KNIGHT v. MOONEY et al

Filing 24

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER re 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed by JARRED BURTON KNIGHT, the Petition is DENIED. And because jurists of reason would not find the denial of the Petition debatable, a Certificate of Appealability is also DENIED. Signed by Chief Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly on 3/27/2017. (tmr)

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JARRED BURTON KNIGHT,
Petitioner,

)
)
)
vs.
)
)
VINCENT F. MOONEY Warden SCI Coal )
Township; THE ATTORNEY GENERAL )
OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, )
Respondents. )

Civil Action No. 14-1058
Chief Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly

OPINION
Jarred Burton Knight (“Petitioner”) was convicted of, inter alia, third degree murder in
the death of his then girlfriend’s 14 month old child by, apparently, slamming the child’s head
against a wall with such force as to result in a dent to both the wall and the underlying stud. As a
result, Petitioner was sentenced to 20 to 40 years incarceration.
Petitioner, proceeding by privately retained counsel, raises four Grounds for Relief in the
instant Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody
(the “Petition”). ECF No. 1. Because none of the Grounds merits the grant of federal habeas
relief, the Petition will be denied. Because jurists of reason would not find denial of the Petition
debatable, a Certificate of Appealability will also be denied.
I. FACTUAL HISTORY
The Pennsylvania Superior Court summarized the factual background of this case as
follows in its Opinion dated May 25, 2010:
On the morning of June 23, 2007, at 8:00 a .m., Jessica Davis, mother
of the decedent, went to work and left her child in the sole care of
Appellant, her boyfriend. That afternoon, Appellant ran to a neighbor's home
seeking emergency medical help for the unresponsive child whom Appellant
alleged had accidentally hit his head. The child was life-flighted to a hospital
but later died as a result of blunt force trauma to his head.

Following a police investigation, Appellant was arrested and
charged. The Commonwealth's case centered on an indentation in the
drywall of the home's bathroom and the allegation that the child's fatal
head injuries were caused when Appellant threw the child into that wall. A
jury convicted Appellant of the child's murder, judgment of sentence was
imposed on June 1 2009. . . .
7,
Pa. Superior Court slip op., ECF No. 1-2 at 1 – 2.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. State Court
After Petitioner was convicted, he filed a direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior
Court, which affirmed the conviction. ECF No. 1-2 at 1 – 13. Petitioner filed a Petition for
Allowance of Appeal, which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied on September 10, 2010.
ECF No. 9 at 2. Petitioner then filed a petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”),
which the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County denied. ECF No. 1-4 at 1 – 15. Petitioner
appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed. ECF No. 1-5 at 1 – 15. Thereafter, Petitioner
filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal, which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied on June
24, 2014. ECF No. 9 at 2.
B. Federal Court
Petitioner filed the instant counseled Petition in this Court, raising the following four
Grounds for Relief:
GROUND ONE: The Petitioner was denied his federal constitutional right to a
fair and impartial jury when it was discovered after the trial that a juror, Amy
McMillan, should have been excluded because of a prior relationship with the
Petitioner’s uncle that created a bias in that juror and prejudiced the Petitioner.
ECF No. 1 at 5.
GROUND TWO: The Petitioner was denied his federal constitutional right to a
fair and impartial jury when that same juror had lied during voir dire and should
have been excluded from the jury.
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Id. at 7.
GROUND THREE: The PCRA Court violated the Petitioner’s 14th Amendment
right to due process and (5th A) [sic] right to compulsory process by refusing
counsel’s motion to subpoena juror Amy McMillan to testify about relationship to
Petitioner’s uncle, her untruthful answers on jury questionnaire, and her visit to
the Petitioner’s uncle after the trial.
Id. at 8.
GROUND FOUR: PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena juror
Amy McMillan for PCRA hearing and deprived Petitioner of effective assistance
of counsel and due process under the 14th Amendment to U.S. Constitution.
Hence, Petitioner was denied compulsory process (5th Amendment) to prove
juror’s lies and bias against him.
Id. at 10.
Respondents, through the District Attorney of Butler County, filed an Answer denying
that Petitioner was entitled to any relief. ECF No. 9. Petitioner then filed a Traverse, ECF No.
22, and a Brief in Support of the Petition. ECF No. 23. All parties have consented to have the
United States Magistrate Judge exercise plenary jurisdiction. ECF Nos. 10 and 11.
III. AEDPA
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, tit. I, '
101 (1996) (the “AEDPA”) which amended the standards for reviewing state court judgments in
federal habeas petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. ' 2254 was enacted on April 24, 1996. Because
Petitioner=s habeas Petition was filed after its effective date, the AEDPA is applicable to this
case. Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 195 (3d Cir. 2000).
Where the state courts have reviewed a federal issue presented to them and disposed of
the issue on the merits, and that issue is also raised in a federal habeas petition, the AEDPA
provides the applicable deferential standards by which the federal habeas court is to review the
state courts’ disposition of that issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and (e).
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In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), the United States Supreme Court has
expounded upon the standard found in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In Williams, the Supreme Court
explained that Congress intended that habeas relief for errors of law may only be granted in two
situations: 1) where the state court decision was “contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or 2) where that state court decision
“involved an unreasonable application of[] clearly established Federal law as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States.” Id. at 404-05 (emphasis deleted). A state court decision
can be contrary to clearly established federal law in one of two ways. First, the state courts could
apply a wrong rule of law that is different from the rule of law required by the United States
Supreme Court. Secondly, the state courts can apply the correct rule of law but reach an outcome
that is different from a case decided by the United States Supreme Court where the facts are
indistinguishable between the state court case and the United States Supreme Court case.
The AEDPA also permits federal habeas relief where the state court’s adjudication of the
claim “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Grounds One and Two - Alleged Juror Misconduct by Amy McMillin.
We address Grounds One and Two together because they both relate to Amy McMillin,1 a
juror at Petitioner’s trial. In Ground One, Petitioner claims that the juror Amy McMillin engaged

1

Petitioner spells the juror’s name as “McMillan” however, the state courts mostly spelled her
name as “McMillin.” We will likewise spell her name as McMillin where we are not quoting
from Petitioner’s filings.
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in misconduct and consequently, was seated as a juror when she should not have been, and
thereby denying Petitioner a fair trial. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that
A trial juror, Amy McMillan, had been charged, prior to Petitioner’s trial, with
harassment by Petitioner’s uncle, Caption [sic] Roger Knight, who is a police
officer. During voir dire and through out [sic] the trial the juror gave no
indication of this relationship. After trial, the juror visited Petitioner’s uncle.
Consequently, the evidence supporting the claim was after-discovered and the
issues were brought to light in the PCRA process. PCRA counsel failed to
subpoena the juror, Amy McMillan, for the PCRA hearing. After the PCRA
hearing, the PCRA court refused to grant the Petitioner’s request to have the juror
subpoenaed as a witness for a hearing.
ECF No. 1 at 5.
In Ground Two, Petitioner asserts as a factual basis that Amy McMillin “lied during voir
dire when she failed to disclose during voir dire that she knew Captain Roger Knight, Petitioner’s
uncle; similarly, she lied when she indicated on her questionnaire that she did not have a criminal
record. In fact, the juror had been convicted of harassment and the police officer on the case was
Petitioner’s uncle.” Id. at 7.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed these two issues on the merits as follows:
Knight asserts that he was denied his constitutional right to a fair
trial because juror Amy McMillin should have been excluded due to her
relationship with his uncle, Roger Knight, a captain of the Slippery Rock
Univer sity Police Department.
Knight correctly states the following standard for excluding a juror:
A prospective juror should be excused for
cause . . . where, irrespective of the answers
given on voir dire, the court should presume
the likelihood of prejudice on the part of the
prospective juror because the prospective juror
has such a close relationship , be it familial,
financial, or situational, with any of the parties,
counsel, victims or witnesses.
Commonwealth v . Johnson, 445 A.2d 509, 511 (Pa.Super. 1982).

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At the PCRA hearing, Roger Knight testified that he knew McMillin,
who used to clean buildings at Slippery Rock. In 2005, he interrogated her
regarding an incident , which eventually led to her convict ion for the
summary offense of harassment. In June 2009, after Knight's trial,
McMillin went to Captain Knight's office at Slippery Rock, told him that
she was a juror on Knight's case.
Captain Knight did not testify at his nephew's trial. However,
Knight states:
Captain Knight was listed as a potential witness
on the defense's witness list. Number nine on
the Witness List for Jarred Knight lists Roger
D. Davis. Unfortunately, a clerical error lists
Captain Knight's last name as Davis rather
than Knight, but the address listed is Captain
Knight's address.
Appellant's Brief, at 29.
Despite the fact that the witness list did not include Roger Knight 's
name, Knight asserts that McMillin failed to truthfully answer Question
27(C) on the jury questionnaire ("Do you know any of the following
persons (C) Defendant 's witness list?" ). Knight fails to articulate any
rational explanation why McMillin should have indicated that she knew a
person whose name was not on the witness list.
Knight further asserts that by going to see Captain Knight after
the trial, McMillan [sic] demonstrated that she could not have been a fair
and impartial juror.
At the PCRA hearing, the following exchange took place between
counsel for Knight and Captain Knight:
Q:
Were there
with [McMillin]?

other

times that

you

had

contact

A: Yes. She would stop into the university and ask for me
specifically. And in 2009, I had a call from our dispatch
saying that I had a visitor. And when I went out, it was
Amy McMillin. So I brought her back to my office. She
wanted to speak with me. And when she came in, she sat
down and apologized for Jarred's conviction, which I felt
was kind of odd. But I didn't go into conversation with her.
But she said she was sorry. And I said, oh, thanks. And she
said, I sat on the jury. And I was like, oh, really. And then I
changed the subject and asked her what she was there to
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talk to me about. So I just completely ignored the
conversation about Jarred.
PCRA Hearing, 8/ 28/ 12, at 9-10.
Based on this testimony, Knight argues, "McMillin was in effect
boasting of her involvement in this matter. It is a presumptive inference
from her conduct that she was gloating, and if she was gloating, it is
permissible to infer that she was not impartial." Appellant's Brief, at 30.
Captain Knight's testimony regarding McMillin's hearsay statements of
sorrow and apology simply does not support, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that her presence on the jury denied Knight his constitutional
right to a fair trial.
ECF No. 1-5 at 11 – 13.
1. Ground One – Alleged juror bias.
Essentially, we find the Superior Court’s disposition of Ground One to be that Petitioner
had the burden to prove bias and partiality on the part of juror McMillin, and that Petitioner
failed to carry that burden through Captain Knight’s hearsay testimony of what McMillin
supposedly told him rather than through the presentation of testimony from Juror McMillin. See
also PCRA Trial Court slip op., ECF No. 1-4 at 12 (“Defendant argues that Ms. McMillin was
biased but fails to provide any evidence of bias or prejudice.”). We do not find this disposition
of Ground One contrary to or an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court
jurisprudence on juror challenges. Indeed, it is axiomatic that a proponent alleging juror bias
bears the burden of proving juror bias. See, e.g., United States v. McDonald, 112 F.3d 511 (4th
Cir. 1997) (“A party moving for new trial because of juror misconduct bears the burden of
demonstrating that a juror failed to answer a material question, and that a truthful response by the
juror would have provided a valid basis to challenge for cause.”) (citing McDonough Power
Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984)); United States v. Estey, 595 F.3d 836, 842
(8th Cir. 2010) (“Where an attack is made upon the integrity of the trial by reason of alleged
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misconduct on the part of a juror in failing to disclose information pertinent to the issue of
prejudice, the defendant's burden of proof must be sustained not as a matter of speculation, but as
a demonstrable reality.”) (quoting United States v. Whiting, 538 F.2d 220, 223 (8th Cir. 1976));
Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185, 1189 (11th Cir. 1982) (“The Supreme Court [in Smith v.
Phillips] rejected the implied bias argument and held that due process requires only that a
defendant have the opportunity at a post-trial hearing to prove actual bias.”).
Instantly, the state courts properly assigned the burden to Petitioner to prove bias on the
part of Amy McMillin. On this record, including the undisputed facts that the name of Roger
Knight was not on the witness list (incorrectly listed as “Roger D. Davis”) and Roger Knight was
never called as a witness at trial, it cannot be said that the state courts unreasonably concluded
that Petitioner failed to carry that burden.2
2. Ground Two – Alleged lying by juror.
Petitioner seemingly suggests that this disposition of Ground Two by the Superior Court
is contrary to or an unreasonable application of McDonough Power Equipment v. Greenwood,
464 U.S. 548 (1984). ECF No. 23 at 3 – 4. In McDonough, the losing litigants argued they were
entitled to a new trial because a juror had failed to disclose material information in response to a
voir dire question. However, as acknowledged by Petitioner, the United States Supreme Court
held in that case that in order “to obtain a new trial in such a situation, a party must first

2

We note that Petitioner was given an opportunity to carry that burden by means of an
evidentiary hearing in the PCRA proceeding. However, his PCRA counsel failed to subpoena
Amy McMillin to appear at the PCRA hearing and/or only belatedly requested the PCRA trial
court to subpoena Amy McMillin, a request that the PCRA trial court apparently denied. That
PCRA counsel did not take the opportunity to establish bias in state court is not an error on the
part of the state courts but, as recognized by present counsel, is an error on the part of Petitioner’s
PCRA counsel, and hence, Petitioner’s claim in Ground Four that PCRA counsel was ineffective
for failing to subpoena Amy McMillin.
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demonstrate that a juror had failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then
further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.”
Id. at 556. Petitioner argues that Juror McMillin failed to answer two questions honestly on the
voir dire question. Namely, Petitioner contends that McMillin failed to disclose that 1) she had
been convicted of a crime, and 2) that she knew Captain Knight. ECF No. 23 at 3 – 4.
In Ground Two, Petitioner contends that Amy McMillin lied in her responses to the voir
dire questions. However, the state courts reasonably concluded that Petitioner failed to establish
that Amy McMillin lied. Indeed, Petitioner has failed to carry his burden to show that the state
courts’ adjudication of this claim that Amy McMillin lied, was contrary to or an unreasonable
application of McDonough. Specifically, Petitioner failed to convince the state courts in the first
instance that McMillin “had failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire” the very
threshold showing to properly invoke McDonough. The state courts expressly found that “it is
clear from the record that McMillin did not lie about knowing a person whose name appeared on
the witness list. Further, she did not lie when she indicated that she had not committed a crime.”
ECF No. 1-5. These are factual determinations entitled to AEDPA’s presumption of
correctness, which Petitioner has failed to rebut with clear and convincing evidence.
Petitioner fails to show that McMillin was dishonest about having been convicted of a
“crime.” As the PCRA court explained, “a summary harassment conviction would not have
prevented Ms. McMillin from serving as a juror (42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4502, Qualifications of jurors).”
ECF No. 1-4 at 11. And as Respondents point out a “crime” does not include a summary
offense, such as harassment, which is what McMillin had pleaded guilty to. ECF No. 9 at 13 -14.
Accordingly, on this record, the state courts’ finding of fact that McMillin did not lie or at least

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that Petitioner failed to establish with evidence that she lied, is presumptively correct and
Petitioner has failed to rebut this presumptively true fact with any evidence.
As to the alleged lie that McMillin told by not disclosing that she knew Captain Knight
who was listed on Petitioner’s potential witness list but under the name of “Roger D. Davis,”3 the
state courts found that again Petitioner failed to establish that McMillin lied. PCRA Court slip
op. at 11 (“Neither witness list contains the name Roger Knight.”); Superior Court slip op., ECF
No. 1-5 at 12 (“Despite the fact that the witness list did not include Roger Knight’s name, Knight
asserts that McMillin failed to truthfully answer Question 27(C) on the jury questionnaire (‘Do
you know any of the following persons (C) Defendants’ witness list?’). Knight fails to articulate
any rational explanation why McMillan [sic] should have indicated that she knew a person whose
name was not on the witness list.”). Petitioner fails to rebut the factual determination of the
Courts either that McMillin did not lie or to rebut the finding that Petitioner failed to establish
that she lied. Hence, Petitioner has not shown that this factual determination of the state courts
was unreasonable.
In light of the state court’s finding that Petitioner failed to carry his burden to show that
McMillin lied, we find that Petitioner has not established the state courts’ disposition of this
claim was contrary to or an unreasonable application of McDonough.

3

As Respondents point out:
“Petitioner states: Captain Knight was listed as a potential witness on the
defense’s witness list. Number nine on the Witness List for Jarred Knight lists
Roger D. Davis. Unfortunately a clerical error lists Captain Knight’s last name as
Davis rather than Knight, but the address listed is Captain Knight’s address.”

ECF No. 9 at 12.
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Petitioner explicitly argues that the state courts’ disposition of apparently both Grounds
One and Two was an unreasonable application of Williams v. Price, 343 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2003);
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000) and Jones v. Cooper, 311 F.3d 306, 310 (4th Cir.
2002). ECF No. 23 at 4. Petitioner does not argue the significance of these cases but merely
cites to them. This is insufficient to carry his burden under AEDPA. Indeed, the court in
Williams v. Taylor, did not address the issue of juror misconduct in any manner. Hence,
Williams v. Taylor is of no significance to the state courts’ decision with respect to this claim of
alleged juror misconduct/bias.
To the extent that lower federal courts’ decisions are relevant to the inquiry under 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), we find that Petitioner has failed to establish that the state courts’
adjudication of this claim was an unreasonable application of Williams v. Price. The discussion
in Williams v. Price, is distinguishable on its facts from this case because here the state courts
found that McMillin did not lie in her questionnaire, whereas there was no such state court
finding of fact in Williams v. Price. Williams v. Price, 343 F.3d at 234 (“the Commonwealth's
brief argues that Hayes's evidence did not show that the juror in question lied during voir dire.
Appellee's Br. at 15. We would be presented with a different question in this appeal if the state
courts had made a factual finding that Hayes's testimony was not credible or that the juror in
question, despite the comment recounted by Hayes, had answered the pertinent voir dire
questions truthfully. In either of those circumstances, we would be compelled to decide whether
the state courts' findings were ‘unreasonable’ in light of the state court record. 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(2). But the state courts made no such findings.”). We have already determined that the
state courts’ finding that McMillin did not lie, is not an unreasonable determination of the facts
in this case. Accordingly, Williams v. Price does not establish that the state courts applied
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clearly established Supreme Court precedents unreasonably. Moreover, the state courts did not
apply the “no impeachment” rule in this case as the state courts had done in the case of Williams
v. Price, which was the concern in Williams v. Price.
As to Jones v. Cooper, Petitioner fails to elaborate how that case supports a contention
that the state courts’ decision herein unreasonably applied United States Supreme Court
precedent. Nor do we find that Jones v. Cooper supports such a contention. There, as here, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that the Petitioner failed to
establish the juror lied or was biased against the criminal defendant.
Accordingly, Ground One and Ground Two fail to afford Petitioner relief in this federal
habeas proceeding.
B. Grounds Three and Four - Alleged Errors During PCRA Proceedings.
We will address Grounds Three and Four together as they concern alleged errors
occurring during the PCRA proceedings. In Ground Three, Petitioner claims that his rights to
substantive due process, i.e., fundamental fairness, and compulsory process were violated by the
PCRA trial court rejecting his PCRA counsel’s belated request to subpoena Amy McMillin. In
Ground Four, Petitioner implicitly concedes that it was not PCRA trial court error but was in fact
due to the ineffectiveness on the part of PCRA counsel for failing to subpoena Amy McMillin in
a timely manner or to request such a subpoena in a timely manner, i.e., before the PCRA hearing
had concluded, that caused him to not present the testimony of Amy McMillin.
The problem for Petitioner is that alleged errors in the course of the PCRA proceedings
simply do not provide a basis for the grant of the federal writ of habeas corpus. "[H]abeas
proceedings are not the appropriate forum for [the petitioner] to pursue claims of error at the
PCRA proceeding." Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 247 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Hassine v.
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Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 954 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[T]he federal role in reviewing an application
for habeas corpus is limited to evaluating what occurred in the state or federal proceedings that
actually led to the petitioner's conviction; what occurred in the petitioner's collateral proceeding
does not enter into the habeas calculation."). Hence, any and all of Petitioner’s claims, regarding
errors allegedly committed by the state courts during the PCRA proceedings, fail to afford a basis
for the grant of habeas relief in these federal habeas proceedings.
C. No Right to Evidentiary Hearing in this Court.
Lastly, in his Traverse, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing in
this Court as a matter of right, apparently to establish that his federal rights to a fair trial were
violated by the presence of Amy McMillin on the jury. ECF No. 22, ¶ 6. In support thereof,
Petitioner cites to Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). Petitioner alleges that the state court
fact finding was inadequate because of its refusal to grant PCRA counsel’s belated request to
subpoena Amy McMillin. Petitioner is simply mistaken on the law.
First and foremost, Petitioner fails to acknowledge the abundant case law which notes
that Townsend’s holding with respect to mandatory evidentiary hearings held in federal habeas
proceedings has been superseded by AEDPA. See, e.g., Cotto v. Murray, No. CIV.A. 10-99,
2011 WL 1118724, at *6 (W.D. Pa. March 24, 2011) (“Petitioner also contends that he is entitled
to an evidentiary hearing, and in support he relies upon Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct.
745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963). [ECF No. 16 at p. 2]. Petitioner's reliance on Townsend is misplaced.
In it, the U.S. Supreme Court enunciated standards regarding when a district court was required
to conduct a federal habeas evidentiary hearing. That decision was superseded by AEDPA, which
significantly amended the federal habeas statute applicable to state prisoners, 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
and it applies to all habeas petitions filed after its effective date of April 24, 1996.”).
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In fact, post-AEDPA, because the state courts adjudicated Petitioner’s two claims with
respect to Amy McMillin on the merits, this Court is affirmatively prohibited from holding an
evidentiary hearing on these two claims. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011).
In Pinholster, the United States Supreme Court declared:
We now hold that review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that
was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Section
2254(d)(1) refers, in the past tense, to a state-court adjudication that “resulted in”
a decision that was contrary to, or “involved” an unreasonable application of,
established law. This backward-looking language requires an examination of the
state-court decision at the time it was made. It follows that the record under
review is limited to the record in existence at that same time i.e., the record before
the state court.
Id. at 181 - 182.
In light of Pinholster, this Court cannot hold an evidentiary hearing on Grounds One or
Two, the only grounds that raise a claim that can provide a ground for relief in these federal
habeas proceedings.
D. Certificate of Appealability.
Because jurists of reason would not find the foregoing denial of the habeas Petition
debatable, a Certificate of Appealability is denied.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the Petition is denied. A Certificate of Appealability is
also denied.
BY THE COURT:
Date: March 27, 2017

cc:

s/Maureen P. Kelly
MAUREEN P. KELLY
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

All counsel of record via CM-ECF
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