ADAMS v. CAPPOZA

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER re 4 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by SILAS JOSEPH ADAMS dismissing petition and denying a certificate of appealability. Signed by Magistrate Judge Robert C. Mitchell on 03/19/2015. (Mitchell, Robert)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SILAS JOSEPH ADAMS, GG-7399,
Petitioner,
v.
SUPT. MARK CAPPOZA,
Respondent.

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2:14-cv-1470

MEMORANDUM and ORDER
Mitchell, M.J.:
Silas Joseph Adams, an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh has
presented a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. For the reasons set forth below, the petition will
be dismissed and because reasonable jurists could not conclude that a basis for appeal exists, a
certificate of appealability will be denied.
Adams is present serving a life plus a combined consecutive 12 ½ to 25 year sentence
imposed following his conviction of first degree murder, criminal attempt-homicide, aggravated
assault- serious bodily injury, aggravated assault-serious bodily injury, burglary, recklessly
endangering another person and person not to possess firearms at Nos. CC200401066 and
CC200400739 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. This sentence
was imposed on July 20, 2003.
An appeal was taken to the Superior Court in which the issues presented were:
I.

II.

1

Was the verdict against the weight of the evidence insofar as the testimony
offered by the Commonwealth to support a finding that Silas Adams fired
the shot that killed Ivan Pegues or acted as an accomplice, and shot at a
police vehicle, was unreliable and uncorroborated by the physical
evidence, such that the finding of guilt was based on mere surmise and
conjecture?
Did the trial court err in denying the motion for a mistrial after
Commonwealth witness Yvonne Luckey testified that the defendant, Silas
Adams, sold crack cocaine, insofar as this evidence was not relevant for
any reason and it was highly prejudicial insofar as it blackened Mr.
Adams' character, stripped him of the presumption of innocence and
predisposed the jury to find him guilty.1

See: Answer at App.68.

1

On October 16, 2008, the judgment of sentence was affirmed.2 Allowance of appeal was denied
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on May 28, 2009.3
On June 11, 2008, Adams filed a post-conviction petition. The petition was dismissed on
July 27, 2012 and a notice of appeal was filed on July 31, 2012. In his appeal, Adams raised the
following issues:
I.

Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
prosecutor's improper closing arguments in which he unfairly expressed
his personal opinions, vouched for his eyewitnesses referred to matters
outside the record and appealed to the jury's passions and whether
cumulative trial ineffectiveness requires a new trial.

II.

Whether trial and appellate counsel were ineffective in failing to raise and
preserve challenges to the excessiveness and legality of the additional
lengthy sentences which were imposed consecutive to the life sentence.

III.

Whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to an improper
and insufficient jury instruction which failed to require careful and
cautionary scrutiny for cooperative witnesses and whether cumulative trial
ineffectiveness requires a new trial.

IV.

Whether prior counsel were ineffective for abandoning and failing to
pursue a meritorious claim for severance of the homicide from the nonhomicide charges and whether cumulative trial ineffectiveness requires a
new trial.4

On May 31, 2013, the denial of post-conviction relief was affirmed.5 Allowance of appeal to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court was denied on October 31, 2013.6
In the instant petition executed on October 27, 2014 and received in this Court on
October 29, 2014, Adams contends he is entitled to relief on the following grounds:
1. The Commonwealth failed to introduce evidence that any of the shell casings
and bullet fragments which were recovered from the scene of the Ivan Pagues
shooting were fired from the weapon that was recovered from the apartment in
which appellant was arrested. The Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that appellant shot the gun that killed the victim in the
instant case, or that appellant acted as an accomplice with those who actually
did the killing. Commonwealths star witness Yvonne Luckey testified that she
2
3
4
5
6

Id. at App.138-149.
Id at App.190.
Id. at App.299.
Id. at App.379-399.
Id. at App.401.

2

was under the influence of crack cocaine at the time she observed the shooting
and that she is near-sighted and wears prescription glasses, but that she was
not wearing her glasses on the night of the incident. She only saw the back of
the person that was shooting and not their face. During cross-examination she
testified that she never told the police that she saw appellant shooting anything
and that she did not know who did the shooting or who might have killed Mr.
Pagues.
2. In spite of the fact that the trial court had specifically instructed the prosecutor
that its star witness Yvonne Luckey was not to testify "where or how" she
came in contact with appellant so as to avoid any reference to her claim that
she knew him from the fact that he sold crack cocaine a fact which the court
and parties agreed was both inadmissible and prejudicial. The witness
nevertheless ignored these instructions and volunteered during her testimony
that appellant "sold crack off and on" insofar as this evidence was not relevant
for any reason and it was highly prejudicial insofar as it blackened appellant's
character, stripped him of the presumption of innocence and predisposed the
jury to find him guilty.
Thus, it would appear that Adams is seeking to challenge his conviction on the grounds of the
insufficiency of the evidence presented to sustain his conviction, and the trial court error in
denying a mistrial after Luckey testified regarding the petitioner's prior drug trafficking.
It is provided in 28 U.S.C. §2254(b) that:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears
that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State,
or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the
existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights
of the prisoner.
This statute represents a codification of the well-established concept which requires that
before a federal court will review any allegations raised by a state prisoner, those allegations
must first be presented to that state's highest court for consideration. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475 (1973); Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484 (1973);
Doctor v. Walters, 96 F.3d 675 (3d Cir. 1996). Since it appears that the issues which petitioner
seeks to raise here, were substantially raised as his issues on direct appeal he has met the
exhaustion requirement.
The background to this prosecution is set forth in the October 16, 2006 Memorandum of
the Superior Court adopted from the opinion of the trial court:

3

On December 27, 2003, the victim, Ivan Pegues (hereinafter referred to as
"Pegues") drove his red Pontiac Grand Am to 7372 Hamilton Street, which is the
residence of Yvonne Luckey (hereinafter referred to as "Luckey"). This residence
was known in the neighborhood to be a crack house where individuals who
wanted to smoke crack cocaine could go to either purchase or to smoke crack
cocaine or both. Luckey was an acknowledged crack cocaine user who smoked
that substance on a daily basis Pegues parked his car on Hamilton Street, went
into the residence and was seated in the living room with [appellant], having an
animated, if not heated discussion. Luckey observed both of these individuals and
also noticed that [appellant] possessed an SKS assault rifle. Luckey had a brief
conversation with [Monifa] Patterson, (hereinafter referred to as "Patterson"), a
friend of hers and also another crack cocaine user. Patterson told Luckey that she
observed two black males who were across the street, acting in a suspicious
manner. Luckey received more crack cocaine and went back upstairs to her
bedroom on the second floor.
Shortly before midnight, Pegues left Luckey's residence, got in his car and was
driving down Hamilton Street and was about to make a left-hand turn onto Collier
Street when three individuals opened fire on his car and shot at it and him more
than forty times. Patterson, who left Luckey's house almost immediately after
Pegues, was walking down the street when she saw [appellant] off to her left with
the assault rifle and then heard four shots. She went to the ground, got beneath a
car and did not look up until all the shooting had ceased. Luckey, who remained
in her residence, after hearing the first shot, went to the window and observed
[appellant] running down the street firing his assault weapon.
Detectives [Robert} Kavals and [Phillip] Mercurio, (hereinafter referred to as
"Kavals" and "Mercurio"), of the Pittsburgh Police Department, were on routine
patrol of North Dunfermine Street when they heard thirty to forty gunshots. They
proceeded to the intersection of Hamilton and Collier Street[s] and found the red
Grand Am that had been bullet-ridden. Kavals looked into the car expecting to
find a victim only to discover that the Pontiac Grand Am had been abandoned
along with a forty caliber semi-automatic weapon. Kavals then tried to locate the
driver of the Pontiac Grand Am, but he could not. Pegues' body was found in a
yard several hundreds of feet from the shooting. His partner, Mercurio, began to
run toward Formosa Way in an effort to locate the shooters. Several moments
later a couple of more shots were fired and Mercurio radioed Kavals that three
black males were running toward Braddock Avenue. Kavals got back in his car
and was in constant radio communication with his partner. He proceeded down
Hamilton onto North Braddock and as he was approaching Kelly Street he saw his
partner, who told him that the three individuals had split up. Kavals then
proceeded down Kelly Street when he observed [appellant] walk from between
two houses and fire two shots. Kavals radioed to his base radio operator that he
was being fired upon by [appellant].

4

[Appellant] continued to run between homes and streets until he reached an
apartment building on Bennett Street and went to the third floor and broke into an
apartment occupied by two teenage girls and three small children. [Appellant] was
seen by other Pittsburgh police officers that participated in this chase take the
assault rifle and attempt to hide it on the outside porch. When the officers went
into the apartment, [appellant] was standing behind one teenage girl and went
onto the floor when he as directed to do so. He was subsequently handcuffed and
then placed under arrest (footnote omitted).7
The first issue which Adams appears to raise is a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence to sustain his conviction. A federal court reviewing that contention must
look to determine whether based on the evidence presented any rational factfinder could
determine guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319
(1979).
In the instant case, petitioner was convicted of first degree murder8, criminal
attempt9, 2 counts of aggravated assault10, burglary11, former convict not to own… a
firearm12, 2 counts of recklessly endangering another person13 and criminal trespass –
breaking into a structure14.

Id. at App.138-140.
18 Pa.C.S.A. §2502 §§A provides: "A criminal homicide constitutes murder of the first degree
when it is committed by an intentional killing."
9
18 Pa.C.S.A. §901§§A provides: "A person commits an attempt when, with intent to commit a
specific crime, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that
crime."
10
18 Pa.C.S.A. §2702 §§A1 and A2 provide "a person is guilty of aggravated assault if he:
(a)(1) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
human life; (a)(2) attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes serious
bodily injury to any of the officers, agents, employees or other persons enumerated in subsection
(c) [police officer] …"
11
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502 §A provides: " A person commits the offense of burglary if, with the
intent to commit a crime therein, the person; (1) enters a building or occupied structure, or
separately secured or occupied portion thereof that is adapted for overnight accommodations in
which at the time of the offense any person is present…"
12
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105 provides in part: "A person who has been convicted of an offense …
shall not possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture … a firearm in this Commonwealth."
By agreement of the parties in order not to introduce Adams' prior record to the jury it was only
asked whether Adams possessed a firearm whereupon it was agreed that the court would enter a
verdict on the charges of possession by a convicted individual (TT.4/11/2005 pp.20-22). After
7
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5

As a matter of Pennsylvania evidentiary law, claims of insufficient evidence are
not properly before this Court, Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S.Ct. 859 (2011), unless based
on the evidence presented no rational juror could find guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jackson v. Virginia, supra. From the factual recitation set forth above, it is apparent that
the evidence presented, if believed, would support a conviction on the various counts. For
this reason, Adam's first claim is meritless.
Adam's next argues that despite a prohibition, Luckey testified about petitioner's
involvement in drug trafficking and as such a mistrial should have been granted. (TT.
4/22/2005 p.51). Following this improper testimony, and a motion for a mistrial, the court
immediately instructed the jury:
Ladies and gentlemen, I'm ordering the last response of the witness to be stricken
from the record and you are to disregard it. It's not something you may consider
as evidence.
(TT. 4/22/2005 p.55). In the context of the trial as whole, and with the instruction to disregard
her testimony, the trial was not impermissibly tainted. (App. 59). See: United States v. Franz,
772 F.3d 134 (3d Cir. 2014). Accordingly, this claim likewise does not provide a basis for relief.
Because there is no showing that Adams' conviction was secured in any manner contrary
to the law of the United States as determined by the Supreme Court, nor involved an
unreasonable application of that law, the petition of Silas Joseph Adams for a writ of habeas
corpus will be dismissed, and because reasonable jurists could not conclude that a basis for
appeal exists, a certificate of appealability will be denied.
An appropriate Order will be entered.

the jury's verdict, the court entered a guilty verdict on this count on May 3, 2005 but no
additional sentence was imposed.
13
18 Pa.C.S.A. §2705 provides: "a person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he
recklessly engages in conduct which places or may another person in danger of death or serious
bodily injury."
14
18 Pa.C.S.A. §3503 §§A(ii) provides: " A person commits an offense [criminal trespass] if,
knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so he breaks into any building or occupied
structure or separately secured or occupied portion thereof."
6

ORDER

AND NOW, this 19th day of March, 2015, for the reasons set forth in the foregoing
Memorandum, the petition of Silas Joseph Adams for a writ of habeas corpus (ECF 4) is
DISMISSED and a certificate of appealability is DENIED.
The parties are advised that pursuant to Rule 4(a) F.R.App.P any party desiring to file an
appeal must do so within thirty (30) days of this date by mailing a notice of appeal to the Clerk,
United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15219-1957.

s/ Robert C. Mitchell
United States Magistrate Judge

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