SHIPLEY v. COLVIN

Filing 10

ORDER denying 6 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 8 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 5/5/15. (ask)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RYAN JOSEPH SHIPLEY,

)
)
) No. 14-1533
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
SYNOPSIS
Plaintiff filed an application for supplemental social security income benefits, alleging
disability due to mental health impairments, beginning January 1, 2012. Plaintiff’s application
was denied initially, and upon hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). The
Appeals Council denied his request for review. Before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions
for summary judgment. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion will be denied, and
Defendant’s granted.

OPINION
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Judicial review of the Commissioner's final decisions on disability claims is provided by
statute. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) 6 and 1383(c)(3)7. Section 405(g) permits a district court to review
the transcripts and records upon which a determination of the Commissioner is based, and the
court will review the record as a whole. See 5 U.S.C. §706. When reviewing a decision, the

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district court's role is limited to determining whether the record contains substantial evidence to
support an ALJ's findings of fact. Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2002).
Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate" to support a conclusion. Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971)). If the ALJ's
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, they are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Richardson, 402 U.S. at 390.
A district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner's decision, or reweigh the evidence of record; the court can only judge the propriety of the decision with
reference to the grounds invoked by the Commissioner when the decision was rendered. Palmer
v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998); S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 - 97,
67 S. Ct. 1575, 91 L. Ed. 1995 (1947). Otherwise stated, “I may not weigh the evidence or
substitute my own conclusion for that of the ALJ. I must defer to the ALJ's evaluation of
evidence, assessment of the credibility of witnesses, and reconciliation of conflicting expert
opinions. If the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, I am bound by those
findings, even if I would have decided the factual inquiry differently.” Brunson v. Astrue, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55457 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2011) (citations omitted).
II. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
Plaintiff’s motion rests on the ALJ’s treatment of the opinion of Dr. Huang, a treating
physician. An ALJ must give controlling weight to and adopt the medical opinion of a treating
physician if it "is well-supported . . . and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in
[the] case record." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2). "The law is clear . . . that the opinion of a
treating physician does not bind the ALJ on the issue of functional capacity." Brown v. Astrue,

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649 F.3d 193, 197 n. 2 (3d Cir. 2011). Faced with conflicting medical evidence, an "ALJ may
choose whom to credit but 'cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.'"
Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000). The ALJ discharges his duty to address the
treating physician opinions in the record if he explains why he finds "extreme limitations"
inconsistent and not well supported by substantial evidence in the record. Baker v. Comm'r of
Soc. Sec., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42769 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2014). As discussed supra, I may
not re-weigh the evidence or undertake a de novo review; instead, I am confined to review of the
record support for the findings and conclusions of the ALJ. Machen v. Colvin, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 86514, at *15 (W.D. Pa. June 20, 2013).
In this case, Dr. Huang completed a mental medical source statement indicating that
Plaintiff had marked limitations in some areas, and extreme limitations in many others. The
ALJ stated that he “reject[ed] this assessment as grossly inconsistent with the treatment records
from Staunton Clinic. The treatment records noted that the claimant’s medications were helping
his condition, and mental status examinations were essentially normal and unremarkable.” The
ALJ afforded the contrary opinion of state agency source Dr. Schnepp significant weight, as
consistent with the records from Staunton Clinic.1 The ALJ also thoroughly discussed the
Staunton Clinic records, including Plaintiff’s GAF scores ranging from 45-60. Although
Plaintiff points to aspects of the Clinic records that may indicate that his condition was often
poor, the ALJ points to a substantial portion of those records that support his conclusions. While
the term “grossly” may overstate the level of inconsistency, I cannot find the ALJ’s decision to

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An ALJ “can only give the opinion of a non-treating, non-examining physician weight insofar as it is supported by
evidence in the case record, considering such factors as the supportability of the opinion in the evidence, the
consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, including other medical opinions, and any explanation
provided for the opinion.” Hansford v. Astrue, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54291, at **6-7 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 2013)

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reject Dr. Huang’s opinion unsupported by substantial evidence. That I might have weighed the
evidence differently cannot affect the outcome of my analysis today.
CONCLUSION
In sum, Plaintiff’s Motion will be denied, and Defendant’s granted. An appropriate
Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 5th day of May, 2015, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED, and Defendant’s GRANTED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/Donetta W. Ambrose
Donetta W. Ambrose
Senior Judge, U.S. District Court

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