BLAKENEY et al v. FAROS PITTSBURGH, LLC

Filing 47

ORDER. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 23 ) is GRANTED regarding Defendant AGPM, L.L.C., but DENIED regarding AGPM Pennsylvania, L.L.C. Signed by Judge Cathy Bissoon on 5/26/15. (dcd)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CHIE BLAKENEY and THEODORE
BLAKENEY,
Plaintiffs,
v.
FAROS PITTSBURGH, L.L.C., AGPM,
L.L.C. and AGPM PENNSYLVANIA,
L.L.C.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 14-437
Judge Cathy Bissoon

ORDER
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 23) will be granted regarding Defendant AGPM,
L.L.C., but denied regarding AGPM Pennsylvania, L.L.C.1
AGPM Pennsylvania’s personal-jurisdiction challenge is founded on its having ceased
ownership and operation of the apartment building in which Plaintiff was injured by no later than
November 15, 2012. See, e.g., AGPM Pa.’s Br. (Doc. 24) at 5. Plaintiff was injured on
January 4, 2013, i.e., less than two months later.
Defendant posits that, because it ceased ties with Pennsylvania less than two month
before the accident, there can be no personal jurisdiction. Defendant cites no legal authority in
support of this proposition, and, unsurprising, it is contrary to the law. See, e.g., Totilo v.
Herbert, 538 F. Supp.2d 638, 640 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2008) (even though defendants no longer
resided in forum, Due Process clause “plainly would not be offended by subjecting [them] to
in personam jurisdiction in the state in which they allegedly ran [operations] and committed the
wrongs alleged in [the] complaint”); cf. also generally GM Corp. v. Ignacio Lopez de Arriortua,
Plaintiffs concede that personal jurisdiction is lacking over Defendant AGPM, L.L.C. See Pls.’
Br. (Doc. 30) at 1. Thus, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted to this limited extent.
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948 F. Supp. 656, 667 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 26, 1996) (“the purpose of the law on personal
jurisdiction and due process is to ensure that a court’s exercise of jurisdiction over an individual
comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, . . . not to permit a
wrongdoer[s] to flee from a court’s adjudication of [their] wrongs”) (citing and quoting
International Shoe).
As to Defendant’s remaining arguments regarding duty,2 these are particularly ill-suited
for resolution under Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs’ allegations against Faros, on one hand,
and AGPM Pennsylvania, on the other, are both straightforward and typical: one of these
Defendants, it matters not to Plaintiff, negligently maintained the air conditioning unit whose
cover landed on her head. See generally Am. Compl. (Doc. 14). Most likely, these Defendants’
theories will include the pointing of fingers at one another, and it would be both unprecedented
and contrary to the interests of justice to hamstring Plaintiffs by releasing one of the potential
tortfeasors at this stage. Defendant’s arguments regarding duty, therefore, are denied without
prejudice to renewal on summary judgment.3
For all of these reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 23) is GRANTED
regarding AGPM, L.L.C., but otherwise DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

May 26, 2015

s\Cathy Bissoon
Cathy Bissoon
United States District Judge

See AGPM Pa.’s Br. (Doc. 24) at 5-9.
The Court questions whether, even then, such arguments properly may dispose of this case,
unless, of course, no disputes of material fact remain regarding which of the Defendants was
responsible for maintaining the air conditioning unit and/or whose acts or omissions proximately
caused Plaintiff’s injuries.
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