COOPER v. MARTUCCHI et al
Filing
98
MEMORANDUM OPINION on the 61 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by JIN. Signed by Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan on 04/28/2016. (jmb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PITTSBURGH
)
HOW ARD COOPER,
)
)
Plaintiff,
2: 15-CV-00267-LPL
)
)
vs.
SGT. MARTUCCHI, OFFICER WALTER,
DR. JIN,
)
)
)
)
ECF NO. 61
Defendants,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case is before the Court on Defendant Jin's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on
October 30, 2015. (ECF No. 61). Defendant has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, concise
Statement of Material Facts and a Brief in Support thereof.
(ECF Nos. 61, 62, 63). On
November 24, 2015, Plaintiff was ordered to file a Response to this Motion as well as a Motion
filed by remaining Defendants on November 23, 2015. (ECF No. 72). Plaintiff filed a Response
to the second filed Motion but not to this one. (ECF No. 78). On January 5, 2016, the Court, sua
sponte, gave Plaintiff another opportunity to file a Response, with a deadline of January 19,
2016. (ECF No. 80). Crossing in the mail was a request by Plaintiff for a 90 day extension of
time to respond. Because the pending motion was filed in October the Court granted Plaintiff an
extension to January 29, 2016. (ECF No. 85). Another extension was requested by Plaintiff on
January 29, 2016 and grated. Plaintiff's Response was now due February 29, 2016. (ECF Nos. 86
and 87). To date, no Response has been received so a ruling will be made without the benefit of a
Response. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On or around February 23, 2015, prose Plaintiff, Howard Cooper, initiated a civil action
against various Defendants regarding an assault by another inmate and the medical care
provided to him while he was an inmate incarcerated within the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections at S.C.I.-Greene. According to his Complaint, on December 1, 2014, Plaintiff
overheard Inmate Mayo advise the Defendant Corrections Officers that he was a Z-Code
(single cell housing restriction) and that he would kill anyone in a cell with him. (ECF No. 7,
~
7). Notwithstanding this threat, the Corrections Officers purportedly ordered Inmate Mayo
into a cell with Plaintiff. (ECF No. 7,
~
8). Once in the cell, Inmate Mayo pulled a sock filled
with batteries from his personal belongings and began to assault Plaintiff, hitting him with
the battery-filled sock approximately 12 to 15 times on his head, hands, ribs, stomach, and
legs. (ECF No. 7,
~
9-10).
Plaintiff now alleges that Defendant, Dr. Byunghak Jin, failed to adequately treat his
injuries. Within his Complaint, Plaintiff acknowledges that he was seen in the infirmary
immediately following the assault, where he was stabilized and given medication for pain. (ECF
No. 7, ~ 10). Additionally, the following day, an X-ray was taken of Plaintiffs ribs and hands.
(ECF No. 7,
~
11 ). At that time, the X-ray technician (who is not a radiologist) purportedly
advised Plaintiff that she believed his fingers and ribs were broken. (ECF No. 7,
~
11 ).
Notwithstanding this treatment, Plaintiff avers that Dr. Byunghak Jin violated his Eighth
Amendment rights by falsifying medical records in order to minimize the gravity of Plaintiffs
alleged injuries, stating:
On December 3, 2014[,] Plaintiff was called to the Prison Infirmary to be seen by
Defendant Dr. Jin. In an attempt to minimize Plaintiffs injuries, Defendant Dr.
Jin fabricated Plaintiffs medical condition and records so that [it] would appear
that Plaintiff had not suffered any broken fingers and ribs despite the X-ray
technician's early findings. Plaintiff was only prescribe[d] Motrin [for] his pain
that offered him no relief. Due to the inaction by Defendant Dr. Jin, one of
Plaintiffs finger[ s] [is] disfigured.
(ECF No. 7
~12).
Defendant Jin has provided, in support of his Summary Judgment Motion, 85
pages of medical records detailing the treatment that was provided to Plaintiff. Defendant Jin
further argues that Plaintiff did not properly exhaust the grievance procedures.
II.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ST AND ARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if, drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving
party, "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment may be
granted against a party who fails to adduce facts sufficient to establish the existence of any
element essential to that party's case, and for which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party bears the initial
burden of identifying evidence, or the lack thereof, which demonstrates the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact. Nat'/ State Bank v. Fed. Reserve Bank of NY, 979 F.2d 1579, 1581-82
(3d Cir. 1992) (citing Celotex. 477 U.S. at 323-25). Once that burden has been met, the nonmoving party may not rest on the allegations in the complaint, but must "go beyond the
pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."'
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting FED. R. Clv. P. 56(e) (1963)). See also Orsatti v. NJ State
Police. 71 F .3d 480, 484 (3d Cir. 1995) ("plaintiff cannot resist a properly supported motion for
summary judgment merely by restating the allegations of his complaint, but must point to
concrete evidence in the record that supports each and every essential element of his case.")
(citing Celotex, 477 U.S. 317).
An issue is genuine only "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Finally, while any evidence used to support a motion for summary judgment must be admissible,
it is not necessary for it to be in admissible form. See FED. R. C1v. P. 56(c)(2); Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 324; JF. Feeser, Inc., v. Serv-A-Portion. Inc., 909 F.2d 1524, 1542 (3d Cir. 1990).
Where the non-moving party fails to respond to a summary judgment motion, that failure
does not automatically result in the entry of summary judgment for the movant.
Douglas v.
Brookville Area Sch. Dist., 836 F.Supp. 2d 329, 351 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (citing Anchorage Assocs.
v. Virgin Islands Bd. of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1990)). Instead, where the non-
moving party fails to properly address the moving party's assertions of fact as required by Rule
56(c), the court may give the non-moving party yet another opportunity to properly address the
asserted facts or may consider the asserted facts undisputed, or the court may "grant summary
judgment only if the motion and supporting materials-including the facts considered
undisputed-show that the movant is entitled to Qudgment as a matter of law]." FED. R. C1v. P.
56(e)(l) - (3). See Accord Cortez v. Ford, No. 1:07-CV-1466, 2008 WL 4186906, at *1 (M.D.
Pa. Sept. 5, 2008) (court deemed summary judgment motion unopposed where plaintiff failed to
file an appropriate response despite being afforded the opportunity to respond and being advised
that his failure to do so in a timely manner would result in the motion being deemed unopposed);
Robinson v. Velasquez, No. 07-CV-3645 (KAM)(LB), 2010 WL 1010733, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.
15, 2010) (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment in §1983 action where prose
plaintiff failed to oppose it, despite receiving notice of the motion and supporting documents,
including a notice identifying his obligations and repeated opportunity, through extensions of
time, to respond, and court determined defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law).
Ill.ANALYSIS
A. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs
Plaintiff claims that Dr. Jin fabricated his medical records. However, he provides nothing
to support this other than an averment that the X-ray technician informed Plaintiff that his ribs
and fingers were broken. Defendant argues, and the records confirm, that Plaintiff's X-ray films
were reviewed by a radiologist, William Betz, M.D., who found no evidence of any fracture or
break. Defendant argues that this is not a case of deliberate indifference but simply a situation
where the Plaintiff disagrees with the medical providers and their diagnosis. The assault
complained of took place on December 1, 2014. The medical records indicate that Plaintiff was
seen in the infirmary by Nurse Dice who noted a "small, superficial laceration" of the middle
finger and red areas on both the left thigh and left ribs. Plaintiff's laceration was cleaned and his
right middle and ring fingers were taped. Pain medication was offered but plaintiff initially
refused. He did return to the infirmary an hour and a half later demanding to be taken to the
hospital. This request was denied. Plaintiff returned to sick call the following morning and per
the records was seen by Esther Mattes, a physician's assistant, who ordered an X-ray of the chest
and fingers. As stated above, the X-ray, taken on December 3, showed no fracture or break.
Plaintiff was then examined by Dr. Paul Dascani who advised him that the X-ray showed no
fracture. (ECF No. 63-1 p. 35). He diagnosed the plaintiff with a sprained finger and prescribed
10 days of ibuprofen, rest and a splint. Plaintiff did not see Defendant Jin until December 19,
2014 (ECF No. 63-1 pp. 34, 35). Defendant argues and the record supports that from December
1, 2014, to the date the Motion for Summary Judgment was filed, Plaintiff was seen by the
medical department on numerous occasions, examined and treated.
The Eighth Amendment protects individuals against the infliction of "cruel and unusual
punishments." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. This protection, enforced against the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees incarcerated persons humane conditions of confinement. In
this regard, prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter and
medical care, and must "take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates."
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27
(1984)).
In the context of medical treatment, an inmate must prove two elements: ( 1) that he was
suffering from a "serious medical need," and (2) that prison officials were deliberately
indifferent to the serious medical need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
The first showing requires the court to objectively determine whether the medical need
was "sufficiently serious." A medical need is "serious" if it is one that has been diagnosed by a
physician as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention. Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzara,
834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988).
The second prong requires a court subjectively to determine whether the officials acted
with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Deliberate indifference may be manifested by an
intentional refusal to provide care, delayed medical treatment for non-medical reasons, a denial
of prescribed medical treatment, or a denial of reasonable requests for treatment that results in
suffering or risk of injury. Durmer v. 0 'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993). A prisoner
must demonstrate that the official acted with more than mere negligence. Estelle, 429 U.S. at
105; Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison
official must both know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Farmer,
511 U.S. at 837. It is a "well-established rule that mere disagreements over medical judgment do
not state Eighth Amendment claims." White v. Napoleon, 897 F .2d 103 (3d Cir. 1990).
Moreover, "[a] court may not substitute its own judgment for diagnosis and treatment decisions
made by prison medical staff members." Inmates ofAllegheny Cty. Jail v. PierceL 612 F.2d 754,
762 (3d Cir. 1979).
First of all, it is not clear that Plaintiff had a serious medical injury. The medical records
support that Plaintiff was X-rayed almost immediately after the altercation in question and no
fractures were reported. His pain was treated with medication, splints, and rest. It is Plaintiffs
belief that somehow all of the medical records, including the radiology reports, were fabricated.
There is absolutely no support for this nor can such a baseless allegation be given credence.
Plaintiff may disagree with the judgment of all of the medical professionals involved in his
treatment however, the law is clear that that does not give rise to a claim under the Eighth
Amendment. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to state a claim for deliberate indifference to his
medical needs.
B. Failure to Exhaust
Defendant argues that, although Plaintiff grieved his medical care, he failed to properly
appeal them to the Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals ("SOI GA") as required
by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. In his brief, Defendant meticulously outlines each of the grievances filed
and explains why each does not satisfy the exhaustion requirement. His conclusion is that,
although Plaintiff has filed numerous grievances on various issues, he did not appeal a single
grievance against Dr. Jin and therefore is precluded from pursuing this action against him.
Through the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat.
1321 (1996), Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) to prohibit prisoners from bringing an
action with respect to prison conditions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or any other federal law,
until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted. Specifically, the act provides,
in pertinent part, as follows:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of
the Revised Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C. § 1983), or any other Federal
law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until
such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.
42 U .S.C. § l 997e(a). Exhaustion is required under this provision regardless of the type of relief
sought and the type of relief available through administrative procedures. See Booth v. Churner,
532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). In addition, the exhaustion requirement applies to all claims relating
to prison life which do not implicate the duration of the prisoner's sentence, including those that
involve general circumstances as well as particular episodes. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516,
532 (2002). Federal courts are barred from hearing a claim if a plaintiff has failed to exhaust all
the available remedies prior to filing the action. See Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 73 (3d Cir.
2000) (by using language "no action shall be brought," Congress has "clearly required
exhaustion").
The PLRA also mandates that inmates "properly" exhaust administrative remedies before
filing suit in federal court.
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006).
"Proper exhaustion
demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no
adjunctive system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the
course of its proceedings." Id. at 90-91. Such requirements "eliminate unwarranted federalcourt interference with the administration of prisons, and thus seek[] to 'affor[d] corrections
officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a
federal case."' Id. at 93 (quoting Porter, 534 U.S. at 525).
Importantly, the exhaustion
requirement may not be satisfied "by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective ...
appeal." Id. at 83; see also Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 228-29 (3d Cir. 2004) (utilizing a
procedural default analysis to reach the same conclusion). Courts have concluded that inmates
who fail to fully, or timely, complete the prison grievance process are barred from subsequently
litigating claims in federal courts. See, e.g., Bolla v. Strickland, 304 F. App 'x 22 (3d Cir. 2008);
Jetter v. Beard, 183 F. App'x 178 (3d Cir. 2006); Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289 (3d Cir. 2000).
This broad rule favoring full exhaustion admits of one narrowly defined exception. If the
actions of prison officials directly caused the inmate's procedural default on a grievance, the
inmate will not be held to strict compliance with this exhaustion requirement. See Camp v.
Brennan, 219 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 2000) (Section 1997e(a) only requires that prisoners exhaust
such administrative remedies "as are available").
However, case law recognizes a clear
"reluctance to invoke equitable reasons to excuse [an inmate's] failure to exhaust as the statute
requires." Davis v. Warman, 49 F. App'x 365, 368 (3d Cir. 2002). Thus, an inmate's failure to
exhaust will only be excused "under certain limited circumstances," Harris v. Armstrong, 149 F.
App'x 58, 59 (3d Cir. 2005), and an inmate can defeat a claim of failure to exhaust only by
showing "he was misled or that there was some extraordinary reason he was prevented from
complying with the statutory mandate." Davis, 49 F. App'x at 368; see also Brown v. Croak,
312 F.3d 109, 110 (3d Cir. 2002) (assuming that prisoner with failure to protect claim is entitled
to rely on instruction by prison officials to wait for outcome of internal security investigation
before filing grievance); Camp, 219 F .3d at 281 (exhaustion requirement met where Office of
Professional Responsibility fully examined merits of excessive force claim and correctional
officers impeded filing of grievance).
In the absence of competent proof that an inmate was misled by corrections officials, or
some other extraordinary circumstances, inmate requests to excuse a failure to exhaust are
frequently rebuffed by the courts. Thus, an inmate cannot excuse a failure to timely comply with
these grievance procedures by simply claiming that his efforts constituted "substantial
compliance" with this statutory exhaustion requirement. Harris, 149 F. App'x at 59. Nor can an
inmate avoid this exhaustion requirement by merely alleging that the Department of Corrections
policies were not clearly explained to him.
Davis, 49 F. App'x at 368.
Thus, an inmate's
confusion regarding these grievances procedures does not, standing alone, excuse a failure to
exhaust. Casey v. Smith, 71 F. App'x 916 (3d Cir. 2003). Moreover, an inmate cannot cite to
alleged staff impediments to grieving a matter as grounds for excusing a failure to exhaust, if it
also appears that the prisoner did not pursue a proper grievance once those impediments were
removed. Oliver v. Moore, 145 F. App'x 731 (3d Cir. 2005) (failure to exhaust not excused if,
after staff allegedly ceased efforts to impede grievance, prisoner failed to follow through on
grievance).
No analysis of exhaustion may be made absent an understanding of the administrative
process available to state inmates. "Compliance with prison grievance procedures, therefore, is
all that is required by the PLRA to 'properly exhaust.'
The level of detail necessary in a
grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim to
claim, but it is the prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper
exhaustion." Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007).
1. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Grievance Procedure
Within DC-ADM 804, the Inmate Grievance System Policy, the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections established a three-step Inmate Grievance System to provide inmates
with an avenue to seek review of problems that may arise during the course of confinement.
Pursuant to DC-ADM 804, after an attempt to resolve any problems informally, an inmate may
submit a written grievance to the facility's Grievance Coordinator for initial review. This must
occur within fifteen days after the events upon which the claims are based. Within fifteen days
of an adverse decision by the Grievance Coordinator, an inmate may then appeal to the Facility
Manager of the institution. 1 Within fifteen days of an adverse decision by the Facility Manager,
an inmate may file a final appeal to the Secretary's Office oflnmate Grievances and Appeals. An
appeal to final review cannot be completed unless an inmate complies with all established
procedures. An inmate must exhaust all three levels of review and comply with all procedural
requirements of the grievance review process in order to fully exhaust an issue. See Booth, 206
F.3d at 293 n.2 (outlining Pennsylvania's grievance review process); Ingram v. SCI Camp Hill,
No. 08-23, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127124, at *21-25 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2010) (same).
Based upon the evidence before the Court, the conclusion is that Plaintiff failed to
properly exhaust his grievances as to Defendant Jin and summary judgment should be granted on
that basis as well. A separate Order will be entered.
DATED this 28 111 day of April, 2016.
CC: HOWARD COOPER
JT-3733
SCI Greene
175 Progress Drive
Waynesburg, PA 15370
The policy was last amended on December I, 20 I 0. The previous version of the policy only allov.ed ten
working days to appeal an adverse initial review decision to the Facility Manager.
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