LABMD, INC. v. TIVERSA HOLDING CORP. et al
Filing
154
MEMORANDUM OPINION denying 102 Motion for Sanctions; denying as moot 139 Motion to Strike. Signed by Chief Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly on 5/23/16. (ard)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LABMD, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
TIVERSA HOLDING CORP.formerly
known as TIVERSA, INC.; ROBERT J.
BOBACK; M. ERIC JOHNSON; DOES
1-10,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Civil Action No. 15-92
Judge Mark R. Hornak/
Chief Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly
Re: ECF Nos. 102, 139
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Maureen P. Kelly, Chief United States Magistrate Judge
In yet another chapter of the ongoing contentious litigation between the parties,
Defendant M. Eric Johnson ("Defendant Johnson") filed a Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions
("Motion for Sanctions"). ECF No. 102. For the reasons that follow, the Motion for Sanctions is
DENIED.
I. RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Litigation between the parties commenced in a Georgia state court action filed by
LabMD, Inc. ("LabMD") in October 2011. That case was removed to the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia where it was dismissed for lack of personal
jurisdiction. LabMD, Inc. v. Tiversa, Inc., 509 F. App'x 842 (11th Cir. 2013)(affirming the
dismissal). 1
1
Defendant Tiversa Holding Corp. also filed an action in this Court against LabMD pleading state law claims for
defamation, slander per se, commercial disparagement and trade libel. Tiversa Holding Corp. v. LabMD, Inc., No.
13-1296 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 2012). On November 4, 2014, Judge Nora Barry Fischer dismissed Tiversa's action for
lack of diversity jurisdiction upon the addition of Richard Edward Wallace, a Pennsylvania resident, as a named
defendant. (ECF No. 84). Tiversa and Robert Boback are now pursuing their claims in a separate consolidated action
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, at GD-14-16497. Also pending and arising out of the subject
The instant iteration of this litigation was commenced via a Complaint filed by LabMD
with this Court on January 21, 2015. ECF No. 1. In the Complaint, LabMD alleged a shakedown
scheme as one in which Defendants conspired to infiltrate LabMD's computer systems and, upon
gaining access, created a data security breach in LabMD's computer files. ECF No. 1 ~ 4.
Through this breach, Defendant Tiversa Holding Corp. ("Tiversa") obtained a 1,718 page file
containing confidential patient health-related data ("the 1718 File"). Id.
~
20. With this file as
proof of a breach, Ti versa then offered to sell LabMD services to remedy the breach. Id. When
LabMD refused to purchase Tiversa's services, Defendants turned to the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") and reported that due to LabMD's failed data security protocols,
confidential patient health and personal information was disseminated on peer-to-peer networks
for unbridled use by identity thieves. Id.
~
22. LabMD contended that Defendants then retaliated
against LabMD's refusal to purchase Tiversa's services by including references to the 1718 File
in publications authored by Defendant Johnson relative to health care "data breaches."
Id.~
21.
Lab MD also alleged that as a result of Defendants' conduct, the FTC initiated a public and wideranging investigation of LabMD, leaving it "an insolvent shell of a company." Id.
~
1. In
addition, LabMD filed a RICO Case Statement on February 18, 2015. ECF Nos. 18, 19.
On March 24, 2015, Tiversa and Defendant Robert J. Boback ("the Tiversa Defendants")
filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint and a brief in support thereof. ECF Nos. 34, 35.
On March 31, 2015, Defendant Johnson filed a Motion to Dismiss and a brief in support thereof.
ECF Nos. 36, 37. On June 1, 2015, LabMD filed responses in opposition to both Motions to
matter of this action is an administrative action commenced by the Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter of
LabMD, Inc., No. 9357 (F.T.C.). LabMD has unsuccessfully challenged the FTC's action in multiple federal
actions. LabMD. Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, No. 1:13-cv-1787 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 2013); LabMD. Inc. v. Federal
Trade Comm'n, No. 13-15267-F (I Ith Cir. Feb. 18, 2014); LabMD. Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, No. I: 14-cv00810-WSD, affd 776 F.3d 1275 (I Ith Cir. 2015).
2
Dismiss. ECF Nos. 63, 64. The Ti versa Defendants filed a Reply in Support of their Motion to
Dismiss on June 24, 2015. ECF No. 68. Defendant Johnson filed a Reply in Support of his
Motion to Dismiss on June 24, 2015. ECF No. 69.
On August 17, 2015, this Court issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that
the Motions to Dismiss be granted. ECF No. 70. However, it was recommended that LabMD be
granted leave to amend the defamation, tortious interference and conspiracy counts (Counts II,
III and VI). Id. On September 11, 2015, LabMD filed Objections to the Report and
Recommendation. ECF No. 73. The Tiversa Defendants filed a Response in Opposition to the
Objections. ECF No. 74. On October 2, 2015, Defendant Johnson filed a Brief in Opposition to
Objections to Report and Recommendation. ECF No. 75. Reply and sur-reply briefs were filed.
ECF Nos. 83, 84, 88.
On November 5, 2015, Defendant Johnson served a Rule 11 "safe harbor" notice letter on
LabMD and enclosed a copy of the draft Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions. ECF Nos. 102, 153. In
the letter, Defendant Johnson demanded that LabMD withdraw every claim against him,
including the claims that the undersigned had recommended that LabMD be given leave to
amend. On November 25, 2015, LabMD declined the demand for dismissal. ECF Nos. 110,
136-1. LabMD specifically referenced its briefing on the Objections to the Report and
Recommendation pending before the Court. ECF No. 136-1.
United States District Judge Mark Hornak conducted a hearing on December 8, 2016, at
which time he heard argument on the Objections to the Report and Recommendation relative to
the Motions to Dismiss. ECF No. 106. Thereafter, on January 8, 2016, Judge Hornak issued a
Memorandum Order ruling on the Objections, largely adopting the Report and Recommendation,
and directing LabMD to file any Amended Complaint by February 12, 2016. ECF No. 115.
3
Thereafter, LabMD filed a Motion for Reconsideration, related, in part, to the dismissal of claims
as to Defendant Johnson. ECF No. 117. On February 22, 2016, Judge Hornak denied the
Motion for Reconsideration. ECF No. 129.
Following the filing of the Amended Complaint that did not include claims against
Defendant Johnson, the undersigned issued an Order directing Defendant Johnson to file a notice
stating whether, in light of his dismissal from this case and the fact that he was not included in
the Amended Complaint, the Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions had become moot. ECF No. 133.
Thereafter, a Notice on Defendant M. Eric Johnson's Pending Rule 11 Motion was filed stating
that the motion was not moot and making additional arguments in support of Defendant
Johnson's request for sanctions.
2
ECF No. 136.
II. ST AND ARD OF REVIEW OF RULE 11 MOTIONS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 is intended to check abuses in the signing of
pleadings. Rule 11 provides, in pertinent part, that:
(a) SIGNATURE. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper must be
signed by at least one attorney ofrecord in the attorney's name-or by a party
personally if the party is unrepresented ....
(b) REPRESENTATIONS TO THE COURT. By presenting to the court a
pleading, written motion, or other paper-whether by signing, filing, submitting, or
later advocating it-an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of
the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances:
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass,
cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;
2
The Court is compelled to note that Defendant Johnson went well beyond filing the requested notice. Instead,
Defendant Johnson filed what amounts to a supplemental brief without leave of this Court. Yet again, Defendant
Johnson also attempted to bring recent events in the pending disputes between the parties in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia into this Court. Because neither is acceptable, this Court does not
consider the unauthorized supplemental brief, nor the Georgia information included in footnote 1 of Defendant
Johnson's recent filing, ECF No. 136.
4
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing
existing law or for establishing new law;
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for
further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 l(a) and (b).
The Rule provides that a court may sanction an attorney or party for filing documents for
an improper purpose, making frivolous arguments or making allegations that lack evidentiary
support. Section (c) of Rule 11 states:
(c) SANCTIONS.
( 1) In General. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond,
the court determines that Rule 11 (b) has been violated, the court may impose an
appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is
responsible for the violation. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm must
be held jointly responsible for a violation committed by its partner, associate, or
employee.
(2) Motion for Sanctions. A motion for sanctions must be made separately
from any other motion and must describe the specific conduct that allegedly
violates Rule 1 l(b). The motion must be served under Rule 5, but it must not be
filed or be presented to the court if the challenged paper, claim, defense,
contention, or denial is withdrawn or appropriately corrected within 21 days after
service or within another time the court sets. If warranted, the court may award to
the prevailing party the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred
for the motion.
(3) On the Court's Initiative. On its own, the court may order an attorney,
law firm, or party to show cause why conduct specifically described in the order
has not violated Rule 11 (b ).
(4) Nature of a Sanction. A sanction imposed under this rule must be
limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct
by others similarly situated. The sanction may include nonmonetary directives;
an order to pay a penalty into court; or, if imposed on motion and warranted for
effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of part or all of the
5
reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses directly resulting from the
violation.
(5) Limitations on Monetary Sanctions. The Court must not impose a
monetary sanction:
(A) against a represented party for violating Rule 1 l(b)(2); or
(B) on its own, unless it issued the show-cause order under Rule
11 (c)(3) before voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against
the party that is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned.
(6) Requirements for an Order. An Order imposing a sanction must
describe the sanctioned conduct and explain the basis for the sanction.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 l(c).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has cautioned that Rule 11
sanctions are warranted "only in the 'exceptional circumstances' ... where a claim or motion is
patently unmeritorious or frivolous." Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeloaders, 857
F .2d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 1988) (internal citations omitted). A court must look to whether the
imposition of sanctions would be reasonable under the circumstances. Id.
In commencing review of a Rule 11 motion for sanctions, a court must first determine
whether the movant has complied with the "safe harbor" provision set forth in Rule 11 (c)(2). If
the movant failed to provide the twenty-one day grace period, "the motion must be denied
[because the] purpose of safe harbor is to give the parties the opportunity to correct their errors."
In re: Schaefer Salt Recovery, Inc., 542 F .3d 90, 99 (3d Cir. 2008). Given the "safe harbor"
provisions, "a party cannot delay serving its Rule 11 motion until conclusion of the case (or
judicial rejection of the offending contention)." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Advisory Committee's
Notes (1993 Amendments).
6
III. DISCUSSION
A. Defendant Johnson's "Safe Harbor" Notice is Untimely.
The initial issue before this Court is whether Defendant Johnson complied with the "safe
harbor" requirements set forth in Rule 11 (c)(2).
The dates relevant to this issue are undisputed. On January 21, 2015, LabMD initiated
this action by filing a Complaint against Defendant Johnson and the other defendants. ECF No.
1. The record reflects that Defendant Johnson was served on January 22, 2015. ECF No. 12.
On March 31, 2015, Defendant Johnson filed a Motion to Dismiss and brief in support. ECF
Nos. 36, 37. On the same date, the Tiversa defendants also filed a Motion to Dismiss and brief
in support. ECF Nos. 34, 35. On August 17, 2015, this Court issued the Report and
Recommendation recommending that both Motions to Dismiss be granted, and granted LabMD
leave to amend certain claims, including certain claims against Defendant Johnson. ECF No. 70.
On September 11, 2015, LabMD filed Objections to the Report and Recommendation. ECF No.
73. On October 2, 2015, Defendant Johnson filed a Brief in Opposition. ECF No. 75.
Not until November 5, 2015, did Defendant Johnson serve a "safe harbor" notice on
LabMD. ECF No. 102 at 2. In that notice, Defendant Johnson's counsel demanded the dismissal
of Defendant Johnson from this case and that LabMD withdraw its Complaint. ECF No. 153.
On November 25, 2015, LabMD declined the demand. ECF Nos. 110, 136-1.
Clearly, the "safe harbor" notice was not served by Defendant Johnson on LabMD
following service of the Complaint. Given that the Complaint was filed on January 21, 2015, the
"safe harbor" notice could have been served shortly thereafter. It was not. By this Court's
calculation, the notice was not served until more than nine months later.
7
Furthermore, it is important to note that in the case at issue, the November 5, 2015, "safe
harbor" notice was not served until long after this Court's Report and Recommendation
recommending the granting of Defendants' Motions to Dismiss was issued (August 17, 2015),
and after the filing of the Objections and Responses to the Report and Recommendation were
filed, in particular by Defendant Johnson (October 2, 2015). 3 In this instance of delay, the "safe
harbor" notice was not served until almost three months after issuance of the Report and
Recommendation.
In Plaintiffs' Opposition to Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions, LabMD argues that the timing
of Defendant Johnson's Motion for Sanctions "is most odd. Defendant Johnson never explains
why his filing is so late and provides no legal support or justification for being so delinquent."
ECF No. 110 at 1. LabMD asserts that the time for Defendant Johnson to demand withdrawal of
the Complaint was promptly after he was served with the Complaint in January 2015.
As LabMD correctly argues, courts have consistently denied Rule 11 sanction motions
that are untimely. In In re: Schaefer Salt Recovery, the Third Circuit held: "The purpose of safe
harbor is to give the parties the opportunity to correct their errors, with the practical effect being
that 'a party cannot delay serving its Rule 11 motion' ... 'until conclusion of the case (or judicial
rejection of the offending contention).'" 542 F.3d at 99. Following the rationale in Schaefer, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in Barley v. Fox Chase
Cancer Center, 54 F.Supp.3d 396 (E.D. Pa. 2014), in the context of a disability discrimination
lawsuit brought by a former employee against her former employer, recently dismissed the
3
Given the "heated" nature of this litigation and aggressive advocacy of all of the parties, this Court would be
remiss not to question whether the timing of the service of the "safe harbor" letter by Defendant Johnson on
LabMD on November 5, 2015 was part ofa litigation strategy by Defendant Johnson not to give LabMD the early
opportunity to amend the Complaint but to compel LabMD withdraw the Objections and to discourage LabMD from
filing an Amended Complaint with any claims against Defendant Johnson. This approach undermines the purpose
of Rule 11 to have the parties self-correct without court intervention.
8
employer's Rule 11 motion for sanctions due to the failure of the defendant employer to comply
with Rule 11 's "safe harbor" requirement. Id. at 407. The District Court held:
We agree with Barley that Fox Chase is not entitled to sanctions under Rule 11.
Fox Chase offers no excuse or legal support for its failure to file any Rule 11
sanctions motion prior to Barley's summary judgment motion or in the three
weeks before we issued our Opinion. Nor could it find such support: Rule 11 's
safe harbor is not optional but rather integral to the Rule's purpose of having
parties self-correct without court intervention. See Schaefer Salt, 542 F.3d at 99
("the purpose of the safe harbor is to give parties the opportunity to correct their
errors"). The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 amendment clarify that
"[g]iven the 'safe harbor' provisions ... , a party cannot delay serving its Rule 11
motion until conclusion of the case." Again, the period for a Rule 11 filing ended
when we granted Fox Chase's summary judgment motion. Fox Chase's motion is
untimely and its failure to comply with the safe harbor cannot be excused.
Furthermore, other Circuits have similarly construed Rule l l(c). Mellott v. MSN
Communications, Inc., 492 Fed. App'x. 887, 888 (10th Cir. 2012) (abuse of discretion to grant a
Rule 11 motion that is filed after dismissal of case because it is impossible to comply with safeharbor provision). Lawrence v. Richman Group of CT LLC, 620 F.3d 153, 158 (2d Cir. 2010)
(sanctions cannot be awarded where Rule 11 motion was filed after the second amended
complaint was effectively dismissed); Peer v. Lewis, 606 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding
motion for sanctions untimely where movant waited until after complaint was struck, eleven
months after movant had all necessary information to move for sanctions); Moore v. Lafayette
Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 416, 446 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that the grant of sanctions pursuant to
Rule 11 was an abuse of discretion where motion for sanction was made after summary
judgment disposed of case).
Consistent with the holdings in Schaefer and Barley, this Court finds that Defendant
Johnson's Motion for Sanctions is untimely. It is undisputed that Defendant Johnson waited
over nine (9) months after service of the Complaint and until almost three (3) months after the
9
Complaint was effectively dismissed by this Court's Report and Recommendation granting the
Motions to Dismiss to serve the "safe harbor" notice. Defendant Johnson has proffered no
legitimate explanation or legal support to excuse the delayed and untimely filing. 4 Accordingly,
the Motion for Sanctions is denied as untimely filed and for failure to comply with the "safe
harbor" requirements of Rule l l(c).
B. Defendant Johnson's Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions Does Not Warrant the
Imposition of Sanctions.
Even if Defendant Johnson had timely served the "safe harbor" notice and complied with
the requirements of Rule 11, this Court would find that LabMD did not engage in conduct
relative to the filing of the original Complaint that warrants the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions.
In the Motion for Sanctions, Defendant Johnson moves for the imposition of sanctions
against LabMD "for maliciously, recklessly and/or in bad faith maintaining a civil action against
Professor Johnson which is time-barred and substantively untenable under the applicable law."
ECF No. 102 ~ 1. Defendant Johnson argues for sanctions on three grounds: the claims against
him are time-barred; the claims have no basis in existing law and that the claims are meritless
and asserted in bad faith.
Id.~~
7-27.
LabMD opposes the Motion for Sanctions on the substantive basis that it does not meet
the standard for Rule 11 sanctions. ECF No. 110 at 9. First, LabMD argues that Defendant
Johnson fails to specify which of the four grounds for Rule 11 sanctions applies to which
attorney and law firm on which claim. Id. at 9-10. Second, LabMD asserts that Pennsylvania
law does not bar the discovery rule in mass-media defamation cases. Id. at 11-12. Third,
4
The Court notes that the existence of such an explanation is unlikely because, as pointed out by LabMD, the
instant Motion for Sanctions is essentially a recitation of the issues raised in Defendant Johnson's Motion to
Dismiss.
10
LabMD contends that the doctrines of equitable tolling and equitable estoppel toll the statute of
limitations. Id. at 12-15.
In considering Rule 11 motions, the Third Circuit has noted that "[f]ormulating a rule
broad enough to curb abusive litigation tactics and misuse of the court's process but not yet so
sweeping as to hinder zealous advocacy was obviously a formidable task." Gaiardo v. Ethyl
Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 482 (3d. Cir. 1987). The Third Circuit also found that Rule 11 imposes an
obligation on attorneys to "Stop, Think, Investigate and Research" before filing litigation
documents. Id. However, the Third Circuit has cautioned that "Rule 11 is not to be used
routinely when the parties disagree about the correct resolution of a matter in litigation. Rule 11
is intended for only exceptional circumstances." Id. at 483. Accordingly, Pennsylvania district
courts have held that Rule 11 sanctions should be imposed only if it is patently clear that a claim
"has absolutely no chance of success." Abney v. Younker, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50701, at *4
(M.D. Pa. April 15, 2016); Cvetko v. Derry Twp. Police Dept., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86907, at
*5 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2010).
Applying this narrow approach to imposing Rule 11 sanctions, courts have consistently
held that "the mere failure of a complaint to withstand a motion for summary judgment or a
motion to dismiss should not be thought to establish a rule violation." Simmerman v. Corino, 27
F.3d. 58, 62 (3d. Cir. 1994); Tegg Corp. v. Beckstrom Elec. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100081,
at *6-7 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2008).
Recently, in Kohar v. Wells Fargo, N.A., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49599 (W.D. Pa. April
13, 2016), United States District Judge Nora Barry Fischer denied a motion for sanctions
following the granting of motions to dismiss. The Kohar case arose from lengthy state court
foreclosure proceedings and extensive bankruptcy proceedings. Defendants in their motions for
11
I
sanctions under Rule 11 sought financial sanctions against plaintiffs and their counsel for
initiating the litigation for improper purposes and for pursuing unmeritorious claims under the
Fair Debt Collections Practices Act ("FDCP A"). The Court granted the motions to dismiss,
finding that the FDCP A claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. In relying on
the holdings in Simmerman and Tegg Corp., Judge Fischer found that the mere failure of the
FDCP A claims to survive the motions to dismiss did not warrant the imposition of Rule 11
sanctions. The Court held:
In addition, the motions for sanctions are overbroad in that they do not
sufficiently delineate between which provisions of Rule 11 (b) were violated by
Plaintiffs or their counsel and Rule 11 (c)( 5) expressly precludes the Court from
imposing sanctions against Plaintiffs individually for a violation of Rule 11 (b)(2)
requiring that "the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing
existing law or for establishing new law." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 l(c)(S)(A).
Id. at * 16-1 7.
The Court also determined that the notice lacked specificity. Accordingly, the Court found that
sanctions were "inappropriate." Id. at *17.
Similar to the ruling in Kohar, this Court finds that the parties have been engaged in
extensive litigation proceedings in a number of courts. This dispute has involved zealous
advocacy by all of the parties. Based on an objective and thorough review of the relevant facts,
pleadings and applicable law, this Court does not find the requisite "extraordinary
circumstances" warranting the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. 5
5
The filing of motions for sanctions appears to be part of a litigation strategy of all of the parties to this ongoing
dispute. In the related action in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Tiversa Holding Corn. v.
LabMD, Inc., GD-14-16497, LabMD, Inc. and Michael J. Daugherty, as defendants in that case, filed a "Motion for
Sanctions Pursuant to Rule 1023.2," on October 2, 2015, alleging that Tiversa and Boback's claims were not
warranted by existing law and lacked evidentiary support. (Rule 1023.2 is the Pennsylvania equivalent to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11.) On April 20, 2016, Judge Christine A. Ward issued an Order of Court denying the Motion for
Sanctions. Id. at Document 113.
12
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions of Defendant Johnson,
ECF No. 102, is DENIED. In light of this ruling, the Motion to Strike Portions of Notice of
Defendant Johnson, ECF No. 139, is DENIED AS MOOT.
BY THE COURT:
MAUREENP.
LY
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGI T
Dated: May 23, 2016
cc:
The Honorable Mark R. Hornak
United States District Judge
All counsel of record via CM-ECF
13
TE JUDGE
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?