BERNETT et al v. WASHINGTON COUNTY REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY et al

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 7 Defendant Redevelopment Authority of the Court of Washington's Motion to Dismiss. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Counts I-III is DENIED. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages is GRANTED. See Memorandum Order for further details. Signed by Judge Arthur J. Schwab on 12/31/2013. (lcb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN S. BERNETT AND
KIMBERLY A. BERNETT,
Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 13-01409
ELECTRONICALLY FILED

v.
REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY OF THE
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON AND
NORTH FRANKLIN TOWNSHIP,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
RE: DEFENDANT REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY OF THE COUNTY OF
WASHINGTON’S MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. NO. 7)
I.

Introduction
This case centers on the legality of the demolition of a property located in North Franklin

Township, Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs have filed suit against two Defendants raising the following
causes of action: (1) violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution; (2) “Wrongful Use of the Legal Process”; and (3) violation of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution “and Negligence.” Doc.
No. 1.
Presently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), filed by Defendant Redevelopment Authority of the County of
Washington (hereinafter the “RACW” or “Defendant”). The RACW contends that each count of
Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and that each count,
as well as Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages, should be dismissed with prejudice. Defendant
North Franklin Township has not filed a Motion to Dismiss. For the following reasons,
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

II.

Factual Background and Procedural History1
Plaintiffs John and Kimberly Bernett jointly own real estate property situated at 16 Mill

Street, Washington, Pennsylvania. Doc. No. 1, ¶ 5. This property is located within North
Franklin Township. Id. at ¶ 1. Plaintiff John Bernett is co-owner of a Tri-State Restoration Inc.,
located in the City of Washington, Pennsylvania. Id.
Plaintiffs began remodeling work on their property in September, 2007, and have spent
over $42,000 on these efforts. Id. at ¶ 11; see also Id. at Exhibit D. On or about the morning of
March 28, 2013, Mr. Bernett went to the property to continue remodeling work. Id. at ¶ 6. He
discovered that the building had been leveled and the land graded. Id. Mr. Bernett inquired into
what happened, and ultimately discovered that Defendant RACW demolished the property at the
behest of Defendant North Franklin Township. Id. at ¶ 8.
The RACW gave Mr. Bernett several documents related to the procedure leading up to
the demolition, including copies of letters the RACW attempted to send to Plaintiffs as early as
June 13, 2012, in order to provide written notice. Id. at Exhibit B. However, Plaintiffs never
received these letters prior to this point, nor any other form of written notice, and were never
obstructed in any way from entering their property prior to its demolition. Id. at ¶¶ 16, 18.
Plaintiffs were also not confronted by any governmental authority. Id. at ¶ 16. Mr. Bernett was
not able to obtain any significant information from North Franklin Township regarding the
demolition, as these actions were undertaken under the direction of its former Code Enforcement
Officer. Id. at ¶ 12.

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When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the
Complaint as true, and construe them in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs. See Phillips v.
County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008).
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Plaintiffs continuously provided electric service to the property since June 2012, and the
structure was in sound condition, with the remodeling efforts being for cosmetic purposes. Id. at
¶ 28. No other owners of a building with a building permit that was undergoing remodeling was
destroyed by the Township. Id. at ¶ 15. Other properties are in “far worse condition and
abandoned,” but were not demolished. Id.
III.

Standard of Review
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Federal Courts require notice pleading, as

opposed to the heightened standard of fact pleading. Federal Rule of Civil procedure 8(a)(2)
requires only “‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds on
which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
Building upon the landmark United States Supreme Court decisions in Twombly and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1947 (2009), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit recently explained that a District Court must take three steps to determine the sufficiency
of a complaint:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.”
Ashcoft v. Iqbal 129 S.Ct. [at 1947.] Second, the court should identify allegations that,
“because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.’
Id. at 1950. Third, “whe[n] there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should
assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement for relief.’ Id. This means that our inquiry is normally broken into three
parts: (1) identifying the elements of the claim, (2) reviewing the complaint to strike
conclusory allegations, and then (3) looking at the well-pleaded components of the
complaint and evaluating whether all of the elements identified in part one of the inquiry
are sufficiently alleged.
Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).

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The third step of the sequential evaluation requires this Court to consider the specific nature of
the claim(s) presented and to determine whether the facts pled to substantiate the claim(s) are
sufficient to show a “plausible claim for relief.” “While legal conclusions can provide the
framework of a Complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id.; see also Fowler
v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
IV.

Discussion
A. Count I-Equal Protection Claim
Plaintiffs claim that Defendants violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment because other properties were in worse repair or abandoned but were
not demolished. Doc. No. 1, ¶ 15. Defendants addressed its Motion to Dismiss as if Plaintiffs
had advanced a class of one theory. Because Plaintiffs, in their Complaint, have not alleged
membership in any protected class, the Court will base its inquiry on the class of one theory.2
A “class of one” theory was first explicitly recognized by the United States Supreme
Court in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000). While a claim under the Equal
Protection Clause usually involves the disparate treatment of a class of individuals, such a claim
can be brought by a “class” of a single individual, “where the plaintiff alleges that she has been
intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis
for the difference in treatment.” Id. at 564.
Neither the Supreme Court nor the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
has addressed the requirements of this doctrine at length, especially in the context of municipal
land use decisions. However, prior cases on this subject make it clear that it is a difficult
standard, and should not be considered “a device to dilute the stringent requirements needed to
2

The Court does not find that Plaintiffs “maintain that they are not setting forth a ‘class of one’
cause of action” in their Brief in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss.
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show a substantive due process violation.” Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 287 (3d
Cir. 2004).
At this stage of the litigation, Plaintiffs have pled sufficient facts to survive a Motion to
Dismiss this Count based upon the factual allegations set forth in the Complaint, especially
paragraph 15. In essence, Plaintiffs have provided the Defendants with notice of the allegation
that their property was demolished while other properties in worse repair were not. In other
words, that they were treated differently than other similarly situated property owners. Plaintiffs
have also specifically alleged that Defendant was aware that they were not properly served or
notified before the demolition. Doc. No. 1, ¶ 50. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Count I will be DENIED. However, the Court stresses that Plaintiffs must supplement their
factual allegations with evidence following the close of discovery.
B. Count II-Wrongful Use of Legal Proceedings
Defendant moves this Court to dismiss Count II, with prejudice, because Plaintiffs have
failed to allege that Defendant used a legal process against them for a purpose for which it was
not designed. Doc. No. 7. Defendants cite that Plaintiffs must allege that Defendant: (1) used
the legal process against Plaintiffs; (2) primarily to accomplish a purpose for which the process
was not designed; and (3) harm has been caused to Plaintiffs. Cruz v. Princeton Ins. Co., 972
A.2d 14, 15 n. 1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009).
Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants terminated utility service to the property without
notice and then demolished the building, in part, because of the lack of utility service. In other
words, termination of utility service was ultimately used to demolish the property. It is
reasonable to conclude that discovery will reveal evidence of the specific legal process that
Defendants allegedly undertook to accomplish these actions. As such, Defendant’s Motion to

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Dismiss Count II will be DENIED under the lenient Motion to Dismiss standard. Following the
close of discovery, Plaintiffs must supplement these factual allegations to prove all elements of
this cause of action to sustain this claim.
C. Count III-Violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
Defendant contends that Count III must be dismissed, with prejudice, because Plaintiffs’
factual averments are “unintelligible” and “excessively vague” and fail to set forth the
Defendant’s alleged inadequate, insufficient, and/or inappropriate training, supervision, customs
and/or practices that allegedly lead to the violation of their constitutional rights. Doc. No. 7.
Defendant also contends that it may not be held liable through respondeat superior or vicarious
liability.
Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts, at this point, to demonstrate that Defendant’s
alleged liability is not premised on respondeat superior or vicarious liability, but rather, its own
insufficient training, customs, policies, etc. Specifically, Plaintiffs have set forth that: (1)
Defendants failed to properly train their Code Enforcement Officers and employees; (2) allowed
these Officers to violate their constitutional rights; and (3) knew the Officer did not properly
serve Plaintiffs and did not contact Plaintiffs at their nearby place of business. Doc. No. 1, 9-10.
At this juncture, these allegations are sufficient. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Count III will be DENIED.
D. Plaintiffs’ Claim for Punitive Damages
Lastly, Defendant moves this Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages
because municipalities are immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. No. 7,
13-15 citing City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981).

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As set forth in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s Model Jury
Instructions: “punitive damages are not available against municipalities.” 4.8.3: Section 1983Damages- Punitive Damages citing City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 271.
Therefore, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Claims for Punitive Damages will
be GRANTED.
V.

Order
AND NOW, this 31st day of December, 2013, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. Defendant Washington County Redevelopment Authority’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
No. 7) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART;
2. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counts I-III is DENIED; and
3. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages is GRANTED.

s/ Arthur J. Schwab
Arthur J. Schwab
United States District Judge

cc:

All Registered ECF Counsel and Parties

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