Box 10133
Pittsburgh, PA 15232
(regular mail)
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