NORRIS v. UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH et al

Filing 83

ORDER. Plaintiffs' Motions (Docs. 63 & 73 ) to reopen this case or for relief from judgment under Rule 60 are DENIED, without prejudice to the filing of a new lawsuit. Signed by Judge Cathy Bissoon on 6/7/16. (dcd)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KAREN A. NORRIS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH,
et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 14-120
Judge Cathy Bissoon

ORDER
Plaintiffs’ Motions (Docs. 63 & 73) to reopen this case or for relief from judgment under
Rule 60 will be denied, without prejudice to Plaintiffs filing a new lawsuit.
The intent of the Court’s dismissal and Judgment Orders (Docs. 60 & 61) was clear.
The Court did not, actually or de facto, stay or administratively close the case. Rather, the Court
dismissed the action, without prejudice to refiling, and entered final judgment under Federal
Rule 58.
The Court agrees with Defendants’ interpretation of the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit’s decision in Penn West Assoc., Inc. v. Cohen, 371 F.3d 118, 126-29 (3d Cir. 2004).
The Cohen Court’s analyses confirm, if not directly by implication, the legal effect of the prior
rulings in this case. Likewise, Plaintiffs framed their consent to dismissal under Federal Rule
41(a), which contemplates a refiling of suit, not a reopening of dismissed claims. Compare
Pls.’ Br. (Doc. 36) at 5-6 (Plaintiffs “agree[d] and request[ed]” to withdraw putative federal
claims “pursuant to F.R.C.P. 41(a)(1)”) with Wright, Miller & Cooper, 9 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ.
§ 2367 (3d ed. 2016) (“a voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Rule 41(a) leaves the

situation as if the action never had been filed,” and “[a]fter the dismissal, the action no longer is
pending . . . and no further proceedings in the action are proper”) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(d)
(implicitly recognizing that mechanism for renewing dismissed claims is to “file[a new] action”).
As to Rule 60, there has been no mistake; none of the grounds listed in subsection (b)
apply; and there are no extraordinary circumstances warranting an application of the “catchall”
provision in Rule 60(b)(6).
Finally, the Court believes that the filing of a new lawsuit is particularly appropriate
given the circumstances presented. In the prior Order of dismissal, the foremost issue on the
Court’s mind was the threshold inquiry of whether and how subject matter jurisdiction attached.
The Court confessed bewilderment regarding Plaintiffs’ decision to plead all of their claims
under state law, given the obvious lack of diversity-of-citizenship. See Order of Dismissal
(Doc. 60) at 1-2 & n.2. Even Plaintiffs appear to recognize the dubiousness of their original
pleadings, as a request for amendment comes in the very next breath. See Pls.’ Mot. (Doc. 63)
at ¶ 29 (“[r]equest for [r]elief,” asking for reopening of case and leave to amend).
The Court sees little benefit in restoring the old case when the original pleadings, on their
face, presented significant issues regarding subject matter jurisdiction. Furthermore, the record
reveals recent, potentially significant activity in the USPTO proceedings, which may well bear
on the nature and framing of Plaintiffs’ putative claims. See Pls.’ Mot. to supplement record
(Doc. 80) (discussing recent decisions by USPTO). The proper course is not to resuscitate
Plaintiffs’ ailing and outdated claims, but for Plaintiffs to file a new lawsuit, taking into account

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recent developments and addressing any and all jurisdictional matters in a thoughtful and
deliberate fashion.1
For all of the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Motions (Docs. 63 & 73) are DENIED,
without prejudice to the filing of a new lawsuit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

June 7, 2016

s\Cathy Bissoon
Cathy Bissoon
United States District Judge

cc (via ECF email notification):
All Counsel of Record

Given the nature of Plaintiffs’ allegations, and the arguably unflattering findings regarding the
Defendant-Doctors in the recent USPTO-filings, the Court is not entirely insensitive to the
eagerness, and frustration, Plaintiffs have experienced in trying to place their claims before a
court of competent jurisdiction. Eagerness and expedience, however, often are in tension with
the need to formulate legal claims and strategies in a thoughtful and deliberate way. The Court
also would note, without the intention of being harsh, that any perceived losses in judicial
economy and convenience were done not at the hands of Defendants or the Court, but, rather,
as a result of Plaintiff’s own litigation-decisions. Cf. discussion supra (noting Plaintiffs’
affirmative request to withdraw claims pursuant to Federal Rule 41(a)(1)). These things being
said, the Court believes that an amicable resolution of the parties’ disagreements, whether
through the judicial process or independent of it, would appear to be in everyone’s best interest.
Should Plaintiffs decide to refile their action here, the Court would be willing, should all parties
so agree, to expedite the mandatory-ADR schedule so that such discussions may be moved to the
fore. Cf., e.g., Doc. 26 in Civil Action No. 14-1342 (W.D. Pa.) (inviting parties to engage in
early-ADR, by unanimous consent, and describing procedures and accommodations afforded,
including declaration that such process would satisfy parties’ obligations under Local Rule 16.2).
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