STORY v. REPUBLIC BANK

Filing 15

OPINION & ORDER re 7 Defendant's Motion to Transfer Plaintiff's Complaint Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1406 to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendant� 39;s "Motion to Transfer Plaintiffs Complaint Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)" [ECF #7] to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court will assist in the transfer of this case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and will mark this case CLOSED. Signed by Judge Maurice B. Cohill on 4/1/14. (bfm )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PEARLINA STORY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
REPUBLIC BANK, alkla
REPUBLIC FIRST BANK
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 13-1429

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OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Pearl ina Story ("Ms. Story"), a resident of Wilkinsburg, in the Western
District of Pennsylvania, filed a Complaint against Defendant Republic First Bank
("Republic Bank"), a Pennsylvania chartered bank with its principal place of business in
Philadelphia, wherein she claims that Republic Bank is liable to her based upon the
following: (1) Republic Bank unlawfully initiated wire transfers; (2) Republic Bank
unlawfully charged stop-payment and return fees; (3) Republic Bank failed to keep
accurate account of Plaintiff s accounts; (4) Republic Bank unlawfully took Plaintiff s
funds without authorization; and (5) Republic Bank discriminated against Plaintiff by
denying Plaintiff a secured loan in the amount of $50,000.
In response, Defendant filed a "Motion to Transfer Plaintiffs Complaint Pursuant
to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)," arguing that this Court is an improper
venue for the litigation and that it is in the interest of justice to transfer this case to the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Defendant also filed
a brief in support of its Motion and attached the Affidavit of Tracie Young, the Chief
Risk Officer of Republic Bank. Ms. Story then filed a brief in opposition to the motion,
the Defendant filed a reply brief, and Plaintiff filed a sur-reply brief. For the reasons that

follow we will grant Defendant's "Motion to Transfer Plaintiffs Complaint Pursuant to
F.R.C.P. 12(b)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)" and transfer this case to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
I. Plaintiff's Allegations.

The following factual allegations are taken from the Plaintiffs Complaint: The
Plaintiff, Pearlina Story. is a resident of Wilkinsburg, Pennsylvania. Complaint"

2. The

defendant, Republic Bank, is located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Id. at , 3. Mary
Gethers ("Ms. Gethers") is a CRS/Teller at Republic Bank and was responsible for the
initial opening of Plaintiffs banking accounts with Defendant Republic Bank. Id. at, 4.
Robert Opferman ("Mr. Opferman") is Vice President of Republic Bank and is
responsible for the operation of client accounts at said bank. Id. at, 5.
Ms. Story, escorted by her Attorney Robert Thomas, went to Republic on May 7,
2010, to cash a check written by Duffy & Partners Law Firm in the amount of
$405,766.89. Id. at, 6. Ms. Gethers took the check and told Ms. Story that she could
not cash the check even though the check was from Republic Bank and that the check had
to be deposited. Ms. Story then deposited the check. Id. at, 8.
The accounts were divided into savings, checking, money market and a CD. The
accounts were as follows: $100,766.89 Savings #4258789, $200,000 Money Market
Checking #1183753, $100.00 Checking #1183761, and $50,000 CD. Id at, 9. The
checking account, which opened on May 7, 2010, did not show an initial deposit until
May 10,2010 via telephone transfer. The accounts totaled $350,866.89. Id. at, 9.
Ms. Story received three cashier's checks after the initial deposit. Two checks
were for $10,000.00 each and one check was for $15,000.00.

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She also received

$20,000.00 cash. It was not until March 20, 2013 that Ms. Story noticed $4,900.00 was
missing from her initial deposit with Ms. Gethers. Id at ~ 10.
Plaintiff also applied for a secure loan for $50,000.00, which was denied. Id. at
~11.

Plaintiff tried to use the bank's online banking service and the computer went out
and not knowing if any checks were accepted, Plaintiff decided to stop payments and she
was charged for stop payment. For example, a stop payment was put on Stewardship
Fund LP for $20,000 but Republic Bank paid Stewardship and charged Plaintiff for the
stop payment. Id. at ~ 12.
Plaintiff could not cash checks, when deposited into her account with A-K Valley
Federal Credit Union, most of the checks were rejected and Plaintiff had to pay for return
fees. Plaintiff had to go to Philadelphia to withdraw funds.]g. at ~ 13.
Ms. Story noticed that a lot of wire transfers existed without her permission and
complained to Republic Bank. Plaintiff was told to get in touch with the party taking
money from the account. An example of this occurring was on July 20, 2010 $2000 was
wired transferred to Republic Bank and on July 16,2010, $1000.00 was wired from AK
Valley FCU, but there is no statement of deposit. Id. at ~ 14.
Ms. Story asked Republic Bank to close the accounts and was told she would
have to come to Philadelphia to close her accounts. After continuing to complain, and
complaining about money being missing from an account, and after Plaintiff spoke to
Dan Doughty Jr., on September 29, 2010, who told Plaintiff to send a notarized
statement, on October 1, 2010 the accounts were closed without a notarized statement.

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Id at

~

15. Republic Bank then sent Ms. Story two checks, one for $5.09 and one for

$0.24. Ms. Story cashed only one check. Id at ~ 16.
Ms. Story was told by the FDIC in July 2011, to meet with Mr. Opferrnan after
the investigation to go over the bank accounts. She met with him and his assistants in
Philadelphia and she understood she would be provided with an excel sheet and then they
would meet again to go over the wire transfers and missing money. She reviewed the
excel sheet and called Mr. Opferrnan. She was told to talk to his attorney. Id. at ~ 17.
II. Legal Analysis.

A. Proper or Improper Venue.
As stated, the legal basis for Republic Bank's motion to transfer this action to the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania is that this Court is an improper venue pursuant to 28
U.S. C. § 1406(a) and therefore, it is in the interest of justice to transfer it to the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Section 1406(a) states: [t]he
district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or
district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district
or division in which it could have been brought." Id.
Whether venue is "wrong" or "improper" is generally governed by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391. Atlantic Marine Const. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Western Dist. of Texas,

134 S.Ct. 568, 573 (20l3). Subsection l391(a) explains, in relevant part, that "except as
otherwise provided by law ... this section shall govern the venue of all civil actions
brought in district courts of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 139I(a)(I). The issue of

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venue in general is addressed in 28 U.S. C. § 1391 (b) which provides:
(b) Venue in general.--A civil action may be brought in-­
(l) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are
residents of the State in which the district is located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is
the subject of the action is situated; or
(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as
provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is
subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

1. 28 U.S. C. § 1391(b){1).

We examine first whether venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 139J(b)(l)
which provides that "[a] civil action may be brought in-- (1) a judicial district in which
any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is
located." The issue of determining the residency of Republic Bank, a Pennsylvania
corporation, is addressed in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) which states:
(d) Residency of Corporations in States With Multiple Districts.- For
purposes of venue under this chapter, in a State which has more than one
judicial district and in which a defendant that is a corporation is subject to
personal jurisdiction at the time an action is commenced, such corporation
shall be deemed to reside in any district in that State within which its
contacts would be sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if that
district were a separate State, and, if there is no such district, the
corporation shall be deemed to reside in the district within which it has the
most significant contacts.

Id. Thus, it is necessary to determine whether Republic Bank's contacts with this district
would be sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction were this district a separate State.
A federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant
to the extent permissible under the law of the forum state, here Pennsylvania. Fed. R.

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Civ. P. 4(e); Pennzoil Prod. Co. v. Colelli & Assocs., Inc., 149 F.3d 197, 200 (3d
Cir.1998) (citation omitted). "Pennsylvania's long-arm statute, 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. §
5322(b), authorizes Pennsylvania courts 'to exercise personal jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants to the constitutional limits of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment'." Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248,255 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing
Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, Nat. Ass'n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1221 (3d Cir. 1992)).
The statute's reach is coextensive with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Grand Entertainment Group, Ltd. v. Star
Media Sales, 988 F.2d 476, 481 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Time Share Vacation Club v.
Atlantic Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61,63 (3d Cir. 1984)).
Courts must resolve the question of personal jurisdiction "based on the
circumstances that the particular case presents." Brooks v. Bacardi Rum Corp., 943 F.
Supp. 559, 562 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
485 (1985). Due process, then, is an individualized inquiry. Mellon Bank, 960 F.2d at
1224-25. Consistent with the requirements of due process, we must ensure that a
defendant is SUbjected to personal jurisdiction only where its activities have been
purposefully directed at residents of the forum, or otherwise availed herself of the
privilege of conducting activities there. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472; Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
The due process inquiry turns on the defendant's contacts with the forum state.
Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific, and both the quality and quantity
of the necessary contacts differ according to which sort ofjurisdiction applies. General
personal jurisdiction arises from a defendant's contacts with the forum that are unrelated

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to the cause of action being litigated. Due process for general personal jurisdiction
requires a showing that the defendant has had continuous and systematic contacts with
the forum state. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, N.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,412­
13,414 nn. 8 & 9 (1984).
Specific jurisdiction exists "when the plaintiff's claim is related to or arises out of
the defendant's contacts with the forum." Mellon Bank, 960 F.2d at 1221. Specific
personal jurisdiction comports with due process as long as the defendant has sufficient
minimum contacts with the forum state. The due process inquiry must focus on "the
relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation." Rush v. Savchuk, 444
U.S. 320,327 (1980) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977)). It has long been
recognized that minimum contacts exist where the defendant "purposefully avails itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 253. Put another way,
when a defendant's conduct is such that she reasonably should have foreseen being haled
into court in the forum, the necessary minimum contacts have been shown. World Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,297 (1980). Even a single act can support
specific jurisdiction, so long as it creates a "substantial connection" with the forum.
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476.
It is the plaintiff's burden to demonstrate that the defendant has minimum

contacts with the forum. Time Share Vacation Club v. Atlantic Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d
61,63 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v. L'Union, 723 F.2d
357 (3d Cir. 1983)). To meet this burden, plaintiffs "must come forward with sufficient
jurisdictional facts by affidavit, depositions, or other competent evidence to establish the

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court's jurisdiction over the defendant." National Precast Crypt Co. v. Dy-Core of
Pennsylvania, Inc., 785 F.Supp. 1186, 1189 (W.D. Pa. 1992). "[F]actual discrepancies
created by affidavits are generally resolved in favor of the non-moving party." Elbeco
Inc. v. Estrella de Plato, Corp., 989 F.Supp. 669, 674 n. 3 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
If a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state, the court
may further consider "whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with
'fair play and substantial justice.'" Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476 (quoting International
Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)). Although this determination is
discretionary, courts in this circuit "have generally chosen to engage in this second tier of
analysis in determining questions of personal jurisdiction." Pennzoil Prods. Co. v.
Copelli & Assoc., 149 F.3d 197,201 (3d Cir. 1998). Factors to be considered include
"the burden on the defendant, the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the
plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the interstate judicial
system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and the
shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies."
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).
At this point it becomes the defendant's burden to "present a compelling case that
the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable."
Grand Entertainment, 988 F.2d at 483 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477).
Finally, in determining whether or not venue is proper in a given court, "[a]11
well-pleaded allegations in the complaint bearing on the venue question generally are
taken as true, unless contradicted by the defendant's affidavits." Bockman v. First
American Marketing Corp., 459 Fed.Appx. 157, 158 (3d. Cir. 2012);

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In her Opposition to Defendant's Motion, Plaintiff argues that venue is proper in
this district because Republic Bank is a Pennsylvania corporation and therefore, it resides
in all three federal districts, including this district. Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion, p. 3.
She further contends that venue is proper in this district:
"because the contract that is at issue in this case was formed in this district
and had its effect in this district: and because her damages 'were suffered
in this district." Specifically, plaintiff claims that her attorney negotiated
with defendants "Via face to face, asked Defendant to cash check for
Plaintiff via firms account at Republic Bank located in Philadelphia."
Defendant denied to cash check and Plaintiff deposited funds at Republic
Bank, Defendant agreed and made Plaintiff do transactions from
Pittsburgh, PA knowing Plaintiff was not a resident of Philadelphia, when
Plaintiff complained and asked for account closure Republic Bank denied
request and stated in order for account to be closed Plaintiff must come to
Philadelphia, Republic Bank then decided (without consulting with
Plaintiff) to close Plaintiffs account, therefore the contract was breached
and was based on Plaintiffs residence in Pittsburgh, based on Plaintiff1']s
inability to return to Philadelphia the Defendant decided that there was no
diversity at t[h]at time and sent Plaintiff two checks closing the account.
Plaintiff did not know and was unaware Republic Bank closed account
until Plaintiff received checks. Whereas, Defendant falsified testimony
stating Plaintiff closed account in Motion for Change of Venue.
Id. at p. 4. Plaintiff also notes that Republic Bank holds a line of credit with the Federal
Home Loan Bank of Pittsburgh and five other accounts in Pittsburgh worth $60,000; that
telephone, wire transfers and negotiations between Defendant and Plaintiff occurred in
this district; that any relevant documents and records located in the Eastern District can
easily be transferred to Pittsburgh; that Defendant has not alleged that its witnesses would
be unavailable or unwilling to testify in this District, only that it would be inconvenient;
and that for Plaintiff, trial in the Eastern District would impose significant financial
hardships on her and "would be extremely inconvenient and burdensome." Id. at pp. 3,
5-7. Thereafter, in supplemental briefing, Plaintiff also contends that venue is proper in
this Court because: (1) she is indigent, disabled and without resources to travel from
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Pittsburgh to Philadelphia; (2) Plaintiff complained to Republic Bank via email and
telephone conversations while she was located in Pittsburgh, which is located in the
Western District of Pennsylvania: (3) some of the transactions she conducted or
attempted to conduct with Republic Bank that underlie her claims against it were done by
her via email, wire transfer, and telephone conversations while she was living in
Pittsburgh; and (4) there will be no prejudice to having the case remain in the Western
District of Pennsylvania. Plaintiff s Reply Brief, p. 1.
As stated above, there is specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant where the cause of action arose from the defendant's forum-related activities.
Mellon Bank (East) v. DiVeronica Bros., 983 F.2d 551 (3d Cir. 1993). Here, assuming
Plaintiff s allegations of misconduct by Defendant are true, as we must for purposes of
this motion, said misconduct, Republic Bank unlawfully initiating wire transfers,
Republic Bank unlawfully charging stop-payment and return fees, Republic Bank failing
to keep accurate account of Plaintiffs accounts, Republic Bank unlawfully taking
Plaintiffs funds without authorization, and Republic Bank discriminating against
Plaintiff by denying her a secured loan in the amount of $50,000, all occurred in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Therefore, we find that the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has specific personal jurisdiction over Republic
Bank relative to this litigation and this court does not have specific personal jurisdiction
over Republic Bank relative to this litigation.
Similarly the Eastern District of Pennsylvania court has general personal
jurisdiction over Republic Bank and we do not have general personal jurisdiction over
Republic Bank. As stated above, general personal jurisdiction arises from a defendant's

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contacts with the forum that are unrelated to the cause of action being litigated. Due
process for general personal jurisdiction requires a showing that the defendant has had
continuous and systematic contacts with the forum state. Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, N.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 412-13, 414 nn. 8 & 9 (1984). Republic Bank's
contacts with this district comprise of six deposit accounts which have a total of $60,000
in assets:

(1) three (3) are accounts which originated in the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania where the customer subsequently moved to this district; (2) one (1) is an
account which is a Court-Ordered Minor Account established by a law firm in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania; (3) one (1) is a custodial account, whereby the custodian is
located in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; and (4) the remaining account is a vendor
account, whereby the vendor is located in the Western District of Pennsylvania.
Otherwise, Defendant: (1) maintains a principal place of business in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, located in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; (2) conducts its business,
banking, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the District of New Jersey; (3) its
corporate officers and directors, and employees are located in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania and the District of New Jersey; and (4) its books and records and the
custodian of records are located in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. We find that
these limited contacts do not rise to the level of being continuous and systematic contacts
with the Western District of Pennsylvania sufficient to give us general personal
jurisdiction over Republic Bank.
Having concluded that we lack both general and specific personal jurisdiction
over Republic Bank and that the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania maintains both general and specific personal jurisdiction over Republic

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Bank, pursuant to §1391(d), for purposes of determining venue, we further find that
Republic Bank shall be deemed to reside in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and not
in the Western District of Pennsylvania. As such, this court is not the proper venue
pursuant to § 1391(b)(1) which states that: "[a] civil action may be brought in--(l) a
judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State
in which the district is located." rd.
2.28 U.S. C. § 1391(b)(2).

Our next query is whether this district is a proper venue pursuant to § 1391(b)(2),
which provides: "[a] civil action may be brought in--(2) a judicial district in which a
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a
substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated." rd. According to
the Complaint and all reasonable inferences therefrom, on May 7, 2010, Plaintiff, a
resident of Wilkinsburg, which is within the Western District of Pennsylvania, went with
her attorney to Defendant Republic Bank, which is located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
within the confines of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, to cash a check for
$405,766.89 written on a Republic Bank account. When Mary Gethers, an employee of
Republic Bank would not cash the check, even though it was a Republic Bank check,
Plaintiff opened three bank accounts and a certificate of deposit ("CD") with RepUblic
Bank and deposited the check to fund those accounts and CD. Republic Bank, from
Philadelphia, thereafter issued Plaintiff three (3) cashier's checks drawn on one or more
of these bank accounts. At some point thereafter, while in Pittsburgh, Plaintiff realized
some of the money was missing from her Republic Bank accounts and she attempted to
get the money back from Republic Bank by telephoning and email them from Pittsburgh.

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Additionally, at some point in time, but prior to the bank accounts being closed by
Republic Bank on October 1, 2010, Plaintiff applied for, and was denied for
discriminatory reasons, a loan by Republic Bank. Moreover at some point, while in
Pittsburgh, Plaintiff tried to use the bank's online service, but was unsuccessful and so
initiated a number of stop payments. Nevertheless, Republic Bank disregarded most of
her stop payments, paid most of the payments, and still charged Plaintiff for the stop
payment. Plaintiff tried to deposit and cash checks written on the Republic Bank account
in Pittsburgh, but most were rejected and she had to pay return fees. Ultimately, Plaintiff
had to travel to Philadelphia in order to withdraw funds from her Republic Bank
accounts. Plaintiff also saw that Defendant was completing wire transfers without her
permission; when she complained to Republic Bank, they told her to contact the party
who was taking the money from their accounts. When Plaintiff, from Pittsburgh, asked
Republic Bank to close the accounts and complained that money was missing from the
accounts, they told her she would have to close them in Philadelphia. Ultimately, Plaintiff
did not have to travel to Philadelphia to close the accounts; Republic Bank closed the
bank accounts and mailed her two (2) checks on October 1, 2010. Plaintiff also was told
by the FDIC in July 2011, presumably while in Pittsburgh, to talk to Republic Bank
employee Robert Opferman and his assistants about the bank accounts, but when she
called to speak to him, she was told to talk to his attorney.
Even assuming these allegations are true, we find the activity relevant to the
litigation that occurred in Pittsburgh does not rise to the level of being "a substantial part
of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim." It is not the conduct of Ms. Story
which gives rise to the claims in this litigation; it is Defendant's conduct and its actions

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all occurred in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See Walker v. Bankliberty, 2011
WL 649950, *2 (S.D. Ind.) (where Indiana bank customer sued Missouri bank for alleged
violations of the federal Electronic Fund Transfer Act and bank moved to dismiss or
transfer for improper venue, court granted bank's motion reasoning that "[Plaintiffs]
analysis of the events giving rise to this litigation, however, overlooks several crucial
steps in the causal chain. In fact, the events at issue are the Bank's determination of
whether to investigate [Plaintiffs] claim, the Bank's document preparation, and the
Bank's employees' conduct more generally, all of which gave rise to the litigation, and
all of which took place within the Missouri offices. The receipt of the letter and
statements [by Plaintiff in Indiana] is simply the last link in the causal chain; it pales in
comparison to the vast majority of material events, which occurred in Missouri.").
Accordingly, we find that venue is not proper in this district pursuant to § 1391(b)(2).
3.28 U.S. C. § 1391(b)(3).
Finally, we find that this district is not a proper venue pursuant to § 1391(b)(3)
which states: (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as
provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the
court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action," because this action may be
brought in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
B. Transfer or Dismiss Complaint.
Having concluded that the Western District of Pennsylvania is an improper venue
for this litigation, we return full circle to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) which states: [t]he district
court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district
shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or

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division in which it could have been brought." Id. There are numerous relevant factors a
court should consider when ruling on a section 1406(a) motion; the court should look to
such factors as: (1) the plaintiffs choice of forum; (2) the relative ease of access to
sources of proof; (3) the availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling
witnesses; (4) the possibility of viewing premises, if applicable; (5) the cost of obtaining
attendance of willing witnesses; (6) all other practical problems that make trial of a case
easy, expeditious, and inexpensive; and (7) "public interest" factors, including the relative
congestion of court dockets, choice of law considerations, and the relationship of the
community in which the courts and jurors are required to serve to the occurrences that
give rise to the litigation. See Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879-80 (3 d Cir.
1995); Quezada v. Darden Restaurants, Inc., 139 F.Supp.2d 666,667 (W.D. Pa. 2001).
We have already determined that venue is proper in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania because Defendant resides there and a substantial part of the events giving
rise to Plaintiffs claims occurred there. Taking these facts into account and also that all
potential witnesses but for Plaintiff are located in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as
are Defendant's records relevant to this litigation, and Defendant's request that we
transfer the case to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania court, as opposed to dismissing it,
we find that it is in the interest of justice to transfer this case to said court and will so
order.
III. Conclusion.

Defendant's "Motion to Transfer Plaintiffs Complaint Pursuant to F.R.C.P.
12(b)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)" to the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania shall be granted. An appropriate Order follows:

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ORDER

AND NOW, this 1st day of April, 2014, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that Defendant's "Motion to Transfer Plaintiffs Complaint Pursuant to
F.R.C.P. 12(b)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)" [ECF #7] to the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is GRANTED.
The Clerk of the Court will assist in the transfer of this case to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and will mark this case CLOSED.

~,e,tWL,~~
MaUrIce B. Cohill, Jr.

Senior United States District Court Judge

cc:

Pearlina S. Story, pro se
1447 Foliage Street
Wilkinsburg, PA 15221

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