HOPKINS v. GILMORE et al

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM OPINION denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. See Memorandum Opinion for details. Signed by Magistrate Judge Cynthia Reed Eddy on 10/27/2017. (bsc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIAM ALVIN HOPKINS,
Petitioner,
v.
ROBERT GILMORE, Superintendent of
SCI-Greene, THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
PENNSYLVANIA, and STEPHEN A.
ZAPPALLA, District Attorney of
Allegheny County, PA,
Respondents.

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Civil Action No. 2: 15-cv-0006
United States Magistrate Judge
Cynthia Reed Eddy

MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Petitioner, William Alvin Hopkins, is a state prisoner incarcerated at State Correctional
Institution Greene in Waynesburg, Pennsylvania. He seeks a writ of habeas corpus, pro se,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons set forth below, the petition will be denying.
I.

Procedural History
On April 11, 2011, Petitioner, William Alvin Hopkins (“Petitioner” or “Hopkins”),

entered a general guilty plea in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County to the
following: four counts of Burglary, consolidating three cases with a total of five victims; three
counts of Theft by Unlawful Taking, two counts of Receiving Stolen Property, one count of
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, and one count of Access Device Fraud. On June 22, 2011,

1

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have voluntarily
consented to have a U.S. Magistrate Judge conduct proceedings in this case, including entry of a
final judgment. See ECF Nos. 29 and 36.
1

following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of twelve to
twenty-four years’ incarceration, plus restitution. 2
Hopkins, through counsel, filed a direct appeal from his judgment of sentence. On
September 21, 2012, the Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. Hopkins did not file
a Petition for Allowance of Appeal (“PAA”) with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
Unsuccessful on direct appeal, Hopkins filed a timely pro se petition under the
Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). The PCRA court appointed new counsel,
who filed an amended petition on November 30, 2012. The PCRA court held a hearing, at which
trial counsel and Petition testified. The PCRA court, finding trial counsel’s testimony credible,
denied relief by order entered February 21, 2013. Hopkins appealed to the Superior Court. By
Order entered February 10, 2014, the Superior Court, adopting the PCRA court’s reasoning as its
own, found that Hopkins was not entitled to relief. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied
allowance of appeal on July 2, 2014.
Having been denied relief in state court, Hopkins filed pro se the instant habeas petition,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in which he raises the following claim:
Trial Counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel in
violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution. Specifically, Petitioner was convicted on a the
basis of a guilty plea that was the product of ineffective assistance
of counsel.

2

At CC No. 201016024, Hopkins was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 48 to 96
months, with credit for time served, and to pay restitution in the amount of $1,045.00. At CC
No. 201008346, Hopkins was sentenced at Count 1 to a term of imprisonment of 24 to 48
months, to be served consecutive to the sentence at CC No. 201016024. At Count 3, Hopkins
was sentenced to a consecutive term of imprisonment of 48 to 96 months. At CC No.
201014284 , Hopkins was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 24 to 48 months, to be served
consecutive to the sentence imposed at count 3 of CC No. 201008346.
2

Habeas Pet. at 6 (ECF No. 1). Respondents filed a timely Answer (ECF No. 8) and the relevant
state court records, to which Petitioner filed a timely Reply Memorandum. (ECF No. 10). The
Court has reviewed the filings by the parties, as well as the state court record, including the
transcripts from Hopkins’ guilty plea proceeding, sentencing proceeding, and PCRA hearing.
The matter is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
II.

Standard of Review
A. 28 U.S.C. § 2254
This case is governed by the federal habeas statute applicable to state prisoners. 28

U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
Pub.L.No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, enacted on April 24, 1996 (“AEDPA”), “which imposes
significant procedural and substantive limitations on the scope” of the Court’s review.3
Wilkerson v. Superintendent Fayette SCI, 871 F.3d 221, 227 (3d Cir. 2017). Under AEDPA, a
petitioner must “ ‘ha[ve] exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State,’ 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)(1)(A), before seeking federal habeas relief, and a claim will be deemed unexhausted if
the petitioner ‘has the right to file under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure,
the question presented,’ but has failed to do so, id. § 2254(c).” Id. at *3.
Respondents do not dispute that the issue raised in this habeas petition is exhausted.
Hopkins raised the claim that his guilty plea was the product of ineffective assistance of counsel
during his PCRA proceedings, and the claim was denied on its merits both before the PCRA
court the Superior Court.

“Where a state court has rejected a petitioner’s claim on the merits,

AEDPA limits the scope of [the court’s] substantive review to whether the state court’s decision
3

The first consideration in reviewing a federal habeas petition is whether the petition was
timely filed under AEDPA’s one-year limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Respondents do
not dispute that Hopkins’ petition was timely filed.
3

‘was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the Untied States.” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).
“A state-court decision is ‘contrary to’ clearly established federal law if the state court (1)
‘contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme] Court's cases or (2) ‘confronts a set of
facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and
nevertheless arrives at a [different] result.’ ” Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 234 (3d Cir.
2004) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06 (2000)). Few state court decisions will
be “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent. “Clearly established Federal law” should be
determined as of the date of the relevant state-court decision. Greene v. Palakovich, 606 F.3d 85,
95 (3d Cir. 2010), aff'd, Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34 (2011).
The federal habeas court more often must determine whether the state court adjudication
was an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court precedent. “A state-court decision
‘involve[s] an unreasonable application’ of clearly established federal law if the state court (1)
‘identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme] Court's cases but unreasonably
applies it to the facts of the particular . . . case’; or (2) ‘unreasonably extends a legal principle
from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably
refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.’ “ Id. (quoting Williams,
529 U.S. at 407).
Hopkins’ claim will be reviewed with these standards in mind.

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III.

Review of Petitioner’s Claim4
As he did during the PCRA proceedings, Hopkins argues that his guilty plea was the

product of trial counsel’s ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he maintains that trial
counsel erred when she advised him to pursue a county sentence5 even though guidelines and
sentencing law mandated that he serve his sentence in a state correctional facility. Hopkins
argues that trial counsel advised him to (1) reject an offer made by the Commonwealth of 5 to 10
years’ incarceration in exchange for pleading guilty, (2) proceed with a general plea, and (3)
request the court to impose a county, rather than state, sentence of incarceration.6
The clearly established federal law with respect to a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under the now familiar
Strickland standard, Hopkins must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that
this deficiency prejudiced his defense.

Bey v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 856 F.3d 230, 238

(3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). On habeas review, a court “may begin and,
when dispositive, end with either of Strickland’s two prongs.”

Mathias v. Superintendent

Frackville SCI, 869 F.3d 175, 189 (3d Cir. 2017).

The factual background of Hopkins’ criminal case is not relevant to the Court’s
determination of the instant federal habeas petition. However, the factual background may be
found in Respondents’ Answer, which quotes extensively from the relevant portions of the
affidavits of probable cause supporting the criminal complaints in Hopkins’ criminal cases. See
Ans. at 7 - 10. (ECF No. 8).
4

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Sentences of less than two years may be served at Allegheny County Jail and are
therefore regularly called “county sentences” or “county-length sentences.”
Hopkins also takes issue with the PCRA court’s credibility findings. Both these issues
depend upon the same assertion that plea counsel was ineffective in advising Hopkins not to take
the Commonwealth’s offer of a negotiated sentence of five to ten years’ incarceration.
6

5

During the PCRA hearing, both trial counsel and Petitioner testified. The PCRA court
summarized their testimony as follows:
[T]rial counsel testified that she represented Appellant on a consolidated
plea for three matters. Counsel testified that she advised Appellant to accept an
offer made by the Commonwealth for an aggregate five-to-ten-year sentence, and
Appellant, understanding the offer, rejected it, believing that he could do better.
According to trial counsel, Appellant believed that he knew the system based on
his lengthy history with the courts and his active Service Plan with JusticeRelated Services (JRS). Appellant was “adamant that he would get his Service
Plan simply by virtue of having a JRS Service Plan. Trial counsel testified that,
after Appellant rejected the offer, she continued to advocate on his behalf to the
best of her ability.
[A]ppellant testified that he rejected the offer because trial counsel told
him that she was going to convince the Court to sentence Appellant to the JRS
Program, and he took her advice. Appellant said that counsel told him that she
would get him a county sentence of 11.5 to 23 months.
PCRA Opinion, August 2, 2013 (ECF No. 8-5 at 19 -20).
Further, the PCRA court noted that during the plea proceeding, when the Court indicated
that it was not inclined to grant a county sentence, Hopkins “remained resolute that he would do
better than the Commonwealth’s offer with a general plea.” He also admitted during his PCRA
testimony that the court told him when he entered his plea that he was not going to get a county
sentence. Id. at 21.
After observing both trial counsel and Hopkins and listening to their sworn testimony, the
PCRA court found as follows:
Experienced counsel credibly testified that she did not promise Appellant
that he would receive a county sentence. Instead she advised him to accept a plea
offer of five to ten years incarceration. Appellant was well aware that he would
not be receiving a county sentence, and counsel’s advice to accept the offer was
sound, given Appellant’s guidelines on the four Burglaries 7 and the fact that he
had five victims on these counts. Appellant, due to his own stubborn beliefs and
misguided notions from his prior court experiences, and against the reasoned
7

Each count was graded as a felony of the first degree.
6

advice of counsel, exercised his right to reject the offer. Having rejected the
sound advice of counsel, Appellant is precluded from alleging ineffectiveness for
his own failure to be persuaded.
Id. Although not citing to Strickland, the PCRA court applied the three-prong ineffectiveness
test set out in Commonwealth v. Pierce, 786 A.2d 203, 213 (Pa. 2013):
(1) the underlying substantive claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel whose
effectiveness is being challenged did not have a reasonable basis for his or her
actions or failure to act and (3) the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of
counsel’s deficient performance.
The PCRA court concluded that Hopkins’ ineffectiveness claim had no arguable merit.
The decisions of the state courts during Hopkins’ PCRA proceedings easily withstand
review under AEDPA. It clear that the PCRA court applied the correct standard for ineffective
assistance of counsel.8 Therefore, the law applied by the state courts was not contrary to the
federal law.

Furthermore, the PCRA court's credibility determination, as affirmed by the

Pennsylvania Superior Court, is a finding of fact presumed to be correct under 28 U.S.C. §
2254(e)(1). Petitioner has not established by clear and convincing evidence that the credibility
determination made by the Pennsylvania state courts was incorrect.9

8

Pennsylvania applies the same test for ineffective assistance of counsel as the federal
courts. Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 203 (3d Cir. 2000). In Pennsylvania, the ineffective
assistance of counsel standard requires the petitioner to “rebut the presumption of professional
competence” by demonstrating: “(1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular
course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed to effectuate
his interest; and (3) but for counsel's ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the proceedings would have been different.” Commonwealth v. Sneed, 899 A.2d
1067, 1076 (Pa. 2006) (citing Commonwealth v. Pierce, 786 A.2d 203, 213 (Pa. 2001)). If the
petitioner fails to satisfy any of the standard's prongs, the claim will be rejected. Id.
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Although § 2254(e)(1) has a heightened standard of clear and convincing evidence for
reviewing factual determinations, this standard is not insurmountable. As the United States
Supreme Court has stated: “Even in the context of federal habeas, deference does not imply the
abandonment or abdication of judicial review. Deference does not by definition preclude relief.
A federal court can disagree with a state court’s credibility determination and, when guided by
7

IV.

Certificate of Appealability
Section 102 of AEDPA, which is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2253, governs the issuance of a

certificate of appealability for appellate review of a district court's disposition of a habeas
petition. It provides that “[a] certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if the applicant has
made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” “When the district court
denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying
constitutional claim, a [certificate of appealability] should issue when the prisoner shows, at
least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the
denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
Where the district court has rejected a constitutional claim on its merits, “[t]he petitioner must
demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional
claims debatable or wrong.” Id. Applying those standards here, the Court concludes that jurists
of reason would not find it debatable whether Hopkins’ claim should be dismissed. Accordingly,
a certificate of appealability will be denied.
IV.

Conclusion
For all of the above reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be denied. There

has been no substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right requiring the issuance of a
certificate of appealability. An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: October 27, 2017

s/ Cynthia Reed Eddy
Cynthia Reed Eddy
United States Magistrate Judge

AEDPA, conclude the decision was unreasonable or that the factual premise was incorrect by
clear and convincing evidence.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).
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cc:

WILLIAM ALVIN HOPKINS
KB-9194
S.C.I. Greene
175 Progress Drive
Waynesburg, PA 15370
(via U.S. First Class Mail)
Kelly D. Tomasic
Rusheen R. Pettit
Office of the District Attorney of Allegheny County
(via ECF electronic notification)

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