JONES v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Filing 13

ORDER denying 9 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 11 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 3/6/15. (ask)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CHRISTOPHER L. JONES,
V.

)
) No. 14-849
)
)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY.

SYNOPSIS
Plaintiff, who was born in 1970, filed an application for supplemental social security
income pursuant to Title XVI of the Social Security Act, alleging disability due to results of a leg
injury from a car accident when he was twenty months of age, and various mental impairments.
Plaintiff’s application was denied initially, and upon hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”). The Appeals Council denied his request for review. Before the Court are the
parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion will
be denied, and Defendant’s granted.

OPINION
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Judicial review of the Commissioner's final decisions on disability claims is provided by
statute. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) 6 and 1383(c)(3) 7. Section 405(g) permits a district court to review
the transcripts and records upon which a determination of the Commissioner is based, and the
court will review the record as a whole. See 5 U.S.C. §706. When reviewing a decision, the
district court's role is limited to determining whether the record contains substantial evidence to
support an ALJ's findings of fact. Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2002).

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Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate" to support a conclusion. Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971)). If the ALJ's
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, they are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Richardson, 402 U.S. at 390.
A district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner's decision, or reweigh the evidence of record; the court can only judge the propriety of the decision with
reference to the grounds invoked by the Commissioner when the decision was rendered. Palmer
v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998); S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 - 97,
67 S. Ct. 1575, 91 L. Ed. 1995 (1947). Otherwise stated, “I may not weigh the evidence or
substitute my own conclusion for that of the ALJ. I must defer to the ALJ's evaluation of
evidence, assessment of the credibility of witnesses, and reconciliation of conflicting expert
opinions. If the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, I am bound by those
findings, even if I would have decided the factual inquiry differently.” Brunson v. Astrue, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55457 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2011) (citations omitted).
II. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
A. MEDICAL OPINION EVIDENCE
First, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not adequately explain why the opinions of Dr.
Santiago, Dr. Uran, and Dr. Dr. Chatha “were not considered.” Regarding Plaintiff’s mental
impairments, the ALJ found as follows:
I give great weight to the opinions of the state agency medical and
psychological consultants because I find them to be well supported and consistent
with other substantial evidence of record as set forth above. I give some weight to
the opinions of both the medical and psychological consultative examiner’s [sic]
but I find that the examiners relied too heavily on the claimants subjective
complaints and in some instances their assessments appear at odds with the
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narrative reports of their examinations. I give no weight to the opinion of Dr.
Santiago, a treating source, because it is inconsistent with other evidence of
record including the claimant’s lack of any psychiatric hospitalizations, Dr.
Uran’s narrative report, and the claimant’s psychiatric treatment notes.1
The ALJ did, in fact, consider the opinion of Dr. Uran, a consultative psychiatric
examiner whose opinion was afforded “some weight.” Dr. Uran concluded that Plaintiff was
moderately limited in understanding and remembering detailed instructions, and responding
appropriately to changes in a work setting. She found him markedly limited in carrying out
detailed instructions, as well as in interacting appropriately with the public and co-workers, and
in responding appropriately to work pressures. She considered all other potential limitations
non-existent or slight. The ALJ considered and discussed Dr. Uran’s September, 2011
examination and report. Further, the ALJ accommodated Dr. Uran’s opinion in his residual
functional capacity statement (“RFC”), by limiting Plaintiff to low stress work, simple repetitive
tasks in a routine work setting and with routine processes, no high production work or close
attention to quality production standards, no teamwork and no contact with members of the
general public. I find no error in the ALJ’s approach.
The same is true for Dr. Chatha, a consultative physical examiner. The ALJ discussed
Dr. Chatha’s examination, which found a full range of motion and complete healing in the
injured knee, despite subjective discomfort. Nonetheless, the ALJ incorporated Dr. Chatha’s
limitations into the RFC, as well as including additional postural limitations that Dr. Chatha did
not indicate. The RFC limited Plaintiff to sedentary work with no crawling, kneeling, squatting,
balancing at heights, or climbing; and no tasks requiring the operation of foot controls.
Accordingly, I find no error in the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Chatha’s opinion.

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The ALJ”s citations to the record are omitted.

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Finally, I reach Dr. Santiago, Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist. It appears that Dr. Santiago
saw Plaintiff in January, June, and August of 2011, and then in February, 2012. He diagnosed
Plaintiff with major depressive disorder, recurrent, moderate, without psychosis; posttraumatic
stress disorder; and dysthymic disorder. In December, 2013, Dr. Santiago completed a “Rating
of Impairment Severity Listing” check-the-box form, in which he noted marked restriction or
difficulty in activities of daily living; maintaining social functioning; maintaining concentration,
persistence, or pace; and repeated episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration. He
noted that Plaintiff had been suffering from the limitations for 10-12 years. Dr. Santiago left
blank the portion of the questionnaire requesting medical findings to support these limitations.
He indicated “poor” ability – and not no ability – to perform many work-related activities. In
support of these “poor” ratings, Dr. Santiago noted, inter alia, that Plaintiff had not worked since
2000. As the ALJ observed, Dr. Santiago’s treatment notes, and the record in general, do not
support the severity of the limitations listed. Moreover, as with Dr. Uran and Dr. Chatha, the
ALJ clearly examined Dr. Santiago’s records, and the RFC does, in fact, accommodate most, if
not all, of Dr. Santiago’s opinions.
While Plaintiff correctly states that office notes and opinion assessments differ in
purpose, "check-the-box" forms are "weak evidence at best." Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058,
1065 (3d Cir. 1993); Grogan v. Comm'r of Social Security, 459 F. App'x 132, 138 n.7 (3d Cir.
2012). Further, an ALJ may reject a treating physician's opinion, if that opinion is inconsistent
with the other medical evidence of record, including that physician's own progress notes. Lewis
v. Colvin, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3600 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 2014). While further explanation of
the analysis of this treating physician’s records would have been preferable, for reasons of clarity

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of review and procedural propriety, I find no reversible error in the ALJ’s treatment of Dr.
Santiago’s opinion.
B. SUBJECTIVE COMPLAINTS
Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ dealt improperly with his subjective pain complaints,
which were found not entirely credible to the extent concerning the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of his symptoms. An ALJ’s credibility determination is entitled to great
deference. Malloy v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 306 Fed. Appx. 761 (3d Cir. 2009). Accordingly,
courts are “particularly reluctant” to overturn an ALJ’s credibility determination. Woodson v.
Barnhart, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57853, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2006). Plaintiff argues that
his complaints to his physician should be deemed credible. "Doctor's notes that are 'simply a
recitation of [claimant's] own subjective complaints' … are not objective medical evidence.”
McClease v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101190, at *27 (E.D. Pa. 2009). In
other words, "a medical source does not transform the claimant's subjective complaints into
objective findings simply by recording them...." Hatton v. Comm'r, 131 F. App'x 877, 879 (3d
Cir. 2005). The ALJ’s decision reflects that he reviewed all of the medical evidence, and
assessed the weight to be afforded that evidence. The ALJ’s process and conclusions, therefore,
are consistent with applicable standards. Cf. Harkins v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 399 Fed. Appx.
731, 735 (3d Cir. N.J. 2010).
CONCLUSION
While I empathize with Plaintiff’s apparent sense of frustration with the disability
process, under applicable standards, I have no grounds on which to reverse the ALJ’s decision.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion will be denied, and Defendant’s granted. An appropriate Order
follows.

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ORDER
AND NOW, this ____ day of March, 2015, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED, and Defendant’s
GRANTED.
BY THE COURT:

Donetta W. Ambrose
U.S. District Court

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