DAVIS v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al
Filing
37
MEMORANDUM OPINION granting Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan on 04/26/16. (jer)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANGELO LENELL DAVIS
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT
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OF CORRECTIONS, SCI Greene County, )
LOUIS FOLINO, Superintendent,
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MICHAEL GUYTON and SUSAN
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COWAN, Block Unit Managers,
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Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 14-1551
Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan
ECF No. 29
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.
Summary
Presently before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint filed
by Defendants the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, SCI-Greene, Susan Cowan, Louis
Folino and Michael Guyton (hereafter the “Motion to Dismiss”) (ECF No. 29). For the reasons
set forth below, the Motion will be granted for failure to state a claim. At bottom, Plaintiff
cannot maintain before this Court claims otherwise barred by res judicata and/or collateral
estoppel by re-characterizing them (on amendment) as claims based on allegations of illegal
confinement and relatedly unconstitutional conduct for want of possession or production of a
Sentencing Order in violation of Pa C.S. Section 9764. In addition, Plaintiff cannot obtain relief
from a Defendant that is immune from suit.
II. Factual & Procedural History
Plaintiff, Angelo Lenell Davis (“Plaintiff”), a current inmate at SCI-Camp Hill,
proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action on December 17, 2014 by a Complaint pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging First, Fifth,1 Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations on the
basis of, e.g., restrictive housing and custody levels, denial of an incentive-based transfer, denial
of an outside work clearance (“R Code”), and parole denial – occurring at SCI-Greene. Plaintiff
also asserted relation of these constitutional violations to a “fraudulent forged misconduct”
charge, and alleged they were in “discrimination and retaliation” for Plaintiff’s filing of
grievances and, in 2011, a federal civil rights action. (ECF No. 3).2 Named as Defendants were
the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, SCI-Greene (“the DOC”), Louis Folino,
Superintendent of that facility; Michael Guyton, the B-Block Manager and Susan Cowan, the CBlock Manager at SCI-Greene (collectively “the Individual Defendants”).
In their August 6, 2015 Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 19), Defendants
noted that the alleged retaliatory acts complained of, i.e., non-return to C-Block housing
(following the relocation of dozens of prisoners to make room for new inmates in 2008), parole
denial (in 2010), R Code denial (attributed by Plaintiff to parole denial which resulted from 2010
Plaintiff’s Complaint makes reference to violation of his rights without elucidation as to
particular claims. The Fifth Amendment requires a Grand Jury indictment for capital crimes
(with limited exception); prohibits double jeopardy and compulsory criminal self-incrimination;
requires due process protection of life, liberty and property; and requires just compensation for a
public-use taking. See generally Livingston v. Borough of Edgewood ,2008 WL 5101478 * 3
(W.D. Pa. 2008). The only provision that could possibly be related is the right of due process;
however, a due process claim under the Fifth Amendment is only applicable in claims against the
Federal government. Id. Actions against a state and its agents are to be considered under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Kelly v. Borough of Saraville, 107 F.3d 1073, 1076 (3d Cir.1997); See
also Kline v. City of Sunbury, 2007 WL 3231959 * 2 (M.D.Pa. 2007). Because Plaintiffs’
allegations are against only State actors, any claim under the Fifth Amendment is inapplicable.
1
Plaintiff’s 2011 civil rights action against the DOC, SCI-Greene and the same individual
Defendants was filed in this Court at CA No. 11-1506. The Complaint was served in February,
2012. See discussion, infra.
2
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misconduct), and transfer denial (from 2009 until the DOC deemed him eligible, by virtue of
expiration of misconduct disqualifier(s), and he was transferred in Spring 2013) – all related to
allegedly falsified misconduct charge/false reports to the parole board- were the same as those
litigated by Plaintiff before this Court in CA No.11-1506. By Memorandum Opinion of August,
2014, this Court had granted Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed case 111506, expressly rejecting Plaintiff’s allegation that actions/circumstances complained of were
due to retaliation or false reports by Cowan or Guyton, and finding that the misconduct charge
had a factual basis. See CA No. 11-1506, ECF No. 122, at 6, 9-16. Plaintiff’s appeal to the
Third Circuit is pending. Defendants’ first Motion to Dismiss therefore asserted that the
doctrines of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel precluded Plaintiff’s relitigation of those
issues and claims. (ECF No. 19 at 2, 6) (citing Riley v. DeCarlo, 532 Fed. Appx. 23, 26-27 (3d
Cir. 2013) (res judicata bars a plaintiff who has received a final judgment on the merits in one
action from litigating another suit against the same parties based on the same cause of action);
Iseley v. Talaber, 232 Fed. Appx. 120, 123 (3d Cir. 2007) (policy behind the doctrine of
collateral estoppel is that “a losing litigant deserves no rematch after a defeat fairly suffered, in
adversarial proceedings, on an issue identical in substance to the one he subsequently seeks to
raise”)
By Order of August 19, 2015 (ECF No. 22), the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for
Leave to file an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 21) and, relatedly, Defendants’ initial Motion to
Dismiss was denied as moot by the Court’s Order of October 14, 2015 (ECF No. 28).
Plaintiff’s October 14, 2017 Amended Complaint (ECF No. 27) significantly altered
Plaintiff’s theory of his causes of action. Plaintiff now maintains – primarily and throughout all
other assertions of his Amended Complaint - that his incarceration and the actions taken by the
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Defendants during his incarceration have been illegal (and conduct preceding and during his
prior litigation was fraudulent and perjured) because the DOC does not have possession of the
Judge’s Sentencing Order issued by the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas. See
Amended Complaint (ECF No. 27 at 1 et seq.). At bottom, the Amended Complaint points to the
Defendants’ non-production of the Sentencing Order in Plaintiff’s prior litigation at case 11-1506
as grounds for purported First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment
violation claims3 based on (a) allegations and objections regarding discovery in case 11-1506;
(b) allegations and objections regarding parole non-recommendations; (c) allegations of
Defendants’ violations of criminal statutes; (d) allegations that Plaintiff’s 2013 transfer to SCICamp Hill was retaliatory and intended to disrupt discovery in/the course of his prior federal
litigation;4 and (e) allegations regarding the level of security of the particular cell block in which
he was placed following transfer to SCI-Camp Hill in Spring, 2013. See generally ECF N0. 27.
Defendants’ currently pending Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 29) and
the Brief in Support (ECF No. 30) assert in response that (a) to the extent Plaintiff attempts to
premise prior allegations/objections on a new claim of illegal confinement, such claims are not
within an action under Section 1983 but must be brought as matters of habeas corpus in State
Court; (b) the doctrines of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel continue to bar Plaintiff’s
objections related to discovery, and adjudication of his allegations regarding parole and related
decisions, in Case 11-1506; (c) Plaintiff is without standing to sue any Defendant for violation of
the cited Pennsylvania criminal statutes; (d) Plaintiff’s prior federal litigation alleged a
See ECF No. 27 at 2 (further asserting that “the DOC prison officials continued to make
Plaintiff subject to their retaliatory acts . . . when they have never had any legal legitimate
documentation to justify Plaintiff’s incarceration”).
3
Compare supra at 2-3 (noting that Plaintiff’s initial Complaint alleged that denial of his
requested transfer was retaliatory).
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retaliatory denial of his requests for transfer and was adjudicated in Defendant’s favor, thus
Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants’ grant of his transfer request when determined to be eligible
(i.e., in Spring 2013, during the course of Case 11-1506) was retaliatory is facially contradictory
and not credible; and (e) claims against the DOC, SCI-Greene and the Individual Defendants in
their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
III. Applicable Standards
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has summarized the standard to
be applied in deciding motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6):
Under the “notice pleading” standard embodied in Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must come forward
with “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” As explicated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009), a claimant must state a “plausible” claim for
relief, and “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded
factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Although
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007), a plaintiff “need only put forth allegations
that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence of the necessary element.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 213
(quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Covington v. Int'l
Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 117–18 (3d
Cir. 2013).
Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2014).
When adjudicating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts may consider - in
addition to the complaint -matters of public record and other matters of which a court may
properly take judicial notice, such as court orders and exhibits attached to the complaint.
Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing 5A
Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d, § 1357; Chester County
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Intermediate Unit v. Pennsylvania Blue Shield, 896 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir. 1990)). A court may
also consider indisputably authentic documents. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir.
2004); Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir.
1993); Golden v. Cook, 293 F. Supp.2d 546, 551 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (“[C]ourts are permitted to
consider matters of which they may take judicial notice, including records and reports of
administrative bodies, and publically available records and transcripts from judicial proceedings
‘in related or underlying cases which have a direct relation to the matters at issue.’”) (citations
omitted).
Finally, the Court must liberally construe the factual allegations of Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint because pleadings filed by pro se plaintiffs are held to a less stringent standard than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). If the Court
“can reasonably read [the] pleadings to state a valid claim on which [Plaintiff] could prevail, it
should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax
and sentence construction, or [Plaintiff’s] unfamiliarity with pleading requirements.” Wilberger
v. Ziegler, No. 08-54, 2009 WL 734728 at *3 (W.D. Pa. March 19, 2009) (citing Boag v.
MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982) (per curiam)).
IV. Analysis
A. Section 1983
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or any other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
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the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim for relief under this provision in Federal Court, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that the conduct in the complaint was committed by a person or entity acting
under color of state law and that such conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges or
immunities secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Piecknick v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994). Section 1983 does not
create rights; it simply provides a remedy for violations of those rights created by the United
States Constitution or federal law. Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996).
As noted, supra, Plaintiff now challenges his confinement, i.e. the validity of the
Defendants’ execution of his sentence, for want of the Sentencing Order. This he simply cannot
do. See, e.g., Jackson v. Sec'y Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 598 Fed.Appx. 815, 816 (3d Cir.
2015) (affirming sua sponte dismissal, with prejudice and without leave to amend, under PLRA
for failure to state a claim where prisoner alleged § 1983 violations on basis of absence of
sentencing orders); id. (noting that plaintiff did not dispute he was properly sentenced and
concluding alleged absence of sentencing orders did not state a claim to relief plausible on its
face). 5 See also Joseph v. Glunt, 96 A.3d 365, 372 (Pa.Super.Ct. 2014) (finding that state
prisoner failed to state claim where “the trial court correctly concluded that, even in the absence
of a written sentencing order, the [Department of Corrections] had continuing authority to detain
[Petitioner].”);6 Travis v. Giroux, No. 489 C.D.2013, 2013 WL 6710773 (Pa.Cmwlth. Dec. 18,
5
In Jackson, the District Court concluded that plaintiff's claims were barred by Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the applicable statute of limitations, and immunity.
6
The Pennsylvania Superior Court regarded the plaintiff’s claim that his sentence was illegal
due to the inability of the DOC to “produce a written sentencing order related to [his] judgment
of sentence” as a claim legitimately sounding in habeas corpus rather than “under the PCRA,
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2013) (holding that Section 9764(a)(8) does not provide cause of action for prisoners where
appellant challenged DOC's authority to hold him in custody for want of written sentencing
order)); Whitaker v. Mooney, CIV.A. 14-2321, 2015 WL 4713648, at *9-11 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7,
2015) (finding claims that petitioner was in custody in violation of his rights for want of signed
sentencing order without merit as statute does not create any remedy or cause of action for a
prisoner, and lack of a sentencing order implicates no 14th Amendment due process or other
constitutional rights) (citing Mundy v. Kerestes, No. 13–6081, 2013 WL 5781108, at *1 (E.D.Pa.
Oct.24, 2013) (finding no legal basis for petitioner's claim that his incarceration was
unconstitutional because the DOC lacked a signed copy of the sentencing order and noting
plaintiff did “not dispute that he was convicted and sentenced to the period of incarceration that
he has been serving”)); Gibson v. Wenerowicz, No. 11–7751, 2013 WL 3463575, at *3 n. 6 (E.D.
Pa. Mar.5, 2013), report and recommendation adopted as modified by, 2013 WL 3476130 (E.D.
Pa. July 10, 2013) (“Even assuming that Petitioner was [incarcerated] without a copy of the
signed sentencing order, Petitioner's confinement under such circumstances does not violate the
Constitution.”).
which typically governs collateral claims implicating the legality of sentence.” See id. at 368-69
(citing Brown v. Penna. Dept. of Corr., 81 A.3d 814, 815 (2013) (per curium ) (citing
Commonwealth ex rel. Bryant v. Hendrick, 280 A.2d 110, 112 (1971); Warren v. DOC, 616 A.2d
140, 142 (1992)). See also Defendants’ Brief in Support at 6-7 (asserting that Plaintiff’s claims
now sound in habeas). Cf. Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir.2005)
(quoting Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485 (3d Cir.2001)) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2241
“confers habeas jurisdiction to hear the petition of a federal prisoner who is challenging . . . the
execution of his sentence.”; id. at 243 (defining “execution” to mean the validity of “put[ting]
into effect” or “carry[ing] out”” the sentence) (quoting Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 794
(1993)).
The Court notes that if Plaintiff’s claims were considered under habeas, as an alternative to
Section 1983, the applicable provisions of the federal habeas corpus statute at 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b) would require that he exhaust available state court remedies before seeking federal
relief.
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As noted by the Pennsylvania Superior Court, it is clear that section 9764 “pertains not to
the DOC's authority to detain a duly-sentenced prisoner, but, rather, . . . the procedures and
prerogatives associated with the transfer of an inmate from county to state detention” and
“[n]one of the provisions . . . indicate an affirmative obligation . . . to maintain and produce the
documents enumerated . . . upon the request of the incarcerated person. Moreover, section 9764
neither expressly vests, nor implies the vestiture, in a prisoner of any remedy for deviation from
the procedures prescribed within.” Joseph v. Glunt, 96 A.3d 365, 371 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014).7
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s newly-characterized claims challenging the validity of
Defendants’ execution of his sentence as illegal confinement, for want of possession or
production of a Sentencing Order and in violation of 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9764 - and thus alleging
the related illegal conduct by Defendants which underlies the various counts of his Amended
Complaint8 - cannot be maintained before this Court.9
7
See also id. at 372 (“[Petitioner] has cited no apposite legal authorities demonstrating that the
undisputed record of his judgment of sentence maintained by the sentencing court constitutes
insufficient authority for his continuing detention” and “courts confronting this issue in the past
have deemed a record of the valid imposition of a sentence as sufficient authority to maintain a
prisoner's detention notwithstanding the absence of a written sentencing order under 42 Pa.C.S. §
9764(a)(8)”).
See ECF No. 27 at 4 (“Here Plaintiff claims that all [Pennsylvania statutory] criminal violations
listed above are all associated with his unlawful illegal confinement as well as the Constitutional
violations listed on [page] 2 based on the fact that Plaintiff requested for [sic] the sentencing
order in discovery [in the 2011 litigation] and [the Defendants] could not produce it . . . .”
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The Court also concurs with Defendants’ briefing regarding the continuing res judicata and
collateral estoppel bars to Plaintiff’s attempts to re-litigate claims (e.g., discovery complaints and
complaints regarding parole, work-release and transfer determinations) from the 2011 action
decided on summary judgment in Defendants’ favor and currently pending on appeal.
In addition, with regard to Plaintiff’s reversed position on his 2013 transfer to and block
placement in SCI-Camp Hill (i.e., that although his Complaint alleges denial of requests for
transfer were retaliatory, his Amended Complaint alleges transfer to his home region when
deemed eligible was retaliatory), the Court concurs with Defendant’s observation of facial
inconsistency. Moreover, the Court notes that “[i]t is well settled that the decision where to
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B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
As correctly noted by Defendants, the Eleventh Amendment10 bars suits against a state in
federal court by private parties. Laskari v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing
Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978)). “Unless a State has waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity or Congress has overridden it . . . a State cannot be sued directly in its own name
regardless of the relief sought.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985) (citing
Pugh, 438 U.S. at 781)). Eleventh Amendment immunity protects entities created by state
governments that operate as alter egos or arms of the State. See Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe
Reg’l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 402 (1979). The United States Supreme Court has held
that a § 1983 action brought against a “State and its Board of Corrections is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment unless [the State] has consented to the filing of such a suit.” Pugh, 438
U.S. at 782. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has specifically reserved its right to immunity
from suit in federal court pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b)
house inmates is at the core of prison administrators’ expertise.” McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24,
39 (2002). And an inmate does not possess a liberty interest arising from the Due Process Clause
in assignment to a particular custody level, security classification, or place of confinement. See
Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221-22 (2005); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245
(1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976). Rather, the custody placement or
classification of state prisoners is among the “wide spectrum of discretionary actions that
traditionally have been the business of prison administrators rather than the federal courts.”
Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225. In addition to the bases of his reliance on Section 9764, and his res
judicata and collateral estoppel bars (see ECF No. 27 at 8-10), Plaintiff has no cause of action
against these Defendants on this claim for these additional reasons.
10
The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity commenced or prosecuted against any one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens of Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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(“Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to waive the immunity of the
Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.”) Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has held that §
1983 does not override a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S.
332, 342 (1979).
In addition, the DOC, as an agency of the State, and individuals sued in their official
capacities, are not “persons” for purposes § 1983 and therefore may not be sued under the civil
rights statute. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
As the Eleventh Amendment requires the dismissal of claims against both DOC/SCIGreene and against the individual DOC Defendants in their official capacities, it provides
another alternative and additional grounds for dismissal of this action.
C. Futility of Further Leave to Amend
The Court notes that “[w]hen a plaintiff does not seek leave to amend a deficient
complaint after a defendant moves to dismiss it, the court must inform the plaintiff that he has
leave to amend within a set period of time, unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.”
Grayson v. Mayview Hosp., 293 F.3d 103,108 (3d Cir. 2002). Here, any attempt by Plaintiff to
further amend would be futile based on the factual allegations he has already stated, and as a
matter of law. See Mundy v. Kerestes, 2013 WL 5781108, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2013)
(holding in analogous case that “[a]lthough a district court should generally provide a pro se
plaintiff with leave to amend, . . ., amendment would be futile here because plaintiff cannot cure
the deficiencies in his complaint”).
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For the above reasons, the Court will grant the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.
29) for failure to state a claim, and because Plaintiff seeks relief from a defendant that is immune
from suit.
An appropriate order will follow.
Dated: April 26, 2016
BY THE COURT
______________________________
LISA PUPO LENIHAN
United States Magistrate Judge
cc:
Angelo Lenell Davis
GY7304
SCI Camp Hill
P.O. Box 200
Camp Hill, PA 17001-0200
All counsel of record
Via electronic filing
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