RAPCHAK et al v. DAIMLER TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA, LLC et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT denying the 35 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; and denying the 17 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Terrence F. McVerry on 12/18/13. (mcp)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
BONNIE RAPCHAK, Executrix of the Estate
of John E. Borzik, Deceased and
WANDA BORZIK,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
FREIGHTLINER CUSTOM CHASSIS
CORPORATION, HALDEX BRAKE
PRODUCTS CORPORATION, , SAFHOLLAND USA, INC., GULF STREAM
COACH, INC. and TOUR MASTER
RECREATIONAL VEHICLES, INC.,1
Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
Pending before the Court is a PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’
PUNITIVE DAMAGES CLAIM (ECF No. 17) filed by Gulf Stream Coach, Inc. (“Gulf
Stream”) and Tour Master Recreational Vehicles Inc. (“Tour Master”) with brief in support (ECF
No. 18);and a MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS (ECF No. 35)
filed by Freightliner Custom Chassis Corporation (“Freightliner”) with brief in support (ECF No.
37). Plaintiffs filed briefs in opposition (ECF No. 39, 42). Accordingly, the motions are ripe for
disposition.
I.
Background
The following background is drawn from the Complaint, and the factual allegations
1. Plaintiff also initially named Haldex Limited, Haldex Corporation, Daimler Trucks North America, LLC;
Freightliner, LLC and Freightliner Corporation as defendants, but they have since been voluntarily dismissed
pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF Nos. 19, 20, 29, 34, & 36). The remaining
parties are advised that this caption should be used moving forward.
therein are accepted as true for purposes of this Memorandum Opinion. As the law requires, all
disputed facts and inferences are resolved in favor of Plaintiffs, the non-moving parties.
A. Factual Background
This case arose out of the tragic death of John E. Borzik while inspecting the
undercarriage of his 2008 Tour Master recreational motor home to check for a leak of antifreeze. At that time, Plaintiff positioned himself near the right side of the rear axle lying supine
on a creeper under the structure when it unexpectedly descended, trapped him, compressed his
chest and caused him to asphyxiate over a period of time which eventually led to his death.
Plaintiffs allege that “the structure of the motor home descended because the height control
valves and/or dump valves in the suspension system of the chassis malfunctioned and did not
perform as intended or expected by permitting air to escape from the rear.” (ECF No. 1 at 8).
According to Plaintiffs, an air leak through a port in the front-mounted dump valve was detected
soon after the decedent’s body was found.
Defendants designed, manufactured, assembled, and/or sold the motor home, its chassis,
and the air suspension system. Plaintiff Rapchak is the Executrix of decedent’s estate; Plaintiff
Wanda Borzik is his mother. As Plaintiffs aver, Ms. Borzik observed her son shortly after the
accident and “perceived that [he] was seriously injured or in the process of dying.” Id. at 21.
B. Procedural History
Plaintiffs initiated this action on September 6, 2013 by filing a five-count Complaint in
this Court in which they allege various product liability claims and a negligent and/or intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim at Count Five.2 Plaintiffs seek damages pursuant to a
2. As the Complaint appears to sound in various theories, the Court notes that there is split within the Third Circuit
regarding the whether the Restatement (Third) of Torts or the Restatement (Second) of Torts should apply in strict
product liability cases. See Sansom v. Crown Equip. Corp., 880 F. Supp. 2d 648, 655 n.5 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (“After
the Third Circuit’s decision in Berrier, but before Judge Aldisert’s opinion for that Court in Covell, district courts in
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Pennsylvania Survival Action, 42 P.S. § 8302 and the Wrongful Death Act, 42 P.S. § 8301.
Additionally, Plaintiffs claim they are entitled to an award of punitive damages.
A variety of responsive filings followed. Freightliner filed an Answer (ECF No. 11) on
November 8, 2013 and a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 35) on
December 11, 2013; Saf-Holland, Inc. (“Saf-Holland”) filed an Answer (ECF No. 12) on
November 11, 2013; Gulf Stream and Tour Master filed an Answer (ECF No. 16) and a partial
motion to dismiss (ECF No. 17) on November 25, 2013; and Haldex filed an Answer on
November 27, 2013. Plaintiffs filed briefs in opposition to what they call “Partial Motion[s] for
Summary Judgment to Dismiss” on December 13, 2013 and December 17, 2013. Compare Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) & (c) with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The Court now turns to the pending Rule 12
motions, which it will address in tandem. Allah v. Hayman, 442 F. App’x 632, 635 (3d Cir.
2011) (“The standards governing Rule 12(c) motions are the same ones that govern motions to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)”) (citing Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 223 n.2 (3d Cir. 2004)).
II.
Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiency of a
complaint, which may be dismissed for the “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Upon review of a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept
all well-pleaded facts and allegations, and must draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor
of the plaintiff. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1861 (2012) (citing In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir.
2010)). However, as the Supreme Court of the United States has made clear in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, such “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
this circuit were split on whether to apply the Restatement (Second) or (Third) of Torts and the principles set forth
therein . . . Even since Covell, a division remains.”) (collecting cases).
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speculative level.” 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007). The Supreme Court later refined this approach in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, emphasizing the requirement that a complaint must state a plausible claim for
relief in order to survive a motion to dismiss. 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555). Nevertheless, “the plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’” but
requires a plaintiff to show “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Accordingly, the Court must separate the factual and legal elements of the claim and
“accept the factual allegations contained in the Complaint as true, but [ ] disregard rote recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, legal conclusions, and mere conclusory statements.” James v.
City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79;
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-57; Burtch, 662 F.3d at 220-21). The Court “must then determine
whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible
claim for relief.’ In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement
to relief. A complaint has to ‘show’ such an entitlement with its facts.” Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal 556 U.S. at 678). The determination
for “plausibility” will be “‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense.’” Id. at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
III.
Discussion
Defendants seek dismissal of the punitive damages aspects of Plaintiffs’ claims, arguing
that they simply plead a threadbare recital of the required elements. In support, both motions
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rely on the same paragraph in their attempt to demonstrate that the Complaint contains nothing
other than formulaic labels and conclusions. See No. 1 at 11, ¶ 29.
Plaintiffs highlight other averments in their Complaint to show that the federal pleading
standard has been met. Those paragraphs include allegations that Defendant knew or should
have known that the product lacked adequate and feasible protective devices, interlock devices,
safety features, or warning that would have made it safe for intended and reasonably foreseeable
users; and that they knew or should have known that using certain substances and compounds
would contaminate and impair the function of the valves.
See ECF No. 1 at 19, ¶ 49.
Alternatively, Plaintiffs submit that Defendants’ motions are premature at this stage.
“Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the
defendant’s evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others.” Hutchison v. Luddy,
870 A.2d 766, 770 (Pa. 2005). Pennsylvania law requires that plaintiff support a punitive
damages claim “by evidence sufficient to establish that (1) a defendant had a subjective
appreciation of the risk of harm to which the plaintiff was exposed and that (2) he acted, or failed
to act, as the case may be, in conscious disregard of that risk.” Id. Of course, “courts can and do
address punitive damages claims at the motion to dismiss stage.” Gardner v. Barry, 1:10-CV0527, 2010 WL 4853885, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 2010) (citations omitted). See Boring v.
Google Inc., 362 F. App'x 273, 283 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[C]ourts do indeed dismiss claims for
punitive damages in advance of trial.”).
Here, this Court will not dismiss the punitive damages aspect of Plaintiffs’ case at this
time. Plaintiffs aver that Defendants designed, manufactured, and/or assembled a product which
they knew or should have known was defective and posed grave danger to the user. These
allegations must be taken as true at this stage of the proceedings and could support an award of
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punitive damages if proven. C.f. Rile v. Alpha Technologies, Inc., CIV.A.06-52, 2006 WL
515534, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2006). Discovery may ultimately reveal that Defendants are
correct, preventing this issue from ever reaching the factfinder. But that determination is best
left for a later stage after Plaintiff have had the benefit of the discovery process. Accordingly,
the motions will be denied without prejudice for Defendants to re-raise their argument(s)
at the summary judgment stage.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons hereinabove stated, the Court will deny the motion to dismiss and the
motion for judgment on the pleadings. An appropriate Order follows.
McVerry, J.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
BONNIE RAPCHAK, Executrix of the Estate
of John E. Borzik, Deceased and
WANDA BORZIK,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
FREIGHTLINER CUSTOM CHASSIS
CORPORATION, HALDEX BRAKE
PRODUCTS CORPORATION, , SAFHOLLAND USA, INC., GULF STREAM
COACH, INC. and TOUR MASTER
RECREATIONAL VEHICLES, INC.,
Defendants.
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ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 18th day of December, 2013, in accordance with the foregoing
Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the
PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ PUNITIVE DAMAGES CLAIM (ECF No.
17) and the MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS (ECF No. 35) are
DENIED.
BY THE COURT:
s/Terrence F. McVerry
United States District Judge
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