DANIELS v. UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH MEDICAL CENTER
Filing
18
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 11 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly on 5/14/2015. [A copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order was mailed to Plaintiff on this date at her address of record]. (bb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
BARBARA DANIELS,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH
MEDICAL CENTER,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Civil Action No. 14-1118
Chief Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly
Re: ECF No. 11
MEMORANDUM OPINION
KELLY, Chief Magistrate Judge
Presently before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11) filed by University of
Pittsburgh Medical Center (“Defendant”), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
with respect to all claims pled in Barbara Daniels’ (“Plaintiff”) Complaint of August 26, 2014
(ECF No. 3). Plaintiff’s claims are asserted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101, et seq. (“ADA”). (Id.). This Court exercises subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) and 1343 (civil rights). For
the reasons that follow, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED, in part, and
DENIED, in part.
1
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is an African American female formerly employed as Internal Adjuster/
Research Support for Defendant 1 beginning April 15, 2011. (ECF No. 3 at 2). Plaintiff was
supervised by Senior Director of Claims Operations Ronald Lacy, a Caucasian male. (Id.). At
some point during her tenure, Plaintiff sought a work-related accommodation from Defendant for
Lymphedema, which rendered Plaintiff unable to walk or sit for extended periods without ready
access to a restroom to relieve the buildup of excess fluid in her body. (Id.). Defendant granted
Plaintiff the ability to work from home as an accommodation. (Id.).
While working from home, Plaintiff experienced difficulties meeting performance
expectations. (Id.). Plaintiff attributed these difficulties, in part, to technical issues she
experienced while connecting to work via her home computer. (Id. at 3). Additionally,
Plaintiff’s job assignments were frequently changed prior to completion of pre-existing
assignments and without adequate training or instruction. (Id.). Neither of these issues was
factored into Plaintiff’s performance reviews, and there was no discussion of the potential need
for further accommodation in order for Plaintiff to complete her fluctuating duties satisfactorily.
(Id.).
As a result of her inconsistent performance, Plaintiff was ultimately terminated on
October 7, 2012. (Id. at 2). During Plaintiff’s term of employment, Rebecca Shutter and Alexis
Nestor, both Caucasian, held the same position as Plaintiff. (Id.). Neither had a disability
1
In its Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Defendant
asserts that Plaintiff was employed by UPMC Health Plan, and not by the University of
Pittsburgh Medical Center – which is a separate and distinct entity. (ECF No. 12 at 1 n. 1; 17 at
1 n. 1). Defendant does not concede that it is the proper defendant in the current litigation. The
Court notes, upon review of the docket of this matter, that Plaintiff’s Civil Cover Sheet (ECF 31) names UPMC Health Plan as the Defendant in this action, while the caption of her Complaint
identifies the Defendant as University of Pittsburgh Medical Center. (ECF No. 3).
2
requiring an accommodation similar to Plaintiff. (Id.). Nonetheless, Ms. Shutter and Ms. Nestor
also failed to meet performance standards. (Id.). Ms. Shutter was not terminated, however, and
while Ms. Nestor was initially terminated, she was later re-hired for the same position. (Id.).
Plaintiff thereafter filed her Complaint 2 in this Court on August 26, 2014. (ECF No. 3).
Plaintiff alleges therein that Defendant’s conduct towards her throughout the duration of her
employment and at the time of her termination constituted race-based disparate treatment in
violation of Title VII, and disability-based disparate treatment in violation of the ADA. (ECF
No. 3 at 3). Plaintiff’s Civil Cover Sheet also includes an unspecified claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, but Plaintiff does not explicitly address this claim. (ECF No. 3-1 at 1). In response to the
Complaint, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
on February 3, 2015, with an accompanying Memorandum of Law. (ECF Nos. 11, 12). Plaintiff
filed her Reply and accompanying brief on March 4, 2015. (ECF Nos. 14, 15). Defendant filed
its Reply on March 18, 2015. (ECF No. 17). The matter is now fully briefed and ripe for
disposition.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain a short and
plain statement of a claim, and show that the pleader is entitled to relief. Dismissal of a
complaint or portion of a complaint is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
when a claimant fails to sufficiently state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Avoiding
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) requires a pleading party’s complaint to provide “enough factual
2
Plaintiff contends, although it was not affirmatively pled in her Complaint, that she
properly exhausted all required administrative remedies with the Pennsylvania Human Relations
Commission and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission prior to filing her Complaint with
this Court. Defendant argues that this omission requires dismissal. The adequacy of Plaintiff’s
pleadings will be addressed in this Court’s Discussion, infra at 9.
3
matter” to allow the case to move beyond the pleading stage of litigation; the pleader must
“‘nudge his or her claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.’” Phillips v. County of
Allegheny, 515 F. 3d 224, 234 – 35 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atlantic Co. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 556, 570 (2007)).
In assessing the merits of a claim subject to a motion to dismiss, a court must engage in a
two-part analysis. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F. 3d 203, 210 – 11 (3d Cir. 2009). First,
factual and legal elements of a claim must be distinguished. Id. Second, it must be determined
whether the facts as alleged support a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. In making the latter
determination, the court must be mindful that the matter pleaded need not include “detailed
factual allegations,” Phillips, 515 F. 3d at 231 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), and the court
must construe all alleged facts, and draw all inferences gleaned therefrom, in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 228 (citing Worldcom, Inc. v. Graphnet, Inc., 343 F. 3d
651, 653 (3d Cir. 2003)). Moreover, a pleading party need only “put forth allegations that ‘raise
a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s].’”
Fowler, 578 F. 3d at 213 (quoting Graff v. Subbiah Cardiology Associates, Ltd., 2008 WL
2312671 (W.D. Pa. June 4, 2008)). A well-pleaded complaint, even when “it strikes a savvy
judge that actual proof of . . . facts is improbable,” will not be dismissed as long as the pleader
demonstrates that his or her claim is plausible. Phillips, 515 F. 3d at 234 (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555 – 56). Additionally, when a Plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court must interpret his or
her pleadings liberally. Rhett v. New Jersey State Superior Court, 260 Fed. App’x 513, 515 (3d
Cir. 2008) (citing Erikson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)) (“[A] pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers”).
4
Nevertheless, the facts provided do need to raise the expectation of relief above a purely
speculative level, and must include more than “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action.” Phillips, 515 F. 3d at 231 – 32 (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 554 – 56). Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a ‘showing’ rather than a blanket assertion of an
entitlement to relief.” Id. at 232. “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Fowler, 578 F. 3d at 211 (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
Through its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s ADA and Title VII
claims are time-barred. A statute of limitations is an affirmative defense which is typically raised
in an answer. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c)(1). However, “the limitations defense may be raised on a motion
under Rule 12(b)(6) ... if ‘the time alleged in the statement of the claim shows that the cause of
action has not been brought within the statute of limitations.’” Bethel v. Jendoco Const. Corp.,
570 F.2d 1168, 1174 (3d Cir. 1978) (quoting Hanna v. U.S. Veterans’ Admin. Hosp., 514 F.2d
1092, 1094 (3d Cir. 1975)). Further, Defendant’s reliance on a statute of limitations may be
considered to the extent documents of public record establish that Plaintiff’s causes of action
against the named Defendants have not been brought within the applicable limitations period for
each of her claims. Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014).
III.
DISCUSSION
A. Timeliness of Complaint
In its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant begins by arguing that Plaintiff’s claims are time-
barred. (ECF No. 12 at 4 – 7). Defendant states Plaintiff filed a complaint with the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (“PHRC”) on September 19, 2012 (Case No.
201201222), and amended her complaint on February 28, 2013. (ECF No. 12 at 1-2). Plaintiff
5
filed a second complaint with the PHRC on February 28, 2013 (Case No. 201203280). (Id.).
Plaintiff dual filed both complaints (Charge Nos. 17F-2013-60712 and 17F-2013-60713) with
the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (Id.). In the
complaints presented to the PHRC and EEOC, Plaintiff made charges of discrimination based
upon disability and race. (Id.).
After conducting an investigation, the PHRC failed to find sufficient evidence to credit
Plaintiff’s claims of discrimination. (ECF Nos. 12 at 2, 12-1, 12-2). Subsequently, the EEOC
adopted the findings of the PHRC, and issued Dismissal and Notice of Rights letters (“right-tosue letters”) to Plaintiff on April 9 and 16, 2014, with regard to both of Plaintiff’s complaints.
(ECF Nos. 12 at 2, 12-3, 12-4). Both right-to-sue letters indicate that Plaintiff retained the right
to independently pursue her claims in court within 90 days of receipt of the letters. (Id.).
Plaintiff ultimately filed the present Complaint in this Court on August 26, 2014, well beyond
the 90 day period.
Plaintiff failed to affirmatively plead the above facts in her Complaint; however, in her
opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff concedes the veracity of Defendant’s
recitation of the above facts. (ECF No. 15 at 1). Nonetheless, she requests that the Court
disregard the 90 day time bar in accordance with the principle of equitable tolling, because she
was “homeless and was forced to leave Pittsburgh and reside with a parent for many months.”
(ECF No. 14 at 1).
Treated as a statute of limitations, the 90 day period within which a claimant must file a
complaint after receiving a right-to-sue letter “is strictly enforced and a delay of even one day
will bar a claim.” Burgh v. Borough Council of the Borough of Montrose, 251 F. 3d 465, 472
(3d Cir. 2001) (citing Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel, Inc., 188 F. 3d 172, 176 – 87 (3d Cir.
6
1999)). Equitable tolling may allow a plaintiff to avoid dismissal when it appears that the
passage of a limitations period would bar a discrimination claim; but, the appropriateness of
equitable tolling has been recognized in only three circumstances: “(1) where the defendant has
actively misled the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff’s cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff in
some extraordinary way has been prevented from asserting his or her rights; or (3) where the
plaintiff asserted his or her rights mistakenly in the wrong forum.” Hanani v. New Jersey Dep’t
of Envtl. Prot., 205 F. App’x 71, 76 – 77 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein,
Sedran & Berman, 38 F. 3d 1380, 1387 (3d Cir. 1994)). The above notwithstanding, equitable
relief is to be extended only sparingly. Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F. 3d 1018, 1023 (3d Cir. 1997).
The “procedural requirements established by Congress for gaining access to the federal courts
are not to be disregarded by courts out of a vague sympathy for particular litigants.” Seitzinger
v. Reading Hospital and Medical Ctr., 165 F. 3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Baldwin
County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984)).
In this case, Plaintiff’s argument appears to invoke the second justification for equitable
tolling: extraordinary circumstances. This principle provides for the tolling of a limitations
period for an otherwise untimely action when an exceptional or extraordinary circumstance
“prevents a plaintiff from asserting a right despite the exercise of reasonable diligence.” Hanani,
205 F. App’x at 77 (citing Merritt v. Blaine, 326 F. 3d 157, 168 (3d Cir. 2003)). Reasonable
diligence is the key determinative factor, here, and the burden of demonstrating extraordinary
circumstances warranting equitable tolling falls upon Plaintiff. Rogan v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 113
F. Supp. 2d 777, 789 (W.D. Pa. 2000).
However unfortunate Plaintiff’s living situation following her termination by Defendant,
Plaintiff has not demonstrated to this Court that she exercised reasonable diligence in pursuing
7
her claims. Plaintiff has not provided this Court with any information regarding the duration of
her homelessness, or the particular state of her homelessness. Plaintiff does not differentiate
between whether she was homeless in the sense that she was living on the street or in a shelter, or
whether she simply moved in with her parents due to unspecified financial or other
circumstances – as she seems to indicate. If Plaintiff was “homeless” only to the extent that she
needed to move in with her parents, this constitutes nothing more than a change of address.
Having changed address without informing either the PHRC or EEOC, resulting in a failure to
receive the right-to-sue letters, is not the exercise of reasonable diligence. Oloo v. Bloomberg
LP, 2013 WL 706292 at * 3 (D. N.J. Feb. 26, 2013); Carl v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co.,
2010 WL 3860432 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2010).
If Plaintiff was homeless prior to moving in with her parents, she has failed to provide
any evidence to this Court to allow for a determination as to the degree of diligence exercised.
What this Court is able to discern from the pleadings, as a whole, is that following her
termination, Plaintiff was capable of filing grievances with the PHRC and EEOC, was ultimately
capable of obtaining her right-to-sue letters, and was also able to file a complaint in this Court.
Plaintiff has provided no other information with respect to her inability to inform either the
PHRC or EEOC of her living situation and/or to make arrangements for the receipt of notice of
the agencies’ ultimate determinations. This is insufficient to satisfy Plaintiff’s substantial burden
of demonstrating that despite the exercise of reasonable diligence, extraordinary circumstances
prevented her from filing a claim prior to the expiration of the 90 day period. Indeed, no
evidence is provided which indicates that any degree of diligence was exercised.
As such, this Court is compelled to find that, even viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff as the non-moving party, and construing her pleadings liberally, Plaintiff’s
8
claims under Title VII and the ADA are time-barred. Defendants Motion to Dismiss will,
therefore, be granted. However, the Court is not persuaded that this deficiency is incapable of
being cured by way of amendment. Accordingly, this claim will be dismissed without prejudice.
In order to support her request for equitable tolling, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint
detailing the exceptional or extraordinary event that prevented her from initiating this lawsuit.
B. Failure to Allege Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Defendant next contends that Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed due to her failure
to affirmatively plead that she exhausted her administrative remedies prior to filing the
Complaint. “It is a basic tenet of administrative law that a plaintiff must exhaust all required
administrative remedies before bringing a claim for judicial relief.” Slingland v. Donahoe, 542
F. App’x 189, 191 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F. 3d 1018, 1020 (3d Cir.
1997)). It necessarily follows that a complaint which does not allege meeting all the
preconditions to filing suit pursuant to Title VII or the ADA, i.e. exhausting all administrative
remedies, does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Id. (citing Robinson, 107 F.
3d at 1022); Williams v. East Orange Cmty. Charter School, 396 F. App’x 895, 897 (3d Cir.
2010) (citing Antol v. Perry, 82 F. 3d 1291, 1296 (3d Cir. 1996)). As such, a motion for
dismissal of a claim in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) may be granted when a defendant has
demonstrated that a plaintiff has not exhausted his or her administrative remedies. Slingland,
542 F. App’x 191 (citing Williams v. Runyon, 130 F. 3d 568, 573 (3d Cir. 1997)).
Far from satisfying such a burden, here, Defendants have in actuality set out with
particularity the steps which Plaintiff took to exhaust her administrative remedies with the PHRC
and EEOC. While Plaintiff clearly failed to articulate said information in her pleadings,
Defendant does not argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, only that
9
she failed to plead exhausting her administrative remedies. See Slingland, 542 F. App’x at 191
n. 3 (“exhaustion is not an element of a Title VII claim, but rather ‘an affirmative defense, for
which the defendant bears the burden of pleading’”). As there is no question regarding whether
Plaintiff availed herself of all the administrative remedies available, the Court will not dismiss
Plaintiff’s Complaint on this basis.
C. Section 1983 Claim
Lastly, as to Plaintiff’s purported 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, Defendant’s argument for
dismissal is well taken. In order to establish a prima facie case in accordance with § 1983, a
plaintiff must show that: “(1) a person deprived [him or her] of a federal right; and (2) the person
who deprived [him or her] of that right acted under state or territorial law.” Burella v. City of
Philadelphia, 501 F. 3d 134, 139 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.
3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995)). Plaintiff has made no such showing, and indeed, Plaintiff never
addressed Defendant’s arguments about a § 1983 claim in any of her responsive pleadings. It is
likely that Plaintiff’s notation on her civil cover sheet regarding a § 1983 claim was made in
error. Regardless, this Court is compelled to dismiss any § 1983 claim which may have been
intended by Plaintiff. Further, because it appears highly unlikely that Plaintiff would be able to
meet the above pleading requirements for such a claim, i.e. that she was deprived of a federal
right by a party acting under color of law, said claim will be dismissed with prejudice. See
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F. 3d 224, 245 – 46 (3d Cir. 2008) (dismissal with prejudice
is appropriate when leave to amend would be futile).
IV.
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted, in part, and denied, in part. Plaintiff’s claims
under Title VII and the ADA will be dismissed as time-barred. However, Plaintiff will be given
10
leave to amend her Complaint to demonstrate that she meets the requirements for equitable
tolling. As it has been established that she exhausted her administrative remedies prior to
bringing her Complaint, Plaintiff’s Title VII and ADA claims will not be dismissed on this basis.
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim, to the extent such claim exists, is dismissed with prejudice.
To the extent that Plaintiff wishes to file an Amended Complaint, she must do so by June
12, 2015. The amendment of the Complaint is only permitted as to the requirements of equitable
tolling. An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 14th day of May, 2015, upon consideration of Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 11), and the briefs and response filed in support and in opposition there to
(ECF Nos. 12, 14, 15 and 17), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
is granted in part and denied in part as follows:
1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s ADA and Title VII claims as time-barred is
granted without prejudice. Plaintiff may file an Amended Complaint setting forth the exceptional
or extraordinary events that prevented her from initiating this lawsuit;
2. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to affirmatively plead
that she exhausted her administrative remedies prior to filing the Complaint is denied; and,
3. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is granted;
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim is dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, if the Plaintiff wishes to appeal from this Order he or she must do so within
11
thirty (30) days by filing a notice of appeal as provided in Rule 3, Fed. R. App. P., with the Clerk
of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219.
/s/ Maureen P. Kelly
MAUREEN P. KELLY
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
cc:
All counsel of record by Notice of Electronic Filing
Barbara Daniels
10615 Lindberg Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15235
12
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?