BURNSWORTH v. Q.E.P. CO., INC et al

Filing 105

MEMORANDUM ORDER indicating that, for reasons more fully stated within said Order, that Plaintiff's Motion in Limine to Enter Portion of Lien Amount Into Evidence 83 is denied. Signed by Judge Nora Barry Fischer on 9/23/15. (jg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RODNEY BURNSWORTH

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Plaintiff,
v.
NUPLA CORPORATION,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 14-448
Judge Nora Barry Fischer

MEMORANDUM ORDER
I.

INTRODUCTION
The instant case remains in discovery and trial has not yet been set. However, the parties

have asked the Court to consider Plaintiff, Rodney Burnsworth’s (“Burnsworth” or “Plaintiff”),
present Motion in Limine to Enter Portion of Lien Amount Into Evidence (Docket No. 83) and
Defendant, Nupla Corporation’s (“Nupla” or “Defendant”), response in opposition (Docket No.
92). The Court heard oral argument on Tuesday, September 8, 2015.1 (Docket No. 100).
Although Plaintiff initially moved the Court to allow AIG’s entire lien into evidence, during
argument he conceded that portions of the lien were inadmissible and sought only to enter the
attorney’s fees portion of the lien. (Id.) Thus, entering the attorney’s fees portion of the lien into
evidence is the only remaining issue before the Court. (Id.) The parties were afforded an
opportunity to provide the Court with supplemental briefing but subsequently declined the
invitation. (Docket No. 100). For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion is denied.
II.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

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The parties did not request a transcript of the September 8, 2015 oral argument and the Court
did not order production of same. (Docket No. 100).
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Burnsworth brings a products liability suit against Nupla, with claims relating to the
designing, selling, and/or manufacturing of a defective sledgehammer. (Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 9–
36). Plaintiff claims that on or about April 10, 2012, he was at his place of employment, SufFrac Wellhead Equipment, located in Perryopolis, Pennsylvania. (Id. at ¶ 5). Plaintiff and a coworker, Jonathan Gonzales, a non-party hereto, were using a 29” sledgehammer, bearing the
name “Nupla,” to hammer down a flange. (Id. at ¶¶ 6–7). Plaintiff alleges that when Gonzales
was using the sledgehammer, suddenly and without warning, the six-pound metal head of the
sledgehammer fully separated from the handle and violently struck him. (Id. at ¶¶ 6-8). Plaintiff
claims that he sustained several serious injuries, including: a head injury, concussion, double
vision, post concussive syndrome, and a severe facial and forehead laceration. (Id. at ¶ 17).
Plaintiff sought and received workers’ compensation benefits from AIG/Chartis. (Docket
No. 92 at 2). His compensable benefits were awarded from the time of injury, and included the
week of July 12, 2012 to July 17, 2012.

(Id.).

Plaintiff eventually settled his workers’

compensation claim on November 8, 2012 for $70,518.75, which included a lump sum payment
of $36,000; an eleven-year annuity in the amount of $20,000; and, attorney’s fees and expenses
totaling $14,518.75. (Id.). AIG/Chartis previously paid $3,466.47 in medical expenses and
$18,773.70 in wage-loss benefits and attorney’s fees. (Id.). AIG has asserted a lien in the
amount of $92,758.42 against any recovery by Plaintiff in this case. (Id.).
Plaintiff filed the present Motion in Limine on August 11, 2015, seeking to introduce the
entire lien into evidence. (Docket No. 83).

As discussed above, the Motion’s scope was

narrowed at oral argument and now only includes the attorney’s fees portion of the lien. (Docket
No. 100).
III.

LEGAL STANDARD

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The Federal Rules of Evidence provide the standard for admitting evidence at trial. Rule
401 states: “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable
than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the
action.” FED. R. EVID. 401. Hence, the definition of relevant evidence is very broad. See Moyer
v. United Dominion Industries, Inc., 473 F. 3d 532, 545 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Gibson v. Mayor
& Council of Wilmington, 355 F. 3d 215, 232 (3d Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Friedman,
658 F. 3d 342, 355 (3d Cir. 2011). However, the Court must conduct a balancing test under Rule
403. Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 403; see also United
States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54 (1984) (“A district court is accorded wide discretion in
determining the admissibility of evidence under the Federal Rules.”).
IV.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff seeks to introduce the attorney’s fees portion of AIG’s lien into evidence as

probative of the damages in his products liability case against Nupla. The parties dispute the
relevance of the proffered evidence under Rule 401 and the appropriate balancing of such
evidence against the considerations of Rule 403. The Court will address each, in turn.
A. Relevance of the Lien Amount Under FED. R. EVID. 401
In this Court’s estimation, the attorney’s fees portion of the lien is not relevant under
Rule 401 because it has no bearing on Nupla’s alleged liability or potential damages in the
instant case.

Yet, Plaintiff maintains his attorney’s fee in the workers’ compensation

proceedings are relevant to any damages awarded here and should be entered into evidence.

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In support, he argues that his potential recovery is subrogated for the entire amount that
AIG paid, and therefore, Plaintiff will be required to reimburse AIG for attorney’s fees in his
workers’ compensation case if he prevails against Nupla. (Docket No. 84 at 3). Plaintiff also
argues that if he cannot present this evidence, he will not have the opportunity to be made whole,
as he will only be able to show evidence of his other expenses, such as medical bills, lost wages
and the like. (Id. at 4).
Plaintiff’s logic is flawed.

As stated, his attorney’s fees are not probative to the

underlying issues nor were they requested in his complaint.

(Docket No. 1).

Moreover,

attorney’s fees are generally not recoverable in strict liability claims. See Glick v. White Motor
Co., 317 F. Supp. 42 (E.D. Pa.1970), judgment aff’d 458 F. 2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1972).
There is another reason why they are not admissible in this case.

Pursuant to the

American Rule, “[e]ach litigant pays his own attorney's fees, win or lose, unless a statute or
contract provides otherwise.” Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 243
(2010); see also Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2164 (2015). “Generally,
Pennsylvania adheres to the ‘American Rule . . . .’” In re Farnese, 17 A.3d 357, 370 (Pa. 2011)
(quoting Trizechahn Gateway LLC v. Titus, 976 A.2d 474, 482–83 (Pa. 2009); and citing
Commonwealth, Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 758 A.2d 1168, 1173 (Pa.
2000)). Additionally, “[t]he burden of proving entitlement to attorney's fees is on the party
claiming such entitlement.” Clark v. Wilkinson, 1998 WL 122232 at *1 (citing In re Fine Paper
Antitrust Litigation, 751 F. 2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984); Jones v. Muir, 515 A.2d 855 (Pa. 1986).
Here, Plaintiff has not demonstrated any exception to the American Rule as adopted by both the
federal and Pennsylvania courts.

See Independence Blue Cross v. Workers’ Compensation

Appeal Board, 820 A.2d 868, 872–73 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003); see also Chambers v. NASCO,

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Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1991) (describing the three circumstances in which federal courts have
been able to assess attorney’s fees against counsel, including the common fund exception, as a
sanction, and for actions in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or oppression (citations omitted)).
Plaintiff attempts to circumvent the American Rule by claiming attorney’s fees from a
previous proceeding as damages. This is not only contrary to the American Rule, but is contrary
to established precedent. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that “it would be
inappropriate for the Judiciary, without legislative guidance, to reallocate the burdens of
litigation . . . .” Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
Against this backdrop, Plaintiff’s proffered precedent does not convince the Court that
the attorney’s fees portion of the lien should be admitted into evidence here. In Simpson v.
Betteroads Asphalt Corp., 2013 WL 5276563 (D.V.I. 2013), judgment aff’d 598 Fed. App’x 68
(3d Cir. 2015)), in which the District Judge held that a jury’s award for pain, suffering, and loss
of enjoyment of life in excess of $325,000 was clearly unsupported by the evidence and
exceeded the amount needed to make the plaintiff whole. The plaintiff in Simpson presented
evidence of a workers’ compensation lien in order to show economic damages, and did not
present any additional evidence to show medical or economic damages. Simpson, 2013 WL
5276563 at *10. In the opinion affirming the District Court, 598 Fed. App’x 68 (3d Cir. 2015),
the Third Circuit does not discuss the lien and does not note any problem with accepting the lien
into evidence. (Docket No. 84 at 3). But, as Defendant argues, the holding in Simpson has
“absolutely nothing to do with the admissibility of lien documentation as proof of liability or
damages and is in no way applicable to the instant action.” (Docket No. 92 at 4) (emphasis in
original). This Court agrees.
B. Exclusion Under FED. R. EVID. 403

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Even if the attorney’s fees portion of the lien were relevant under Rule 401, it would still
be excluded under Rule 403. First, it would be prejudicial to both Defendant and Plaintiff.
Allowing the attorney’s fees portion of the lien into evidence would lead to jurors making legal
and factual conclusions based on the outcome of the workers’ compensation proceeding. See,
e.g., Posel v. Dayton Power & Light, 2012 WL 524475 (S.D. Ohio 2012). In Posel, the court
said that:
[t]he lack of probative value and the absence of prejudice to plaintiff must be
balanced against the danger that the jury will draw unfounded assumptions as to
Mid–Atlantic's liability and the damages incurred if the collateral source evidence
is admitted, given that the standards governing the payment of workers'
compensation benefits differ from those which govern the imposition of tort
liability.
Posel, 2012 WL 524475 at *3.
Under Pennsylvania law, workers’ compensation claims are traditionally considered
collateral sources of recovery. Nigra v. Walsh, 797 A.2d 353, 356 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002), see also
Beechwoods Flying Service, Inc. v. Al Hamilton Contracting Corp., 476 A.2d 350, 353 (Pa.
1984). Consequently, such liens are typically excluded under Rule 403 at plaintiffs’ request.
See, e.g., Ocasio v. Ollson, 596 F. Supp. 2d 890, 904 (E.D. Pa. 2009); Collins v. Cement Express,
Inc., 447 A.2d 987, 988 (Pa. Super Ct. 1982). Here Plaintiff argues for introduction of the
attorney’s fees portion of the lien. Despite same, there remains the risk of prejudice to Plaintiff.
For example, a jury could be prejudiced against Plaintiff if it were to find out that he had already
received a large cash payment from a third party. “[A]ny mention of Plaintiff’s collection of
Workers’ Compensation benefits, or even mention of the claim or settlement in general terms,
runs the risk of creating substantial prejudice to Plaintiff by suggesting to the jury that he need
not recover against Defendants because he has already received payments from his employer.”
Ocasio, 596 F. Supp. 2d at 905 (citing Nigra, 797 A.2d at 360; Lobalzo v. Varoli, 185, A.2d 557,

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558 (Pa. 1962); Kostar v. Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co., Inc, 1998 WL 848116, at *2–3
(E.D. Pa. 1998)). They could also infer liability on the part of Nupla given the resolution of the
workers’ compensation claim.
Secondly, as the attorney’s fees portion of the lien was part of a settlement, other
problems arise. Generally, settlements are not permitted into evidence under any scenario. See
Trout v. Milton S. Hershey Medical Center, 572 F. Supp. 2d 591, 596 (M.D. Pa. 2008)
(“Settlement agreements . . . are inadmissible regardless of relevance if offered to establish
liability for or the amount of a claim or if introduction thereof would result in undue prejudice to
an opposing party.”); see also FED. R. EVID. 408 (generally prohibiting the introduction of
evidence of compromises and settlements and offers to compromise).
Third, the introduction of attorney’s fees would likely cause confusion and delay as well
as potentially mislead jurors.2 The legal theories of recovery in the workers’ compensation
proceeding, and its subsequent settlement, are completely different from the instant negligence
case. Introduction of such evidence would create a “mini trial” surrounding the attorney’s fees
generated in the workers’ compensation proceeding, as the parties would have to offer evidence
and the Court would be required to provide instruction on the burden of proof in the workers’
compensation arena as well as the computation of benefits. See, e.g., Bacone v. Philadelphia
Housing Authority, 112 Fed. App’x 127, 130 (3d Cir. 2004), United States v. Farrington, 58 Fed.
App’x 919, 925 (3d Cir. 2003), & United States v. Raisley, 466 Fed. App’x 125 (3d Cir. 2012);

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In this Court’s opinion, admitting the attorney’s fees portion of the lien into evidence in
isolation would beg for further information as to its nature, causing jurors to make assumptions
regarding the remainder of the lien and any workers’ compensation benefits that Plaintiff
received.

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see also FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (the rules should be “employed by the court . . . to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” (emphasis added)).
Prejudice, confusion, delay, and misleading the jurors can be avoided by the Plaintiff
introducing into evidence his actual losses. (Docket No. 92 at 6–7.). He can produce medical
evidence, including bills; pay stubs; cancelled checks; tax returns, and the like. He can also
testify to his medical condition, treatment, residual problems, and lost wages and he can call his
treating physicians and his employer as witnesses to verify the factual underpinning of his
damages claim.
V.

CONCLUSION
After considering the facts and circumstances in this case, and against the authority cited

above, Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Enter Portion of Lien Amount in Evidence (Docket No.
83) is denied. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the attorney’s fees portion of the lien is
relevant to the present case, nor that the probative value of the attorney’s fees portion of the lien
is “substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice [and] confusing the issues.” See
FED. R. EVID. 401 & FED. R. EVID. 403.
AND NOW, this 23rd day of September, 2015, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Enter Portion of Lien
Amount Into Evidence, (Docket No. [83]), is DENIED.
s/Nora Barry Fischer
Nora Barry Fischer
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc/ecf: all counsel of record

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