FRANKS v. WAGUESPACK et al
Filing
25
ORDER denying 20 Motion to Amend Complaint to Add New Parties and Claims. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff may submit another motion for leave to amend the Complaint attaching a newly drafted proposed amended complaint setting forth his claims against Defendant Scott M. Perrilloux and/or a plausible Section 1985 conspiracy claim, within 10 days from the date the District Judge enters an order on the Reports & Recommendations ECF Nos. 23 & 24 .In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Ac t, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), and Rule 72.C.2 of the Local Rules of Court, the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of issuance of this Order to file an appeal to the District Judge, which includes the basis for objection to this Order. Any party opposing the appeal shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of the notice of appeal to respond thereto. Failure to file a timely notice of appeal will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights. Signed by Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan on 8/11/15. (clh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JACK L. FRANKS,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
)
ZORRAINE M. WAGUESPACK, et al., )
)
)
Defendants.
)
Civil Action No. 2:14-cv-1733
Judge David Stewart Cercone
Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan
ECF No. 20
MEMORANDUM ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
TO AMEND COMPLAINT TO ADD NEW PARTIES AND CLAIMS
Currently pending before this Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the
Complaint to Add New Parties and Claims (ECF No. 20) pursuant to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) and 20 (“Motion to Amend”). In support, Plaintiff submits
that the circumstances have changed since he filed his original Complaint on December
23, 2014, and he has since been made aware of actions taken by Mary B. Adamczyk,
Mary E. Heck Barrios, and Lori K. Stevens, which allegedly violated his constitutional
rights under 42 U.S.C. §1985. As such, he seeks to add these individuals as named
Defendants in this action, and to add a civil rights conspiracy claim under Section 1985.
Because he has only recently been made aware of the full actions taken by these
individuals and has moved expeditiously to find additional defendants and file the
Motion to Amend,1 Plaintiff maintains that no evidence exists to show that the Motion
to Amend was filed as a result of bad faith, dilatory motives, unexplained delay, or any
other reason justifying denial of the Motion to Amend. Thus, in the absence of undue
prejudice to Defendants and in the interests of justice, Plaintiff requests that his Motion
to Amend be granted.
On March 23, 2015, the Court entered an order directing that any responses to
the Motion to Amend be filed by April 10, 2015. To date, only Title IV-D Legal Services
Unit has filed a response objecting to the Motion to Amend (ECF No. 22). For the
reasons set forth below, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend.
Legal Standard
Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that leave to amend a
pleading “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” In Foman v. Davis, the
Supreme Court delineated the grounds that would justify denying leave to amend:
“undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to
cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing
party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment”. Foman v.
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The grant or denial of leave to amend is within the
sound discretion of the district court; however, failure to provide a reason for denying
leave to amend is considered an abuse of that discretion. Id.; see also In re Burlington
Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Foman, supra).
1
Plaintiff filed his Motion to Amend on March 20, 2015.
2
Our Court of Appeals has interpreted this language to mean that prejudice to the
non-moving party is the touchstone for the denial of an amendment. Lorenz v. CSX
Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1414 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Cornell & Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm'n, 573 F.2d 820, 823 (3d Cir. 1978). In the absence of substantial or undue
prejudice, denial instead must be based on bad faith or dilatory motives, truly undue or
unexplained delay, repeated failures to cure the deficiency by amendments previously
allowed, or futility of amendment. Id. (citing Heyl & Patterson Int'l, Inc. v. F.D. Rich
Housing of the Virgin Islands, Inc., 663 F.2d 419, 425 (3d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1018 (1982).
In determining whether the proposed amendment would be futile, courts apply
the same standard as that applied to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 121 (3d Cir. 2000)
(citation omitted). That standard, as recently articulated by the court of appeals,
provides:
Under the “notice pleading” standard embodied in Rule 8 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must come
forward with “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” As explicated
in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), a claimant must
state a “plausible” claim for relief, and “[a] claim has facial
plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Although “[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007), a plaintiff “need only put forth allegations
that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence of the necessary element.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 213
(quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Covington v.
3
Int'l Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 117–
18 (3d Cir.2013).
Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2014).
Defendants Title IV-D Legal Services Unit & Alexander P. Bicket
Defendant Title IV-D Legal Services Unit has filed a response opposing Plaintiff’s
Motion to Amend, arguing that the proposed amendment would (1) be futile and (2)
result in an undue delay and/or prejudice.
Defendant Alexander P. Bicket (“Judge
Bicket”) did not file a response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend.
The Court finds that it would be futile to allow the proposed amendment as to
Title IV-D Legal Services Unit and Judge Bicket. In the Report and Recommendation
filed on August 11, 2015 (ECF No. 23), the Court recommended that the motions to
dismiss filed by Defendants Title IV-D Legal Services Unit and Judge Bicket be granted
with prejudice. In so doing, the Court conducted a futility analysis and concluded that
it would be futile to allow Plaintiff to amend his Complaint as to these Defendants, as
they are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See ECF No. 23 at 26-27.
This analysis applies equally to the Motion to Amend, and therefore, the Motion to
Amend will be denied as to Defendants Title IV-D Legal Services Unit and Alexander P.
Bicket.
Proposed New Parties – Mary B. Adamczyk,
Mary E. Heck Barrios & Lori K. Stevens
Title IV-D Legal Services Unit has filed a response opposing Plaintiff’s request to
add Mary B. Adamczyk, a Title IV-D solicitor, as a party defendant in this action. In
4
support, Title IV-D Legal Services Unit argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a civil
rights conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(2) or (3), as the proposed first amended
complaint fails to assert any facts to show or suggest that the alleged conspiracy against
him was motivated by racial or class based discriminatory animus. The Court agrees.
In order “[t]o state a claim under §§ 1985(2) or (3), a plaintiff must allege four
things: (1) a conspiracy; (2) motivated by a racial or class-based discriminatory animus
designed to deprive, directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal
protection of the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an injury to
person or property or the deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United
States.” Andela v. Admin. Office of U.S. Courts, 569 F. App’x 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971)). Nowhere in the proposed first
amended complaint does Plaintiff aver any facts to show or suggest that the alleged
conspirators acted to deprive Plaintiff of a constitutional right because of a racial or
class-based discriminatory animus. As such, the proposed section 1985 conspiracy
claim is legally insufficient under Rule 12(b)(6). See, e.g., McArdle v. Hufnagel, 588 F.
App’x 118, 120-21 (3d Cir. 2014); Mendez v. New Jersey State Lottery Comm’n, 532 F. App’x
41, 45 (3d Cir. 2013). Therefore, it would be futile to allow Plaintiff to amend his
complaint to add the civil rights conspiracy claim under section 1985 as pled in the
proposed first amended complaint. Moreover, because the Section 1985 claim is legally
5
deficient, it would be futile to allow Plaintiff to add the alleged conspirators, Mary
Adamczyk, Mary E. Heck Barrios,2 and Lori K. Stevens, as defendants.
Although it would be futile to allow Plaintiff to file the proposed first amended
complaint as drafted with regard to the Section 1985 conspiracy claim and alleged
conspirators, it is unclear whether Plaintiff may be able to assert a plausible Section
1985 claim. Therefore, the Court will deny the motion to amend, but will give Plaintiff
one last opportunity to file another motion to amend with a newly drafted proposed
amended complaint.
Defendant Zorraine M. Waguespack
Defendant Waguespack has not filed a response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend.
However, she has filed a motion to dismiss the original Complaint (ECF No. 15), and in
her brief in support thereof, she submits that the motion to dismiss should be granted
with prejudice because amendment to state a claim would be futile. See ECF No. 16 at 4.
The Court agrees with Defendant Waguespack that it would be futile to allow Plaintiff
to amend his claims against her, because as this Court found in the Report and
Recommendation filed on August 11, 2015 (ECF No. 24), Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendant Waguespack are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, thus divesting this
Court of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court will deny the Motion to
Amend as to Defendant Waguespack.
Plaintiff alleges that Mary E. Heck Barrios is a Louisiana attorney representing Lori K.
Stevens, his ex-spouse.
2
6
Scott M. Perrilloux
Defendant Perrilloux has not filed a response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend, and
although being served with the original Complaint on December 26, 2014, see ECF No.
8, and thus, required to file an answer to the Complaint by January 16, 2015, Defendant
Perrilloux has yet to respond in any fashion. Without the benefit of any response from
Defendant Perrilloux, the Court is unable to determine, with any certainty, whether it
would be futile to allow the amendment. However, the proposed first amended
complaint cannot be filed as drafted. Therefore, giving Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt,
the Court will deny the motion to amend, but will allow Plaintiff one last opportunity to
submit another motion for leave to amend the complaint with a copy of his newly
drafted proposed amended complaint setting forth his claims against District Attorney
Scott M. Perrilloux.
Accordingly, the Court enters the following Order:
AND NOW, this 11th day of August, 2015, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the Complaint to Add New Parties and Claims (ECF No.
20) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff may submit another motion for leave
to amend the Complaint attaching a newly drafted proposed amended complaint
setting forth his claims against Defendant Scott M. Perrilloux and/or a plausible Section
7
1985 conspiracy claim, within 10 days from the date the District Judge enters an order
on the Reports & Recommendations (ECF Nos. 23 & 24).
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), and Rule
72.C.2 of the Local Rules of Court, the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the
date of issuance of this Order to file an appeal to the District Judge, which includes the
basis for objection to this Order. Any party opposing the appeal shall have fourteen
(14) days from the date of service of the notice of appeal to respond thereto. Failure to
file a timely notice of appeal will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.
BY THE COURT:
LISA PUPO LENIHAN
United States Magistrate Judge
cc:
Jack L. Franks, Esquire
Pro Se Plaintiff
Via CM/ECF Electronic Mail
All Counsel of Record
Via CM/ECF Electronic Mail
8
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?