HOPKINS v. COLVIN

Filing 16

ORDER denying 12 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 14 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 11/12/15. (ask)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CATHERINE MARIE HOPKINS

)
)

No. 15-440

v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN
OPINION AND ORDER
SYNOPSIS
Plaintiff filed an application for disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security
Act, and supplemental social security income under Title XVI of the Act, alleging disability due
to physical and mental impairments. Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially, and upon hearing
before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). The Appeals Council denied her request for review.
Before the Court are the parties Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. For the following
reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion will be denied, and Defendant’s granted.
OPINION
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Judicial review of the Commissioner's final decisions on disability claims is provided by
statute. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) 6 and 1383(c)(3)7. Section 405(g) permits a district court to review
the transcripts and records upon which a determination of the Commissioner is based, and the
court will review the record as a whole. See 5 U.S.C. §706. When reviewing a decision, the
district court's role is limited to determining whether the record contains substantial evidence to
support an ALJ's findings of fact. Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2002).
Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate" to support a conclusion. Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971)). If the ALJ's
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findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, they are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Richardson, 402 U.S. at 390.
A district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner's decision, or reweigh the evidence of record; the court can only judge the propriety of the decision with
reference to the grounds invoked by the Commissioner when the decision was rendered. Palmer
v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998); S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 - 97,
67 S. Ct. 1575, 91 L. Ed. 1995 (1947). Otherwise stated, “I may not weigh the evidence or
substitute my own conclusion for that of the ALJ. I must defer to the ALJ's evaluation of
evidence, assessment of the credibility of witnesses, and reconciliation of conflicting expert
opinions. If the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, I am bound by those
findings, even if I would have decided the factual inquiry differently.” Brunson v. Astrue, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55457 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2011) (citations omitted).
II. THE PARTIES’ MOTIONS
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ relied on outdated assessments that failed to consider
developments in her condition; and that he erred in failing to give controlling weight to the
opinions of treating or examining medical sources, as opposed to those of the non-examining
source. She also asserts that the ALJ erred in considering her low back and shoulder problems,
and that the hypothetical question to the vocational expert (“VE”) did not include the limitations
opined to by the treating and examining sources.
Each of these contentions focuses on the ALJ’s approach to three medical sources of
record: Dr. Rings, a non-examining consultant; Dr. Last, Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist; and Dr.
Groves, an examining consultant. In determining that Dr. Rings’ opinion was entitled to great
weight, the ALJ observed that progress notes from both treating and examining sources were

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consistent with Dr. Rings’ opinion. The ALJ considered Dr. Last’s check-the-box opinion that
Plaintiff had a seriously limited capacity to perform most unskilled work criteria and would miss
more than four days of work per month due to psychological symptoms. The ALJ placed little
weight on this opinion, as inconsistent with the GAF assigned by Dr. Last; she also stated, inter
alia, that Dr. Last’s progress notes revealed a trend of improving symptoms and generally normal
mental status examinations. As regards Dr. Groves, the ALJ accepted the moderate limitations,
and rejected the marked limitations, to which Dr. Groves opined. The ALJ explained that the
marked limitations were inconsistent with the Plaintiff’s own pertinent testimony.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ should not have placed great weight on Dr. Rings’ June
11, 2012 opinion, because it did not account for Dr. Last’s later records or report. In particular,
Plaintiff complaints that Dr. Rings did not consider Dr. Last’s March 18, 2013 medical source
statement, which contained his opinion regarding Plaintiff’s various limitations. An ALJ may
rely on a medical source opinion that did not have access to the entire medical record, so long as
the ALJ accounts for any subsequent evidence. Shipman v. Colvin, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
129806, at *23 (D.S.C. Sept. 28, 2015). "The fact that the state agency physician did not have
access to the entire evidentiary record — because the record was incomplete at the time of the
assessment — is inconsequential [if] the ALJ considered the entire evidentiary record and
substantial evidence supports his determination.” Thacker v. Astrue, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
152844, at *19 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 28, 2011). Here, the ALJ both accounted for and explicitly
discussed Dr. Last’s 2013 report, and she also explained that Dr. Rings’ opinion was consistent
with other evidence of record regarding Plaintiff’s mental health.1

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I note, too, that Plaintiff does not point to any material notations contained in Dr. Last’s treatment notes between
the time of Dr. Rings’ opinion and Dr. Last’s 2013 medical source statement.

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Plaintiff also challenges the ALJ’s failure to give controlling weight to the opinion of Dr.
Last, or greater weight to examiner Dr. Groves. It is true that a treating physician’s opinion is
entitled to controlling weight when it is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence….”
20 CFR § 404.1527. It is also true that generally speaking, greater weight is accorded to the
opinions of examining sources than to those of non-examining sources. Nonetheless, an ALJ
may accept some parts of the medical evidence and reject other parts, so long as he considers all
of the evidence and gives some reason for discounting the evidence he rejects. Wilson v. Colvin,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136974, at **5-6 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2014). Thus, if record evidence
contradicts a treating physician’s opinion, the ALJ is not required to give it controlling weight.
See Russo v. Astrue, 421 Fed. Appx. 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2011).
The ALJ discharges his duty to address the treating physician opinions in the record if he
explains why he finds extreme limitations inconsistent with and not well supported by substantial
evidence in the record. Baker v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42769, at *11
(W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2014). As mentioned supra, I cannot re-weigh evidence; instead, I am
confined to review of the record support for the ALJ’s conclusions. Machen v. Colvin, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86514, at *15 (W.D. Pa. June 20, 2013). Here, contrary to Plaintiff’s
suggestion, the ALJ explained her reasons for rejecting Dr. Last’s medical source statement, and
for partially accepting the opinion of Dr. Groves.2 I find no error in this regard. Moreover,
because the ALJ did not err in her consideration of the medical testimony, she likewise did not
err in failing to include rejected impairments in her hypothetical to the VE.

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“It is not error for an ALJ to consider and assign weight to a GAF score that has been assigned by a medical or
non-medical source.” Cooke v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119915 (N.D. Ohio June 15, 2015).

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Finally, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in failing to consider Plaintiff’s low back
and shoulder pain as “severe.” As Defendant notes, the determination of whether Plaintiff
suffers a severe impairment is akin to a threshold screening procedure. “So long as the ALJ
rules in Plaintiff's favor by finding that any single impairment meets the severity threshold
required at step two, any error the ALJ made in this determination was harmless.” Auriemma v.
Colvin, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115282, at *14 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2015). Thus, remand would not
be justified even had the ALJ erred.
CONCLUSION
In sum, Plaintiff’s Motion will be denied, and Defendant’s granted. An appropriate
Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 12th day of November, 2015, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
and DECREED that Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED, and Defendant’s GRANTED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/Donetta W. Ambrose
________________________________
Donetta W. Ambrose
Senior Judge, U.S. District Court

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