ROBINSON v. DT INTEPRETING et al

Filing 27

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 23 Defendant Stauffer's Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff's Title VII claim (Count I) against Stauffer is dismissed with prejudice, and, otherwise, the Motion is denied. Signed by Judge Cathy Bissoon on 10/8/15. (dcd)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MICHELLE ROBINSON,
v.

Plaintiff,

DT INTERPRETING t/d/b/a DEAF TALK and
DAVID STAUFFER,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 15-280
Judge Cathy Bissoon

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
For the reasons that follow, Defendant David Stauffer’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 23)
will be granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff filed this action against her former employer, DT Interpreting, and her former
supervisor, Stauffer, asserting violations of Title VII, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act
(“PHRA”), and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff alleges that Stauffer
repeatedly and pervasively subjected her to sexual harassment in the workplace and ultimately
terminated her employment when she objected.
As noted by Stauffer, it is axiomatic that “individual employees cannot be held liable
under Title VII.” Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1077 (3d Cir.
1996) (collecting cases). Plaintiff concedes this point in her Brief in Opposition. (Doc. 25 at 2
n. 1). Consequently, Plaintiff’s Title VII claim against Stauffer will be dismissed with prejudice.
Stauffer next requests that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s state law claims and dismiss him from this action entirely. However, there is no
question that the Court has an independent basis for the exercise of federal jurisdiction with
respect to Stauffer’s co-defendant, DT Interpreting. Thus, the Court may also exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims that “share a common nucleus of operative
fact” with those federal claims. De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, 342 F.3d 301, 308 (3d Cir. 2003);
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). A careful review of the Amended Complaint demonstrates that Plaintiff’s
state law claims against Stauffer are based on the precise same allegations of sexual harassment
and retaliation that form the basis for her federal claims against DT Interpreting. Because her
state law claims clearly derive from the same common nucleus of operative facts as her federal
claims, supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims is warranted.
For the reasons set forth above, Stauffer’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 23) will be granted in
part and denied in part. Plaintiff’s Title VII claim (Count I) against Stauffer will be dismissed
with prejudice. However, Stauffer’s Motion to Dismiss will be denied as to the state law claims
set forth in Count II (PHRA) and Count III (intentional infliction of emotional distress).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

October 8, 2015

s/ Cathy Bissoon
Cathy Bissoon
United States District Judge

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