HILL v. COLVIN

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER denying 9 plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 13 defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The decision of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. See Memorandum Judgment Order for further details. Signed by Judge Gustave Diamond on 9/28/15. (kw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MARY KAY HILL,

)
)

Plaintiff,

v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil Action No. 14-922

MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER
AND NOW, this

~~f September, 2015, upon consideration of the parties' cross-

motions for summary judgment pursuant to plaintiffs request for review of the decision of the
Acting Commissioner of Social Security ("Acting Commissioner") denying her application for
disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), IT IS
ORDERED that the Acting Commissioner's motion for summary judgment (Document No. 13)
be, and the same hereby is, granted and plaintiffs motion for summary judgment (Document No.
9) be, and the same hereby is, denied.
As the factfinder, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") has an obligation to weigh all of
the facts and evidence of record and may reject or discount any evidence if the ALJ explains the
reasons for doing so. Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999). Where the ALJ's
findings offact are supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court is bound by those findings,
even if it would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34,
38 (3d Cir. 2001). Moreover, it is well settled that disability is not determined merely by the
....Aon
(Rev.8/82)

presence ofimpairments, but by the effect that those impairments have upon an individual's ability

to perform substantial gainful activity. Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991). These
well-established principles preclude a reversal or remand of the ALl's decision here because the
record contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ's findings and conclusions.
Plaintiff filed her DIB application on July 31,2011, alleging disability beginning on March
1, 2010,1 due to generalized anxiety disorder, chronic depression and premenstrual dysphoric
disorder. Plaintiffs application was denied. At plaintiffs request, an ALJ held a hearing on
January 23, 2013, at which plaintiff appeared and testified while represented by counsel. On
January 28, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff is not disabled. The Appeals
Council denied plaintiffs request for review on May 12,2014, making the ALJ's decision the final
decision of the Commissioner. The instant action followed.
Plaintiff, who has a high school education, was 50 years old on her alleged disability onset
date, and is classified as an individual closely approaching advanced age under the regulations. 20
C.F.R. §404.1563(d). Plaintiffhas past relevant work experience as a registered nurse, but she has
not engaged in substantial gainful activity at any time during the relevant period.
After reviewing plaintiff's medical records and hearing testimony from plaintiff and a
vocational expert at the hearing, the ALJ concluded that plaintiffis not disabled within the meaning
of the Act. Although the medical evidence established that plaintiff suffers from the severe
impairments of affective mood disorder, anxiety and obesity, those impairments, alone or in

lPlaintifffiled a prior OIB application in May 20 I 0, which was denied on February 1,2011. There
is no evidence that plaintiff appealed the prior denial, and the ALl in this case determined that plaintiff did
not provide a basis for reopening the prior decision. (R. 13). Therefore, under the doctrine ofres judicata.
the relevant period in this case began on February 1, 2011, which is the date ofthe prior denial, rather than
the alleged onset date of March 1, 2010. See 20 C.F.R. §404.957(c)(I) ("The doctrine of res judicata
applies ... [to] a previous determination or decision under this subpart about your rights on the same facts
and on the same issue or issues, and this previous determination or decision has become final by either
administrative or judicial action."). The ALl stated that his decision "determines the [plaintiff's] disability
from the date of the most recent prior denial, February 1, 2011, through the date of [the] decision."
(hereinafter, the "relevant period") (R. 13).
~A072

(Rev. 8/82)

- 2 ­

combination, do not meet or equal the criteria of any of the listed impairments set forth in
Appendix 1 of20 C.F.R., Subpart P, Regulation No.4 ("Appendix 1").
The ALl found that plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity to perform medium
work with a number of additional non-exertionallimitations. Plaintiffis limited to simple, routine
and repetitive tasks that are not performed in a fast-paced production environment and that involve
only simple work-related decisions and relatively few work place changes. Plaintiff is precluded
from interaction with the general public and she is restricted to no more than superficial
interactions with supervisors and co-workers (collectively, the "RFC Finding").
Based upon testimony by a vocational expert, the ALl concluded that plaintiffs vocational
factors and residual functional capacity do not permit her to perform her past relevant work.
However, the ALl found that plaintiff is capable of performing other work that exists in significant
numbers in the national economy, such as an industrial cleaner, hand packer or laundry operator.
Accordingly, the ALl found that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act.
The Act defines "disability" as the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity by
reason of a physical or mental impairment that can be expected to last for a continuous period of
at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A). The impairment or impairments must be so
severe that the claimant "is not only unable to do [her] previous work but cannot, considering [her]
age, education and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which
exists in the national economy ...." 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A).
The Social Security Regulations specify a five-step sequential evaluation process for
determining whether a claimant is disabled. The ALl must assess: (1) whether the claimant is
currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) ifnot, whether she has a severe impairment;
(3) if so, whether her impairment meets or equals the criteria listed in Appendix 1; (4) if not,
~A072

(Rev. 8/82)

- 3 ­

whether the claimant's impairment prevents her from performing her past relevant work; and (5)
if so, whether the claimant can perform any other work that exists in the national economy, in light
of her age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity.2

20 C.F.R.

§404.1520(a)(4). If the claimant is found disabled or not disabled at any step, further inquiry is
unnecessary. Id.
In this case, plaintiff argues that the ALl's step 5 finding is not supported by substantial
evidence for the following reasons: (1) the ALJ failed to properly consider and weigh certain
medical opinions; (2) the ALJ did not properly evaluate plaintiff s credibility; (3) the ALl's RFC
Finding failed to account for plaintiffs significant difficulty handling work stress; and (4) the ALJ
relied upon a deficient hypothetical question that did not accommodate all ofplaintiff s limitations.
For reasons explained below, these arguments are without merit.
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ did not properly consider and weigh the opinions issued
by Dr. Steven Foreman, Dr. John Mills, Dr. Judith Keins and Dr. Gregory Hofstetter. Plaintiff is
incorrect.
Dr. Foreman is plaintiffs former treating psychiatrist, and he completed a medical source
statement of her ability to perform mental work-related activities on October 27, 2010. (R. 313­
315). Dr. Mills performed a one-time mental consultative examination of plaintiff on November
20,2010. (R. 335-341). The opinions issued by Drs. Foreman and Mills relate to plaintiffs prior
application and predate the relevant period, see supra footnote 1, thus the ALJ did not err by failing
to consider them in the instant case. See Becker v. Colvin, 2015 WL 1326346, at *3 (W.D. Pa.
Mar. 25, 20 15) (finding that the ALJ did not err in failing to discuss or weigh medical opinions that

2Residual functional capacity is defined as that which an individual still is able to do despite the
limitations caused by her impairments. 20 C.F.R. §404.1545(a)(l). In assessing a claimant's residual
functional capacity, the ALJ is required to consider the claimant's ability to meet the physical, mental,
sensory and other requirements of work. 20 C.F.R. §404.1545(a)( 4).
~A072

(Rev 8/82)

4 ­

were part of the plaintiffs prior claim).
However, to the extent that Drs. Foreman and Mills found that plaintiff has marked or
extreme limitations in certain areas of mental functioning, the ALl's RFC Finding accounts for
those limitations. For example, the RFC Finding accounts for Dr. Foreman's assessment that
plaintiff is extremely limited in understanding, remembering and carrying out detailed instructions
by restricting her to simple, routine and repetitive tasks. (R. 17, 314). The RFC Finding also
accounts for Dr. Foreman's opinion that plaintiff is markedly limited in interacting appropriately
with supervisors and co-workers by requiring that she have no more than superficial interactions
with them. (R. 17,314). Finally, the RFC Finding accommodates the opinions of Drs. Foreman
and Mills that plaintiff is markedly limited in responding appropriately to work pressures and
changes by precluding her from working in a fast-paced production environment and restricting her
to work that involves only simple work-related decisions and relatively few work place changes.
(R. 17,314,340). Accordingly, although the ALl was not required to consider the opinions of Drs.

Foreman and Mills which predate the relevant period, the RFC Finding nevertheless accounts for
mental work-related limitations they identified.
Plaintiff next complains that the ALl failed to consider the opinion of Dr. Keins, who
conducted an examination of plaintiff on behalf of the City and County of San Francisco in
connection with her disability retirement claim and subsequently issued a report of the
examination. (R. 373-399). Although the ALl did not consider Dr. Keins report, his failure to do
so does not warrant remand. Whether or not plaintiff was considered to be disabled for purposes
of receiving disability retirement benefits from the City and County of San Francisco is irrelevant
because another agency's determination regarding disability is not binding on the Acting

~A072

(Rev 8/82)

-

5

­

Commissioner of Social Security. 3 See 20 C.F.R. §404 .1504.
Plaintiff also argues that the AL] improperly weighed the opinion of her treating
psychologist, Dr. Hofstetter, who completed a Medical Source Statement rating plaintiff as having
poor or no ability to perform a variety of mental work-related activities. (R. 476). The AL]
assigned Dr. Hofstetter's opinion little weight because it was inconsistent with his treatment
records. (R. 19,20).
A treating physician's opinion is entitled to controlling weight if it is well-supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the
other substantial evidence of record. 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(2). Under this standard, the AL]
properly determined that Dr. Hofstetter's opinion was entitled to little weight.
As the AL] explained, Dr. Hofstetter's restrictive assessment of plaintiffs mental workrelated capabilities is inconsistent with his treatment records. Contrary to Dr. Hofstetter's opinion
on the Medical Source Statement, his treatment records during the relevant period do not support
such extreme mental functional limitations, but rather document generally unremarkable mental
status examinations and a OAF score of60, which indicates only moderate symptoms.4 (R. 423,

3Dr. Keins concluded that plaintiffs mental symptoms interfered with her ability to perform her
work as a registered nurse. (R.397). We note that the AU reached this same conclusion in the instant case
when he found at step four of the sequential evaluation process that plaintiff can not perform her past
relevant work.
4GAF is a numeric scale that has been used by mental health clinicians and physicians to rate
SUbjectively the social, occupational and psychological functioning of adults. The latest edition of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-S) no longer includes the GAF scale. See
Brown v. Colvin, 2013 WL 6039018, at *7 n.3 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 14, 2013)(noting that the GAF scale was
dropped from the DSM-S). Although a claimant's GAF score is not determinative ofdisability, see Gilroy
v. Astrue, 3S1 Fed. Appx. 714, 71S (3d Cir. 2009)(recognizing that GAF scores do not have a direct
correlation to the severity requirements ofthe Social Security mental disorder Iistings, and determ ining that
a low GAF score is not conclusive evidence of a mental disability), it was not improper for the AU to
consider the GAF scores Dr. Hofstetter attributed to plaintiff in connection with the AU's overall analysis
of the doctor's opinion. See Markoch v. Colvin, 20 IS WL 2374260, at * 11 (M.D. Pa. May 18, 20 IS)
(rejecting the plaintiffs argument that the AU erred in considering GAF scores and noting that the
plaintiffs GAF scores were one relevant piece of evidence the AU considered in conjunction with the

'Aon
(Rev. 8/82)

- 6

425-27,429,432,443-44,446-450,452-54,456-57, 459-460, 462-64, 466, 468). Accordingly, the
court finds no error in the ALl's consideration and weighing of Dr. Hofstetter's opinion.
Plaintiff next contends that the ALl did not properly evaluate her credibility concerning her
claimed limitations. A claimant's complaints and other subjective symptoms must be supported
by objective medical evidence. 20 C.F .R. §404.1529(c); Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F .3d 358, 362 (3d
Cir. 1999). An ALl may reject the claimant's subjective testimony ifhe does not find it credible
so long as he explains why he is rejecting the testimony. Schaudeck v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec.,
181 F.3d 429,433 (3d Cir. 1999). In this case, the ALl properly analyzed plaintiffs subjective
complaints and explained why he found plaintiffs testimony not entirely credible.
In evaluating plaintiff s credibility, the ALl complied with the appropriate regulations and
considered all of the relevant evidence in the record, including plaintiffs own statements about
her symptoms and limitations, the medical evidence of record, plaintiffs medications and the
extent of her treatment, plaintiffs activities of daily living and the opinions of physicians who
treated and examined her. See 20 C.F.R. §§404.1529( c)(I) - (c)(3); Social Security Ruling 96-7p.
The ALl then considered the extent to which plaintiffs alleged functional limitations reasonably
could be accepted as consistent with the evidence of record and how those limitations affect her
ability to work. 20 C.F.R. §404.1529(c)(4). The ALl concluded that the objective evidence is
inconsistent with plaintiffs allegation of total disabling limitations. Accordingly, the ALl
determined that plaintiff s testimony regarding her limitations was not entirely credible. (R. 18,
20). This court finds that the ALl adequately explained the basis for his credibility determination,
(R. 18-20), and is satisfied that such determination is supported by substantial evidence.

entire record). The ALJ's decision makes clear that he assigned little weight to Dr. Hofstetter's opinion
because it was inconsistent the GAF scores he assessed and his treatment notes that documented
unremarkable mental status examinations. CR. 19,20).
'lloAOn
(Rev. 8/82)

- 7 ­

In connection with her credibility argument, plaintiff asserts that the ALJ should have
considered her 30-year work history as a factor enhancing her credibility. While it is true that the
testimony of a claimant with a long work history may be given substantial credibility concerning
her claimed limitations, see Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403,409 (3d Cir. 1979), work
history is only one of many factors an ALJ may consider in evaluating a claimant's credibility. 20
C.F.R. §404.1529(c)(3). Indeed, a claimant's work history alone is not dispositive ofthe question
of her credibility, and an ALJ is not required to equate a long work history with enhanced
credibility. See Christl v. Astrue, 2008 WL 4425817, *12 (W.D.Pa. Sept. 30, 2008).
Here, the ALJ clearly was aware ofplaintiff s work history and referred to it in his decision
when he discussed her hearing testimony and also when he determined that she could not perform
her past relevant work. (R. 18,21). It likewise is clear from the ALJ's decision that he considered
the record as f! whole in assessing plaintiffs credibility as discussed above. An exemplary work
history in and of itself is insufficient to overcome the substantial evidence supporting the ALl's
credibility determination, thus remand is not warranted.
Plaintiff next claims that the ALJ's RFC Finding failed to include a limitation to account
for her significant difficulty handling work stress, as found by Drs. Foreman, Mills, Keins and
Hofstetter. As discussed above, the ALJ did not err in failing to consider the opinions of Drs.
Foreman, Mills and Keins, and the ALJ properly determined that Dr. Hofstetter's opinion only was
entitled to little weight. Despite this, and contrary to plaintiff s contention, the ALJ nevertheless
accounted for any difficulty plaintiff experiences with handling work stress by limiting her to
simple, routine and repetitive tasks that are not performed in a fast-paced production environment
and that involve only simple work-related decisions and relatively few work place changes.
Plaintiffs final argument is that the ALl's hypothetical question to the vocational expert

'Aon
(Rev. 8/82)

-

8

limiting her, inter alia, to simple, routine, repetitive tasks did not properly account for her
moderate difficulties with concentration, persistence and pace. Contrary to plaintiff's position, the
Third Circuit Court ofAppeals has determined that a limitation to simple, routine tasks sufficiently
accounted for a claimant's moderate limitation in concentration, persistence and pace. See
McDonald v. Astrue, 293 Fed. Appx. 941,946 (3d Cir. 2008); Menkes v. Astrue, 262 Fed. Appx.
410, 412 (3d Cir. 2008) (restriction to simple, routine tasks accounted for the claimant's moderate
limitation in concentration, persistence and pace).
In addition to adequately accounting for plaintiffs limitation with concentration,
persistence and pace, the ALJ's hypothetical otherwise incorporated all of plaintiffs functional
limitations that the evidence of record supported, including all of the factors that were the basis
of the RFC Finding.5

Chrupcala v. Heckler, 829 F.2d 1269, 1276 (3d Cir. 1987)(an ALJ's

hypothetical to a vocational expert must reflect all of the claimant's impairments and limitations
supported by the medical evidence). Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in relying on the vocational
expert's testimony to conclude that plaintiff can perform other work that exists in the national
economy.

5Plaintiff also incorrectly argues that the hypothetical did not include a limitation to accommodate
her difficulty handling work pressure and stress. As previously discussed, the RFC Finding accounted for
any difficulty plaintiff experiences with handling work stress by restricting her to simple, routine and
repetitive tasks that are not performed in a fast-paced production environment and that involve only simple
work-related decisions and relatively few work place changes. Therefore, the hypothetical question, which
incorporated all of the factors that were the basis of the RFC Finding, adequately accommodated any
limitation plaintiff has with handling work pressure and stress.
~A072

(Rev 8/82)

- 9 ­

In conclusion, after carefully and methodically considering all of the medical evidence of
record, the ALJ determined that plaintiffis not disabled within the meaning ofthe Act. The ALl's
findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence and are not otherwise erroneous.
Therefore, the decision of the Acting Commissioner must be affirmed.

/~&...~
Gustave Diamond
United States District Judge

cc:

Elizabeth A. Smith, Esq.
Law Offices of Elizabeth A. Smith PC
129 S. McKean Street
Butler, PA 16001
Michael Colville

Assistant U.S. Attorney

700 Grant Street

Suite 4000

Pittsburgh, P A 15219

'A072
(Rev 8/82)

- 10 ­