DOE v. CHARLEROI SCHOOL DISTRICT et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION re 14 Partial MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by CHARLEROI SCHOOL DISTRICT, PATRICIA MASON. Signed by Judge Maurice B. Cohill on 10/22/2014. (cag)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JANE DOE, a minor, by and through
her parents and natural guardians,
RICHARD DOE AND MARY DOE,
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Plaintiff,
Civ. No.2:14-cv-951
Judge Maurice B. Cohill
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v.
CHARLEROI SCHOOL DISTRICT;
BETHLEHEM-CENTER SCHOOL
DISTRICT; JENNIFER MARIE JOYCE; and
PATRICIA MASON,
Defendants.
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OPINION
Pending before the Court is a Partial Motion to Dismiss rECF No. 14] filed by
Defendants Charleroi School District ("Charleroi") and Patricia Mason ("Mason"), the Principal
at Charleroi School (collectively "Charleroi Defendants") pursuant to Rule 12 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. When making a determination regarding a motion to dismiss, the
Court must consider the facts and allegations as they are presented by Plaintiff.
Plaintiff, Jane Doe, was a seventeen-year-old student in Charleroi School District [ECF
No.1 at
2J.
Jeffery A. Hahn, Jr. ("Hahn"), an adult, was a teacher at Bethlehem Center School
District ("Bethlehem"); he was "borrowed" by Charleroi to produce a school musical at Charleroi
[ECF No.1 at 3-4]. Defendant Mason was the Principal of Charleroi [ECF No.1 at 2], and
Defendant Jennifer Marie Joyce ("Joyce") was a teacher at Charleroi and was in charge of the
school musical and responsible for recruiting Hahn as the producer [ECF No. I at 3].
Hahn and Jane Doe entered into a romantic relationship during the course of the musical
and after. The relationship included telephone and electronic communication, in-person
meetings, handholding, hugs, and other physical contact. Joyce was informed by friends of Jane
Doe and by Jane Doe herself that there was a romantic relationship between Jane Doe and Hahn
[ECF No.1 at 5]. Joyce warned Hahn to stop the inappropriate relationship but took no other
action rECF No.1 at 5]. Jane Doe also alleges that Bethlehem knew Hahn engaged in other
inappropriate relationships but failed to fully investigate or discipline Hahn [ECF No.1 at 4].
On or about May 4, 2012 Hahn requested Jane Doe to help him remove stage props from
a basement storage room at Charleroi's High School Auditorium. When the two met in the
basement storage room Hahn subdued, sexually assaulted, and forcibly raped Jane Doe. Jane
Doe's head was slammed against the wall causing a laceration and bleeding [ECF No.1 at 4-5].
Charges were brought against Hahn for sexual assault, corrupting a minor, institutional
sexual assault, and statutory sexual assault. Hahn subsequently pled guilty and was sentenced to
4-8 years' imprisonment followed by 10 years of state-supervised probation rECF No.1 at 6].
Joyce was charged with failing to report suspected child abuse and sentenced to 12 months of
court supervision rECF No. 1 at 5]. Jane Doe, and her parents have filed this action against
Charleroi, Bethlehem, Joyce, and Mason.
On July 15,2014, Plaintiff, Jane Doe, tiled a Complaint in Civil Action rECF No.1]
seeking compensatory damages, costs of suit, attorneys' fees, and any other relief the court deems
appropriate under Title IX and 42 U .S.c. § 1983. The Complaint alleges Count I, Violation of
Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (Sexual harassment and sexual assault by Hahn against Charleroi
and Mason, among others); Count II, Violation of 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (Sexual harassment and
sexual assault by Hahn against Charleroi and Mason, among others); Count III, Violation of Title
IX, 20 U .S.C. § 1681 (Sexually hostile educational environment and retaliation against Charleroi
and Mason among others); and Count IV, Violation of 42 U .S.C. § 1983 (Sexually hostile
educational environment and retaliation against Charleroi and Mason, among others) [ECF No.
1].
On September 15, 2014, Charleroi Defendants tiled their Partial Motion to Dismiss and
supporting Brief [ECF Nos. 14 and 15] claiming that Counts I, II, and III should be dismissed
with prejudice as to Mason because an individual is not a proper defendant under the law.
Charleroi Defendants also assert that Counts I and II should be dismissed with prejudice as to
Charleroi because the elements of the claim are not factually substantiated.
In Jane Doe's Brief in Opposition to Charleroi Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss
[ECF No. 17], Jane Doe consents to the Motion to Dismiss Counts I, II, and III as to Mason.
With regard to Counts I and III there can be no individual liability under Title IX, and as such a
claim cannot be maintained against an individual school official such as Mason. With regard to
Count II under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Jane Doe must show a specific causallink between Mason and
the alleged constitutional deprivation, which was not done in Jane Doe's Complaint. However,
Jane Doe requests that Count II be dismissed without prejudice in the event that discovery
reveals grounds for liability against Mason at a later date. As such, this Court will grant the
Motion to Dismiss with regard to Defendant Mason on Counts I, II, and III. Counts I and IIIare
dismissed with prejudice. Count II is dismissed without prejudice.
Jane Doe, however, contests the dismissal of Counts I and II as to Charleroi. The Court
will address the Parties' arguments with regard to these two counts below.
I. Standard of Review.
In ruling on a Rule 12(b)( 6) Motion for Fail ure to State a Claim upon which Relief can be
Granted, a court must '''accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light
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most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under'any reasonable reading of the
complaint, the plaintiffmay be entitled to relief.'" Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d
224,233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n. 7 (3d Cir.
2002»; (see also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,563, n.8 (2007». A valid
complaint requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8{a){2). Rule 8 "demands more than an unadorned, the
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.662, 678 (2009)
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
"To survive a motion to dismiss a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "Factual allegations
[ofa complaint] must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555. "This [standard] 'does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading
stage,' but instead' simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery
will reveal evidence or the necessary element." Phillips, 515 F .3d at 234 (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). Thus, "a plaintifrs obligation to provide the 'grounds' of [her] 'entitle[ment] to
relier requires more than labels and concl usions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted).
The Supreme Court in Iqbal explained that although a court must accept as true all of the
factual allegations contained in a complaint, that requirement does not apply to legal conclusions;
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therefore, pleadings must include factual allegations to support the legal claims asserted. See
556 U.S. at 678. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements do not suffice."
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see also Phillips,
515 F.3d at 232 ("We caution that without some factual allegation in the complaint, a claimant
cannot satisfy the requirement that he or she provide not only 'fair notice,' but also the 'grounds'
on which the claim rests.") (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n. 3 (2007)). Accordingly, to
survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead "factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678.
Finally, if the court decides to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the court must next decide
whether leave to amend the complaint must be granted. As explained in Phillips, "We have
instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to 12(b )(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a
curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile." 515 F3d 236 (citing
Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F 3d 103, 108 (3d Cir.2002)).
II. Relevant Facts
After the assault Jane Doe returned to Charleroi School in August of 20 12 for the new
school year. Jane Doe alleges that, upon her return, she endured harassment and confrontations
from fellow students regarding the incident with Hahn. Furthermore, Jane Doe asserts that
Principal Patricia Mason harassed her saying she did not believe Jane Doe was raped, and that
Jane Doe was just seeking attention. Mason forbade Jane Doe from getting help from teachers
[ECF No.1 at 6-7]. Jane Doe's parents reported to Superintendent, Brad Ferko, that due to
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Mason's hostile, retaliatory and harassing actions toward Jane Doe at school Jane Doe could not
remain in Charleroi School [ECF No.1 at 7].
Jane Doe began attending cyber school for periods 1 through 6 and then went to Charleroi
for the last two periods of algebra and band/music in the classroom setting [EeF No. 1 at 8].
Though Jane Doe's attendance at Charleroi was reduced, she alleges that the harassment and
retaliatory treatment continued. The blood stain left on the wall from Hahn's attack was never
cleaned though it was upsetting to Jane Doe. Jane Doe would have flashbacks and crying
episodes when she saw it, and she had requested it be cleaned repeatedly [ECF No.1 at 8].
In December of2012 Jane Doe was awarded a part in the school musical. While other
students were permitted to attend practice during school, Jane Doe was denied a hall pass to
attend practices [ECF No.1 at 8]. Due to the continuing harassment at Charleroi, and the fact
that the school district made no reasonable attempt to address the harassing behavior, Jane Doe
withdrew from Charleroi completely for the 2013-2014 school year and enrolled at an
independent cyber school program [ECF No.1 at 9].
III. Legal Analysis
Charleroi Defendants seek to dismiss several claims of Jane Doe. First, Charleroi
Defendants seek dismissal of Counts I and III under Title IX, 20 U .S.c. § 1681 as to Mason
because the Courts have consistently held that there is no individual liability under Title IX. See
Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, 555 U.S. 246, 257 (2009). Jane Doe concedes this
fact and consents to the dismissal of Counts I and III with prejudice.
Second Charleroi Defendants seek dismissal of Count II under 42 U .S.c. § 1983 as to
Mason because a necessary element of a claim under this statute is there must be a causal link
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between Mason's official conduct and the alleged constitutional or statutory deprivation. See
Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp 946, 950 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d
1195, 1204 (3d Cir. 1988). In this case Jane Doe has not alleged that Mason was acting in an
official capacity and that her official conduct subjected Jane Doe to a deprivation of a
Constitutional Right. Therefore, Jane Doe concedes the dismissal of the claim, reserving the
right to re-allege the claim should discovery produce facts to support such a claim.
Third, Charleroi Defendants seek dismissal of Count I under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681
as to Charleroi asserting that in order for a school district to be liable under this statute, an
appropriate official of the school district with authority to take correcti ve action to end the
discrimination must have actual knowledge of the discrimination and fail to adequately respond.
See Gebserv. Lago Vista Independent Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998). In this case,
Charleroi Defendants claim that the only school employee to have actual knowledge of the
relationship between Hahn and Jane Doe was Joyce, and Joyce was not an "appropriate official"
who would be required to take action under the law. Jane Doe contests the Defendants' position
and asserts that she has alleged sufficient facts that Joyce is an "appropriate person" under the
law to take corrective measures in response to actual notice of sexual harassment. We further
note that Mason is also a potentially "appropriate person" who based on the alleged facts would
also have had notice of harassing treatment of Jane Doe.
The fourth and final claim where Charleroi Defendants seek dismissal is with regard to
Count II under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Charleroi. Charleroi Defendants claim that Jane Doe
must show a policy, practice, or custom of the school district which deprived Jane Doe of some
federally secured right.
Bielevicz. v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990).
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Defendants claim that Jane Doe has not alleged any policy, practice or custom that was employed
by Charleroi and practiced by a school official that deprived Jane Doe of her rights. Charleroi
Defendants reassert that Joyce is not an "appropriate" authority and her actions, were not dictated
by any school policy, and were not attached to Charleroi procedures in any way [ECF No. 15 at
11]. Jane Doe counters Charleroi Defendants' arguments by asserting that Charleroi Defendants
interpretation of the statute is too narrow. Jane Doe once again asserts that Joyce is an
appropriate authority and representative of the school district.
Analysis
To reiterate what was stated above, on a Rule 12(b )(6) motion for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted a court must "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any
reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Phillips v. County of
£..!.!2~~,L'
515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008). A court must accept as true all of the factual
allegations contained in a complaint, however, that requirement does not apply to legal
conclusions; therefore, pleadings must include factual allegations to support the legal claims
asserted. Based on the testimony provided by both parties, we find that Plaintiffs have stated a
claim upon which relief can be granted. Therefore, Charleroi Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is
denied with regard to Counts I and If as to Charleroi.
Count I Against Charleroi
Jane Doe asserts that she was sexually assaulted by Hahn and later harassed by the
students of the school and by Principal Mason. Under 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) ("Sex"), Prohibition
against discrimination - "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
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from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
From the first day of class [of2012], Jane Doe was subjected to harassing
confrontations and comments by fellow students regarding the sexual assault and
Jane Doe's relationship with Hahn. She had flashbacks regarding the sexual
assault while in school, and was visibly reminded of the assault because she
regularly walked past the wall that had the stain from her blood. She frequently
broke down emotionally, had panic attacks, and began crying during classes.
[EeF No. 1 at 6]
During one such episode in August 20 I Jane Doe was crying
uncontroIJably during her math class. Principal Mason puIJed Jane Doe out of
class and demanded to know why she was crying and making such a scene ...
Principal Mason said that she did not believe that Jane Doe was raped by Hahn
and that Jane Doe needed to stop telling outrageous stories. Principal Mason said
that Jane Doe was making all of this up because she just wanted attention.
Principal Mason forbade Jane Doe from seeking help or guidance from any
teachers and said that Jane Doe was not permitted to leave the classroom. [ECF
No. I at 6]
"A school district may be liable under Title IX provided it: (1) has actual knowledge of:
and (2) is deliberately indifferent to, (3) harassment that is so severe, pervasive and objectively
offensive as to (4) deprive access to the educational benefits or opportunities provided by the
school." Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 School Dist., 511 F.3d 1114, 1119 (2008);
20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (West). Charleroi Defendants claim that actual knowledge may only be
gained by the school district through an "appropriate actor" and that Joyce, the only teacher with
knowledge had no authority to discipline [ECF No. 15 at 7]. Jane Doe claims that Joyce did have
authority and further states that there is no case law precedent to support that a teacher of Joyce's
stature would not have the proper authority under the law.
Viewing Plaintiffs' claim in a light most favorable to them, we find the following factual
assertions and reasonable legal inferences to be plausible: That Jane Doe attended Charleroi, a
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qualifying institution under Title IX; that Joyce, an employee of Charleroi knew of an
inappropriate relationship between Jane Doe and another contract employee (Hahn); that Jane
Doe suffered a sexual assault by Hahn; that Jane Doe suffered harassment from her peers due to
the sexual relationship and assault by Hahn; that Jane Doe was harassed by an employee of
Charleroi (Mason) upon her return to school after the assault; that Joyce, Mason, and likely other
teachers had knowledge of the alleged harassment. These allegations constitute "enough facts to
raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[ s]."
Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct at 1965). "Whether gender-oriented
conduct rises to the level of actionable "harassment" under Title IX depends on a constellation of
surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships, including, but not limited to, the ages
of the harasser and the victim and the number of individuals involved." 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681
(West).
Plaintiffs allegations in this case are plausible. Plaintiff has presented a set of facts,
which under the applicable law, present potential for a legitimate claim. We, therefore, find that
Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded a claim for relief based on the allegations.
Count II Against Charleroi
Count II against Charleroi under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 generally hinges on the same facts as
described above. The law reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
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officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West).
Charleroi Defendants state this claim should be dismissed because Jane Doe must show a
policy, practice or custom of the school district which deprived her of some federally secured
right [ECF No. 15 at 9]. Furthermore, she must show the damaging action was taken with a
requisite degree of culpability [ECF No. 15 at 10]. Jane Doe states that Charleroi implemented a
policy, pattern, custom and practice of preferential treatment with deliberate indif1erence towards
female students, and this caused a violation of Jane Doe's Constitutional Rights [ECF No.1 at
11]. Charleroi Defendants claim that Jane Doe has not sufficiently alleged any policy, practice or
custom for which Charleroi can be held liable under Section 1983 rECF No. 15 at 11].
Jane Doe counters by stating that a school district may be held liable if the actions of its
employees can be deemed to be the result of policy or custom.
Kobrick, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 137554 at *23.
[A] policy or custom may also exist where the policymaker has failed to act
affirmatively at all, [though] the need to take some action to control the agents of
the government is so obvious, and the inadequacy of existing practice to likely to
result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymaker can reasonably
be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need. Id.
The facts are identical and application of the law is similar to the claim under
Title IX above, therefore, our conclusion is the same. While precedentiallaw exists
supporting Charleroi Defendants' position that the action at issue must be based on policy
to create liability, See Board of County Com'rs of Bryan County, Ok!. v. Brown, 520 U.S.
397 (1997), based on our reading of Kobrick we find it to be a question of fact whether
Charleroi was implementing policy in its treatment of Jane Doe at the direction of Mason
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and we find it is a question of fact whether Joyce or Mason may be considered a person of
authority or representatives of Charleroi.
We find that Jane Doe has sufficiently presented plausible facts, which under the
law as applied could produce a legitimate cause of action. Because relevant case law
presents different factual scenarios where a school district may be deemed to be in
violation of Section 1983, we find that there is sufficient information in the Complaint
from which the Court can reasonably infer that the Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
IV. Conclusion.
Because Plaintiffs have provided sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss will be denied with regard Counts I and II as
to Defendant Charleroi School District. The case shall proceed in consideration of Plaintiff's
claims.
An appropriate Order follows.
~
~~hil~~~' \rv.
October}#, 2014
Senior District Court Judge
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