ROBINSON v. FOLINO et al

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM ORDER denying 17 Motion for Reconsideration for the reasons set forth more fully in the Memorandum itself. Signed by Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly on 12/2/2014. [A copy of this Memorandum Order was mailed to Plaintiff on this date at his address of record]. (bb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
HARVEY MIGUEL ROBINSON, JR.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LOUIS S. FOLINO; PETER VIDONISH,
Sued in their individual capacities,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 14-227
Chief Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly

Re: ECF No. 17

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Plaintiff Harvey Miguel Robinson, Jr. (“Plaintiff”), is an inmate in the custody of the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”), and is currently incarcerated at the State
Correctional Institution at Greene (“SCI-Greene”). Plaintiff brought this civil rights action
against Defendants Louis S. Folino, the Superintendent at SCI-Greene, and Peter Vidonish, the
Unit Manager at SCI-Greene in charge of capital case prisoners, (collectively, “Defendants”),
alleging that Defendants violated his rights provided by the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 4, on March 17, 2014,
which this Court granted in an Opinion and Order filed on October 29, 2014. ECF No. 17. On
November 28, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration, ECF No. 17, which is presently
before the Court.
The purpose of a motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)
is “‘to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.’” Max's
Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999), quoting Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki,
779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). “Because of the interest in finality . . . the parties are not free
to relitigate issues the court has already decided,” Williams v. City of Pittsburgh, 32 F. Supp. 2d
236, 238 (W.D. Pa. 1998), and thus motions for reconsideration are to be granted sparingly.

Jacobs v. Bayha, 2011 WL 1044638, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Mar.18, 2011). A court therefore may
grant a motion for reconsideration only if the moving party demonstrates: (1) an intervening
change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence which was not available when
the court issued its order; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent a
manifest injustice. Max's Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d at 677, citing North River Ins.
Co. v. Cigna Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995). See Van Tassel v. Piccione,
2014 WL 3401680, at *1 (W.D. Pa. July 10, 2014).
In this case, Plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider its findings with respect to Plaintiff’s
First Amendment retaliation claim brought at Count I of the Complaint, arguing that the Court
dismissed the claim based on an error of fact. Specifically, Plaintiff takes issue with the Court’s
finding that Plaintiff was unable to succeed on his claim because Defendants had demonstrated
that they would have taken the same adverse action, i.e., filing a misconduct against Plaintiff for
lying to an employee, even if Plaintiff had not engaged in protected conduct, i.e., filing a
grievance. Plaintiff argues that because the untrue statement that he made was contained in the
grievance, had he not filed the grievance, the lie would not have existed and Defendants would
have no basis for the misconduct. Plaintiff therefore concludes that it was the grievance itself
that caused the misconduct to be filed.
Plaintiff’s argument, however, speaks to his ability to establish a prima facie case of
retaliation in the first instance and overlooks the fact that Defendants and the Court assumed for
purposes of the Motion to Dismiss that Plaintiff could establish that he engaged in protected
activity, that an adverse action was taken against him and that he could arguably show that there
was a causal connection between the two acts. See Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir.
2003). Because Plaintiff seemingly met his burden in this regard, the burden then shifted to

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Defendants to prove that they would have taken the same action without the unconstitutional
factors. See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 334 (3d Cir. 2001) (“once a prisoner demonstrates
that his exercise of a constitutional right was a substantial or motivating factor in the challenged
decision, the prison officials may still prevail by proving that they would have made the same
decision absent the protected conduct”). Here, Plaintiff lied to an employee, which Plaintiff all
but admits. See ECF No. 4-1, p. 9. See also ECF No. 1-2, ¶¶ 70-75. The fact that the statement
was contained in a grievance does not negate the fact that it was untrue. Moreover, Plaintiff was
found guilty of the misconduct by the hearing examiner and that finding was upheld through
three levels of appeals. ECF No. 4-1, pp. 11, 14, 17, 18. As such, no error of fact has occurred
and the Court correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim. See Bonaparte
v. Beck, 441 F. App'x 830, 832-33 (3d Cir. 2011) (a finding of guilt of the underlying
misconduct necessarily establishes that the same action would have been taken even if the
plaintiff had not engaged in the protected activity and precludes a finding that the misconduct
was issued in order to retaliate against him). Accordingly, the following Order is entered:
ORDER
AND NOW, this 2nd day of December, 2014, upon consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration, ECF No. 17, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion is DENIED.
BY THE COURT:

/s/ Maureen P. Kelly
MAUREEN P. KELLY
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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cc:

Harvey Miguel Robinson, Jr.
CJ-8032
SCI Greene
175 Progress Drive
Waynesburg, PA 15370
All Counsel of Record Via CM-ECF

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