BROWN v. COLVIN
Filing
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ORDER denying 11 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 13 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 3/26/15. (slh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PATRICIA BROWN,
Plaintiff,
-vsCAROLYN W. COLVIN,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 14-1109
AMBROSE, Senior District Judge
OPINION
Pending before the court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 11 and
13). Both parties have filed Briefs in Support of their Motions. (ECF Nos. 12 and 14). After
careful consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based on my Opinion set forth
below, I am denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 11) and granting
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 13).
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brought this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security (ACommissioner@) denying her applications for disability insurance benefits (DIB”) and
supplemental security income (“SSI”) pursuant to the Social Security Act (AAct@). Plaintiff filed
her applications alleging she had been disabled since January 1, 2012. (ECF No. 5-6, pp. 2, 6).
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), Daniel F. Cusick, held a hearing on April 3, 2013. (ECF No.
5-3, pp. 2-56). On May 3, 2013, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act.
(ECF No. 5-2, pp. 19-32).
After exhausting all administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed the instant action with this
court. The parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (Docket Nos. 11 and 13).
The issues are now ripe for review.
II.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
A.
Standard of Review
The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence exists in
the record to support the Commissioner=s decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir.
1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as Amore than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.@ Ventura v. Shalala, 55
F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995), quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
Additionally, the Commissioner=s findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are
conclusive. 42 U.S.C. '405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). A
district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner=s decision or re-weigh the
evidence of record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Where the ALJ's
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if
the court would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360
(3d Cir. 1999). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, however,
the district court must review the record as a whole. See, 5 U.S.C. '706.
To be eligible for social security benefits, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he cannot
engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. '423(d)(1)(A); Brewster v. Heckler,
786 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986).
The Commissioner has provided the ALJ with a five-step sequential analysis to use
when evaluating the disabled status of each claimant. 20 C.F.R. '404.1520(a). The ALJ must
determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not,
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a severe impairment,
whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P., appx. 1; (4) if the
impairment does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether the claimant=s impairments
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prevent him from performing his past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of
performing his past relevant work, whether he can perform any other work which exists in the
national economy, in light of his age, education, work experience and residual functional
capacity. 20 C.F.R. '404.1520. The claimant carries the initial burden of demonstrating by
medical evidence that he is unable to return to his previous employment (steps 1-4).
Dobrowolsky, 606 F.2d at 406. Once the claimant meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts
to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in alternative substantial gainful
activity (step 5). Id.
A district court, after reviewing the entire record may affirm, modify, or reverse the
decision with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris, 745
F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1984).
B.
Step 2 - Severe Impairment and Medically Determinable Impairment
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred in finding her mental impairment of depression
was not a “severe” impairment and in finding her fibromyalgia was not a medically determinable
impairment. (ECF No. 12, pp. 11-13). Based on the same, Plaintiff argues that remand is
warranted. Id.
At step 2 of the analysis, an ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a medically
determinable impairment that is severe.
20 C.F.R. §§416.920(a), 404.1520(a).
A severe
impairment is one which significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work
activities. 20 C.F.R. §§416.920(c), 404.1520(c). Thus, an impairment is not severe if it is a
slight abnormality or a combination of slight abnormalities that causes no more than minimal
functional limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§416.924(c); 404.1520(c). If a claimant is found to have a
severe impairment, then the ALJ proceeds to the next step. 20 C.F.R. §§416.920(a);
404.1520(a).
When an ALJ finds that a plaintiff suffers from even one severe impairment, the failure to
find other impairments severe is not harmful to the integrity of the analysis because the plaintiff
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is not denied benefits at that stage and the ALJ continues with the analysis. Salles v.
Commissioner of Social Sec., 229 Fed.Appx. 140, 144-145, n. 2, 2007 WL 1827129 (3d Cir.
2007); Sheeler v. Astrue, No. 08-64J, 2009 WL 789892, 4 -5 (W.D.Pa. March 24, 2009); Hanke
v. Astrue, No. 12-2364, 2012 WL 6644201, *4 (7th Cir. Dec. 21, 2012). In this case, the ALJ did
not find Plaintiff’s mental impairments to be severe at step 2. (ECF No. 5-2, p. 22). Additionally,
the ALJ did not find Plaintiff’s alleged fibromyalgia to be a medically determinable impairment
(and as such, the ALJ did not even consider the severity of the same). Id. After a review of the
record, I find there is substantial evidence of record to support the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s
mental impairment of depression was not severe and that Plaintiff’s alleged fibromyalgia was
not a medically determinable impairment.1 (ECF No. 5-2 p. 22).
Furthermore, the ALJ found Plaintiff to have the following severe impairments: bilateral
carpal tunnel syndrome and right sided tennis elbow (epicondylitis), status post releases;
degenerative joint disease of the knees, status post surgeries; lumbar degenerative disc
disease; obesity; and anemia. (ECF No. 5-2, pp. 21-22). Therefore, Plaintiff was not denied
benefits at step 2.
Rather, the ALJ proceeded beyond step 2 to determine Plaintiff’s residual
functional capacity (“RFC”). (ECF No. 5-2, pp. 24-32). Therefore, the ALJ did not err in this
regard and remand is not warranted on this basis.
C.
Opinion of Treating Physician
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred in failing to give “substantial weight” to her
treating physician, Dr. Lisa Guthrie. (ECF No. 12, pp. 14-15). The amount of weight accorded
to medical opinions is well-established. Generally, the ALJ will give more weight to the opinion
of a source who has examined the claimant than to a non-examining source. 20 C.F.R. §
416.927(c)(1). In addition, the ALJ generally will give more weight to opinions from a treating
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I note that the ALJ specifically stated that “although fibromyalgia is not considered to be a medically
determinable impairment for purposes of this decision, all of the claimant’s pain symptoms and reported
limitations have been considered in the context of her other medically determinable impairments including
her upper and lower extremity conditions and lumbar degenerative disc disease.” (ECF No. 5-2, p. 22).
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physician, “since these sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a
detailed, longitudinal picture of [a claimant’s] medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique
perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings
alone or from reports of individual examinations, such as consultative examinations or brief
hospitalizations.” Id. § 416.927(c)(2). If the ALJ finds that “a treating source’s opinion on the
issue(s) of the nature and severity of [a claimant’s] impairment(s) is well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other
substantial evidence [of] record,” he must give that opinion controlling weight. Id. Also, “the
more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight [the ALJ generally]
will give to that opinion.” Id. § 416.927(c)(4). In the event of conflicting medical evidence, the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained:
“A cardinal principle guiding disability determinations is that the ALJ accord
treating physicians’ reports great weight, especially ‘when their opinions reflect
expert judgment based on continuing observation of the patient’s condition over a
prolonged period of time.’” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000)
(quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999)). However, “where .
. . the opinion of a treating physician conflicts with that of a non-treating, nonexamining physician, the ALJ may choose whom to credit” and may reject the
treating physician’s assessment if such rejection is based on contradictory
medical evidence. Id. Similarly, under 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2), the opinion of a
treating physician is to be given controlling weight only when it is well-supported
by medical evidence and is consistent with other evidence in the record.
Becker v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., No. 10-2517, 2010 WL 5078238, at *5 (3d Cir. Dec.
14, 2010). Although the ALJ may choose whom to credit when faced with a conflict, he “cannot
reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.” Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Security, 577
F.3d 500, 505 (3d Cir. 2009).
In this case, Plaintiff first seems to argue that the ALJ improperly disregarded the opinion
of Dr. Guthrie that Plaintiff was temporarily disabled from May 1, 2012 through May 1, 2013.
(ECF No. 12, p. 14). A treating physician=s assertion that a plaintiff is Adisabled@ or Aunable to
work,@ however, is not dispositive of the issue. 20 C.F.R. §' 404.1527, 416.927. Such ultimate
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questions of disability are reserved solely for the ALJ. Id. Thus, the ALJ was not required to
give such opinion substantial weight.
Next, Plaintiff seems to argue that the ALJ erred in failing to give Dr. Guthrie’s opinions
set forth in physical capacity evaluation forms substantial weight simply because Dr. Guthrie
was Plaintiff’s treating physician and Dr. Guthrie kept informed as to Plaintiff’s treatment. (ECF
No. 12, pp. 14-15). As set forth above, when there are conflicting medical opinions, the ALJ
may choose whom to credit. Becker, 2010 WL 5078238 at *5; Diaz, 577 F.3d at 505. After a
review of the record, I find the reasons given by the ALJ in weighing the opinions of Dr. Guthrie
to be appropriate, sufficiently explained and supported by sufficient evidence of record. (ECF
No. 5-2, pp. 19-32); 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.927, 404.1527 (discussing the evaluation of medical
opinions). Therefore, I find no error in this regard on the part of the ALJ. Consequently, remand
is not warranted on this basis.
D.
Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) 2
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ improperly determined her RFC. (ECF No. 12, pp. 1618). In support thereof, however, Plaintiff’s entire argument is that there is substantial evidence
to support that she is not able to physically or mentally do the work set forth in the ALJ’s RFC
finding. Id. The standard is not whether there is evidence to establish Plaintiff’s position but,
rather, is whether there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding. Allen v. Bowen,
881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir. 1989). Thus, the support for Plaintiff’s argument is entirely misplaced.
Nonetheless, I have reviewed the record and based on the same, I find there is substantial
evidence of record to support the ALJ’s RFC determination.3 (ECF No. 5-2, pp. 19-32).
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RFC refers to the most a claimant can still do despite his/her limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a),
416.945(a). The assessment must be based upon all of the relevant evidence, including the medical
records, medical source opinions, and the individual’s subjective allegations and description of his own
limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a).
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The ALJ found Plaintiff has the RFC to perform light work with the following exceptions: “lift or carry up
to 20 [pounds] occasionally; lift or carry up to 10 pounds frequently; stand or walk for four hours in an
eight-hour workday; sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday; frequently balance; occasionally climbs
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Consequently, remand is not warranted on this basis.4
E.
Vocational Expert
Plaintiff next submits that the ALJ erred by improperly disregarding vocational expert
testimony and by relying on an incomplete hypothetical question. (ECF No. 12, pp. 18-19). I
disagree. An ALJ is required to accept only that testimony from the vocational expert which
accurately reflects a plaintiff’s impairments. See, Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210 (3d Cir.
1984); Chrupcala v. Heckler, 829 F.2d 1269, 1276 (3d Cir. 1987). Based on my review of the
record, there is substantial evidence that the ALJ’s hypothetical questions accurately reflected
Plaintiff’s impairments. (ECF No. 5-2, pp. 19-32). Consequently, I find no error in this regard.
An appropriate order shall follow.
ramps or stairs; occasionally climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; and occasionally stoop, kneel, couch, and
crawl.” (ECF No. 5-2, p. 24).
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Plaintiff, in one fleeting sentence, seems to suggest that the ALJ erred in failing to give great weight to
Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her inability to work due to her impairments. (ECF No. 12, p. 18). In
evaluating whether a plaintiff’s statements are credible, the ALJ will consider evidence from treating,
examining and consulting physicians, observations from agency employees, and other factors such as
the claimant's daily activities, descriptions of the pain, precipitating and aggravating factors, type, dosage,
effectiveness, and side effects of medications, treatment other than medication, and other measures used
to relieve the pain. 20 C.F.R. '§416.929(c), 404.1529(c); SSR 96-7p. The ALJ will also look at
inconsistencies between the claimant's statements and the evidence presented. Id. I must defer to the
ALJ=s credibility determinations, unless they are not supported by substantial evidence. Smith v.
Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 972 (3d Cir. 1981); Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d 309, 312 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 931 (1975). After my own review of the record, I find that the ALJ followed the proper
method to determine the Plaintiff’s credibility and his opinion is based on substantial evidence. As laid
out in his decision, the ALJ considered the factors set forth above. (ECF No. 5-2, pp. 30-31). For
example, while assessing Plaintiff=s credibility, the ALJ compared the medical evidence to her complaints
and found them to be contradictory. Id. The ALJ also discussed the fact that Plaintiff=s complaints were
contradicted by her daily activities and her testimony was inconsistent. Id. Thus, I find the ALJ properly
evaluated Plaintiff's credibility as required by 20 C.F.R. '404.1529 and SSR 96-7p and, based on the
entire record as a whole, there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ=s conclusion. (ECF No. 5-2, pp.
19-31). Therefore, I find no error in this regard.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PATRICIA BROWN,
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Plaintiff,
-vsCAROLYN W. COLVIN,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 14-1109
AMBROSE, Senior District Judge
ORDER OF COURT
THEREFORE, this 26th day of March, 2015, it is ordered that Plaintiff=s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Docket No. 11) is denied and Defendant=s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Docket No. 13) is granted.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Donetta W. Ambrose
Donetta W. Ambrose
United States Senior District Judge
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