LUCAS v. COLVIN

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER denying 8 plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 10 defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The decision of the Acting Commissioner is affirmed. See Memorandum Judgment Order for further details. Signed by Judge Gustave Diamond on 3/28/16. (kw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYL VANIA

CRYSTAL LEE LUCAS,
Plaintiff,

v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 14-1544

MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER

AND NOW, this 28 th day ofMarch, 2016, upon consideration ofthe parties' cross-motions
for summary judgment pursuant to plaintiff's request for review of the decision of the Acting
Commissioner of Social Security ("Acting Commissioner") denying her applications for disability
insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income ("SSI") under Titles II and XVI,
respectively, ofthe Social Security Act, IT IS ORDERED that the Acting Commissioner's motion
for summary judgment (Document No. 10) be, and the same hereby is, granted and plaintitrs
motion for summary judgment (Document No.8) be, and the same hereby is, denied.
As the factfinder, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") has an obligation to weigh all of
the facts and evidence of record and may reject or discount any evidence if the ALJ explains the
reasons for doing so. Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422,429 (3d Cir. 1999). Where the ALJ's
findings offact are supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court is bound by those findings,
even ifit would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34,
38 (3d Cir. 2001). Moreover, it is well settled that disability is not determined merely by the
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presence ofimpairments, but by the effect that those impairments have upon an individual's ability

to perform substantial gainful activity. Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991). These
well-established principles preclude a reversal or remand of the ALl's decision here because the
record contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ's findings and conclusions.
Plaintiff filed her applications for DIB and SSI on October 5, 2011, alleging disability
beginning on March 10, 2010, due to fibromyalgia, polycystic kidney disease, depression and
shoulder problems. Plaintiff's applications were denied. At plaintiff's request, an ALJ held a
hearing on June 4, 2013, at which plaintiff appeared and testified while represented by counseL
On June 26, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff is not disabled. The Appeals
Council denied plaintiff's request for review on September 23,2014, making the ALJ's decision
the final decision of the Acting Commissioner. The instant action followed.
Plaintiff, who has a high school education through a general equivalency degree, was 52
years old when the ALJ issued his decision, and is classified an individual closely approaching
advance age under the regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§404.l563(d), 416.963(d).

Plaintiff has past

relevant work experience as a nursing assistant, waitress and paralegal, but she has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity at any time since her alleged onset date.
After reviewing plaintiff's medical records and hearing testimony from plaintiff and a
vocational expert at the hearing, the ALJ concluded that plaintiffis not disabled within the meaning
of the Act. The ALJ first found that plaintiff suffers from the severe impairments ofthe residuals
of a left shoulder surgical repair, fibromyalgia, myofascial pain syndrome, cervicalgia, polycystic
kidney disease, dysthymic disorder, anxiety disorder and adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety
and depression; however, those impairments, alone or in combination, do not meet or equal the
criteria ofany ofthe listed impairments set forth in Appendix 1 of20 C.F .R., Subpart P, Regulation
No.4 ("Appendix I").
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The ALl next found that plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity to perfonn light
work with a number of additional limitations. Plaintiff is precluded from crawling or climbing
ropes, ladders or scaffolds and she is restricted to occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling,
crouching and climbing ramps and stairs. In addition, plaintiff is limited to occasionally using her
left dominant ann to push, pull and reach overhead, but she is not limited in pushing, pulling or
reaching with her right ann. Plaintiff also must avoid concentrated exposure to vibration and
temperature extremes, and she must avoid all exposure to unprotected heights, dangerous
machinery and similar workplace hazards.

Further, plaintiff is limited to understanding,

remembering and carrying out simple instructions and perfonning simple, routine tasks. She is
restricted to only occasional and superficial interaction with co-workers and the public, occasional
supervision and no work that involves sales or negotiation. Finally, plaintiff requires work in a low
stress environment that does not involve production rate pace, but rather goal oriented work with
only occasional and routine changes in the work setting (collectively, the "RFC Finding").
The ALl concluded that plaintiff is unable to perform her past relevant work because it
exceeds her residual functional capacity. However, based upon testimony by a vocational expert,
the ALl detennined that plaintiff is capable of perfonning other work that exists in significant
numbers in the national economy, such as an office helper, mail clerk or light unskilled packing
jobs. Accordingly, the ALl found that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act.
The Act defines "disability" as the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity by
reason of a physical or mental impainnent that can be expected to last for a continuous period of
at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The impainnentor impainnents
must be so severe that the claimant "is not only unable to do [her] previous work but cannot,
considering [her] age, education and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial
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gainful work which exists

In

the national economy . . . "

42 U.S.C. §§423(d)(2)(A),

1382c(a)(3)(B).
The Social Security Regulations specify a five-step sequential evaluation process for
determining whether a claimant is disabled. The ALJ must assess: (1) whether the claimant
currently is engaged in substantial gainful acti vity; (2) if not, whether she has a severe impairment;
(3) if so, whether her impairment meets or equals the criteria listed in Appendix 1; (4) if not,
whether the claimant's impairment prevents her from performing her past relevant work; and (5)
ifso, whether the claimant can perform any other work that exists in the national economy, in light
of her age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity. I

20 C.F.R.

§§404.l520(a)(4),416.920(a)(4). If the claimant is found disabled or not disabled at any step,
further inquiry is unnecessary. Id.
In this case, plaintiff argues that the ALJ's step 5 finding is not supported by substantial
evidence for the following reasons: (1) the ALJ failed to properly weigh certain medical opinions
and evidence; (2) the RFC Finding does not account for all of plaintiff's limitations; (3) the ALJ
posed an incomplete hypothetical question to the vocational expert; and (4) the ALJ did not
properly evaluate plaintiffs credibility. After reviewing the record, we conclude that plaintiff's
arguments are without merit.
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ failed to properly weigh the medical opinion of her pain
management physician, Dr. Brinda Navalgund. Dr. Navalgund indicated on an Employability
Assessment Form for the Pennsylvania Department ofPublic Welfare that plaintiff was permanently
disabled. (R. 584). Dr. Navalgund also completed a Physical Capacity Evaluation form on which

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lResidual functional capacity is defined as that which an individual still is able to do despite the
limitations caused by her impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1545(a)(l), 916.945(a)(l). In assessing a
claimant's residual functional capacity, the ALJ is required to consider the claimant's ability to meet the
physical, mental, sensory and other requirements of work. 20 C.F.R. §§404.l545(a)(4), 416.945(a)(4).
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she indicated that with normal breaks, plaintiff could sit 4 hours and stand 2 hours in an 8-hour
workday, but she would need to lie down 4 hours during the workday. (R. 623-24). According to
Dr. Navalgund, plaintiff could lift 5-10 pounds, but she could not push and pull and she should
avoid various environmental conditions. (R. 624). The ALl did not give weight to Dr. Navalgund' s
opinion that plaintiffis permanently disabled, or that she could not sit and stand with normal breaks
and would need to lie down during the workday. (R. 26). However, as reflected by the RFC
Finding, the ALl gave some weight to Dr. Navalgund's opinion that plaintiff was limited with
pushing and pulling and should avoid exposure to environmental conditions and workplace hazards.
(R.26).
A treating physician's opinion is entitled to controlling weight if it is well-supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the
other substantial evidence of record. 20 C.F.R. §§404.l527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). Under this
standard, the ALl properly analyzed and weighed Dr. Navalgund's opinion of plaintiff s physical
capabilities.
As an initial matter, the ALl was not bound to accept Dr. Navalgund's opinion set forth on
the state welfare form that plaintiff was permanently disabled. Whether plaintiff was considered
to be disabled for purposes ofreceiving state welfare benefits is irrelevant because another agency's
determination regarding disability is not binding on the Acting Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R.
§§404.1504,416.904. Thus, Dr. Navalgund's conclusory opinion of permanent disability on the
state welfare form was in no way dispositive of the ALl's analysis in this case.
Likewise, the ALl correctly determined that some of Dr. Navalgund's findings regarding
plaintiff's physical capabilities set forth on the Physical Capacity Evaluation form were not
substantiated by her treatment records. Dr. Navalgund's records describe plaintiffs left shoulder
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problems, which the ALJ accounted for by restricting plaintiff's pushing and pulling and overhead
reaching. However, Dr. Navalgund's treatment records do not document findings that support the
restrictions she assessed for plaintiff's ability to sit and stand during the workday or purported need
to lie down. (R. 430-31, 434-35, 591-92, 596-98, 600-03, 606-07,610-11,614,618-19,622).
Accordingly, the court finds no error in the ALl's consideration and weighing of Dr. Navalgund's
opinion.
Plaintiff next complains that the ALJ improperly disregarded OAF scores of50-55 contained
in the record. (R. 531, 547). Plaintiff is incorrect.
OAF is a numeric scale that has been used by mental health clinicians and physicians to rate
subjectively the social, occupational and psychological functioning of adults. However, the latest
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) no longer includes
the OAF scale as a measurement tool. See Hughes v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 2016 WL
231676, at *2 n.2 (3d Cir. Jan. 20, 2016) (noting that DSM-5 abandoned the OAF scale).
Moreover, courts have recognized that a claimant's OAF score is not determinative of disability.
See Oilroy v. Astrue, 351 Fed. Appx. 714, 715 (3d Cir. 2009) (recognizing that OAF scores do not
have a direct correlation to the severity requirements ofthe Social Security mental disorder listings,
and determining that a low OAF score is not conclusive evidence of a mental disability); Wind v.
Barnhart, 2005 WL 1317040, *6 n.5 (11 th Cir. 2005) (noting that the Commissioner has declined
to endorse the OAF scale for use in the Social Security and SSI disability programs).
Although an individual's OAF score alone is not controlling, the ALl's decision makes clear
that he considered plaintiff's OAF scores, but determined they only were a snapshot of her
functioning at a particular point in time. (R. 26). Rather than rely on OAF scores, the ALJ gave
significant weight to the opinion ofthe consultative psychological examiner, Dr. Martin Meyer, and
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some weight to plaintiff's counselor/therapist. (R. 26). The ALJ then relied on their assessments
of plaintiff's ability to handle the mental aspects of work in formulating the mental limitations he
incorporated into the RFC Finding. Accordingly, we find that the ALJ appropriately considered
evidence relating to plaintiff's mental functioning, including GAF scores.
Plaintiff next argues that the RFC Finding fails to account for Dr. Navalgund's opinion of
plaintiff's physical capabilities, including her need to lie down during the workday. As already
explained, the ALJ properly considered, weighed and rejected certain portions of Dr. Navalgund's
opinion, thus the ALJ was not required to include in the RFC Finding any unsubstantiated
limitations she identified.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ's hypothetical question to the vocational expert was
incomplete because it did not include a limitation for plaintiff's purported need to lie down during
the workday, As discussed above, the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Navalgund's opinion on that
matter, thus there was no need for the ALJ to incorporate such a restriction in the hypothetical
question.
An ALl's hypothetical question to a vocational expert must reflect all of the claimant's
impairments and limitations supported by the medical evidence. Chrupcala v. Heckler, 829 F.2d
1269, 1276 (3d Cir. 1987). Here, the ALl's hypothetical incorporated all ofplaintiff's limitations
resulting from her impairments that were supported by the evidence of record, including all ofthe
factors that were the basis of the RFC Finding. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in relying on the
vocational expert's testimony to conclude that plaintiff can perform work that exists in the national
economy.
Plaintiff's final argument challenges the ALl's evaluation of her credibility. According to
plaintiff, Dr. Navalgund's treatment records indicated that she suffers from chronic pain, thus the
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ALJ should have found her complaints of pain fully credible and determined that she is disabled.
Contrary to plaintiffs position, although one may experience constant and uncomfortable pain, it
may not be of disabling severity. See Welch v. Heckler, 808 F.2d 264,270 (3d Cir. 1986). In this
case, the ALJ thoroughly evaluated plaintiffs complaints of pain and assessed her credibility in
accordance with the Regulations.
As required by the Regulations, the ALJ evaluated plaintiff s credibility by considering all
ofthe relevant evidence in the record, including plaintiff s own statements about her symptoms and
limitations, her activities of daily living, the medical evidence of record, the extent of plaintiffs
treatment and the opinions of physicians who treated and examined her.

See 20 C.F.R.

§§404.lS29(c)(l) and (c)(3), 416.929(c)(l) and (c)(3); Social Security Ruling 96·7p. The ALJ then
considered the extent to which plaintiffs alleged functional limitations reasonably could be
accepted as consistent with the evidence of record and how those limitations affect her ability to
work. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1S29(c)( 4), 416.929(c)(4). The ALJ concluded that the objective evidence
is inconsistent with plaintiffs allegation of total disabling limitations, and thus determined that
plaintiffs testimony regarding her pain and limitations was not entirely credible. (R. 23). This
court finds that the ALJ adequately explained the basis for his credibility determination, (R. 23-26),
and is satisfied that such determination is supported by substantial evidence. See Schaudeck v.
Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999) (an ALJ may reject the claimant's
subjective testimony ifhe does not find it credible so long as he explains why he is rejecting the
testimony).

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In conclusion, after carefully and methodically considering the medical evidence in this
case, the ALJ determined that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. The ALl's
findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence and are not otherwise erroneous.
Therefore, the decision of the Acting Commissioner must be affirmed.

sl Gustave Diamond
Gustave Diamond
United States District Judge

cc:

Christine M. Nebel, Esq.
220 South Main Street
Suite D
Butler, PA 16001
Christy Wiegand

Assistant U.S. Attorney

700 Grant Street

Suite 4000

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

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