TARNAI v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Filing
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MEMORANDUM ORDER denying 2 Motion to Reassign Case; granting 3 Motion to Continue Evidentiary Hearing. Evidentiary Hearing now set for 7/21/2016 10:15 AM in Courtroom 3B before Judge Donetta W. Ambrose. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 3/24/16. (ask) (Main Document 4 replaced on 3/24/2016) (ask). Modified on 3/24/2016. (ask)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
)
)
) CR No. 11-254
) CV No. 14-211
BALAZS TARNAI
MEMORANDUM ORDER
In this matter, before Judge Cercone, Defendant pleaded guilty to one Count of producing
material depicting the sexual exploitation of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251; the
remainder of a seven-count superseding indictment was dismissed pursuant to the plea
agreement, although Defendant acknowledged responsibility for the conduct charged therein.
On January 23, 2013, Defendant was sentenced to a term of 180 months of imprisonment.
Defendant filed a Section 2255 Motion on February 12, 2014, alleging that that he and
his friend both advised counsel to accept an earlier plea agreement, the terms of which were
more favorable than the plea eventually accepted. The Government responded on February 14,
2014, by filing a Motion to Dismiss Defendant’s Motion on grounds of a collateral attack waiver
in the plea agreement. In its Reply to Defendant’s Response to the Motion to Dismiss, filed on
April 28, 2014, the Government responded to Defendant’s factual allegations. In connection
with that Reply, the Government furnished the transcript of Defendant’s plea and sentence
hearing, as well as Defendant’s plea agreement and other documents relating to plea
negotiations. On November 16, 2015, Defendant filed a Notice, which stated that the length of
time passed during the pendency of his Section 2255 petition violated his due process rights. On
February 23, 2016, for reasons of caseload management internal to the Court, the matter was
transferred from Judge Cercone to me.
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Immediately after the case was transferred, I reviewed Defendant’s allegations and
scheduled an evidentiary hearing. The evidentiary hearing was intended to address Defendant’s
supported factual contentions; its prompt scheduling was intended to address Defendant’s
concerns. Moreover, as the Government represented to the Court that it intended no further
briefing, it appeared that no further briefing was required. Subsequently, Defendant moved to
continue the evidentiary hearing and to have the matter returned to Judge Cercone, or reassigned
to a different Judge through the Court’s random assignment procedure. In response, I cancelled
the evidentiary hearing until further Order of Court, and directed the Government to respond to
the motion to continue and for reassignment.
Defendant’s motion rests, in part, on Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings,
which reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
The clerk must promptly forward the motion to the judge who conducted
the trial and imposed sentence or, if the judge who imposed sentence was not the
trial judge, to the judge who conducted the proceedings being challenged. If the
appropriate judge is not available, the clerk must forward the motion to a judge
under the court's assignment procedure.
According to the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 4, this provision reflects
administrative considerations: “Because the trial judge is thoroughly familiar with the case,
there is obvious administrative advantage in giving him the first opportunity to decide whether
there are grounds for granting the motion.” Accordingly, the purpose underlying Rule 4 of the
Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases is to promote interests of judicial economy and efficiency.
United States v. Bendolph, 409 F.3d 155, 163 n. 12 (3d Cir. 2005. As another Court has
observed, it is clear that Congress intended that the Judge conducting the challenged proceedings
should conduct, at least, the preliminary review of the Section 2255 Motion. Spengler v. United
States, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67703, at *4 (E.D. Wis. June 23, 2011). Moreover, generally
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speaking, courts have the discretion to manage their caseloads, including reassignment; in most
scenarios, a litigant does not have the right to proceed before a particular judge. Cf., e.g., In re
Marshall, 721 F. 3d 1032 (2013).
Here, I note that Defendant proffers no substantive objection to the reassignment. I note,
too, that his Motion was in fact placed before Judge Cercone, in accordance with Rule 4, for
preliminary review. With the advent of electronic filing, every Judge on this Court has full and
complete access to the pertinent documents and transcripts; a transferee Judge need not request,
await, and sort through paper files. In addition, Defendant’s Motion rests on allegations
regarding factual matters external to the Court proceeding, and the parties’ plea negotiations;
there is no suggestion that Judge Cercone would have relevant or superior extra-record
knowledge that would hasten resolution in this case. Likewise, Defendant does not allege any
harm that could arise if I, rather than Judge Cercone, adjudicate his Motion. There is no
suggestion that the reassignment was the result of bias, prejudice, or the desire to influence the
outcome of the proceedings. In other words, there is absolutely no administrative or substantive
advantage to again transferring the case, and Defendant does not contend otherwise. Indeed,
given his previously expressed concerns regarding delay and “procedural irregularities,”
Defendant’s current requests are puzzling.
Moreover, I reject Defendant’s arguments that he is entitled to random assignment of his
case pursuant to Local Rule 40.C, and that the reassignment violated Local Rule 40.G.2, which
precludes the reassignment of civil cases that have been pending for over two years. Case
assignment rules such as these exist for internal management purposes, and to further “judicial
economy, order, and convenience, rather than to control a judge’s authority to hear a case.” Cf.,
e.g., Vreeland v. Schwartz, 613 Fed. Appx. 679 (10th Cir. 2015). Rejecting a challenge to
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internal case assignment procedures in a different context, our Court of Appeals noted, “litigants
do not have a right to have their case heard by a particular judge, have no right to a particular
judge-selection procedure, and do not have a right to a randomly selected judge.” In re Brown,
577 Fed. Appx. 89, 90 (3d Cir. 2014). Moreover, a Section 2255 proceeding is a “hybrid,” as it
is a continuation of a criminal case as well as a civil proceeding; local rules relating solely to
civil actions are not necessarily applicable. Cf. United States v. Thomas, 713 F.3d 165, 173 (3d
Cir. 2013).
Under all of the circumstances, the interests of both justice and sound judicial
administration point to avoiding further reassignment of this matter. Although recusal presents a
different question, the following principle is instructive here: “there is as much obligation upon a
judge not to recuse herself when there is no occasion to do so as there is for her to recuse when
there is." Svindland v. Nemours Found., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74944, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21,
2009). Of course, Defendant may move for reconsideration of this decision, should he, for
example, have reasons for seeking reassignment that were not heretofore presented. At this
juncture, however, transfer of this matter from my docket to that of another Judge of this Court is
not justified. The Motion for Reassignment is denied.
I will, therefore, address Defendant’s Motion to Continue, which is granted. The
previously cancelled evidentiary hearing is now scheduled to take place on July 21, 2016, at
10:15 AM, which affords Defendant the time requested for preparation and investigation.1 All
further submissions shall be filed at the criminal docket, No. CR 11-254.
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To the extent that Defendant points to “procedural irregularities” in the proceedings to date, each of those
irregularities have been cured or otherwise addressed. In that regard, I note that the signed plea agreement and
transcript of plea proceedings are attached as exhibits to the Government’s Reply filed at Docket no. 111.
Moreover, the fact that the Court did not issue certain orders pursuant to Rule 5 of the Rules Governing 2255
Motions is of no moment, as the Government both responded to Defendant’s Motion and supplied pertinent
documents.
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AND NOW, this 24th day of March, 2016, IT IS SO ORDERED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/Donetta W. Ambrose
___________________________________
Donetta W. Ambrose
Senior Judge, U.S. District Court
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