WYNN v. NATIONAL CORRECTIVE GROUP, INC.

Filing 29

MEMORANDUM ORDER indicating that upon consideration of the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 17 , Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to same 20 , Defendant's Reply Brief 21 , this Court's Order for the Defendant to provide the Distric t Attorneys Contact Information 25 , and Defendants Response to same 27 , it is hereby ordered that the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 17 is denied without prejudice to Defendant renewing its motion following discovery on the issue of immunity (details more fully stated in said Order); that Defendant shall file an Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint 1 on or before 8/26/14. Signed by Judge Nora Barry Fischer on 8/11/14. (jg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LISA M. WYNN, on her own behalf and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,

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Plaintiffs,
v.
NATIONAL CORRECTIVE GROUP, INC.,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 14-200
Judge Nora Barry Fischer

MEMORANDUM ORDER
AND NOW, this 12th day of August, 2014, upon consideration of the Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss [17], Plaintiffs’ Brief in Opposition to same [20], Defendant’s Reply Brief [21], this
Court’s Order for the Defendant to provide the District Attorneys’ Contact Information [25], and
Defendant’s Response to same [27],
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [17] is DENIED
without prejudice to Defendant renewing its motion following discovery on the issue of
immunity. In support of this ORDER, the Court notes:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7) permits dismissal of a claim for failure to join a
party under Rule 19. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a) states:
(a) Persons Required to Be Joined if Feasible.
(1) Required Party. A person who is subject to service of process
and whose joinder will not deprive the court of subject-matter
jurisdiction must be joined as a party if:
(A) in that person's absence, the court cannot accord complete
relief among existing parties; or
(B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the
action and is so situated that disposing of the action in the person's
absence may:

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(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to
protect the interest; or
(ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring
double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of
the interest.
FED.R.CIV.P. 19(a). Further, Rule 19(b) provides factors for the Court to consider in determining
whether to dismiss an action when joinder is not feasible:
(1) the extent to which a judgment rendered in the person's absence
might prejudice that person or the existing parties;
(2) the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or avoided
by:
(A) protective provisions in the judgment;
(B) shaping the relief; or
(C) other measures;
(3) whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence would be
adequate; and
FED.R.CIV.P. 19(B). Consideration of a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(7) “naturally
begins with Rule 19.” Enter. Bank & Trust v. Lipton, 2013 WL 394868 (W.D.Pa. Jan. 31, 2013)
citing Pittsburgh Logistics Sys., Inc. v. C.R. England, Inc., 669 F.Supp.2d 613, 616–17 (W.D.Pa.
2009).
Rule 19 confronts two distinct but related questions concerning compulsory joinder, and
the Rule’s structure typically demands a two-step analysis. Id. citing Pittsburgh Logistics Sys.,
Inc., 669 F.Supp.2d at 616–17; Tullett Prebon PLC v. BGC Partners, Inc., 427 F. App'x 236, 239
(3d Cir. 2011); and Gen. Refractories Co. v. First State Ins. Co., 500 F.3d 306, 312 (3d Cir.
2007). The standard set forth in Rule 19(a) requires a Court to consider whether a person or
entity not presently a litigant in the action is a “required party.” Id. at 617; Huber v. Taylor, 532
F.3d 237, 248 (3d Cir. 2008). “Required parties” are those “subject to service of process and
whose joinder will not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction” and who satisfy one of
two subsections of Rule 19(a). Id. (quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 19(a)(1)); see Altman v. Liberty
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Helicopters, 2010 WL 2998467 (E.D.Pa. July 29, 2010) (“‘Clauses (1) and (2) of Rule 19(a) are
phrased in the disjunctive and should be so treated.’”) (quoting Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc. v.
Shepard Niles, Inc., 11 F.3d 399, 405 (3d Cir. 1993)). Rule 19(a)(1)(A) asks whether “in that
person's absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties.” FED.R.CIV.P.
19(a)(1)(A). “At this step, the court limits its inquiry to whether it can ‘grant complete relief to
persons already named as parties to the action; what effect a decision may have on absent parties
is immaterial.’” Pittsburgh Logistics Sys., Inc., 669 F.Supp.2d at 617 (quoting Gen. Refractories,
500 F.3d at 313) (emphasis in original) (citing Huber, 532 F.3d at 248).
Alternatively, with respect to Rule 19(a)(1)(B), the Court “must consider the effect, if
any, that resolution of the dispute among the named parties will have on an absent party.” Huber,
532 F.3d at 248. Rule 19(b) then sets forth whether the Court should permit the litigation to
proceed when the joinder of an otherwise required party is not feasible because doing so would
either destroy subject matter jurisdiction or violate venue principles. FED.R.CIV.P. 19(b). This is
a question that the Court need not reach if the absent party is not necessary under Rule 19(a). See
Culinary Serv. of Delaware Valley, Inc. v. Borough of Yardley, Pa, 385 F. App'x 135, 145 (3d
Cir. 2010) (“A holding that joinder is compulsory under Rule 19(a) is a necessary predicate to
the district court's discretionary determination under Rule 19(b).”) (citing Gen. Refractories Co.,
500 F.3d at 307). In other words, if it is not feasible to join a necessary absent party, the Court
must then determine whether the absent party is “indispensable” by applying the four Rule 19(b)
factors. Enter. Bank & Trust, at *4 citing Pittsburgh Logistics Sys., Inc., 669 F.Supp.2d at 617. If
the Court deems the absent party indispensable, the litigation cannot proceed. Id. citing Janney
Montgomery Scott, 11 F.3d at 404.

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The Defendant argues that the District Attorneys are necessary parties to the present
litigation. (Docket No. [18] at 6–9). The Defendant further avers that joinder of the District
Attorneys is not feasible, because they enjoy absolute immunity. (Id. at 13–15). In support of its
Motion, the Defendant contends that without the District Attorneys, the Court would be unable to
grant the Plaintiffs complete relief, the District Attorneys have a legally protected interest, the
District Attorneys will suffer severe prejudice, no relief can be shaped that avoids prejudice, and
no adequate relief is available. (Id. at 7–13; 16–18).
The Plaintiffs claim that this Court can accord complete relief, the District Attorneys do
not have a legally protected interest, there is no substantial risk of multiple or inconsistent
obligations, the District Attorneys will not suffer any prejudice, and there is no alternative forum.
(Docket No. [20] at 6–19).
Neither party clarifies what individuals and/or entities are parties to the contracts that are
the subjects of this suit: the District Attorneys in their individual capacities, the District
Attorneys in their official capacities, or the Offices of the District Attorney. Thus, the
Defendant’s conclusory statement that the District Attorneys enjoy absolute immunity (Docket
No. [17] at ¶ 35; Docket No. [18] at 13–16) is insufficient to warrant dismissal at this juncture, as
the record is undeveloped even with the Defendant’s Response [27] to this Court’s Order [25]
wherein the Defendant lists all District Attorneys with whom the Defendant has contracts.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall file an Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint
[1] on or before August 26, 2014.
s/Nora Barry Fischer
Nora Barry Fischer
United States District Judge
cc/ecf: All counsel of record

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