RANKIN v. COLVIN
Filing
17
MEMORANDUM OPINION RE: 11 14 CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Signed by Judge Arthur J. Schwab on 11/17/2014. (lcb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN WESLEY RANKIN, JR.,
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
)
)
)
)
)
)
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Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
)
Plaintiff,
v.
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 14-491
)
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
ARTHUR J. SCHWAB, District Judge.
I.
Introduction
Plaintiff, John Wesley Rankin, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
405(g) of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), seeking judicial review of the final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his application for disability
insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”). The parties have
submitted cross motions for summary judgment on the record developed at the administrative
proceedings. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No.
11) will be denied. The Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 14) will be
granted and the administrative decision of the Commissioner will be affirmed.
II.
Procedural History
On April 13, 2011, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB and SSI, alleging disability
beginning on March 17, 2009, due to depression, shoulder pain, back and neck pain, joint pain,
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allergies and sinusitis.1 (R. at 83-84). An administrative hearing was held on July 20, 2012,
before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Karen B. Kostol. (R. at 31). Plaintiff and a
vocational expert, Eugene A. Czuczman, each testified at the hearing. (R. at 31-82).
On September 13, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision in which she determined that Plaintiff
was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act because he could perform a range
of unskilled, low-stress, light jobs. (R. at 14-26). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request
for review, rendering the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner in this case. (R.
at 1-4).
Plaintiff commenced the instant action on April 16, 2014, seeking judicial review of the
Commissioner’s decision. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on
August 4, 2014. (Doc. No. 11). The Commissioner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on
September 4, 2014. (Doc. No. 14). These motions are the subject of this Memorandum Opinion.
III.
Statement of the Case
In his decision, the ALJ made the following findings:
1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through
December 31, 2010. (R. at 16).
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 17, 2009, the
alleged onset date (20 C.F.R. § 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.). (R. at 16).
3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: degenerative joint disease of cervical
and thoracic spine, status post compression fracture of T10-T12; degenerative joint
disease of the right knee; status post bilateral rotator cuff repairs; and allergic rhinitis
history of sinusitis (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)). (R. at 16-17).
1
References to the administrative record (Doc. No. 7), will be designated by the citation “(R. at __)”.
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4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925
and 416.926)). (R. at 18).
5. The claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20
C.F.R. 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except the type of work must: entail no climbing of
ladders, ropes, or scaffolds or crawling and only occasional other postural movements;
allow the claimant the option of standing or walking for 30 minutes or sitting for 30
minutes alternatively without being off task; avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold
and hot temperatures, wetness, humidity, or hazards (i.e. unprotected heights or moving
machinery); entail only occasional rotation, flexion, or extension of the neck; entail only
frequent overhead reaching bilaterally; be limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks
(SVP levels 1 and 2); be limited to low stress jobs defined as having only occasional
decision making required, occasional changes in the work setting, and no strict
production quotas; and entail only occasional interaction with the general public, coworkers and supervisors. (R. at 18-19).
6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work. (20 C.F.R. 404.1565 and
416.965)). (R. at 24).
7. The claimant was born on July 9, 1970 and was 38 years old, which is defined as a
younger individual age 18-49, on the disability onset date (20 C.F.R. 404.1563 and
416.963)). (R. at 24).
8. The claimant has a limited education and is able to communicate in English (20 C.F.R.
404.1564 and 416.964)). (R. at 24).
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9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because
using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant
is “not disabled,” whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR 82-41
and 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2). (R. at 25).
10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional
capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the
claimant can perform (20 C.F.R. 404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416.969, and 416.969(a)). (R. at
25).
11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from
March 17, 2009, through the date of this decision. (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g) and
416.920(g)). (R. at 26).
IV.
Standard of Review
This Court’s review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is
“supported by substantial evidence.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 46 (3d
Cir. 1994). The Court may not undertake a de novo review of the Commissioner’s decision or
re-weigh the evidence of record. Monsour Medical Center v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 11901191(3d Cir. 1986). Congress has clearly expressed its intention that “[t]he findings of the
Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable
amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (internal
quotation marks omitted). As long as the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial
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evidence, it cannot be set aside even if this Court “would have decided the factual inquiry
differently.” Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999). “Overall, the substantial
evidence standard is a deferential standard of review.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d
Cir. 2004).
In order to establish a disability under the Act, a claimant must demonstrate a “medically
determinable basis for an impairment that prevents him [or her] from engaging in any
‘substantial gainful activity’ for a statutory twelve-month period.” Stunkard v. Secretary of
Health & Human Services, 841 F.2d 57, 59 (3d Cir. 1988); Kangas v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 775, 777
(3d Cir. 1987); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant is considered to be
unable to engage in substantial gainful activity “only if his [or her] physical or mental
impairment or impairments are of such severity that he [or she] is not only unable to do his [or
her] previous work but cannot, considering his [or her] age, education, and work experience,
engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42
U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B).
To support his or her ultimate findings, an administrative law judge must do more than
simply state factual conclusions, he or she must make specific findings of fact. Stewart v. Sec’y
of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 714 F.2d 287, 290 (3d Cir. 1983). The administrative law judge
must consider all medical evidence contained in the record and provide adequate explanations
for disregarding or rejecting evidence. Weir on Behalf of Weir v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 955, 961 (3d
Cir. 1984); Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981).
The Social Security Administration (“SSA”), acting pursuant to its legislatively delegated
rule making authority, has promulgated a five-step sequential evaluation process for the purpose
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of determining whether a claimant is “disabled” within the meaning of the Act. The United
States Supreme Court has summarized this process as follows:
If at any step a finding of disability or non-disability can be made, the SSA will
not review the claim further. At the first step, the agency will find non-disability
unless the claimant shows that he is not working at a “substantial gainful
activity.”[20 C.F.R.] §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). At step two, the SSA will find
non-disability unless the claimant shows that he has a “severe impairment,”
defined as “any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly
limits [the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” §§
404.1520(c), 416.920(c). At step three, the agency determines whether the
impairment which enabled the claimant to survive step two is on the list of
impairments presumed severe enough to render one disabled; if so, the claimant
qualifies. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the claimant’s impairment is not on the
list, the inquiry proceeds to step four, at which the SSA assesses whether the
claimant can do his previous work; unless he shows that he cannot, he is
determined not to be disabled. If the claimant survives the fourth stage, the fifth,
and final, step requires the SSA to consider so-called “vocational factors” (the
claimant’s age, education, and past work experience), and to determine whether
the claimant is capable of performing other jobs existing in significant numbers in
the national economy. §§ 404.1520(f), 404.1560(c), 416.920(f), 416.960(c).
Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24-25 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
In an action in which review of an administrative determination is sought, the agency’s
decision cannot be affirmed on a ground other than that actually relied upon by the agency in
making its decision. In SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947), the Supreme Court
explained:
When the case was first here, we emphasized a simple but fundamental rule of
administrative law. That rule is to the effect that a reviewing court, in dealing with
a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized
to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by
the agency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to
affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to be a more
adequate or proper basis. To do so would propel the court into the domain which
Congress has set aside exclusively for the administrative agency.
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. at 196.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recognized the applicability
of this rule in the Social Security disability context. Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 44, n. 7
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(3d Cir. 2001). Thus, the Court’s review is limited to the four corners of the ALJ’s decision. It is
on this standard that the Court has reviewed the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.
V.
Discussion
In his brief in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ
committed several reversible errors. (Doc. No. 13). Specifically, Plaintiff contends that: (1) the
ALJ improperly evaluated the opinions offered by his treating physician and two state agency
psychologists; (2) the ALJ failed to properly consider evidence that Plaintiff suffers from
allergies and chronic sinusitis; and (3) the ALJ should have re-contacted a treating physician to
seek clarification as to an ambiguity in the medical evidence. The Commissioner counters that
the ALJ properly evaluated the evidence submitted and that his decision is supported by
substantial evidence. (Doc. No. 15). Each of Plaintiff’s contentions will be addressed in turn.
A. The ALJ Appropriately Evaluated and Weighed the Evidence of Record With Respect
to Plaintiff’s Mental Impairments
Plaintiff first contends that the ALJ improperly credited the opinions of two examining
psychologists over a mental health opinion issued by his treating psychiatrist, Dr. Melissa Albert.
On May 16, 2012, Dr. Albert completed a mental residual functional capacity questionnaire in
which she offered a “guarded” prognosis as to Plaintiff’s diagnoses of major depressive disorder
(MDD), obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), and
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). (R. at 668). Dr. Albert checked boxes indicating that
Plaintiff was “limited but satisfactory” in his ability to remember work-like procedures, carry out
short and simple instructions, maintain regular work attendance and punctuality, understand and
remember detailed instructions, maintain socially appropriate behavior, and travel to unfamiliar
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places. (R. at 668-671). Dr. Albert described Plaintiff as “severely limited” in his ability to
maintain attention for two hours at a time, work in coordination or proximity to others, make
simple work-related decisions, complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions
from psychologically based symptoms, perform at a consistent pace without rest, respond
appropriately to workplace changes, carry out detailed instructions, interact appropriately with
the general public and use public transportation. (R. at 668-671). Dr. Albert concluded that
Plaintiff was “unable to meet competitive standards” in several areas including his ability to ask
simple questions or request assistance, accept instruction and criticism from supervisors, get
along with co-workers without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes, deal with
normal work stress, set realistic goals or plan independently of others, and deal with stress of
semiskilled and skilled work. (R. at 668-671). Finally, Dr. Albert opined that Plaintiff would
likely miss work more than four times a month. (R. at 672).
As correctly noted by Plaintiff, an ALJ must generally give the opinion of a treating
physician “substantial and possibly controlling weight.” Chetoka v. Colvin, 2014 WL 295035, at
*10 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2014) (citing Johnson v. Comm’r., 529 F.3d 198, 201-02 (3d Cir. 2008)).
However, in order to be accorded greater weight, that opinion must be “well-supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and [] not inconsistent with
the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); Hagner v.
Barnhart, 57 F. App’x 981, 983 (3d Cir. 2003). An ALJ is entitled to reject the opinion of a
treating physician if it is “conclusory and unsupported by the medical evidence.” Jones v.
Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991). Moreover, courts have consistently held that an ALJ
may grant less weight to a treating physician’s opinion where it conflicts with his or her own
treatment notes. See, e.g., Millard v. Comm’r., 2014 WL 516525, at * 2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 2014)
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(“An ALJ . . . may give less weight to a treating physician’s opinion that is inconsistent with the
physician’s own treatment notes.”); Chetoka, 2014 WL 295035, at *11 (The ALJ properly
concluded that the limitations assessed in the disability opinion were inconsistent with [the
physician’s] own treatment notes.”). This is particularly true where the treating physician’s
opinion is expressed by way of a “check-the-box” form with no supporting rationale or narrative
statement. See, e.g., Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1065 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Form reports in
which a physician’s obligation is only to check a box or fill in a blank are weak evidence at
best.”); Hagner, 57 F. App’x at 983 (noting that the ALJ properly accorded “minimal weight” to
a treating physician’s opinions “because they were offered on ‘check-the-box’ forms, were
unsupported by objective findings, and were inconsistent” with his follow-up treatment notes).
In the instant case, the ALJ explained that Dr. Albert’s responses on the checkbox form
were entitled to “little weight” because they were inconsistent with her own treatment notes. (R.
at 17). For example, while Dr. Albert checked boxes opining that Plaintiff was severely limited
in numerous areas, she reported a GAF score of 59, indicating only moderate impairments.2 (R.
at 668). The ALJ also correctly observed that Dr. Albert had reported GAF scores of over 60
several times over the prior year, indicating only mild impairments.3 (R. at 645, 646, 648). In
her notes, Dr. Albert consistently described Plaintiff as cooperative and noted that he displayed
relevant speech, coherent thought processes, fair to sound judgment, and that his mood was
typically “good,” “fair” or “okay,” with congruent affect. (R. at 645-653). In light of the
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The Global Assessment of Functioning Scale (“GAF”) assesses an individual’s psychological, social and
occupational functioning with a score of 1 being the lowest and a score of 100 being the highest. The GAF score
considers “psychological, social, and occupational functioning on a hypothetical continuum of mental healthillness.” American Psychiatric Association: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM–IV–TR)
34 (4th ed. 2000). A GAF score of 51 to 60 indicates “[m]oderate symptions (e.g., flat affect and circumstantial
speech, occasional panic attacks) OR moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., fe
friends, conflicts with peers or co-workers).” Id.
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A GAF score of 61 to 70 indicates that an individual has “some mild” symptoms or “some” difficulty in social,
occupational, or school functioning, but generally functions “pretty well.” Id.
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generally unremarkable evidence of psychological limitations displayed in Dr. Albert’s treatment
notes, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision to afford little weight to Dr. Albert’s
conclusions.
Similarly, the ALJ did not err in according great weight to the opinion of a state agency
consultant, Dr. Michelle Santilli, who reviewed the evidence of record and found no evidence of
a severe mental impairment.4 (R. at 17, 103-04). The ALJ accorded great weight to Dr.
Santilli’s findings because her opinion was “consistent with the evidence as a whole” and “was
buttressed by the fact that the claimant did not seek any significant mental health treatment until
April 2011, only after his claims for disability benefits were denied on multiple occasions,” and
displayed only “moderate, mild, and less than mild” symptoms. (R. at 17). Overall, the ALJ
conducted a thorough evaluation of the medical evidence before according great weight to Dr.
Santilli’s opinion. In making that determination, the ALJ provided sufficient and well-reasoned
grounds, and her conclusions are supported by substantial evidence.5
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Medical and psychological consultants of a state agency who evaluate a claimant based upon a review of the
medical record “are highly qualified physicians and psychologists who are also experts in Social Security disability
evaluation. Therefore, administrative law judges must consider findings of State agency medical and psychological
consultants or other program physicians or psychologists as opinion evidence, except for the ultimate determination
about whether [a claimant is] disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(2)(I). See also SSR 96-6p: Titles II and XVI:
Consideration of Administrative Findings of Fact by State Agency Medical and Psychological Consultants (“1.
Findings of fact made by State agency medical and psychological consultants and other program physicians and
psychologists regarding the nature and severity of an individual's impairment(s) must be treated as expert opinion
evidence of non-examining sources at the administrative law judge and Appeals Council levels of administrative
review. 2. Administrative law judges and the Appeals Council may not ignore these opinions and must explain the
weight given to these opinions in their decisions.”)
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Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ improperly relied on evidence from a state agency psychologist, Dr. Richard
Heil, that is not contained in the record. This argument is unavailing. In her decision, the ALJ explained that
Plaintiff had filed several prior applications for disability benefits and that a previous ALJ had concluded (based, in
part, on Dr. Heil’s opinion evidence) that Plaintiff had no medically determinable mental impairment at that time.
(R. at 17). The prior administrative decision was properly part of the record in this case (R. at 83-98), and the ALJ
appropriately considered the findings therein in making her overall disability determination. (R. at 17). See, e.g., 20
C.F.R. § 404.1512(b)(5) (defining “evidence” as “anything you or anyone else submits to us or that we obtain that
relates to your claim,” including “[d]ecisions by any governmental or nongovernmental agency about whether you
are disabled or blind”); Zavilla v. Astrue, 2009 WL 3364853, at *16 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2009) (“[A] prior decision as
to a claimant’s disability under the Act by the Commissioner is evidence under [the applicable regulations] and must
be considered by the ALJ when evaluating a claim for benefits.”); Soli v. Astrue, 2010 WL 2898798, *6 (E.D. Pa.
July 10, 2010) (same).
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B. The ALJ Properly Considered and Accounted for Plaintiff’s Allergies and Chronic
Sinusitis
Plaintiff next asserts that the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) failed to properly account for “the fact that [Plaintiff] is constantly sick.” (Doc. No. 13
at 8). “‘Residual functional capacity is defined as that which an individual is still able to do
despite the limitations caused by his or her impairment(s).’” Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 359 n.1 (3d
Cir. 1999)); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a); 416.945(a). An individual claimant’s RFC is an
administrative determination expressly reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527(e)(2); 416.927(e)(2). In making this determination, the ALJ must consider all the
evidence before him. Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121. This evidence includes “medical records,
observations made during formal medical examinations, descriptions of limitations by the
claimant and others, and observations of the claimant’s limitations by others.” Fargnoli v.
Halter, 247 F.3d 34, 41 (3d Cir. 2001). Moreover, the ALJ’s RFC finding must “be
accompanied by a clear and satisfactory explication of the basis on which it rests.” Id. (quoting
Cotter, 642 F.2d at 704).
Plaintiff contends that the record clearly establishes that he is constantly suffering from
severe allergies and infectious diseases. As noted by the ALJ, Plaintiff’s medical records
indicate that he experiences severe allergies, sinusitis, allergic rhinitis, nasal congestion, facial
pressures, headaches, and postnasal drip. (R. at 22, 250-52). The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff
underwent multiple bilateral endoscopic sinus surgeries in an effort to reduce his symptoms. (R.
at 22, 254-55). However, the presence of a diagnosis alone is not sufficient to establish the
existence of disabling functional limitations. Foley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 349 F. App’x 805,
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808 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Petition of Sullivan, 904 F.2d 826, 845 (3d Cir. 1990)). To the
contrary, “[d]isability is not determined by the mere presence of an impairment, but rather by the
effect that an impairment has upon an individual’s ability to perform substantial gainful activity.”
Clemente v. Astrue, 2011 WL 2731816, at *7 (W.D. Pa. July 13, 2011) (citing Jones v. Sullivan,
954 F.2d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991)).
Although Plaintiff speculates that his constant sickness “may” create “difficulties
maintaining regular attendance or maintaining attention and concentration,” Plaintiff has not
pointed to any medical evidence in the record to connect his sinusitis and allergies to an inability
to work. (Doc. No. 13 at 10). Indeed, none of the medical professionals who examined or
treated Plaintiff, including his allergist, a consulting examiner, and a treating physician, assessed
any limitations on the basis of his allergies and sinusitis. (R. at 250-55, 605, 678). Moreover, as
noted by the ALJ, Plaintiff’s daily activities – including, for example, his voluntary exposure to
allergens and nasal irritants mowing his own grass – belie the necessity for any significant
environmental limitations due to his allergies. (R. at 22). Finally, the ALJ noted that none of the
sampling of available jobs cited by the vocational expert involved significant exposure to
environmental irritants, temperature extremes, wetness, or humidity. (R. at 18, 22, 25).
In sum, Plaintiff’s arguments with respect to his allergies and sinus impairments focus
entirely on the diagnosis of those impairments, rather than any resulting limitations. See, e.g.,
Phillips v. Barnhart, 91 F. App’x 775, 780 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[Plaintiff’s] argument incorrectly
focuses on the diagnosis of an impairment rather than the functional limitations that result from
that impairment.”). In the absence of any medical evidence connecting his impairments to an
inability to work, the Court concludes that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s RFC
assessment.
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C. The ALJ Reasonably Evaluated Medical Evidence Obtained From Plaintiff’s Treating
Physician
Finally, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in rejecting opinion evidence from Dr.
Stephanie Hahn Le, his pain management physician, who opined, inter alia, that Plaintiff was
limited to standing/walking for less than 15 minutes and sitting for 30 minutes. (R. at 23). In her
decision, the ALJ noted that “it was unclear” how Dr. Hahn Le had arrived at those limitations
but that they “appear to be based on the claimant’s subjective complaints, which are not fully
credible.” (R. at 23). Plaintiff, citing SSR 96-5p, contends that the ALJ was obligated to recontact Dr. Hahn Le to determine whether her opinion was based on her objective findings or on
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. See SSR 96-5p (stating that “if the evidence does not support a
treating source’s opinion on any issue reserved to the Commissioner and the adjudicator cannot
ascertain the basis of the opinion from the case record, the adjudicator must make ‘every
reasonable effort’ to recontact the source for clarification as to the reasons for the opinion.”).
Effective March 26, 2012, six months prior to the ALJ’s decision in this matter, the
Commissioner revised the social security regulations regarding an ALJ’s duty to re-contact
physicians. Prior to that date, the regulations obligated an ALJ to re-contact a medical source to
clarify the record if the source’s report “contain[ed] a conflict or ambiguity that must be
resolved, [did] not contain all the necessary information, or [did] not appear to be based on
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(e)(1).
However, the new controlling regulations direct that, “if any of the evidence, including medical
opinion(s) is inconsistent, we will weigh the relevant evidence and see whether we can determine
whether you are disabled based on the evidence we have.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(b);
416.920b(b); see, e.g., Toland v. Colvin, 2013 WL 6175817, at *7 n. 3 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2013)
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(“As of March 26, 2012, the regulations governing an ALJ’s duty to recontact a medical source
have changed. Under the current regulations . . ., an ALJ “may recontact [a] treating physician,
psychologist, or other medical source” but may instead seek further evidence from another
source . . .”) (emphasis added). In the instant case, the ALJ already had the benefit of a complete
and adequate record on which to base her disability determination. Substantial evidence
supported that determination, as well as her decision not to exercise her permissive authority to
re-contact Dr. Hahn Le.
VI.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence. Therefore, the Commissioner’s administrative decision will be affirmed.
An appropriate order follows.
s/ Arthur J. Schwab
Arthur J. Schwab
United States District Judge
cc:
All Registered ECF Counsel and Parties
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