CELAPINO v. COLVIN
Filing
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ORDER denying 9 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 11 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 1/21/16. (hmg)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KAY ANN CELAPINO,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of
Social Security
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 15-401
AMBROSE, U.S. Senior District Judge
OPINION
AND
ORDER
I. Synopsis
Pending before the Court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. ECF Nos. [9]
(Plaintiff) and [11] (Defendant). Both parties filed Briefs in support of their Motions. ECF Nos.
[10] (Plaintiff) and [12] (Defendant).
The issues are now ripe for review.
After careful
consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based on my Opinion as set forth below,
Defendant’s Motion, ECF No. [11], is granted and Plaintiff’s Motion, ECF No. [9], is denied.
II. Background
Plaintiff brought this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application for disability benefits pursuant to the
Social Security Act (“Act”). Plaintiff alleges disability beginning August 28, 2011. ECF No. 72, 19. After Plaintiff’s application was denied initially on April 12, 2012, she requested that her
application be reviewed by an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).
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Id.
Plaintiff and a
Vocational Expert (“VE”) testified at a hearing before the ALJ on April 19, 2013.
Id.
Subsequently, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claims in an unfavorable decision on June 27, 2013. Id.
at 27. After Plaintiff’s request for review by the Appeals Council was denied, Plaintiff filed this
cause of action seeking judicial review of the decision denying her benefits. ECF No. 10, 2.
III. Legal Analysis
A. Standard of Review
The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence exists in
the record to support the Commissioner’s decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir.
1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as “[m]ore than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d
900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
Additionally, the Commissioner’s findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are
conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). A
district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner’s decision or re-weigh the
evidence of record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F. Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). While the ALJ’s
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if
the court would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358,
360 (3d Cir. 1999). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence,
however, the district court must review the record as a whole. See 5 U.S.C. § 706.
To be eligible for social security benefits, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she cannot
engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).
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The Commissioner has provided the ALJ with a five-step sequential analysis to use when
evaluating the disabled status of each claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The ALJ must
determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not,
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a severe impairment,
whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1; (4) if the
impairment does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether the claimant’s impairments
prevent her from performing her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of
performing her past relevant work, whether she can perform any other work which exists in the
national economy, in light of her age, education, work experience, and residual functional
capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. A claimant carries the initial burden of demonstrating by
medical evidence that she is unable to return to her previous employment (Steps 1-4).
Dobrowolsky, 606 F.2d at 406. Once the claimant meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts
to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in alternative substantial gainful
activity (Step 5). Id.
A district court, after reviewing the entire record may affirm, modify, or reverse the
decision with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris, 745
F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1984).
B. Whether the ALJ Erred in Weighing the Medical Evidence
Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred by failing to properly weigh the medical evidence in
her determination of Plaintiff’s RFC. ECF No. 10, 6. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ
improperly cherry-picked the findings from Plaintiff’s treating gastroenterologist, Dr. Regueiro,
with whom she agreed, and improperly rejected the rest without good cause. Id. at 8.
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Regardless of the source, an ALJ must evaluate every medical opinion received, state the
weight she assigns the opinion, and articulate her reasons.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).
Generally, an ALJ will give more weight to the opinion of a source who has examined the
claimant than to a non-examining source.
Id. § 404.1527(c)(1).
When weighing medical
opinions, an ALJ should consider all of the following factors: the examining relationship, the
treatment relationship (the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examinations
as well as the nature and extent of the treatment relationship), supportability, consistency,
specialization and other factors brought to the ALJ’s attention or which tend to support or
contradict an opinion. Id. § 404.1527(c).
An ALJ generally will give more weight to opinions from a treating physician, “since
these sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed,
longitudinal picture of [a claimant’s] medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective
to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or
from reports of individual examinations, such as consultative examinations or brief
hospitalizations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). If the ALJ finds that “a treating source’s opinion
on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of [a claimant’s] impairment(s) is well-supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with
the other substantial evidence [of] record,” he must give that opinion controlling weight. Id.
Moreover, “the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight [an
ALJ generally] will give to that opinion.” Id. § 404.1527(c)(4). In the event of conflicting
medical evidence, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained:
“A cardinal principle guiding disability determinations is that the ALJ accord
treating physicians’ reports great weight, especially ‘when their opinions reflect
expert judgment based on continuing observation of the patient’s condition over a
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prolonged period of time.’ ” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000)
(quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999)). However, “where .
. . the opinion of a treating physician conflicts with that of a non-treating, nonexamining physician, the ALJ may choose whom to credit” and may reject the
treating physician’s assessment if such rejection is based on contradictory medical
evidence. Id. Similarly, under 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2), the opinion of a
treating physician is to be given controlling weight only when it is well-supported
by medical evidence and is consistent with other evidence in the record.
Becker v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 10-2517, 2010 WL 5078238, at *5 (3d Cir. Dec. 14,
2010). Although the ALJ may choose whom to credit when faced with a conflict, he “cannot
reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.” Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Security, 577
F.3d 500, 505 (3d Cir. 2009).
An ALJ must set forth her reasons for crediting or discrediting relevant or pertinent
medical evidence. Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 121-22 (3d Cir. 2000).
“Although the ALJ ‘may properly accept some parts of the medical evidence and reject other
parts . . . he must consider all of the evidence and give some reason for discounting the evidence
he rejects.’ ” Lanza v. Astrue, No. 08-301, 2009 WL 1147911, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 2009)
(quoting Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 48 (3d Cir. 1994)). “In the absence of such an
indication, the reviewing court cannot tell if significant probative evidence was not credited or
simply ignored.’ ” Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121-22 (quoting Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d
Cir. 1981)).
Here, with regard to Dr. Regueiro, the ALJ assigned his medical opinion from June 2012
(Exhibit 7F) partial weight. ECF No. 7-2, 25. The ALJ stated: “The portions of the doctor’s
opinion related to number of days missed per month, inability to tolerate even low stress work,
and interference of symptoms in attention and concentration are not found to be persuasive and
are assigned very little weight, as these limitations are not supported by the doctor’s own
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progress notes, as discussed above, and are not consistent with the substantial evidence of record,
including the progress notes of Dr. McGrogan, Plaintiff’s primary care physician, which describe
the claimant’s Crohn’s disease as quiescent (Exhibits 1F, 8F, and 10F).” Id. The ALJ found Dr.
Regueiro’s progress notes in conflict with Dr. McGrogan’s progress notes stating that Dr.
Regueiro’s December 2011 progress notes showed that Plaintiff experienced inter alia “almost
constant low level abdominal cramping and pain [and] diffuse tenderness in the left and right
abdomen, soft ostomy, no hernia, no cyanosis, and no edema.” Id. (citing Exhibit 2F). The ALJ
contrasted this notation with Dr. McGrogan’s progress notes in May 2012 stating that Plaintiff
was “in good health and good spirits.” Id. (citing Exhibit 8F). The ALJ also noted that in June
2012, the claimant had an ileoscopy showing “patchy mild inflammation, active chronic ileitis
with focal ulceration, and no dysplasia.” Id. (citing Exhibit 6F).
I do not find Plaintiff’s reliance on Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 318 (3d Cir. 2000) on
this point persuasive. The portion of Morales cited by Plaintiff discusses a situation where an
ALJ ignored the “ultimate conclusions and medical symptomatology” supporting a medical
opinion and drew his own medical conclusion using pieces of the medical examination as well as
his own credibility determination. Morales, 225 F.3d at 318. That is not the case here.1 The
ALJ reviewing Plaintiff’s claim did not draw her own medical conclusion; rather, she gave less
weight to one medical opinion in favor of another in the record. Also, I disagree with Plaintiff
that the ALJ impermissibly relied on Dr. Regueiro’s progress notes to discount Dr. Regueiro’s
ultimate opinion. ECF No. 10, 8 (relying in part on Brownawell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 554 F.
3d 352, 356 (3d Cir. 2008) and Morales, 225 F.3d at 319). In addition to Dr. Regueiro’s
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For similar reasons I find Plaintiff’s reliance on Griffith v. Astrue, 839 F. Supp. 2d 771 (D. Del. 2012) misplaced.
In that case, the ALJ erred because he adopted some of the restrictions recommended by a treating physician but
rejected others “without specific explanation.” Id. at 783.
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progress notes, the ALJ relied on other medical evidence of record, including Dr. McGrogan’s
progress notes, which do not support the greater limitations endorsed by Dr. Regueiro based on
Plaintiff’s Crohn’s disease.
The ALJ cited Dr. McGrogan’s characterization of Plaintiff’s
Crohn’s disease as “quiescent.”
ECF No. 7-2, 25 (Exhibit 1F, 16).
Accordingly, I find
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding and, on this point, I affirm.
C. Whether the ALJ Erred in Failing to Incorporate Dr. Regueiro’s Limitations When
Determining Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”)
Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ erred by failing to consider Dr. Regueiro’s opinion in
her formulation of Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). ECF No. 10, 9. Here, the
ALJ found that Plaintiff “has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in
20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b), except that she should avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold and
would require ready access to a bathroom during scheduled break times.” ECF No. 7-2, 24.
Relying on Dr. Regueiro’s opinion, Plaintiff argues that the amount of time that she would need
to be away from her workstation due to bathroom breaks to empty her ileostomy bag during an
eight hour work day makes her unable to work. ECF No. 10, 9. Plaintiff further argues that she
is restricted in her ability to stand/walk such that she cannot stand and/or walk six hours a day as
required for light exertional work. Id.
“ ‘Residual Functional Capacity is defined as that which an individual is still able to do
despite the limitations caused by his or her impairment(s).’ ” Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d
34, 40 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 12, 121 (3d Cir. 2000))
(citations omitted); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1) (RFC determination is an assessment of the most
an individual can do given her limitations); see also SSR 96-8p. In determining a claimant’s
RFC, all of the claimant’s impairments, including those not considered “severe” must be
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considered. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2). Additionally, the ALJ is required to consider all of the
evidence before her, including the medical evidence, a claimant’s subjective complaints, and
evidence of the complainant’s activity level. Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121 (citations omitted);
Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 41. Further, “the opinion of a treating physician does not bind the ALJ on
the issue of functional capacity.” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir.
2011) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, because the ALJ did not give great weight to the opinion of Dr. Regueiro,
as explained more fully infra, the ALJ was not required to include all of Dr. Regueiro’s
limitations in her RFC determination. Here, the ALJ incorporated only those restrictions for
which she found support in the record. For example, the ALJ stated that she assigned partial
weight to Dr. Regueiro’s opinion that Plaintiff “could lift/carry 5-10 pounds frequently and 1020 pounds occasionally” and this restriction is consistent with the ALJ’s RFC which limited
Plaintiff to light work. ECF No. 7-2, 25; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). Although Plaintiff
claims that the ALJ erred by stating she agreed with Dr. Regueiro’s opinion and then failing to
adequately accommodate Plaintiff’s sit/stand/walk restrictions as identified by Dr. Regueiro, I
disagree. The ALJ clearly found Dr. Regueiro’s opinion that Plaintiff could sit for four hours
and stand and walk for two hours in an eight-hour workday to be consistent with the
sit/stand/walk restrictions of light work--standing or walking, off and on, for a total of
approximately six hours of an eight-hour work day with intermittent sitting during the remaining
time. SSR 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at *6. Similarly, the ALJ considered and accommodated
Plaintiff’s need to empty her ileostomy bag in crafting her RFC. ECF No. 7-2, 25-26 (finding no
reference to complaints of excessive bathroom use in the medical evidence and citing Exhibits
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2F, 6F, 7F, 8F, 9F, and 10F). Therefore, I find substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC
determination.
D. The ALJ’s Credibility Determination
Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Plaintiff’s credibility.
ECF No. 10, 10.
An ALJ is charged with the responsibility of determining credibility. Smith v. Califano,
637 F.2d 968, 969 & 972 (3d Cir. 1981). The ALJ must consider “the entire case record” in
determining the credibility of an individual’s statements. SSR 96-7p. An ALJ’s decision “must
contain specific reasons for the finding on credibility, supported by the evidence in the case
record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any subsequent
reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements and the reason for that
weight.” Id. In evaluating whether a plaintiff’s statements are credible, the ALJ will consider
evidence from treating, examining and consulting physicians, observations from agency
employees, and other factors such as the claimant’s daily activities, descriptions of the pain,
precipitating and aggravating factors, type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of
medications, treatment other than medication, and other measures used to relieve the pain. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1529(c); SSR 96-7p. The ALJ will also look at inconsistencies between the
claimant’s statements and the evidence presented. Id. I must defer to the ALJ’s credibility
determinations unless they are not supported by substantial evidence. Smith, 637 F.2d at 972;
see also Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d 309, 312 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 931
(1975).
Upon careful review of the record, I find that the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s
subjective testimony of her inability to perform work in accord with the above-cited standards.
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Specifically, the ALJ explained that she found Plaintiff’s statements not consistent with “her
activities of daily living, her medical history consisting of generally conservative treatment, her
medication regimen, her demeanor at the hearing, and the other evidence in the record.” ECF
No. 2-7, 25-26. The ALJ went on to detail, for example, how Plaintiff’s ability to independently
care for her personal and household needs is inconsistent with an individual who is experiencing
debilitating symptoms. Id. at 26. The ALJ further noted inter alia that Plaintiff’s treatment
history reveals that physical therapy has been effective in treating Plaintiff’s sciatica and she
otherwise has not required any aggressive medical treatment, frequent hospital confinement,
emergency room care, or surgical intervention (other than remote colectomy and ileostomy). Id.
After careful review, I find that the ALJ carefully considered Plaintiff’s subjective claims,
weighed them with the rest of the evidence, and found the statements to be inconsistent with the
evidence as a whole. Accordingly, I find substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s credibility
determination, and I will not disturb it.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the evidence of record and the briefs filed in support thereof, I find there is
substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff is not disabled within the
meaning of the Social Security Act.
As a result, I deny Plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment, and I grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
An appropriate Order follows.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KAY ANN CELAPINO,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of
Social Security
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 15-401
AMBROSE, U.S. Senior District Judge
ORDER
AND NOW, this 21st day of January, 2016, after careful consideration of the submissions
of the parties and for the reasons set forth in the Opinion accompanying this Order, it is Ordered
that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. [9]) is DENIED and Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. [11]) is GRANTED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Donetta W. Ambrose
Donetta W. Ambrose
Senior U.S. District Court Judge
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