EASTERLING v. COLVIN
Filing
17
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 11 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying 15 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Terrence F. McVerry on 8/12/2014. (rjw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
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) 2:13-cv-01357
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EUGENE EASTERLING,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.
Introduction
Plaintiff, Eugene Easterling, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for
judicial review of the final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security
(“Commissioner”), which denied his application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and
supplemental security income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act (“Act”),
42 U.S.C. §§ 401-403; 1381-1383(f). The parties have filed cross-motions for summary
judgment, with briefs in support (ECF Nos. 12, 16). For the following reasons, the
Commissioner’s motion will be GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s motion will be DENIED.
II.
Background
Plaintiff was born on May 8, 1972. (R. 40). After graduating from high school, Plaintiff
worked as a welder, lead burner, and machine operator. (R. 40). He last worked in 2008, and
after losing (or quitting) his job at a steel products plant, he sought new employment and claimed
unemployment compensation benefits. (R. 41). However, his efforts to find a new job were
unsuccessful, and he has not engaged in substantial gainful employment (“SGA”) since May 22,
2008, his alleged onset date. (R. 18).
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A.
Medical Evidence
Plaintiff alleges disability due to several impairments: kidney stones, chronic low back
pain, anxiety, depression, panic attacks, and stress headaches.
1.
Physical Impairments
Plaintiff has a history of kidney stones. Plaintiff testified that the kidney stones “come
and go. They could be anywhere from one a year to every two years, couple times a year.” (R.
54). He described them as “[v]ery, very painful.” (R. 54). He twice underwent surgery to remove
the stones, in 2008 and May 2010, but has also successfully passed stones – including the most
recent one in February 2011 – without the assistance of an operation. (ECF No. 8-2, at 21). At
the time of the hearing, he had not experienced any other issues related to his kidney stones since
February 2011.
Plaintiff began seeing Dr. Patrick Shaughnessy for his back pain in 2006. (R. 243). In
July of that year, he rated his pain at 4 out of 10 on the pain scale and reported that it typically
ranged between 2 and 6 out of 10. (R. 423). Dr. Shaughnessy noted that Plaintiff was not
undergoing therapy at the time and continued to work full time. (R. 423). The results of a
physical examination were largely unremarkable, as Plaintiff displayed good range of motion,
albeit with some discomfort. (R. 423). Dr. Shaughnessy diagnosed Plaintiff with chronic thoracic
and right scapular pain resulting from an “old work injury.” (R. 423). He continued Plaintiff on
his then-current medications (i.e., Vicoprofen, Mobic, Ultracet, and Flexeril) and also started him
on Ultram. (R. 423). Plaintiff continued to receive routine treatment from Dr. Shaughnessy
throughout the remainder of 2006 until September 2007.
After a hiatus in treatment in the latter part of 2007 and the early part of 2008, Plaintiff
returned to Dr. Shaughnessy’s office in May 2008, again complaining of mid-to-low back pain.
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(R. 274). He reported having “good days and bad days” and complained that his back “went out”
several weeks before this office visit while he was performing yard work. (R. 274). Dr.
Shaughnessy noted that Plaintiff was still not undergoing any treatment, though he did do “his
stretches and activities of daily living at home for exercise.” (R. 274). He also continued to take
Vicoprofen and Ultram for the pain. (R. 274). Upon examination, Plaintiff was able to flex
forward 75 degrees, with some stiffness in the mid-thoracic and at the thoracolumbar junction.
(R. 274). He also displayed decreased lumbar motion and decreased lumbar extension. (R. 274).
Dr. Shaughnessy reaffirmed his previous diagnoses of chronic lumbar and lower thoracic pain
caused by a work injury, and also assessed Plaintiff with chronic pain syndrome. (R. 274).
Plaintiff was seen by his primary care practitioner, Lori Leipheimer, C.R.N.P., on
September 8, 2008, complaining of lower back pain. (R. 275). At the time, Plaintiff had been
pain free for some time, but had re-injured his back while at work and then re-injured it again
while doing yard work. (R. 275). Ms. Leipheimer noted that Plaintiff had recently quit his job
because he was apparently missing too much time for “personal and medical reasons.” (R. 275).
On September 25, 2008, Plaintiff followed up with Dr. Shaughnessy, at which time he
reported that his pain had remained the same since his last appointment in May. (R. 273).
According to Dr. Shaughnessy, Plaintiff again reported having “good and bad days.” (R. 273).
Moreover, prior to the appointment, Plaintiff had seen an uptick in his activity level, which
caused the pain to increase a “little bit.” (R. 274). After examining Plaintiff, Dr. Shaughnessy
noted that he could flex forward from the lumbar nicely – “almost full range.” (R. 273).
However, he had some mild pain when arising from flexion and also displayed pain on
extension. (R. 274).
Plaintiff was next seen by Dr. Shaughnessy in late January 2009, at which time he
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complained that he had seen an increase in pain in his lower back, which he attributed to the cold
weather. (R. 284). He explained that he had slipped and fallen a few weeks before the
appointment, twisting his back. (R. 284). The pain from the fall lasted a few days before
dissipating. (R. 284). At the time, Plaintiff rated his pain at a 3 out of 10 and explained that it
ranged from a 2 to a 7/8 out of 10. (R. 284). Moreover, he reported that his activity level was the
same, and he continued to take Ultram and Vicoprofen to deal with the pain. (R. 284). Upon
exam, Plaintiff could flex forward “nicely” but had trouble extending at the lumbosacral
junction. (R. 284). After examining Plaintiff, Dr. Shaughnessy noted that he reviewed the
stretching exercises with Plaintiff and remarked that he could be stretching more. (R. 284).
Plaintiff saw Dr. Shaughnessy three more times in 2009, and his condition remained
stable. (R. 282). In September, Dr. Shaughnessy noted that Plaintiff’s activity level had
improved, and although he was not working full time, he was doing odd jobs and looking for a
full-time job. (R. 282). By December, Plaintiff had seen an increase in pain, which he attributed
to the cold temperatures. (R. 281). However, he reported that that medication made the pain
tolerable. (R. 281).
Plaintiff continued to see Dr. Shaughnessy throughout 2010, still complaining of mild-tomoderate pain, which was relieved by his medications. (R. 356, 355). His activity level also
remained the same. After an October 10, 2010, appointment, Dr. Shaughnessy noted that
Plaintiff had been out of work for nearly two years and he “suspect[ed] he is not going to be able
to go back to work. He certainly cannot work full time at this point.” (R. 354). After this
appointment, Dr. Shaughnessy completed a medical source statement that indicated that Plaintiff
could frequently lift/carry 2-3 pounds, occasionally lift 10 pounds and frequently carry 10
pounds, occasionally lift 20 pounds, never carry 20 pounds, and never lift/carry 25-100 pounds.
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(R. 352). He also opined that Plaintiff could stand and walk for up to 3 hours during a workday,
sit for 4 hours during a workday, push and pull occasionally, and occasionally engage in all
postural activities except climbing. (R. 352). In addition, Dr. Shaughnessy opined that Plaintiff
had limited reaching capabilities and should not be around heights or moving machinery because
of his medications. (R. 253).
About two weeks later, Mary Ellen Wyszomierski, M.D., a state agency consultant,
reviewed Plaintiff’s file and completed a physical residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
assessment form. (R. 357). Dr. Wyszomierski opined that Plaintiff could occasionally lift/carry
20 pounds, frequently lift/carry 10 pounds, stand/walk for about 6 hours in a workday, sit for
about 6 hours in a workday, and occasionally engage in all postural activities. (R. 358-59).
Plaintiff saw Dr. Shaughnessy four times in 2011. Most recently, in September 2011 Dr.
Shaughnessy performed an MRI that showed mild bulging in the L4-L5 and L5-S1 discs without
focal herniation and mild degeneration. (R. 439-44). That same month, Dr. Shaughnessy
completed a medical questionnaire, in which he opined that Plaintiff could lift 20 pounds
occasionally and 10 pounds frequently and could stand/walk and sit for a total of six hours each
in one-hour intervals without interruption. (R. 437). However, Dr. Shaughnessy also found that
Plaintiff did not need to lie down unpredictably during the day for pain relief, but did note that he
would likely miss four days of work a month due to his medical condition and would not be
capable of working on a regular and continuing basis. (R. 438).
2.
Mental Health Impairments
Plaintiff complained of anxiety and depression several times throughout his treatment
with Ms. Leipheimer, who initially prescribed him with Prozac. (R. 275). These conditions
seemed to have come to a head in July 2010, when Plaintiff presented to Ms. Leipheimer with
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“multiple problems.” (R. 345). For one thing, he reported that he had been out of work for some
time and unsuccessfully looking for a job. (R. 345). This caused him anxiety and kept him awake
at night, “ruminating about all his current problems.” (R. 345). He was also “[v]ery depressed,
but denie[d] suicidal ideation.” (R. 345). Ms. Leipheimer diagnosed Plaintiff with severe anxiety
and depression, continued him on Prozac, and prescribed him Xanax. (R. 345). She also referred
him to a psychiatrist. (R. 345).
On August 16, 2010, Plaintiff underwent a psychological assessment. (R. 342). At the
time, he complained of, inter alia, anxiety, depression, increased stress in his life due to his
unemployment, and money problems. (R. 342). He also described feeling “useless” and “failing
at everything.” (R. 342). He reported, however, that he got some relief from his medications. (R.
342). A mental status examination was unremarkable, and Plaintiff was diagnosed with major
depressive disorder and assessed a global assessment of functioning (“GAF) of 60. (R. 344).
After that initial evaluation, Plaintiff started to see psychiatrist, Harshad Patel, M.D., for
medication management on a monthly basis. (R. 392-401).
At an August 25, 2010, appointment with Ms. Leipheimer, Plaintiff reported that, in
addition to his continued back pain, he still experienced anxiety and depression. (R. 341). He
explained that he had recently been taken off Prozac, but had been started on Effexor and
Klonopin and he seemed to be doing well on these medications. (R. 341). During the
appointment, Ms. Leipheimer completed medical assistance papers for Plaintiff and opined that
he was unable to work “because of his present problems and really is distraught about going on
medical assistance. . . he is so young and willing to work.” (R. 341).
In October 2010, Dr. Arlene Rattan, Ph.D., a psychological consultant for the state,
reviewed Plaintiff’s file and completed a mental RFC assessment form. (R. 364). Dr. Rattan
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opined that Plaintiff could meet the mental demands of work on a sustained basis despite his
mental impairments. (R. 366). Specifically, Dr. Rattan found that Plaintiff was not significantly
limited in the areas of understanding and remembering; not significantly limited to moderately
limited in the areas of sustaining concentration and persistence; not significantly limited to
moderately limited in the area of social interaction; and not significantly limited to moderately
limited in the area of adaption. (R. 364-65).
Dr. Fred Gallo, Ph.D., performed a psychological evaluation of Plaintiff at the behest of
the Mercer County Assistance Office in January 2011. (R. 381-84). Dr. Gallo diagnosed him
with Major Depressive Disorder, Generalized Anxiety Disorder, and Personality Disorder with
paranoid features. (R. 383). He also assessed a GAF score in the range of 45-50 and opined that
Plaintiff had been unable to maintain competitive employment for the past couple of years
because of physical and psychiatric problems. (R. 383-84).
In August 2011, Dr. Patel completed a medical questionnaire in relation to Plaintiff’s
disability claim. (R. 425). Dr. Patel noted that Plaintiff suffered from depression, anxiety,
anhedonia, disturbed sleep, decreased stress tolerance, temper control, and easy frustration. (R.
425). Based on his review of Plaintiff’s chart and his treatment notes, Dr. Patel opined that
Plaintiff could work, but only part time (20 hours per week) in a job with low responsibility
because he has “poor focus and concentration” and “doesn’t handle stress well.” (R. 426).
B.
Procedural History
Plaintiff protectively filed applications for DIB and SSI on September 17, 2010, in which
he alleged disability as of May 22, 2008. After Plaintiff’s claims were initially denied, he
requested an administrative hearing, which was held on November 21, 2011, before
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) John J. Porter. Plaintiff was represented by a non-attorney
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representative and testified at the hearing, as did an impartial vocational expert (“VE”).
On January 13, 2012, the ALJ rendered an unfavorable decision to Plaintiff, in which she
found that Plaintiff retained the ability to perform light work with the following additional
limitations:
The claimant must be afforded the option to sit or stand, changing positions at a
maximum frequency of every thirty minutes. The claimant is limited to no more
than occasional postural maneuvers, and should avoid concentrated exposure to
extreme cold, wetness, vibration, machinery, heights, and like hazards. He is
further limited to simple, routine and repetitive work that is not performed in a
fast-paced production environment and involves only simple work decisions and
occasional interaction with others.
(R. 20-21). The VE testified that given all of these factors, Plaintiff would not be able to perform
his past relevant work as a lead burner and machine operator; however, he would still be able to
perform the requirements of the following representative occupations: packing line worker
(80,000 jobs), office helper (85,000 jobs), and mail clerk, excluding those that work for the U.S.
Postal Service (110,000). (R. 29). In reliance on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ held that Plaintiff
was “not disabled” within the meaning of the Act and denied his claims for benefits. (R. 30).
The ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner on June 18, 2013,
when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request to review the decision of the ALJ.
Therefore, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court on September 18, 2013, and the
Commissioner filed her Answer on February 5, 2014. Both parties have now filed cross motions
for summary judgment.
III.
Legal Analysis
A.
Standard of Review
The Act limits judicial review of disability claims to the Commissioner’s final decision.
42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). If the Commissioner’s finding is supported by substantial
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evidence, it is conclusive and must be affirmed by the Court. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Rutherford v.
Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005). The United States Supreme Court has defined
“substantial evidence” as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971). It consists of more than a
scintilla of evidence, but less than a preponderance of the evidence. Thomas v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 625 F.3d 798 (3d Cir. 2010).
In situations where a claimant files concurrent applications for SSI and DIB, courts have
consistently addressed the issue of a claimant’s disability in terms of meeting a single disability
standard under the Act. See Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 119 n.1 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted). (“This test [whether a person is disabled for purposes of qualifying for SSI] is the same
as that for determining whether a person is disabled for purposes of receiving social security
disability benefits [DIB].; Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 525 n.3 (1990) (same); Morales v.
Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 315-16 (3d Cir. 2000) (same).
When resolving the issue of whether an adult claimant is “disabled,” the Commissioner
utilizes a five-step sequential evaluation. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. This process requires
the Commissioner to consider, in sequence, whether a claimant (1) is working, (2) has a severe
impairment, (3) has an impairment that meets or equals the requirements of a listed impairment,
(4) can return to his or her past relevant work, and (5) if not, whether he or she can perform other
work. 42 U.S.C. § 404.1520; Newell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 347 F.3d 541, 545-46 (3d Cir.
2003) (quoting Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 118-19 (3d Cir. 2000)).
To qualify for disability benefits under the Act, a claimant must demonstrate that there is
some “medically determinable basis for an impairment that prevents him or her from engaging in
any substantial gainful activity for a statutory twelve-month period.” Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247
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F.3d 34, 38-39 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal citation omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(1). This may be
done in two ways: (1) by introducing medical evidence that the claimant is disabled per se
because he or she suffers from one or more of a number of serious impairments delineated in 20
C.F.R. Regulations No. 4, Subpt. P, Appendix 1, see Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983);
Newell, 347 F.3d at 545-46; Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004); or, (2) in the
event that claimant suffers from a less severe impairment, by demonstrating that he or she is
nevertheless unable to engage in “any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy . . . .” Campbell, 461 U.S. at 461 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(2)(A)).
To prove disability under the second method, a claimant must first demonstrate the
existence of a medically determinable disability that precludes him from returning to his former
job. Newell, 347 F.3d at 545-46; Jones, 364 F.3d at 503. Once it is shown that claimant is unable
to resume his previous employment, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that, given
claimant’s mental or physical limitations, age, education and work experience, he is able to
perform SGA in jobs available in the national economy. Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 551; Newell,
347 F.3d at 546; Jones, 364 F.3d at 503; Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 119 (3d Cir. 2002).
B.
Discussion
As set forth in the Act and applicable case law, this Court may not undertake a de novo
review of the Commissioner’s decision or re-weigh the evidence of record. Monsour Med. Cntr.
v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied., 482 U.S. 905 (1987). The Court
must simply review the findings and conclusions of the ALJ to determine whether they are
supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181
F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999). Plaintiff raises two arguments in support of his motion for
summary judgment. First, he objects to the ALJ’s decision to discredit his subjective complaints
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of pain and other symptoms. Second, he argues that the ALJ erred in declining to incorporate all
of his alleged impairments into his RFC assessment.1 These arguments will be discussed
seriatim.
1.
The ALJ Did Not Err in Assessing Plaintiff’s Credibility.
Plaintiff alleges that the “ALJ failed to follow Agency regulations, Agency rulings and
this Circuit’s law in rendering his credibility determination in failing to determine whether
Plaintiff’s symptoms could reasonably be expected to result from a demonstrated physical
impairment . . . .” Pl.’s Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 9 (ECF No. 16). Plaintiff also argues
that “the ALJ failed to properly explain his credibility finding and instead made general,
ambiguous statements about Plaintiff’s credibility.”2 Id. After a careful study of both the record
1.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ asked a hypothetical question to the VE that failed to
accurately portray all of his limitations. As the Court of Appeals has explained, “objections to
the adequacy of hypothetical questions posed to a vocational expert often boil down to attacks on
the RFC assessment itself.” Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 554 n.8. Such is the case where, as here, a
plaintiff argues that the VE’s testimony cannot be relied upon “because the ALJ failed to
recognize credibly established limitations during the RFC assessment and so did not convey
those limitations to the vocational expert.” Id. Accordingly, the Court will construe Plaintiff’s
argument as a challenge to the ALJ’s RFC assessment and will not separately address Plaintiff’s
challenge to the ALJ’s reliance on the VE’s testimony. Insofar as the ALJ did not err in that
respect, he was permitted to rely on the VE’s testimony in response to the hypothetical question
that he posed.
2.
Plaintiff’s argument is couched as an attack on the ALJ’s credibility finding. In reality,
however, Plaintiff’s major objection seems to be that the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments
did not completely preclude him from working. Indeed, rather than documenting particular
complaints that the ALJ allegedly ignored or specific pieces of evidence suggesting that his
impairments cause functional limitations greater than those recognized by the ALJ, he has simply
copy and pasted the portion of his brief documenting his treatment history for his various alleged
impairments and argued that his medical records “provide clear evidence that [his] impairments
cause chronic pain despite her [sic] on-going treatment.” Pl.’s Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J.
at 11 (ECF No. 16). This is hardly a persuasive or effective manner of arguing since it ignores
that the “[m]ere presence of a disease or impairment is not enough” to establish that a claimant is
“disabled.” Walker v. Barnhart, 172 F. App’x 423, 426 (3d Cir. 2006). Instead, “[a] claimant
must show that his disease or impairment caused functional limitations that precluded him from
engaging in any substantial gainful activity.” Id. Plaintiff has not even attempted to do this but,
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as a whole and the ALJ’s decision, the Court cannot agree with these contentions.
“An ALJ must give serious consideration to a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain,
even where those complaints are not supported by objective evidence.” Mason v. Shalala, 994
F.2d 1058, 1067 (3d Cir. 1993). “Where a medical impairment that could reasonably cause the
alleged symptoms exists, the ALJ must evaluate the intensity and persistence of the pain or
symptom, and the extent to which it affects the individual’s ability to work.” Bair v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., No. 09-05, 2010 WL 3222123, at *9 (W.D. Pa. July 23, 2010). “This obviously
requires the ALJ to determine the extent to which a claimant is accurately stating the degree of
pain or the extent to which he or she is disabled by it.” Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 362 (3d
Cir. 1999) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)). If the ALJ does not find a claimant’s subjective
complaints to be credible, he may reject them, partially or fully, in favor of other medical
evidence in the record, as long he provides a reasonable explanation as to why he is doing so.
Schaudeck, 181 F.3d at 433; Gupta v. Astrue, No. 09–1055, 2010 WL 2835719, at *15 (W.D. Pa.
July 16, 2010). As the Court of Appeals has explained,
when assessing a claimant’s credibility “[i]n instances in which the adjudicator
has observed the individual, the adjudicator is not free to accept or reject that
individual’s complaints solely on the basis of such personal observations. Rather,
in all cases in which pain or other symptoms are alleged, the determination or
decision rationale must contain a thorough discussion and analysis of the
objective medical and the other evidence, including the individual’s complaints of
pain or other symptoms and the adjudicator’s personal observations. The rationale
must include a resolution of any inconsistencies in the evidence as a whole and set
forth a logical explanation of the individual’s ability to work.”
Schaudeck, 181 F.3d at 433 (quoting SSR 95-5P, 1995 WL 670415, at *2 (SSA Oct. 31, 1995)).
As long as the ALJ substantiates his credibility finding with substantial evidence, it will not be
disturbed. Van Horn v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 871, 873-74 (3d Cir. 1983).
again, has simply copied verbatim his recitation of the records documenting the treatment he
received for his alleged impairments.
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The ALJ in this case fully complied with these requirements. Contrary to Plaintiff’s
argument, the ALJ expressly found that Plaintiff had medically determinable impairments that
could reasonably be expected to cause his alleged symptoms. (R. 22). Nevertheless, based on his
review of the factors in S.S.R. 96-7p, he found that Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were not
entirely credible. (R. 22). This decision is supported by substantial evidence.
First, while Plaintiff claims that the ALJ overlooked the fact that he has a “painful
kidney disorder that has led to several surgeries and hospitals,” the ALJ actually did no such
thing. Rather, he explicitly considered and discussed all of the medical records documenting
Plaintiff’s history of kidney stones and Plaintiff’s own testimony regarding his kidney stones.
After doing so, he accurately noted that Plaintiff required surgery to remove the stones “on
average once every two years” and only one such surgery took place within the relevant time
period. (R. 22). As the ALJ also observed, Plaintiff was able to pass his most recent kidney stone
without surgery and, thereafter, had not experienced any problems that would suggest this
condition was disabling. (R. 22). Plaintiff has not offered anything – not a citation to a specific
portion of his own testimony or a record from one of his treating sources – to establish the
contrary, i.e., that the pain from his kidney stones was so serious that it caused functional
limitations greater than those recognized in the RFC assessment.
Second, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ improperly rejected his complaints of disabling
back pain, but again, the ALJ did no such thing. To the contrary, the ALJ recounted Plaintiff’s
complaints of back pain and determined that they were not consistent with the objective evidence
of record and Plaintiff’s activities of daily living. (R. 28). Specifically, he explained that
Plaintiff’s testimony as to his limited ability to sit, stand, and walk were “wholly unsupported by
the records from Dr. Shaughnessy, who has recommended no more than conservative treatment
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for his allegedly disabling pain, including medication and occasional manipulative treatment.”
(R. 28). Likewise, the ALJ supported his credibility finding by explaining that Plaintiff
performed a number of activities, e.g. winterizing his home, that were inconsistent with his
complaints of disabling pain. (R. 24). These are all reasonable conclusions, based on the ALJ’s
thorough review of the evidence, and the Court will not disturb them. Moreover, the Court notes
that the ALJ adequately took into account Plaintiff’s complaints of back and abdominal pain by
limiting him to light work and affording him a sit/stand option. None of Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints suggest that he required greater restrictions. In view of that, Plaintiff’s first argument
does not provide a basis for remand.
2.
The ALJ’s RFC Assessment Properly Accounted for All of Plaintiff’s
Credibly Established Impairments.
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ’s RFC assessment is not supported by substantial
evidence because it fails to accommodate “all of Plaintiff’s limitations.” Pl.’s Br. in Supp. of
Mot. for Summ. J. at 11 (ECF No. 16). Rather than identifying specific pieces of evidence in the
record to bolster this position, however, Plaintiff merely copies and pastes his recitation of the
medical evidence in the record – the third time this recitation appears verbatim in his brief – and
then baldly announces that his “impairments are documented in the record and would cause
greater limitations than the ALJ determined.” Id. at 14. Needless to say, this argument is
unpersuasive.
An RFC assessment is an administrative finding reserved exclusively for the
Commissioner, not simply a medical assessment. See Arlow v. Colvin, No. 13-99, 2014 WL
1317606, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2014) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(e)). It
reflects “what [a Plaintiff] can still do despite [his] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a). In
making an RFC finding, “the ALJ must consider all evidence before him.” Burnett, 220 F.3d at
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121. That is not to say, however, that an ALJ needs to incorporate “every impairment alleged by
a claimant” into his RFC finding. Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 554 (emphasis in original). Rather, he
need only accommodate those that are “credibly established” by the evidence. Id. (citing
Plummer, 186 F.3d at 431).
In making his RFC finding, the ALJ discussed the medical evidence in the record at
length and in great detail and then appropriately determined the extent to which Plaintiff’s
alleged impairments were credibly established and the extent to which they would prevent him
from working. (R. 21-29). As the ALJ explained, Plaintiff received moderate treatment for his
kidney stones and did not report experiencing any problems after February 2011, when he passed
his last stone. As for his alleged back pain, the ALJ accurately found that although Plaintiff
experienced mild-to-moderate symptoms, his symptoms remained stable throughout his regular
office visits with Dr. Shaughnessy and were mostly controlled by Plaintiff’s pain medication.
The ALJ also found that Plaintiff continued to perform a number of daily activities that were
inconsistent with a finding of “disabled.” Finally, with regard to Plaintiff’s alleged mental health
impairments, the ALJ considered all of the records of Plaintiff’s treatment with Dr. Patel before
concluding that Plaintiff had responded well to treatment and had not displayed any significant
abnormalities during mental status examinations. All of this evidence supported the ALJ’s
conclusion that Plaintiff could perform light work with the exertional and non-exertional
limitations identified in his RFC assessment.
The ALJ also thoroughly discussed all of the opinion evidence in the record and complied
with the applicable regulations and Social Security Rulings by discussing the amount of weight
he was assigning each opinion and setting forth specific reasons for rejecting the opinions that he
decided to reject. See generally 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. In particular, he considered both of the
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forms completed by Dr. Shaughnessy and assigned the opinions in these forms “some weight” or
“great weight” because he found them to be largely consistent with the other evidence in the
record. Indeed, most of Dr. Shaughnessy’s opinions were adopted as part of the ALJ’s RFC
assessment. As the ALJ concluded, however, Dr. Shaughnessy’s opinion regarding Plaintiff’s
inability to work was not entitled to any special significance because it touched upon an issue
that is ultimately reserved for the commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)-(3).
The ALJ also considered the opinions of Ms. Leipheimer, Dr. Patel, Dr. Gallo, and Dr.
Rattan regarding Plaintiff’s mental health impairments and discussed how much weight he was
according each opinion and his reasons for doing so. Plaintiff does not directly challenge the
ALJ’s treatment of the opinions of these sources. He does, however, insinuate that the ALJ failed
to afford appropriate weight to Dr. Gallo’s opinions. That is clearly not so. The ALJ spent two
full paragraphs discussing Dr. Gallo’s findings before concluding that his opinion that Plaintiff
could not maintain employment before was entitled to “little, if any, weight.” (R. 27). The ALJ’s
decision to discount Dr. Gallo’s opinion is supported by substantial evidence, as the question of
whether a claimant can work is an issue reserved for the commissioner and, moreover, Dr.
Gallo’s findings were largely unsupported by the record. Finally, the ALJ appropriately afforded
great weight to the findings of Dr. Rattan, the state agency consultant, since Dr. Rattan’s
opinions were consistent with Plaintiff’s history of mild-to-moderate symptoms, which were
controlled by his medications. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2)(i) (“State agency medical and
psychological consultants. . . are highly qualified physicians, psychologists, and other medical
specialists who are also experts in Social Security disability evaluation. Therefore, administrative
law judges must consider findings and other opinions of State agency medical and psychological
consultants. . . as opinion evidence. . . .”).
16
In sum, Plaintiff’s bare re-statement of his medical history does nothing to persuade the
Court that the ALJ improperly rejected limitations that were credibly established by the evidence
in the record. To the contrary, the ALJ properly considered all of the evidence in the record and
thoroughly discussed his reasons for rejecting some of the evidence, while crediting other pieces
of evidence, before arriving at his ultimate conclusion that Plaintiff is “not disabled.” His
decision must be affirmed.
IV.
Conclusion
It is undeniable that Plaintiff has a number of impairments, and this Court is sympathetic
and aware of the challenges which Plaintiff faces in seeking gainful employment. Under the
applicable standards of review and the current state of the record, however, the Court must defer
to the reasonable findings of the ALJ and his conclusion that Plaintiff is not disabled within the
meaning of the Social Security Act.
For these reasons, the Court will GRANT the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
the Commissioner and DENY the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff. An
appropriate Order follows.
McVerry, J.
17
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
EUGENE EASTERLING,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
)
)
)
) 2:13-cv-01357
)
)
)
)
)
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 12th day of August, 2014, in accordance with the foregoing
Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is DENIED. The clerk shall docket this case as CLOSED.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Terrence F. McVerry
United States District Judge
cc:
Kelie C. Schneider, Esq.
Email: Kelieschneider@gmail.com
Michael Colville, Esq.
Email: michael.colville@usdoj.gov
Via CM/ECF
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