JACKSON v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM ORDER granting 24 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim with prejudice as to Defendants Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and SCI Fayette Medical Department, who are terminated from this action, and granting 24 Motion to Dismiss without prejudice as to Defendants Campbell and Coleman, to permit the filing of an Amended Complaint; granting in part 30 and 39 Motion for Subpoena and Motion to Compel production of video recording; 28 granting Motion for Reconsid eration Motion for Appointment of Counsel. It is further ORDERED that this case is hereby stayed pending the location and appointment of counsel for the Plaintiff. As such, the requirement of Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint is stayed. Howeve r, Defendants are to comply with the Court's Order regarding the production of video evidence by June 1, 2015. Signed by Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly on 5/15/2015. A copy of the Memorandum Order has been mailed this day, 5/15/2015, to Plaintiff at his address of record. (ndf )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DEREK WAYNE JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS; SUPERINTENDANT
BRIAN COLEMAN; MR. LOZADA;
MS. HALL; MR. CAMPBELL; ALBERT
RIORDAN; SCI FAYETTE MEDICAL
DEPARTMENT,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 14-1604
Chief Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly
Re: ECF Nos. 24, 28, 30, 39
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Plaintiff Derek Wayne Jackson (“Plaintiff”), currently an inmate at the Pennsylvania
State Correctional Institution at Greene (“SCI – Greene”), has presented a civil rights complaint
alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by failing to intervene and otherwise
protect him from an inmate assault that occurred while he was incarcerated at the State
Correctional Institution at Fayette (“SCI – Fayette”). Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants
violated his rights by committing negligence in the provision of medical care. (ECF No. 7).
Presently before this Court are Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 24),
Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 28) of this Court’s Order denying Plaintiff’s
prior Motion for Appointment of Counsel (ECF No. 11), and Plaintiff’s Motion for a Subpoena
for the Production of Video Evidence (ECF No. 30).
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On May 12, 2015, this Court heard argument on each of the pending Motions, with
Plaintiff appearing by video link. Plaintiff capably and ably articulated the basis for each of his
pending motions and his grounds for opposition to the Partial Motion to Dismiss. For the
reasons set forth below, the Partial Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 24) is granted without prejudice
to permit the Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint; the Motion for Reconsideration of this
Court’s Order regarding appointment of counsel (ECF No. 28) is granted; and the Motion for a
Subpoena for Production of Video Evidence (ECF No. 30) is granted in part.
A. Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss
Defendants present two bases for the partial dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint. First,
Defendants contend that Plaintiff has insufficiently pled facts establishing liability pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 as to Defendants Campbell and Coleman. Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiff
cannot maintain a Section 1983 action against two named Defendants, the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections and the SCI-Fayette Medical Department, because they are not
“persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
As the Court indicated during the hearing of this matter, federal courts require notice
pleading, as opposed to the heightened standard of fact pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires
only “‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in
order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds on which it
rests.’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
However, building upon the landmark United States Supreme Court decisions in
Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit explained that a District Court must undertake the following three steps to
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determine the sufficiency of a complaint: first, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a
plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because
they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Third, “whe[n]
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.” This means that our
inquiry is normally broken into three parts: (1) identifying the elements of the claim, (2)
reviewing the Complaint to strike conclusory allegations, and then (3) looking at the wellpleaded components of the Complaint and evaluating whether all of the elements identified in
part one of the inquiry are sufficiently alleged. Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir.
2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679). The third step of the sequential evaluation requires
this Court to consider the specific nature of the claims presented and to determine whether the
facts pled to substantiate the claims are sufficient to show a “plausible claim for relief.” Fowler
v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). “While legal conclusions can provide the
framework of a Complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 210–11; see
also Malleus, 641 F.3d at 560. Generally speaking, a Complaint that provides adequate facts to
establish “how, when, and where” will survive a motion to dismiss. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 212; see
also Guirguis v. Movers Specialty Servs., Inc., 346 F. App’x. 774, 776 (3d Cir. 2009). In short, a
motion to dismiss should not be granted if a party alleges facts, which could, if established at
trial, entitle him/her to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563, n.8.
1. Claims as to Defendants Campbell and Coleman
In this case, Plaintiff fails to allege any specific facts in the Complaint relative to
Defendants Campbell and Coleman sufficient to establish a claim against them. Defendant
Campbell is a Lieutenant at SCI-Fayette and Defendant Coleman is the Superintendent of the
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facility. Plaintiff’s constitutional claims are brought pursuant to Section 1983, which provides
that “[a] defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs
to be liable, and cannot be held responsible for a constitutional violation which he or she neither
participated in nor approved.” Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007). Personal
involvement in the alleged wrongdoing may be shown “through allegations of personal direction
or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005),
quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). See Ruff v. Health Care Adm
‘r, 441 F. App’x 843, 846 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“[t]o be liable under § 1983, a defendant
must have some personal involvement in the underlying unconstitutional conduct”). See also
Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 432 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2006), quoting Estate of Smith v.
Marasco, 430 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[i]n order to prevail on a § 1983 claim against
multiple defendants, a plaintiff must show that each individual defendant violated his
constitutional rights”).
During the hearing of this matter, Plaintiff stated the basis for his claims against both
Defendant Coleman and Defendant Campbell. This Court explained the applicable law and that
Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts in the Complaint to state a claim against these
Defendants. Plaintiff indicated that he understood that his Complaint fails to allege facts
establishing claims against them.
2. Claims as to Defendants Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and SCI
Fayette Medical Department.
Plaintiff has identified the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and SCI-Fayette
Medical Department as Defendants in this action. However, a § 1983 action brought against a
“State and its Board of Corrections is barred by the Eleventh Amendment unless [the State] has
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consented to the filing of such a suit.” Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978): see also
Thompson v. Burke, 556 F.2d 231, 232 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding that the parole board could not
be sued because it is not a person within the meaning of § 1983). A prison or correctional facility
is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. See Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir.
1973); Philogene v. Adams County Prison, Civ. No. 97–0043, slip op. at p. 4 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 30,
1997) (Rambo, C.J.); Sponsler v. Berks County Prison, 1995 WL 92370, *1 (E.D. Pa. 1995). It
has been similarly recognized that a department within a prison “may not be sued under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 since it is not a person.” Fischer, 474 F.2d at 992; see also Thompkins v. Jane
Doe, No. 99–3941, slip op. at 2–3 (3d Cir. March 16, 2000); Stanley v. Delaware Co. Medical
Dept., 1991 WL 29928 *1 (E.D.Pa.1991) (concluding that the prison medical department is
clearly not a person for purposes of § 1983).
Pursuant to the above standards, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and the
SCI-Fayette Medical Department are not persons and may not be sued under § 1983.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Defendants Coleman and Campbell is granted without prejudice to the filing of an Amended
Complaint, which sets forth all facts supporting all claims against all parties to this action. The
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Defendants Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and SCIFayette Medical Department is granted with prejudice. Plaintiff shall be afforded sixty days to
file his Amended Complaint, which shall be stayed pending the appointment of counsel, as set
forth infra.
B. Motion for a Subpoena for the Production of Video Evidence
Plaintiff has filed a motion seeking the issuance of a subpoena requiring the production of
any video evidence that may exist relative to the assault he suffered in the dining facilities at
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SCI-Fayette on October 28, 2013, and a motion to produce the video recordings. (ECF Nos. 30,
39). During the hearing of this matter, Plaintiff presented testimony that the dining facility has
four cameras, all of which should have captured the assault at issue. Plaintiff seeks production of
the video footage, which he asserts will establish that Defendants Lozado and Hall stood and
watched the assault, without intervening to assist him, and thus caused him to be repeatedly
punched in the head, ribs, and back, kicked in the testicles, and then stabbed with kitchen
utensils.
Defendants have provided counsel with a note stating “[t]here was no video of the
Incident. I/M on I/M assault.” ECF No. 36-1. Given the conceded presence of four cameras in
the dining facility, and the likelihood that video documented the incident at issue, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motions relative to the videos, ECF Nos. 30 and 39, are
granted in part. Counsel for Defendants shall forthwith and without delay conduct further
investigation to confirm with Defendants as to where the cameras were located, whether the
cameras were recording on October 28, 2013, and whether video evidence of the incident exists
or existed at any point in time. Defendants shall file an Affidavit setting forth all steps taken to
locate the video evidence and any policies and procedures implicated by the failure to preserve
such evidence, if video evidence cannot be located.
Defendants are ordered to serve Plaintiff with a supplemental response to this discovery
request by June 1, 2015. Defendants are further ordered to file the supplemental response on the
docket as a “Response to Order of Court” by June 1, 2015.
C. Motion for Reconsideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel
Plaintiff first petitioned this Court for the appointment of counsel on January 8, 2015.
(ECF No. 8). In an Order dated January 22, 2015, Plaintiff’s request was denied. (ECF No. 11).
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Plaintiff then sought reconsideration alleging that he is “severely mentally ill, diagnosed with
schizophrenia, prescribed antipsychotic medication and housed in a residential treatment unit
with a maximum security setting due to the seriousness of his disease.” (ECF No. 14). Plaintiff
further alleged that he “is disabled and unable to participate in a meaningful and intelligent
manner.” Id.
In light of Plaintiff’s allegations regarding his purported disability, the Court considered
his Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Rule 17(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See, Powell v. Symons, 680 F.3d 301, 303, 307 (3d Cir. 2012). However, Plaintiff
failed to present evidence from an appropriate court of record or a relevant public agency
indicating that he had been adjudicated incompetent; nor had Plaintiff presented evidence from a
mental health professional demonstrating that he is being or has been treated for mental illness of
the type that would render him legally incompetent. In addition, the Court determined that
contrary to his claims that he is incapable of litigating this action without the appointment of
counsel, the docket in this matter demonstrates that Plaintiff has appropriately litigated his claims
and appears sufficiently articulate and capable of appropriate legal argument. Accordingly, on
March 16, 2015, this Court issued a Memorandum Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration. (ECF No. 23).
On March 31, 2015, Plaintiff filed a “Motion to Reconsider Motion for Reconsideration
of Counsel.” (ECF No. 28). Plaintiff produced Montgomery County Emergency Services records
from 2001-2004, which he was in his teens. The records document that Plaintiff was repeatedly
hospitalized for behavioral issues and disordered thinking related to his eventual diagnosis of
schizophrenia and a bipolar disorder. (ECF No. 28-1). Given the severity of these conditions, the
Court revisited Plaintiff’s request to determine whether evidence exists of a current diagnosis
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that establishes psychosis and disordered thinking that would impair his ability to represent
himself in this action.
On April 1, 2015, the Court issued an Order directing counsel for Defendants to facilitate
Plaintiff’s execution of a consent form authorizing the release of Plaintiff’s medical and
psychiatric records for the past three years. Upon execution of the release, Defendants submitted
a copy of the records to the Court for in camera inspection. Review of Plaintiff’s mental health
records establishes that Plaintiff currently suffers from serious mental illness, for which he
receives medication and participates in professional and peer counseling. At the hearing of this
matter, Plaintiff revealed that he recently sought and was granted a change in his medication to
reduce side effects, but Plaintiff is frequently distracted by voices and images and cannot control
these episodes. Plaintiff stated that he attends library sessions as permitted and spends time in the
gym, but does not attend classes because he cannot read more than a few pages and believes he is
dyslexic.
During the hearing before this Court on May 12, 2015, Plaintiff was articulate and
understood all matters presented and was able to discern nuances of Defendants’ arguments and
respond accordingly. However, the Court is concerned that Plaintiff’s reading ability appears
limited and accepts his testimony that reading for more than two to three pages is quite
challenging for him. Plaintiff candidly admits that he suffers frequent delusions, which can be
exacerbated by visually concentrating for an extended period of time.
Plaintiff advised the Court that he has a pending federal habeas action relating to his
homicide conviction in Montgomery County. He also stated that counsel has been appointed by
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in that case. See,
Jackson v. Coleman, No. 13-5932 (ECF No. 22) (E.D. Pa. April 14, 2015). A review of the
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record in that matter reveals that Plaintiff’s mental illness was the basis for the appointment of
counsel. In this instance as well, it would appear that the appointment of counsel is warranted to
assist Plaintiff in the pursuit of the pending action.
Plaintiff was advised of the likely delays occasioned by the appointment of counsel and
agreed that such delays were not unexpected or unreasonable. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration for Appointment of Counsel (ECF
No.28) is granted.
IT is further ORDERED that this case is hereby stayed pending the location and
appointment of counsel for the Plaintiff. As such, the requirement of Plaintiff filing an Amended
Complaint is stayed. However, Defendants are to comply with the Court’s Order regarding the
production of video evidence by June 1, 2015.
BY THE COURT,
/s/ Maureen P. Kelly
MAUREEN P. KELLY
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dated: May 15, 2015
cc:
All counsel of record via CM/ECF
Derek Wayne Jackson
GO-3151
SCI Greene
175 Progress Drive
Waynesburg, PA 15370
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