DECOSTRO v. BABY CACHE, INC. et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER granting Plaintiff's 8 Motion to Remand to the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County, Pennsylvania. The case shall be marked CLOSED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Cynthia Reed Eddy on 5/6/2015. (bap)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DEBORAH DECOSTRO, ESQ., in her
capacity as Administratix of the Estate of
Ryeley E. Beatty, deceased and in her
capacity as Administratix of the Estate of
Brooklyn N. Beatty, deceased,
Plaintiffs,
v.
BABY CACHE, INC., a corporation,
TOYS “R” US, INC., a corporation,
BABIES “R” US, INC., a wholly owned
corporate subsidiary of TOYS “R” US,
INC. and MICHAEL BLAIN, an adult
individual,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 15-272
United States Magistrate Judge
Cynthia Reed Eddy
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion to remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
(ECF No. 8). For the reasons that follow, said motion will be granted.2
I.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The above-captioned matter was originally initiated in the Court of Common Pleas of
Beaver County, Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs seek damages in connection with the asphyxiation
deaths of two year old Brooklyn Beatty and three year old Ryeley Beatty (“Decedents”), which
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By consent of the parties, (ECF Nos. 25, 26, 28), and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the
undersigned has full “authority over dispositive motions” and the authority to enter “final judgment, all
without district court review.” Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 585 (2003); In re Search of Scranton
Hous. Auth., 487 F.Supp.2d 530, 535 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
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Also before the Court are two motions to dismiss filed by the Defendants. (ECF Nos. 3, 15).
However, because Plaintiff’s motion to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is granted, the Court
will deny these motions to dismiss as moot via separate order.
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occurred when a dresser manufactured and/or sold by the above Defendants tipped over on the
Decedents.
On February 26, 2015, Defendants Toys “R” Us, Babies “R” Us, and Blain filed a notice
of removal to this court. (ECF No. 1). Although Plaintiffs and Defendant Blain are both alleged
to be citizens of Pennsylvania, Defendants nonetheless assert that the court has diversity
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Defendants claim that Blain’s inclusion in this lawsuit
constitutes a fraudulent joinder, solely for purposes of defeating diversity jurisdiction, and that
absent Blain’s inclusion, the parties have complete diversity of citizenship. The claims asserted
against Blain are pursuant to Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection
Law (“UTPCPL”), 73 P.S. § 201-1 et. seq. Defendants contend that Plaintiff DeCostro has no
standing to bring such claims against Blain because Decostro was not the purchaser of the
dresser and the general allegations in the complaint do not state a colorable claim under the
UTPCPL.
Plaintiffs filed the present motion to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on
March 17, 2015, (ECF No. 8), contending that Blain is a proper party to this action and was not
fraudulently joined for purposes of defeating diversity jurisdiction. Defendants have responded
to said motion. (ECF Nos. 20-23, 27). On April 9, 2015, Plaintiff filed a reply brief. (ECF No.
24). Accordingly, the motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), “[a] civil action brought in state court may be
removed by the defendant to federal district court if the federal court would have had original
jurisdiction over the claim. Johnson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 724 F.3d 337, 346 (3d Cir.
2013). District courts have original jurisdiction when diversity of citizenship is present. 28
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U.S.C. § 1332(a). For diversity jurisdiction to exist, no plaintiff may be a citizen of the same
state as any of the defendants. Grand Union Supermarkets of the Virgin Islands, Inc. v. H.E.
Lockhart Mgmt., Inc., 316 F.3d 408, 410 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494
U.S. 185, 187 (1990)). When the matter is removed from state court to federal court, the
removing party generally must establish that diversity jurisdiction existed both when the
complaint was filed and at the time of removal. Johnson, 724 F.3d at 346.
However, “[t]he doctrine of fraudulent joinder represents an exception to the requirement
that removal be predicated solely upon complete diversity.” In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 215216 (3d Cir. 2006). “In a suit with named defendants who are not of diverse citizenship from the
plaintiff, the diverse defendant may still remove the action if it can establish that the non-diverse
defendants were ‘fraudulently’ named or joined solely to defeat diversity jurisdiction.” Id. at
216. But if the district court determines that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because the
joinder was not fraudulent, the matter must be remanded to state court. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
“Upon a motion to remand, it is the removing party’s burden to establish the existence of federal
jurisdiction, and all doubts must be resolved in favor of remand.” Miller v. Liberty Mut. Group,
97 F.Supp.2d 672, 674 (W.D.Pa. 2000) (citing Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851
(3d Cir. 1992)). Given this standard, the removing party carries a “heavy burden of persuasion”
in establishing fraudulent joinder. Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851 (3d Cir.
1992).
III.
DISCUSSION
In Batoff, the court of appeals provided the following analysis with respect to fraudulent
joinder:
Joinder is fraudulent where there is no reasonable basis in fact or colorable
ground supporting the claim against the joined defendant, or no real intention in
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good faith to prosecute the action against the defendants or seek a joint judgment.
But, if there is even a possibility that a state court would find that the complaint
states a cause of action against any one of the resident defendants, the federal
court must find that joinder was proper and remand the case to state court.
Furthermore, we recently have held that where there are colorable claims or
defenses asserted against or by diverse and non-diverse defendants alike, the court
may not find that the non-diverse parties were fraudulently joined based on its
view of the merits of those claims or defenses.
Batoff, 977 F.2d at 851-852 (internal citations and marks/punctuation omitted). In other words,
the court need only assess whether the plaintiff’s claims are “wholly insubstantial or frivolous.”
Id. at 852; see also Horne v. Progressive Advanced Ins.Co., 2015 WL 1875970, *1 (E.D. Pa.
April 24, 2015).
Defendants here have failed to meet their heavy burden of persuasion in establishing that
joinder of Defendant Blain was fraudulent. In their notice of removal, Defendants assert that
Plaintiff DeCostro does not have standing to pursue the claims against Blain under the UTPCPL
because DeCostro was not a “purchaser” of the dresser. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 13-14). Defendants also
contend that Plaintiff’s general allegations fail to set forth a reasonable basis in fact or colorable
ground supporting the claims against Blain. (Id. at ¶ 15).
Plaintiffs counter that Defendants’ notice of removal improperly go the merits of the
claim, which the court may not consider. Additionally, Plaintiff DeCostro asserts that she is
bringing this claim in a representative capacity only on behalf of the interests of the minor
Decedents as required by Pa.R.C.P. 2027 and 2201. Therefore, Plaintiff DeCostro argues that “it
is not her standing but rather that of the Minor Decedents’ which give rise to the UTPCPL
claim.” (Pl.s’ Br. in Supp. at 6-7, ECF No. 9). Further, Plaintiff DeCostro asserts that the
UTPCPL is to be liberally construed and that “[i]f the legislature intended to exclude children
and estates from protection under the UTPCPL they could and would have done so directly.”
(Pl.’s Reply Br. at 3, ECF No. 24).
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Plaintiff DeCostro’s brief in support of the motion to remand provides the following:
As set forth in the Complaint, Plaintiffs’ Decedents’ mother and
grandmother purchased the subject dresser for use by the Decedent Minors, who,
as minors at the time of said purchase, were legally incapable of making this
purchase themselves. In that this consumer transaction involved a purchase of
children’s furniture which was specifically for use by the Minor Decedents, the
Minor Decedents were specifically intended to rely upon the misrepresentations
and improper conduct that led to that purchase and their reliance was specially
and specifically foreseeable, therefore standing exists to pursue this UTPCPL
claim on their behalf. Valley Forge, supra.
Plaintiffs have alleged affirmative conduct on the part of Defendant Blain that
sufficiently supports a claim of malfeasance which is actionable under the UTPCPL.
The instant Complaint, among other conduct, alleges that Defendant Blain withheld
the fact that the subject dresser was unsafe and posed a tip-over hazard and that
appropriate anchoring devices were necessary to prevent said risk/hazard It is further
alleged that that in withholding this information, Defendant Blain misrepresented the
condition of the subject dresser as meeting all applicable safety standards thereby
through deceptive means inducing the Minor Decedents’ mother and grandmother
into purchasing the subject dresser for them. Additionally it is alleged that Defendant
Blain sold the dresser at a reduced price as a floor model when in fact the price had
been reduced because the dresser lacked appropriate labels, warnings, and anchoring
devices. Complaint ¶55 and ¶64.
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… It is further alleged that the mother and grandmother of the Plaintiffs’
Decedents purchased the subject dresser for them as a result of and in justifiable
reliance upon Defendant Blain’s improper conduct, and that as a consequence, the
Minor Decedents sustained fatal injuries and ascertainable losses under the
Wrongful Death and Survival Statutes. Complaint ¶56, 58, 65 and ¶67.
The Complaint alleges Defendant Blain deliberately engaged in the
nondisclosure of material facts relating to the safety of the dresser at issue and
misrepresented the reason for the price reduction of the dresser. This wrongful
and deceitful conduct alleged as to Defendant Blain constitutes culpable
misrepresentation and falls squarely within the unfair business practices
prohibited by the UTPCPL. The misrepresentations alleged against Defendant
Blain relate to materials [sic] facts regarding the safety of the dresser at issue and
were justifiably relied upon in making the purchase as his conduct misrepresented
that the dresser met all applicable safety standards. Any further consideration of
the allegations would constitute consideration of the merits of the claim, an
inappropriate inquiry in a request for remand.
Based on the foregoing, the Complaint properly alleges that the Plaintiffs’
Decedents were consumers of goods purchased on their behalf and specifically for
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them for their personal and household use, and that Defendant Blain has engaged
in unfair and deceitful conduct in making that sale, in violation of the UTPCPL.
In that Plaintiffs have properly alleged a colorable claim under the UTPCPL
against Defendant Blain, a Pennsylvania citizen, the Defendants have failed to
meet their burden of establishing federal jurisdiction based upon diversity.
(Pl.s’ Br. in Supp at 7-9, ECF No. 9).
In Defendants’ brief in opposition, the court notes that the issue presented by Defendants
is “Whether Plaintiff has failed to set forth a viable claim of breach of [UTPCPL] against
Michael Blain (former Assistant Store Manager).” (Def.s’ Br. in Opp’n at 5, ECF No. 21)
(emphasis added). But this states the incorrect standard. When conducting a fraudulent joinder
analysis, the court does not assess whether there is a “viable” claim; rather, as outlined in Batoff,
supra, the court analyzes whether the plaintiff has stated a colorable claim, i.e., one that is not
wholly insubstantial or frivolous. 977 F.2d at 851-852; see also Horne, 2015 WL 1875970, at *1
(“However, the court’s inquiry with respect to a claim of fraudulent joinder is less searching than
that on a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) … Thus, assessing
the merits of a claim is beyond the task evaluating subject matter jurisdiction.”) (citations
omitted).
The court finds that Defendants have failed to meet their heavy burden in establishing
that the complaint does not state a colorable claim against Defendant Blain. Defendants do not
cite any case law holding that a representative of minor decedents may not bring a UTPCPL
claim solely as a legal representative of the minor decedents’ estates. As discussed above, the
complaint alleges that the dresser was purchased on behalf of the minor decedents and in
justifiable reliance of the alleged misrepresentations made by Blain. The minor decedents’ were
incapable of purchasing this equipment for themselves at the time of the sale and Plaintiff
DeCostro is bringing this action on their behalf solely in a representative capacity. Defendants
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have not established that in such a situation, a representative of minor decedents cannot bring a
claim under the UTPCPL on their behalf or that the justifiable reliance element is wholly
insubstantial or frivolous. Indeed, “determining whether Plaintiff adequately states justifiable
reliance [under the UTPCPL] would necessarily require an assessment of the claim’s merits,
which we may not do.” Horne, 2015 WL 1875970, at *2.
Accordingly, the court finds that Blain was not fraudulently joined in this matter.
Whether Plaintiffs have stated a claim against Blain for violation of the UTPCPL is not for this
court to decide, as the court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to make such a
determination. Accordingly, the matter is remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver
County, Pennsylvania.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, Plaintiffs’ motion to remand to the Court of Common Pleas of
Beaver County, Pennsylvania (ECF No. 8) is granted. An appropriate Order follows.
Dated: May 6, 2015.
By the Court:
s/ Cynthia Reed Eddy
Cynthia Reed Eddy
United States Magistrate Judge
cc: all registered counsel via CM-ECF
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DEBORAH DECOSTRO, ESQ., in her
capacity as Administratix of the Estate of
Ryeley E. Beatty, deceased and in her
capacity as Administratix of the Estate of
Brooklyn N. Beatty, deceased,
Plaintiffs,
v.
BABY CACHE, INC., a corporation,
TOYS “R” US, INC., a corporation,
BABIES “R” US, INC., a wholly owned
corporate subsidiary of TOYS “R” US,
INC. and MICHAEL BLAIN, an adult
individual,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 15-272
United States Magistrate Judge
Cynthia Reed Eddy
ORDER
AND NOW, this 6th day of May, 2015, in accordance with the foregoing Memorandum
Opinion, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand to the Court of
Common Pleas of Beaver County, Pennsylvania (ECF No. 8) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall mark this case CLOSED.
By the Court:
s/ Cynthia Reed Eddy
Cynthia Reed Eddy
United States Magistrate Judge
cc: all registered counsel via CM-ECF
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