HAINES v. COLVIN
Filing
22
MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER denying 12 plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 16 defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The decision of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. See Memorandum Judgment Order for further details. Signed by Judge Gustave Diamond on 9/21/15. (kw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRlCT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRlCT OF PENNSYLVANIA
FRANK ASHER HAINES, III,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROL YN W. COLVIN,
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 14-833
MEMORANDUMlUDGMENTORDER
AND NOW, this
.2:L~fSePtember, 2015, upon consideration of the parties' cross-
motions for summary judgment pursuant to plaintiffs request for review of the decision of the
Acting Commissioner of Social Security ("Acting Commissioner") denying his application for
disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), IT IS
ORDERED that the Acting Commissioner's motion for summary judgment (Document No. 16)
be, and the same hereby is, granted and plaintiffs motion for summary judgment (Document No.
12) be, and the same hereby is, denied.
As the factfinder, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") has an obligation to weigh all of
the facts and evidence of record and may reject or discount any evidence if the ALJ explains the
reasons for doing so. Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999). Where the ALl's
findings offact are supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court is bound by those findings,
even ifit would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34,
38 (3d Cir. 2001). Moreover, it is well settled that disability is not determined merely by the
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presence ofimpairments, but by the effect that those impairments have upon an individual's ability
to perfonn substantial gainful activity. Jonesv. Sullivan, 954F.2d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991). These
well-established principles preclude a reversal or remand of the ALJ's decision here because the
record contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ's findings and conclusions.
Plaintiff filed his DIB application on July 31, 2012, alleging disability beginning on April
24,2012, due to post-traumatic stress disorder, degenerative disc disease, chronic knee pain and
chronic ankle pain. Plaintiff s application was denied. At plaintiff s request, an ALJ held a video
hearing on February 26, 2013, and a supplemental video hearing on August 15,2013, at which
plaintiff testified while represented by counsel. On October 7, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision
finding that plaintiff is not disabled. The Appeals Council denied plaintiff s request for review on
April 28, 2014, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. The instant
action followed.
Plaintiff, who has a high school education, was 28 years old on his alleged disability onset
date, and is classified as a younger individual under the regulations. 20 C.F.R. §404.1563(c).
Plaintiffhas past relevant work experience as a fire support specialist, cook, bellman and auto parts
clerk, but he has not engaged in substantial gainful activity at any time since his alleged onset date.
After reviewing plaintiffs medical records and hearing testimony from plaintiff and a
vocational expert at the hearings, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff is not disabled within the
meaning of the Act. Although the medical evidence established that plaintiff suffers from the
severe impainnents oflumbar degenerative disc disease, right knee chondromalacia, post-traumatic
stress disorder, depressive disorder and a history of alcohol abuse, those impainnents, alone or in
combination, do not meet or equal the criteria of any of the listed impainnents set forth in
Appendix 1 of20 C.F.R., Subpart P, Regulation No.4 ("Appendix 1").
The ALJ found that plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity to perfonn light work
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with a number of additional non-exertional limitations. Plaintiff is limited to low stress work
defined as involving routine daily tasks that do not significantly change in pace or location each
day. In addition, plaintiff is limited to work that does not ordinarily require confrontation with
others (such as arguing with customers), and is he is restricted to no more than occasional
interaction with the public (collectively, the "RFC Finding").
Based upon testimony by a vocational expert, the ALl concluded that plaintiff s vocational
factors and residual functional capacity do not permit him to perform his past relevant work.
However, the ALl found that plaintiff is capable ofperforming other work that exists in significant
numbers in the national economy, such as an assembler of small parts, collator or mail clerk.
Accordingly, the ALl found that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act.
The Act defines "disability" as the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity by
reason of a physical or mental impairment that can be expected to last for a continuous period of
at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A). The impairment or impairments must be so
severe that the claimant "is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age,
education and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists
in the national economy ...." 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A).
The Social Security Regulations specify a five-step sequential evaluation process for
determining whether a claimant is disabled. The ALl must assess: (1) whether the claimant is
currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) ifnot, whether he has a severe impairment; (3)
if so, whether his impairment meets or equals the criteria listed in Appendix 1; (4) ifnot, whether
.
the claimant's impairment prevents him from performing his past relevant work; and (5) if so,
whether the claimant can perform any other work that exists in the national economy, in light of his
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age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity. I 20 C.F .R. §404.1520(a)(4). If .
the claimant is found disabled or not disabled at any step, further inquiry is unnecessary. Id.
In this case, plaintiff argues that the ALl's step 5 finding is not supported by substantial
evidence for the following reasons: (1) the ALJ failed to properly weigh the opinion of plaintiffs
treating psychiatrist; and (2) the ALJ did not properly evaluate plaintiffs credibility. For reasons
explained below, these arguments are without merit.
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ did not properly weigh the opinion of his treating
psychiatrist, Dr. Jeannine Bordonaro. A treating physician's opinion is entitled to controlling
weight ifit is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques
and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence of record. 20 C.F .R. §404.1527( c)(2).
Under this standard, the ALJ properly determined that Dr. Bordonaro's opinion should not be given
controlling weight. (R. 25).
Dr. Bordonaro examined plaintiff only two times - on January 11,2013, and subsequently
on February 13, 2013, (R. 862-64, 875-77) - prior to completing a Psychiatric Impairment
Questionnaire form report on February 26,2013, rendering an opinion that plaintiff is markedly
limited in various areas ofmental functioning and unable to tolerate even low work stress, (R. 815
817, 818), and predicting that he would miss work more than three times per month. (R. 819).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have given controlling weight to Dr. Bordonaro's opinion on
those matters, and contends the ALJ further erred by failing to explain why she rejected the doctor's
OpInIOn.
Contrary to plaintiff's position, the ALJ summarized Dr. Bordonaro's findings indicating
lResidual functional capacity is defined as that which an individual still is able to do despite the limitations
caused by his impairments. 20 C.F.R. §404.1545(a)(I). In assessing a claimant's residual functional capacity, the AU
is required to consider the claimant's ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory and other requirements of work. 20
C.F.R. §404.1545(a)(4).
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that plaintiff is significantly restricted from a mental standpoint and noted that Dr. Bordonaro only
saw plaintiff two times before issuing her opinion. (R. 29). The ALJ then explained that Dr.
Bordonaro's findings are "wildly exaggerated and without substance" because they are not
adequately supported by her own treatment records and are inconsistent with the evidence as a
whole. (R. 29).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the ALJ correctly determined Dr. Bordonaro's
restrictive opinion of plaintiffs mental work-related capabilities stated on the form report is
inconsistent with her own treatment records. On the two occasions Dr. Bordonaro examined
plaintiff prior to issuing her opinion, Dr. Bordonaro's mental status examinations were rather
unremarkable. According to Dr. Bordonaro, plaintiff was calm and cooperative, he had normal
psychomotor activity, his speech was clear and coherent and his thought processes were goal
directed. (R. 864, 877). Similarly, on the four occasions Dr. Bordonaro examined plaintiff after
issuing her opinion (March 12,2013, April 18, 2013, May 29, 2013, and June19, 2013), the doctor's
mental status examinations revealed the same unremarkable findings she previously reported in her
treatment notes. (R. 859, 963, 976, 981). While Dr. Bordonaro's treatment notes reflect that
plaintiff experiences some limitations from a mental standpoint, they do not document the drastic
limitations she identified on the form report. For these reasons, the court finds that there was no
error in the ALl's decision to rej ect Dr. Bordonaro's opinion as inconsistent with her own treatment
records and other evidence of record summarized by the ALJ in her decision?
2If a treating physician's opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, the ALl will give it the weight she
deems appropriate based on such factors as the length of the treatment relationship and frequency of examination, the
nature and extent of the treatment relationship, whether the opinion is supported by medical signs and laboratory
findings, whether the opinion is supported by relevant evidence, whether the opinion is consistent with the record as
a whole, the doctor's specialization and otherrelevant factors. See 20 C.F.R. §§404.1S27(c)(2)-(c)(6). Plaintiff argues
that the ALl did not consider these factors in analyzing Dr. Bordonaro's opinion. To the contrary, the ALl rejected
Dr. Bordonaro's opinion after noting that she only examined plaintiff twice prior to issuing it, and further explaining
that Dr. Bordonaro's opinion was not supported by her own treatment notes and was inconsistent with other record
evidence. (R. 29).
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Plaintiff next argues that the ALl did not properly evaluate his credibility concerning his
claimed limitations. A claimant's complaints and other subjective symptoms must be supported
by objective medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. §404.1529(c); Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 362 (3d
Cir. 1999). An ALl may reject the claimant's subjective testimony ifhe does not find it credible
so long as he explains why he is rejecting the testimony. Schaudeck v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec.,
181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999). In this case, the ALl properly analyzed plaintiffs subjective
complaints and explained why she found plaintiff s testimony not entirely credible.
In evaluating plaintiff s credibility, the ALl complied with the appropriate regulations and
considered all of the relevant evidence in the record, including plaintiffs own statements about
his symptoms and limitations, the medical evidence of record, the extent of plaintiffs treatment,
his activities of daily living and the opinions of physicians who treated and examined him. See
20 C.F.R. §§404.1529(c)(l) - (c)(3); Social Security Ruling 96-7p. The ALl then considered the
extent to which plaintiff s alleged functional limitations reasonably could be accepted as consistent
with the evidence of record and how those limitations affect his ability to work. 20 C.F.R.
§404.1529(c)(4). The ALl concluded that the objective evidence is inconsistent with plaintiffs
allegation oftotal disabling limitations. Accordingly, the All determined that plaintiff s testimony
regarding his limitations was not entirely credible. (R. 28). This court finds that the ALl
adequately explained the basis for her credibility determination in her decision, (R. 25-26,28-29),
and is satisfied that such determination is supported by substantial evidence?
3Plaintiff specifically critiques the AU's credibility detennination because she noted that a consultative
examiner believed plaintiffembellished his limitations, one ofplaintiff s military commanders did not believe plaintiff
experienced any traumatic event that would warrant symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder and plaintiffwas able
to successfully attend college courses. (R. 28). Contrary to plaintiff s argument that the AU improperly based her
credibility detennination on these factors, the ALl's decision makes clear that she considered many other factors in
evaluating plaintiffs credibility. As stated, the AU summarized the medical evidence and the extent of plaintiffs
treatment, noting that plaintiff had undergone little treatment for his back problems and declined additional treatment
that was offered. CR. 25, 28). The AU also discussed plaintiffs own testimony concerning his symptoms and
limitations, including the range of daily activities he perfonns, as well as the medical opinion evidence from physicians
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In conclusion, after carefully and methodically considering all of the medical evidence of
record, the ALJ determined that plaintiffis not disabled within the meaning ofthe Act. The ALl's
findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence and are not otherwise erroneous.
Therefore, the decision of the Acting Commissioner must be affirmed.
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/ Gustave Diamond
United States District Judge
cc:
Samantha Xander, Esq.
Law Offices of Harry J. Binder and Charles E. Binder, P.C.
60 East 42nd Street
Suite 520
New York, NY 10165
Michael Colville
Assistant U.S. Attorney
700 Grant Street
Suite 4000
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
who treated and examined him. (R.28-29). The ALl's decision makes clear that her credibility determination did not
hinge on one factor to the exclusion of others. Moreover, despite the ALl's determination thatplaintiffs subjective
allegations were not entirely credible, she nonetheless credited plaintiffs complaints ofmental limitations to the extent
that the RFC Finding restricted plaintiff to low stress work that involved routine daily tasks and limited his interaction
with others.
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