SCARNATI v. BRENTWOOD BOROUGH POLICE DEPARTMENT et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION Re: 6 Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and 4 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. An appropriate Order follows. Mailed to pro se Plaintiff this same day. Signed by Judge Arthur J. Schwab on 10/29/2013. (lcb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
GLORIA E. SCARNATI,
Plaintiff,
13cv1461
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
v.
BRENTWOOD BOROUGH POLICE
DEPARTMENT, SERGEANT JOHN
VOJTAS,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
(DOC. NO. 6; DOC. NO. 4).
I.
Introduction
Presently before the Court is a Motion to Remand filed by Plaintiff, Gloria E. Scarnati
(“Plaintiff”), and a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants, the Brentwood Borough Police
Department and Sgt. John Vojtas (“Defendants”). For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion
to Remand (Doc. No. 6) will be denied, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 4) will be
granted.
II.
Procedural History
Plaintiff filed her initial Complaint against Defendants in the Court of Common Pleas of
Allegheny County on July 25, 2013. Doc. No. 1, par. 1. After her initial Complaint was
dismissed without prejudice, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on September 6, 2013, which
Defendants received on September 9, 2013. Doc. No. 1, par. 2, 4, 5; Doc. No. 6, par. 4, 5. In her
Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges numerous claims under state and federal law, including,
inter alia, violations of her rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution. Doc. No. 1, Ex. 2, par. 4. Defendants removed the case to this
Court on October 8, 2013, and filed their Motion to Dismiss on October 15, 2013. Doc. No. 1;
Doc. No. 4. Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims in their entirety as frivolous, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), or for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). Doc. No. 4. Plaintiff responded to this Motion on October 25, 2013. Doc.
No. 10; Doc. No. 11.
On October 15, 2013, Plaintiff filed a “Response to Defendants’ Notice of Removal,” in
which she criticized the removal of her case to this Court. Doc. No. 6. Given Plaintiff’s pro se
status in this case, the Court has treated Plaintiff’s “Response” as a Motion to Remand.
10/16/2013 Text Order. Defendants responded to this Motion on October 17, 2013, and Plaintiff
replied to that Response on October 25, 2013. Doc. No. 8; Doc. No. 9. Both Motions are now
ripe for disposition and are the subject of this Memorandum Opinion.
III.
Standard of Review
a. Motion to Remand
After a case has been removed to Federal Court, a party may move to remand the case on
the grounds of either noncompliance with removal procedure or a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). A motion to remand based on a procedural defect must be
made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal, but a case should be remanded at
any time, whether by motion or sua sponte, when a Court recognizes a defect in its subject
matter jurisdiction. Id.; see also Wisconsin Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 392 (1998).
The party asserting jurisdiction has the burden of showing the action is properly before
the Court. See, e.g., Sikirica v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 2005). It is also
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widely recognized that the removal statutes are to be construed strictly against removal and all
doubts resolved in favor of remand. Id.; Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d
Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).
b. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) provides, in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court
shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . .
(B) the action or appeal —
(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or]
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted[.]
The standard under which a District Court may dismiss an action as frivolous was clarified by
the United States Supreme Court in Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989). Dismissal is
appropriate both when the action is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory” and when it
posits “factual contentions [that] are clearly baseless.” Id. at 327; see also Mehta v. City of New
Jersey City, 360 F. App’x 270, 271 (3d Cir. 2010).
c. Failure to State a Claim Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Federal Courts require notice pleading, as
opposed to the heightened standard of fact pleading. Federal Rule of Civil procedure 8(a)(2)
requires only “‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds on
which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
Building upon the landmark United States Supreme Court decisions in Twombly and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1947 (2009), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
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Circuit recently explained that a District Court must take three steps to determine the sufficiency
of a complaint:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.”
Ashcoft v. Iqbal 129 S.Ct. [at 1947.] Second, the court should identify allegations that,
“because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”
Id. at 1950. Third, “whe[n] there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should
assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement for relief.’ Id. This means that our inquiry is normally broken into three
parts: (1) identifying the elements of the claim, (2) reviewing the complaint to strike
conclusory allegations, and then (3) looking at the well-pleaded components of the
complaint and evaluating whether all of the elements identified in part one of the inquiry
are sufficiently alleged.
Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
The third step of the sequential evaluation requires this Court to consider the specific nature of
the claim(s) presented and to determine whether the facts pled to substantiate the claim(s) are
sufficient to show a “plausible claim for relief.” “While legal conclusions can provide the
framework of a Complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id.; see also Fowler
v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
IV.
Discussion
The Court will address Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand first, as it is the Court’s
responsibility to ensure that it has subject matter jurisdiction in each case. See, e.g., Medlin v.
Boeing Vertol Co., 620 F.2d 957, 960 (3d Cir. 1980).
a. Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand
Defendants have satisfied their burden of showing that the Court has jurisdiction over this
matter. As Defendants point out, Plaintiff explicitly asserts claims of violations of her federal
constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. No. 2, ex. 2, par. 4. Thus, Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint clearly sets forth claims “arising under” the United States Constitution and
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federal law, thus satisfying the requirements for the Court’s federal question jurisdiction. 28
U.S.C. § 1331.
Plaintiff offers no argument for why removal was procedurally improper in this case, and
no argument for why this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff points out several
“lies” in the Notice of Removal, such as that Defendants stated that her original Complaint was
dismissed with prejudice, when it was actually dismissed without prejudice. Doc. No. 6, par. 11,
12. While this is unquestionably an important distinction, the Court is satisfied that this alleged
“lie” was based on a clerical error at the Court of Common Pleas, and even if it were not, it
would not be grounds for remanding an otherwise properly removed case. Doc. No. 8, 2, n. 1.
Aside from pointing out this error, Plaintiff largely bases her argument for remand on her
assertion of claims arising under state law. Doc. No. 9, 2. However, since all of these claims
appear to arise from the same set of alleged facts, they are sufficiently related for this Court to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
b. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), or for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Because the Court finds that the Amended Complaint
is frivolous, there is no need for a full 12(b)(6) analysis.
Reading the Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, it appears that
her essential claim is that Sgt. Vojtas and several other unnamed members of the Brentwood
Police Department are involved in a plot to retaliate against Plaintiff for reporting crimes
committed by her neighbor. Doc. No. 1, Ex. 2, passim. Plaintiff claims that her neighbors
regularly read her mail, make terroristic threats against her, and cause damage to her property.
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Id. at par. 12, 18. When Plaintiff has notified the police department about these issues, the
crimes are allegedly overlooked because her neighbor has connections with the “Polish mafia,”
along with Sgt. Vojtas and other members of the department. On one occasion, Plaintiff claims
that Sgt. Vojtas “willfully chose to discriminate against [P]laintiff by falsifying the police
report,” making it appear as if Plaintiff called for less serious reasons, thus thwarting any
possibility of a police investigation. Id. at par. 12. Furthermore, Plaintiff claims that she is now
being stalked and harassed by several “phony FBI agents” (who are really members of the Polish
mafia) at the behest of Sgt. Vojtas, and that her phone has been tapped by Sgt. Vojtas, apparently
so that he can learn when she speaks about her neighbors crimes. Id., at par. 14, 23.
The factual allegations in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, as far as they can be discerned
from the meandering narrative, are clearly baseless.
Plaintiff alleges that a widespread
conspiracy has turned its collective attention to harass Plaintiff for complaining about her
neighbor reading her mail and ruining her plants. At many points in the Complaint, great leaps
of inference are required to follow Plaintiff’s conspiracy theory, as the facts alleged are quite
mundane and harmless. See, e.g., Id. at par. 24 (a meter reader parked in Plaintiff’s driveway to
read her neighbor’s meter); par. 16 (a “grossly obese” girl, who was sitting across the street from
Plaintiff’s house, gave Plaintiff a “murderous look” and began texting when Plaintiff left). At
those few points where Plaintiff directly alleges facts that would constitute a violation of her
rights by Defendants, they are meritless. See, e.g., Id. at par. 14 (Vojtas ordered “phony FBI
agents” to go to Plaintiff’s church to slander Plaintiff). Plaintiff’s alleged conspiracy thus
stretches the bounds of conceivability, and falls far short of the plausibility standard required by
Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
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Further, the Court has previously dismissed similar claims by Plaintiff as frivolous. See
Scarnati v. Pa. Federal Bureau of Investigation, et al., 12-cv-1289 (W.D. Pa. 2012), Doc. No. 2,
see also Scarnati v. Pa Office of Inspector General, et al., 11-cv-1143, Doc. No. 11 (granting
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss due to immunity from suit). The Court must emphasize that
Plaintiff has now unsuccessfully brought these grievances before a court of law multiple times.
Plaintiff should refrain from bringing these same claims in any Court. Plaintiff has had her
claims heard and now must move on.
V.
Conclusion
Because Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint brings claims arising under federal law, and
Plaintiff is unable to bring any defects in Defendants’ removal to the Court’s attention, Plaintiff’s
Motion to Remand will be denied. Furthermore, because Plaintiff’s legal theory rests on the
existence of highly implausible conspiracy, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be granted.
Since any further amendments to the Complaint would be futile, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
will be dismissed with prejudice. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410,
1434 (3d Cir. 1997).
An appropriate Order follows.
s/ Arthur J. Schwab
Arthur J. Schwab
United States District Judge
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