BELL v. COLVIN
Filing
15
OPINION granting 10 plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying 12 defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The case is remanded to the Acting Commissioner of Social Security for further proceedings consistent with the court's Opinion. See Opinion for further details. Signed by Judge Gustave Diamond on 9/14/15. (kw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYL VANIA
JOSEPH PAUL BELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
)
)
)
)
)
)
CAROLYNW. COLVIN,
ACTING COMMISSIONER
OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 14-959
)
)
)
)
)
OPINION
AND NOW, this ~fSeptember, 2015, upon consideration of the parties' crossmotions for summary judgment pursuant to plaintiff s request for review of the decision of the
Acting Commissioner of Social Security ("Acting Commissioner") denying his application for
disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act ("Act"), IT IS
ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for summary judgment (Document No.1 0) be, and the same
hereby is granted, and the Acting Commissioner's motion for summary judgment (Document No.
12) be, and the same hereby is, denied. The case will be remanded to the Acting Commissioner
pursuant to sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. §405(g) for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
When the Acting Commissioner determines that a claimant is not "disabled" within the
meaning of the Act, the findings leading to such a conclusion must be based upon substantial
evidence. "Substantial evidence has been defined as 'more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate. ", Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d
422,427 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
'l\laA072
(Rev. 8/82)
Despite the deference to administrative decisions required by this standard, reviewing courts
"'retain a responsibility to scrutinize the entire record and to reverse or remand if the [Acting
Commissioner's] decision is not supported by substantial evidence.'" Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d
310,317 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 970 (3d Cir. 1981)). In
evaluating whether substantial evidence supports an ALl's findings, '" leniency [should] be shown
in establishing the claimant's disability, and ... the [Acting Commissioner's] responsibility to
rebut it [should] be strictly construed .... m Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376,379 (3d Cir. 2003)
(quoting Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403,407 (3d Cir. 1979)). These well-established
principles dictate that the court remand this case to the Acting Commissioner for further
proceedings as explained herein.
Plaintifffiled his DIB application on January 22,2012, alleging disability beginning on July
20, 2011, due to a heart condition, fatigue, obesity and joint pain. Plaintiffs application was
denied. At plaintiffs request, an ALJ held a hearing on March 29,2013, at which plaintiff, who
was represented by counsel, appeared and testified. On April 5, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision
finding that plaintiffis not disabled. The Appeals Council denied plaintiffs request for review on
June 6, 2014, making the ALl's decision the final decision of the Acting Commissioner. The
instant action followed.
Plaintiff, who has a high school education, was 44 years old on his alleged onset date,
which is classified as a younger individual under the regulations. 20 C.F .R. §404.1563(c). Plaintiff
has past relevant work experience as an air conditioning repairman, maintenance supervisor and
maintenance worker, but he has not engaged in substantial gainful activity at any time since his
alleged onset date.
""'Aon
(Rev. 8/82)
- 2
After reviewing plaintiffs medical records and hearing testimony from plaintiff and a
vocational expert at the hearing, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning
of the Act. Although the medical evidence established that plaintiff suffers from the severe
impairments of non-sustained ventricular tachycardia, mild restrictive respiratory defect, obesity
and syncope, those impairments, alone or in combination, do not meet or equal the criteria of any
of the listed impairments set forth in Appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R., Subpart P, Regulation No.4
("Appendix 1").
The ALJ found that plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary
work, but he is precluded from bending at the waist to the extremes of the range of motion. In
addition, plaintiff is restricted from climbing or working at exposed heights. Finally, he is unable
to operate a motor vehicle or other dangerous machinery (collectively, the "RFC Finding").
The ALJ concluded that plaintiff is unable to perform his past relevant work because it
exceeds his residual functional capacity. However, based upon testimony by a vocational expert,
the ALJ determined that plaintiff is capable of performing other work that exists in significant
numbers in the national economy, such as an information clerk, ticket counter, document preparer
or telephone quote clerk. Accordingly, the ALJ found that plaintiff is not disabled within the
meaning of the Act.
The Act defines "disability" as the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity by
reason of a physical or mental impairment that can be expected to last for a continuous period of
at least twelve months. 42 U.S.c. §423(d)(l)(A). The impairment or impairments must be so
severe that the claimant "is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age,
education and work experience, engage in any other kind ofsubstantial gainful work which exists
in the national economy ...." 42 U.S.c. §423(d)(2)(A).
~A072
(Rev. 8/82)
- 3
The Social Security Regulations delineate a five-step sequential evaluation process for
determining whether a claimant is disabled. The ALJ must assess: (I) whether the claimant is
currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether he has a severe impairment; (3)
if so, whether his impairment meets or equals the criteria listed in Appendix 1; (4) if not, whether
the claimant's impairment prevents him from performing his past relevant work; and (5) if so,
whether the claimant can perform any other work that exists in the national economy, in light of
his age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity.1 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4).
If the claimant is found disabled or not disabled at any step, further inquiry is unnecessary. Id.
In this case, plaintiff argues that the ALJ' s decision is not supported by substantial evidence
for the following reasons: (1) the ALJ did not properly consider the opinion of plaintiff s treating
physician and the consultative examining physician; (2) as a result, the RFC Finding does not
adequately account for all ofpiaintiffs limitations; (3) the ALJ improperly evaluated plaintiffs
credibility; and (4) the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert was incomplete. The
court finds no merit to plaintiff's contentions concerning the ALJ's consideration of plaintiff's
treating physician's opinion2 or evaluation of his credibility.3 However, we conclude that the ALJ
lResidual functional capacity is that which an individual still is able to do despite the limitations
caused by his impainnents. 20 C.F.R. §404.1545(a)(1). In assessing one's residual functional capacity,
the AU must consider the claimant's ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory and other requirements
of work. 20 C.F.R. §404.1545(a)(4).
2Plaintiff argues that the AU did not properly consider the opinion of his treating cardiologist, Dr.
Dean Wolz, that he needs to lie down for three hours during the work day. A treating physician's opinion
is entitled to controlling weight if it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence of record. 20 C.F.R.
§404.1527(c)(2). Under this standard, the AU properly detennined that Dr. Wolz's opinion was entitled
to little weight because, as the AU explained, it was inconsistent with plaintiffs benign cardiac workup
and his pulmonary function testing which showed only a mild restrictive defect. (R.23).
3The AU evaluated plaintiffs credibility consistent with the Regulation by considering plaintiffs
own statements about his symptoms and limitations, his activities of daily living, the medical evidence of
record, the extent of plaintiffs treatment and the opinions of physicians who treated and examined him.
See 20 C.F.R. §§404.1529(c)(l) and (c)(3); Social Security Ruling 96-7p. The AU then considered the
~A072
(Rev, 8/82)
- 4
did not explain why he gave the consultative examiner's opinion great weight yet failed to
incorporate part of his assessment into the RFC Finding, which also could impact the accuracy of
the hypothetical question that was posed to the vocational expert. Accordingly, for reasons which
we explain below, the case must be remanded to the Acting Commissioner for additional
consideration at step 5 of the sequential evaluation process.
In making the RFC Finding, the ALJ relied on the opinion of consultative examining
physician Dr. Mohamed Abul-Ela, which the ALJ gave great weight. (R.23). As part ofDr. Abul
Ela's opinion, he assessed plaintiffs ability to perform various postural activities and found that
plaintiff could never bend, kneel, stoop or crouch. (R. 376). Despite giving Dr. Abul-Ela' s opinion
great weight, plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to include in the RFC Finding a limitation
precluding him from kneeling, stooping and crouching.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has observed that "no rule or regulation compels an
ALJ to incorporate into an RFC every finding made by a medical source simply because the ALJ
gives the source's opinion as a whole 'significant' weight." Wilkinson v. Commissioner of Soc.
Sec., 558 Fed. Appx. 254,256 (3d Cir. 2014). Although an ALJ is not bound to accept all aspects
of an opinion he gives significant weight, he nevertheless must provide some explanation for
discounting certain evidence. See Burnett v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112,
121 (3d Cir. 2000) (although the ALJ may weigh the credibility of the evidence when making an
extent to which plaintiff's alleged functional limitations reasonably could be accepted as consistent with
the evidence of record and how those limitations affect his ability to work. 20 C.F.R. §404.1S29(c)(4).
The ALJ concluded that the objective evidence is inconsistent with plaintiff's allegation of total disabling
limitations, and thus determined that plaintiff's testimony regarding his limitations was not entirely
credible. (R. 22). We find that the ALJ adequately explained the basis for his credibility determination,
(R. 21-23), and are satisfied that such determination is supported by substantial evidence. See Schaudeck
v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999) (an ALJ may reject the claimant's
subjective testimony if he does not find it credible so long as he explains why he is rejecting the testimony).
'
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?