GEARY v. COLVIN

Filing 13

ORDER denying 8 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; granting 10 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 5/22/14. (ask)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PATRICIA GEARY,

)
) No. 13-1351
)

Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
SYNOPSIS
In this action, Plaintiff filed an application for disability benefits pursuant to Title XVI of
the Social Security Act. Plaintiff alleged disability due to diabetes, degenerative joint disease
with meniscal tear, and adjustment disorder, with a date of onset of July 4, 2010. The
application was denied upon hearing, at which Plaintiff was not present.1 Plaintiff was twenty
years old at the time of the hearing. This appeal followed, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings, and Defendant’s for Summary Judgment, are before the Court. For the
following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion will be denied, and Defendant’s granted.
OPINION
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Judicial review of the Commissioner's final decisions on disability claims is provided by

statute. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) 6 and 1383(c)(3) 7. Section 405(g) permits a district court to review
the transcripts and records upon which a determination of the Commissioner is based, and the
court will review the record as a whole. See 5 U.S.C. §706. When reviewing a decision, the
district court's role is limited to determining whether the record contains substantial evidence to
support an ALJ's findings of fact. Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2002).
1

Plaintiff’s absence from the hearing is not raised as a concern on appeal.

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Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate" to support a conclusion. Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971)). If the ALJ's
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, they are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Richardson, 402 U.S. at 390.
A district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner's decision, or reweigh the evidence of record; the court can only judge the propriety of the decision with
reference to the grounds invoked by the Commissioner when the decision was rendered. Palmer
v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998); S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 - 97,
67 S. Ct. 1575, 91 L. Ed. 1995 (1947).

Otherwise stated, “I may not weigh the evidence or

substitute my own conclusion for that of the ALJ. I must defer to the ALJ's evaluation of
evidence, assessment of the credibility of witnesses, and reconciliation of conflicting expert
opinions. If the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, I am bound by those
findings, even if I would have decided the factual inquiry differently.” Brunson v. Astrue, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55457 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2011) (citations omitted).
I. THE PARTIES’ MOTIONS
In this case, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to
perform light work, with many limitations relating both to her physical and mental condition.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by failing to seek additional medical evidence.

Plaintiff

objects that the ALJ interpreted these bare medical findings himself, without the benefit of expert
opinion regarding functional limitations. Defendant, correctly asserting that the ALJ is not
required to obtain an expert opinion in any event, notes that it was patently unnecessary in this
case. Plaintiff also complains that the ALJ failed to give appropriate weight to the opinion of Dr.

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Tavoularis, a one-time examiner, and instead credited a non-examining source; relied solely on a
non-exmining source to reject Dr. Tavoularis’ opinion; and failed to consider Plaintiff’s
problems falling asleep at a reasonable hour.
Plaintiff relies on Doak v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 26 (3d Cir. 1986), in which the Third Circuit
suggested that an RFC must be based on medical opinion regarding the activity that a claimant
can perform. "'Residual functional capacity is defined as that which an individual is still able to
do despite the limitations caused by his or her impairment(s).'" Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000). "There is no legal requirement that a physician have
made the particular findings that an ALJ adopts in the course of determining an RFC."
Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 Fed. Appx. 6, 11 (3d Cir. 2006). Keller v. Colvin, 12-1502, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21078 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2014). Thus, “remand is not always required when
an ALJ fails in his duty to request opinions, particularly where… the record contains sufficient
evidence from which an ALJ can assess the petitioner's residual functional capacity." Toland v.
Colvin, No. 12-1663, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166756, at *28 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2013); cf.
Pollace v. Astrue, No. 6-5156, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9735 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 11, 2008). Generally
speaking, an ALJ is required to seek additional medical evidence if the evidence presented is
inconclusive or unclear. See Clark v. Colvin, No. 12-1116, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103363, at
*26 (D. Del. July 24, 2013).
Plaintiff first complains about the failure to obtain additional medical information
regarding her knee. The MRI and evidence referred to consists of a single report by Dr. Sheba,
authored on July 22, 2011. The report, while noting Plaintiff’s subjective pain complaints
(including the pain on full extension and moderate tenderness that Plaintiff notes in her brief),
found normal objective examinations of the knees in all respects. A note of antalgic gait, along

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with subjective complaints, does not require additional evidence in light of the objective medical
evidence of record. Plaintiff points to no other evidence regarding her knee condition. Further,
as Defendant notes, the record reflects that in January 2011, Plaintiff injured her hand while
playing volleyball. Lastly, Plaintiff’s counsel indicated that Plaintiff’s primary concern was with
her non-exertional limitations, and exertional limitations related to diabetes. With regard to
Plaintiff’s diabetes and mental impairments, the ALJ considered all of the evidence, and noted
Plaintiff’s significant history of noncompliance.
This situation is markedly unlike that in Doak, where one physician opined that claimant
was able to do sedentary work, one opined that another was totally disabled, one rendered no
opinion about ability to work, and the ALJ nevertheless concluded that claimant was able to
perform light work. Doak, 790 F. 2d at 26. In Doak, “[t]he Third Circuit did nothing more than
make a substantial evidence finding in light of a limited record and did not purport to create a
rule that an RFC determination must be based on a specific medical opinion, and subsequent
Third Circuit case law confirms this understanding.” Doty v. Colvin, No. 13-80, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21, at **3-4 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 2, 2014).2 Under all of the circumstances here, the record
contained sufficient evidence to allow the ALJ to assess Plaintiff’s RFC. This Court, in
addition, has carefully reviewed every page of the record presented to the ALJ, alongside the
ALJ’s opinion. The ALJ did not err in failing to seek additional evidence.
I next address Plaintiff’s argument regarding Dr. Tavouaris, who examined Plaintiff in
connection with her disability claim. Dr. Tavouaris opined that Plaintiff was markedly impaired
in her ability to interact with co-workers, but found only moderate limitations in work-related
functioning. State agency psychologist Dr. Diorio, a non-examining source, found that Dr.

2

I recognize that Judge Bloch’s discussion in Doty disagrees with the analysis expressed in Gunder v. Astrue, No.
11-300, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19232, at **56-58 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 2012).

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Tavoularis’ findings about Plaintiff’s personal and social adjustability were not consistent with
all of the evidence. Considering the credibility of Plaintiff’s allegations, Dr. Diorio’s opinion,
and the internal inconsistencies in Dr. Tavoularis’ opinion, the ALJ gave little weight to Dr.
Tavoularis’ opinion. The ALJ also considered other evidence of record, such as Plaintiff’s
ability to attend classes, live with friends, and attend medical appointments. In considering
Plaintiff’s mental impairments, the ALJ did not specifically mention her problems falling asleep,
but I am satisfied that he considered the totality of the record. It is axiomatic that the ALJ may
choose whom to credit, so long as he expresses an appropriate reason for his choice. See, e.g.,
Masher v. Astrue, 354 Fed. Appx. 623, 627 (3d Cir. 2009). Here, the ALJ clearly assessed the
evidence before him, rather than employing his own expertise or making speculative inferences;
he did not err in his assessment of Dr. Touvaris’ opinion.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff’s Motion
will be denied, and Defendant’s granted. An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 22nd day of May, 2014, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [8] is DENIED, and
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [10] is GRANTED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/Donetta W. Ambrose
Donetta W. Ambrose
Senior Judge, U.S. District Court

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