N'JAI v. US ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY et al
Filing
290
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 282 Motion in Limine to Hold a Daubert or Frye Hearing. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion is granted to the extent that Plaintiff seeks the disclosures required pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(v) - (vi); said disclosures shall be filed no later than October 7, 2016. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants shall file a motion to place under seal those records they failed to adequately redact; said motion shall be filed no later than October 7, 2016. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other relief requested in the Motion is denied. Signed by Judge Nora Barry Fischer on 9/29/2016. (erk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JACQUELYN B. N’JAI,
Plaintiff,
v.
GARY BENTZ, CONNIE BENTZ, and C.A.
BENTZ LLC,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 13-1212
Judge Nora Barry Fischer
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Following consideration of the Motion in Limine to Hold a Daubert or Frye Hearing
(“Motion”) (Docket No. 282) filed by Jacquelyn B. N’Jai (“Plaintiff”), the Response (Docket
No. 284) filed on behalf of Gary Bentz, Connie Bentz, and C.A. Bentz LLC (collectively
“Defendants”), and the parties’ exhibits attached thereto, the Court will GRANT said Motion, in
part, and DENY, in part.
I. MEMORANDUM
In the Motion presently before the Court, Plaintiff requests a hearing pursuant to either
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), or Frye v. United States,
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In its Order of August 16, 2016, the Court gave Plaintiff leave to
file a Motion in Limine regarding the alleged lack of citations to the record in Defendants’ expert
reports. (Docket No. 275). The above notwithstanding, Plaintiff takes the liberty of levying a
litany of criticisms of Defendants’ discovery practices, including failure to include pinpoint
citations to evidence used by the experts to support their reports, failure to list all cases in which
the experts had previously testified, failure to state the experts’ compensation, unprofessional
and uncooperative conduct by Defendants’ counsel, threats of motions for fees and costs
associated with Plaintiff’s “frivolous” discovery requests, deliberate delay of the discovery
process, falsification of records produced in discovery, and failure to redact sensitive personal
information in medical records which is not pertinent to the instant case. (Docket Nos. 282 and
283).
Plaintiff also asks the Court to grant, in addition to a hearing, provision of all materials
required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B), sealing of certain records pertaining
to her alleged history of smoking, and an injunction against UPMC and the Alma Illery Medical
Center in order for her to examine and/or copy medical records she contends were not provided
to her pursuant to earlier issued subpoenas. (Docket Nos. 282 and 283). In response, Defendants
admit that the experts’ reports should have been accompanied by a list of other cases in which
they provided their services over the past four years, as well as the compensation received for
their services in the instant case. (Docket No. 284 at 3). Nonetheless, Defendants object to the
remainder of the Motion as being beyond the scope of the Court’s August 16, 2016 Order.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that it is well established that Frye was superseded
by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, and is no longer applicable to proceedings in federal court.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579. As such, the Court will look only to Rule 702 and Daubert to
determine whether Plaintiff’s request for a hearing on Defendants’ expert reports has merit. Rule
702 provides:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the
case.
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Hartle v. FirstEnergy Generation Corp., 7 F.Supp.3d 510, 514 (W.D. Pa 2014) (quoting Fed. R.
Evid. 702). This language reflects “‘a liberal policy of admissibility.’” Rowland v. Novartis
Pharmaceuticals Corp., 9 F.Supp.3d 553, 558 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (quoting Kannankeril v. Terminix
Int’l, Inc., 128 F.3d 802, 806 (3d Cir. 1997)). However, the Court must act as a gatekeeper and
ensure that proffered evidence is reliable and relevant. Id. (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589,
597).
To this end, Rule 702 “‘embodies a trilogy of restrictions on expert testimony:
qualification, reliability and fit.’” Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Group, Ltd., 286
F.R.D. 266, 269 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (quoting Schneider ex rel. Estate of Schneider v. Fried, 320
F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 2003)). As long as an expert’s opinion rests upon “‘good grounds, based
on what is known,’ it should be tested by the adversary process – competing expert testimony
and active cross-examination – rather than excluded from the juror’s scrutiny for fear that they
will not grasp its complexities or satisfactorily weigh its inadequacies.’” Id. (quoting United
States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 244 (3d Cir. 2004)).
Currently, Defendants note that Plaintiff has failed to state a basis under the
aforementioned standards in Daubert for obtaining a hearing. Indeed, Plaintiff’s only arguments
pertinent to Daubert involve nothing more than broad generalizations about Defendants’ experts’
reliance upon falsified or incomplete medical records. 1 A Daubert hearing is not automatically
required whenever an objection is raised. Kerrigan v. Maxon Ind., 223 F.Supp.2d 626, 633 (E.D.
Pa. 2002) (citing Padillas v. Stork-Gamco, Inc., 186 F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir. 1999)). Moreover,
the decision whether or not to hold a Daubert hearing “rests in the sound discretion of the trial
court.” Parkinson v. Guidant Corp., 315 F.Supp.2d 754, 756 n. 1 (W.D. Pa. 2004) (citing
Padillas, 186 F.3d at 418). In the instant case, a proper motion for a Daubert hearing was not
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Plaintiff cites no evidence to substantiate such allegations.
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made. Based upon the Court’s reading of Plaintiff’s Motion, a hearing would serve no purpose
other than to further delay the progress of this case and add unnecessary expense. Fed. R. Civ. P.
1. Plaintiff’s Motion will, therefore, be denied to the extent an evaluation or hearing pursuant to
Daubert is sought.
Should Plaintiff continue to take issue with Defendants’ experts’
conclusions, and the bases on which they relied, she may question them by deposition 2 or
interrogatory, and she may cross-examine them should this matter proceed to trial.
In terms of the information Defendants’ experts should include with their reports, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) states:
disclosure must be accompanied by a written report--prepared and signed by the
witness--if the witness is one retained or specially employed to provide expert
testimony in the case or one whose duties as the party's employee regularly
involve giving expert testimony. The report must contain:
(i) a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and
reasons for them;
(ii) the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them;
(iii) any exhibits that will be used to summarize or support them;
(iv) the witness's qualifications, including a list of all publications authored in the
previous 10 years;
(v) a list of all other cases in which, during the previous 4 years, the witness
testified as an expert at trial or by deposition; and
(vi) a statement of the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony in the
case.
Here, Plaintiff correctly observes that she is entitled to a list of all other cases in which – over the
previous four years – each expert testified at trial or by deposition, and a statement concerning
the compensation each expert received for their services in the instant case. 3 (Docket No. 282 at
4). However, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to “compel the Defendants to submit each and
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Incidentally, the Court reminds Plaintiff that “[c]ivil litigants, including pro se litigants, generally bear their
own deposition costs.” Stewart v. Union Cnty. Bd. of Educ., -- F.App’x --, 2016 WL 3743181 at *4 n. 4 (3d Cir.
2016). Pro se status does not excuse a party’s failure to depose witnesses. Id. Proceeding in forma pauperis does
not relieve a party of the duty to pay his or her share of the cost of discovery. Nusbaum v. MBFG Ltd. P’ship, 2009
WL 2605320 at *3 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2009) (Fischer, J.).
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Defendants admit as much, and state that this information will be forthcoming. (Docket No. 283 at 3).
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every document or citation of documents, for their so called facts, data, degrees of certainties
and/or conclusions as well as their specific locations,” the Court finds that Plaintiff’s resort to
Rule 26(a)(2)(B) is unavailing. While courts have interpreted Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(ii) to “include
materials that an expert reviews, reflects upon, reads, and/or uses,” Dyson Tech. Ltd. v. Maytag
Corp., 241 F.R.D. 247, 251 (D. Del. 2007), Plaintiff cites no authority indicating that an expert
must provide the page and line of each piece of evidence upon which he or she focused. The
Court also notes that Defendants have exceeded their obligations pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2)(B(ii)
by attempting to accommodate Plaintiff’s requests for greater specificity. (See Docket No. 283-4
at 6). Thus, the Court will order Defendants to provide the materials required under Rule
26(a)(2)(B)(v) – (vi), but will deny Plaintiff’s further requests for relief pursuant to Rule
26(a)(2)(B).
Plaintiff next asks that “the Court seal any statements that are unsubstantiated by strict
proof of her allegedly being a smoker, and being advised by a doctor in 2015 of the dangers of
smoking,” as well as records submitted as attachments to Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment filed August 19, 2016 and containing “DOB, address, phone numbers, social security
numbers, and other privileged information.” (Docket Nos. 282 at 5 and 283 at 5). With respect
to the statements regarding Plaintiff’s history of smoking, the Court will not order these to be
sealed. Plaintiff may question the experts by deposition or interrogatory regarding same, and
may cross-examine them should this matter proceed to trial. However, with respect to the
sensitive personal information displayed – unredacted – in attachments to Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment (Docket Nos. 277), the Court will issue an Order that Defendants shall
file a motion to place under seal those documents in which they failed to redact personal
identifiers. Per Local Rule 5.2(G), “[t]he responsibility for redacting these personal identifiers
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rests solely with counsel and the parties.” See also Local Rule 5.2(D) (redaction of personal
identifiers).
With respect to Plaintiff’s desire for an injunction against UPMC and the Alma Illery
Medical Center in order to examine and/or copy medical records, the Court will deny the relief
sought. Plaintiff points to no authority under which such an injunction would be appropriate.
See Angino v. BB&T Bank, 2016 WL 4408835 at *14 (M.D. Pa. June 7, 2016) (“Motions which
request preliminary or permanent injunctions seek a special form of relief and require a specific
and exacting showing.”).
Finally, Plaintiff now asks for an extension of “time for all tests to be done so she can
submit a report on her disagnosis [sic] and prognosis and treatment and have accurately correct
medical records.” (Docket No. 282 at 7). Plaintiff – in essence – seeks to reopen expert
discovery, which period was closed on July 29, 2016. (Docket No. 263). This date was itself the
second extension from the original end-date of June 18, 2016. (Docket No. 263). Plaintiff has
failed to show good cause why another extension should be allowed, particularly when Plaintiff’s
request for same was not filed for over a month after the close of expert discovery. See Leboon
v. Lancaster Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 235 (3d Cir. 2007); Krouse v. American Sterilizer
Co., 984 F.Supp. 891, 915 – 16 (W.D. Pa. 1996). See also Section III(B)(1), Practices and
Procedures of Judge Nora Barry Fischer. Hence, expert discovery will not be reopened.
Plaintiff similarly attempts to reopen fact discovery by adding witnesses and documents
related to her healthcare. (Docket No. 283 at 10). Fact discovery was initially set to close on
September 4, 2015 (Docket No. 126), and was most recently extended until February 5, 2016
(Docket No. 216). Plaintiff waited until August 30, 2016 to make this request. Plaintiff has not
provided good cause why fact discovery should be reopened; neither has Plaintiff conferred with
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opposing counsel or filed a Certificate of Conferral per Section II(N) of this Court’s Policies and
Procedures. Thus, fact discovery will not be reopened.
II. ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion [282] is granted
to the extent that Plaintiff seeks the disclosures required pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(v) – (vi);
said disclosures shall be filed no later than October 7, 2016.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants shall file a motion to place under seal those
records attached to their Motion for Summary Judgment [277] in which they failed to adequately
redact Plaintiff’s sensitive personal information (e.g. date of birth, address, etc.); said motion
shall be filed no later than October 7, 2016.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other relief requested in this Motion is denied.
s/ Nora Barry Fischer
Nora Barry Fischer
United States District Judge
Dated: September 29, 2016.
cc/ecf: All counsel of record.
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