HAYES v. COLVIN
Filing
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ORDER denying 8 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 10 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 9/24/15. (hmg)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JULIE LYNN HAYES,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Commissioner of
Social Security
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 15-296
AMBROSE, U.S. Senior District Judge
OPINION
AND
ORDER
I. Synopsis
Pending before the Court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. ECF Nos. [8]
(Plaintiff) and [10] (Defendant). Both parties filed Briefs in support of their Motions. ECF Nos.
[9] (Plaintiff) and [11] (Defendant).
The issues are now ripe for review.
After careful
consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based on my Opinion as set forth below,
Defendant’s Motion, ECF No. [10], is granted and Plaintiff’s Motion, ECF No. [8] is denied.
II. Background
Plaintiff brought this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application for disability benefits pursuant to the
Social Security Act (“Act”). Plaintiff alleges disability beginning June 20, 2012. ECF No. 3-2,
29. After Plaintiff’s application was denied initially on January 7, 2013, she requested that her
application be reviewed by an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).
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Id.
Plaintiff and a
Vocational Expert (“VE”) testified at a hearing before the ALJ on October 23, 2013. Id.
Subsequently, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claims in an unfavorable decision on December 11,
2013. Id. After Plaintiff’s request for review by the Appeals Council was denied, Plaintiff filed
this cause of action seeking judicial review of the decision denying him benefits. ECF No. 9, 2.
III. Legal Analysis
A. Standard of Review
The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence exists in
the record to support the Commissioner’s decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir.
1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as “[m]ore than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d
900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
Additionally, the Commissioner’s findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are
conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). A
district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner’s decision or re-weigh the
evidence of record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F. Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). While the ALJ’s
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if
the court would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358,
360 (3d Cir. 1999). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence,
however, the district court must review the record as a whole. See 5 U.S.C. § 706.
To be eligible for social security benefits, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she cannot
engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).
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The Commissioner has provided the ALJ with a five-step sequential analysis to use when
evaluating the disabled status of each claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The ALJ must
determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not,
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a severe impairment,
whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1; (4) if the
impairment does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether the claimant’s impairments
prevent her from performing her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of
performing her past relevant work, whether she can perform any other work which exists in the
national economy, in light of her age, education, work experience, and residual functional
capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. A Claimant carries the initial burden of demonstrating by
medical evidence that she is unable to return to her previous employment (Steps 1-4).
Dobrowolsky, 606 F.2d at 406. Once the claimant meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts
to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in alternative substantial gainful
activity (Step 5). Id.
A district court, after reviewing the entire record may affirm, modify, or reverse the
decision with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris, 745
F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1984).
B. Plaintiff’s Motion
Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred by discrediting Plaintiff’s pain, fatigue, and headaches
resulting from her fibromyalgia and not restricting her to simple, routine work. Id. at 17-20.
Plaintiff argues that because the ALJ should have limited her to simple, routine work, Grid Rule
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202.06 compelled the ALJ to find Plaintiff disabled starting in September 2012, when the
Plaintiff turned 55 years old. Id. at 17.1
Pursuant to Rule 202.06, where a claimant’s maximum sustained work capacity is limited
to light work as a result of severe medically determinable impairment(s), the claimant is of
advanced age, the claimant’s education is high school graduate or more, and the claimant’s work
experience is “skilled or semiskilled—skills not transferable,” then the ALJ is directed to find the
claimant disabled. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Sub. Pt. P, Appx 2, Sec. 202.06. Here, at step four, the
ALJ concluded that Plaintiff “has the residual functional capacity [“RFC”] to perform light work
as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(c) except [she] is limited to occasional climbing ropes, ladders
and scaffolds, and frequent bending, balancing, crouching, stopping, kneeling, and crawling.”
ECF No. 3-2, 34. Based on her RFC finding and because the Vocational Expert (“VE”) testified
that Plaintiff’s past relevant work as an administrative assistant was sedentary, skilled (SVP 6)
work, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff is capable of performing her past relevant work. Id. at 41.
Because the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s skilled work history is transferable, she did not address
Rule 202.06. Thus, boiled to its essence, Plaintiff’s argument is an attack of the ALJ’s RFC
determination—Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in her RFC decision because the ALJ
improperly discredited Plaintiff’s testimony due to a misunderstanding of the nature of the
disease of fibromyalgia. ECF No. 9, 19. I disagree.
“ ‘Residual Functional Capacity is defined as that which an individual is still able to do
despite the limitations caused by his or her impairment(s).’ ” Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d
34, 40 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 12, 121 (3d Cir. 2000))
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In addition to arguing that the ALJ erred by failing to restrict her to simple, routine work, in a footnote, Plaintiff
further argues that her fibromyalgia prevents her from performing any work activity on a full-time basis. ECF No.
9, 17 n.5.
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(citations omitted); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1) (RFC determination is an assessment of the most
an individual can do given her limitations); see also SSR 96-8p. In determining a claimant’s
RFC, all of the claimant’s impairments, including those not considered “severe” must be
considered. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2). Additionally, the ALJ is required to consider all of the
evidence before her, including the medical evidence, a claimant’s subjective complaints, and
evidence of the complainant’s activity level. Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121 (citations omitted);
Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 41. Further, “the opinion of a treating physician does not bind the ALJ on
the issue of functional capacity.” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir.
2011) (citation omitted).
There is no question that fibromyalgia, an elusive problem, poses special circumstances
in the social security arena. In evaluating fibromyalgia, courts acknowledge that symptoms of
the disease are entirely subjective and medical testing may not be able to assess its severity.
Singleton v. Astrue, 542 F. Supp. 2d 367, 377 (D. Del. 2008) (citing Wilson v. Apfel, 1999 WL
993723, *1, n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1999)). Because of the subjectivity of the symptoms of fibromyalgia,
the credibility of a claimant’s testimony is paramount when evaluating whether a claimant’s
fibromyalgia impairment is disabling. Singleton, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 378. “[G]reat weight must
be given to a claimant’s testimony regarding her subjective pain, especially when that testimony
is supported by competent medical evidence.” Lintz v. Astrue, Civ. Action No. 08-424, 2009
WL 1310646, at *7 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (citing Chrupcala v. Heckler, 829 F.2d 1269, 1276 n.10 (3d
Cir. 1997)). Moreover, the reports prepared by doctors treating a claimant with fibromyalgia are
particularly significant and, of course, subject to the “Treating Physician Doctrine,” which
prescribes that great weight should be given to the opinion of a physician who has had the
opportunity to continually observe the patient over a prolonged period of time. Id. (internal
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citations omitted); Perl v. Barnhart, Civ. Action No. 03-4580, 2005 WL 579879, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 10, 2005); Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000). Still, a claimant who has
been diagnosed with fibromyalgia will not automatically be classified disabled under the Social
Security Act. Id. “Even in fibromyalgia cases, the ALJ must compare the objective evidence
and the subjective complaints and is permitted to reject plaintiff’s subjective testimony so long as
he provides a sufficient explanation for doing so.” Nocks v. Astrue, 626 F. Supp. 2d 431, 446 (D.
Del. 2009). Accordingly, when assessing a complainant’s symptoms of fibromyalgia, an ALJ
may consider whether the record reveals clinical documentation of the complainant’s symptoms
and whether diagnosing physicians reported on the severity of the condition. Singleton v. Astrue,
542 F. Supp. 2d at 378; see also SSR 12-2p (evaluation of fibromyalgia).
Additionally, an ALJ is charged with the responsibility of determining credibility. Smith
v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 969 & 972 (3d Cir. 1981). The ALJ must consider “the entire case
record” in determining the credibility of an individual’s statements. SSR 96-7p. An ALJ’s
decision “must contain specific reasons for the finding on credibility, supported by the evidence
in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any
subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements and the
reason for that weight.” Id. In evaluating whether a plaintiff’s statements are credible, the ALJ
will consider evidence from treating, examining and consulting physicians, observations from
agency employees, and other factors such as the claimant’s daily activities, descriptions of the
pain, precipitating and aggravating factors, type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of
medications, treatment other than medication, and other measures used to relieve the pain. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1529(c); SSR 96-7p. The ALJ will also look at inconsistencies between the
claimant’s statements and the evidence presented. Id. I must defer to the ALJ’s credibility
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determinations unless they are not supported by substantial evidence. Smith, 637 F.2d at 972;
see also Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d 309, 312 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 931
(1975).
Upon careful review of the record, I find that the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s
fibromyalgia in crafting her RFC and that the ALJ’s RFC determination is supported by
substantial evidence.
First, I find the ALJ’s thorough assessment of Plaintiff’s pain and fatigue demonstrates
that she understood the unique circumstances present in a case involving the disease of
fibromyalgia. Here, the ALJ fully detailed Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain, ECF No. 32, 35, and then gave a detailed explanation why she found Plaintiff not entirely credible: “the
claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these
symptoms are not entirely credible in light of the clinical and objective medical evidence, the
opinion evidence . . . , the degree and effectiveness of treatment, and the claimant’s activities of
daily living.” Id. at 36. As the ALJ noted, Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that she had extreme
fatigue; sore legs upon waking; neck pain and muscle spasms in her back; that she needs to lie
down 4-6 times per day, for a half hour each time, to relieve her fatigue—and sitting and
standing for long periods made it worse; that she experienced weekly migraine headaches that
lasted all day, and that her pain and fatigue interfered with her concentration. ECF No. 3-2, 35,
38.
The ALJ carefully weighed Plaintiff’s symptoms of pain and fatigue, comparing her
symptoms with various MRI scans and detailing Plaintiff’s history of pain management, which
mainly was addressed with prescription medications, such as Percocet, Baclofen, and Lyrica, and
trigger point injection therapy. ECF No. 36-38. The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff was not
currently in physical therapy, but that she had attended at some point prior; Plaintiff did not use
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any devices to help with the pain, such as a brace; Plaintiff acknowledged that the medication
seemed to be working with no side-effects; and Plaintiff had not experienced any exacerbation of
her systems, allowing her course of treatment to remain consistent. Id. at 38.
After a thorough review of the objective medical evidence, the ALJ then explained why
the clinical documentation underlying the opinion evidence also undercut Plaintiff’s credibility
as to the severity of her symptoms. For example, the ALJ explained that the majority of the
September 2013 opinion provided by Dr. Savit, a treating neurologist, was not supported by the
doctor’s own clinical findings “which document a full range of motion of the neck, normal
strength throughout, normal sensation, normal finger-to-nose coordination, and normal toe and
heel walking and tandem gait,” and that the most recent diagnostic studies “show a normal brain,
no new or additional plaques in the cervical spinal cord, and only mild, tiny or small
abnormalities on MRI studies of the cervical and lumbar regions of the spine (Exhibits 9F, 14F,
15F).”
Id. at 39-40.
The ALJ concluded by noting that “[t]here are relatively minimal
abnormalities on diagnostic studies and on physical examinations with respect to the claimant’s
musculoskeletal conditions.” Id.
Additionally, the ALJ explained how Plaintiff’s daily activities documented greater
functional ability than alleged. ECF No. 3-2, 39. For instance, the Plaintiff reported that, inter
alia, she helps to care for her ailing father and takes him to doctor’s appointments, listens to
audio books for hours at a time, and has worked on home renovations. Id. (citing Plaintiff’s
Testimony and Exhibit 3E—claimant’s function report).
Accordingly, I find the ALJ did not err in evaluating Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia and in
giving Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her
symptoms limited weight. Because the ALJ carefully considered Plaintiff’s subjective claims of
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fatigue and pain, weighed it with the rest of the evidence, particularly the medical evidence and
the clinical documentation underlying the opinion evidence, and found it to be inconsistent with
the evidence as a whole, I find that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination
and disability decision.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the evidence of record and the briefs filed in support thereof, I find there is
substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff is not disabled within the
meaning of the Social Security Act.
As a result, I deny Plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment, and I grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
An appropriate Order follows.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JULIE LYNN HAYES,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Commissioner of
Social Security
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Civil Action No. 15-296
AMBROSE, U.S. Senior District Judge
ORDER
AND NOW, this 24th day of September, 2015, after careful consideration of the
submissions of the parties and for the reasons set forth in the Opinion accompanying this Order,
it is Ordered that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. [8]) is DENIED and
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. [10]) is GRANTED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Donetta W. Ambrose
Donetta W. Ambrose
Senior U.S. District Court Judge
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