WILLIAMS v. USA
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying § 2255 motion filed at Criminal Case No. 12-162. Signed by Judge Terrence F. McVerry on 7/14/15. (mh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
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) 2:12-cr-162-TFM
) 2:15-cv-461-TFM
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
vs.
ALLAN WILLIAMS
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
Pending before the Court is a MOTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255 TO VACATE, SET
ASIDE, OR CORRECT SENTENCE BY A PERSON IN FEDERAL CUSTODY (ECF No.
1103), filed by counsel for Defendant Allan Williams. The government has filed a response in
opposition to the motion (ECF No. 1140). Accordingly, the motion is ripe for disposition. For the
reasons that follow, the motion will be denied without a hearing, and no certificate of
appealability will be issued.1
I.
Background
On June 13, 2012, a federal grand jury sitting in the Western District of Pennsylvania
returned an 18-count Indictment against Allan Williams (“Williams”) and 19 codefendants in
relation to their involvement in drug trafficking. Williams was charged in Count One with
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine in
violation of Title 21 U.S.C. § 846.
1.
A district court has the authority to dismiss a motion to vacate without holding an
evidentiary hearing when it is clear from both the motion and the record that the movant is not
entitled to relief. See U.S.C. § 2255(b); Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings.
As more fully explained herein, Williams has not demonstrated a prima facie entitlement to
relief. Accordingly, the Court will resolve this motion without a hearing.
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On March 19, 2013, a federal grand jury sitting in the Western District of Pennsylvania
returned a 22-count Superseding Indictment within which the first 15 counts remained the same
as charged in the original indictment. Allan Williams was charged only in Count One.
A trial in this action was scheduled to commence on September 2, 2014, against Williams
and two codefendants, Brandon Boone and Michael Porter. On the morning of jury selection,
however, Williams, who was represented by counsel 2 , advised the Court that he intended to
change his plea of not guilty to a plea of guilty to a lesser-included offense in Count One of the
superseding indictment pursuant to a plea agreement with the government. (Tr., ECF No. 1127 at
4). It was stipulated that the type and quantity of controlled substance attributable to Williams
was at least 100 grams, but less than 200 grams of cocaine. Id. The Court conducted a thorough
colloquy to assure that Williams’ plea was knowing and voluntary. (Tr., ECF No. 1127). In open
court, Williams acknowledged that he had read, discussed with his attorney and understood the
plea agreement. Id. at 21. Williams also acknowledged that he had signed page five of the plea
agreement and that his signature was placed on the document of his own free will. Id. at 21-22.
Following the change-of-plea hearing, the probation office prepared a Presentence
Investigation Report (“PSI”). According to the PSI, Williams’ offense level was 13 (i.e., 16
minus three for acceptance of responsibility), after applying the reductions in § 3E1.1(a) and §
3E1.1(b). Moreover, his criminal history category was III, which resulted in a Guidelines range
of incarceration of 18 to 24 months. After a sentencing hearing on January 5, 2015, Williams
2.
Williams was represented by attorney Christopher Capozzi throughout the pretrial
process and during his change-of-plea hearing and sentencing. However, on January 21, 2015,
Capozzi was granted leave to withdraw as Williams’ counsel based upon an allegation that
Williams intended to pursue a claim against defense counsel for ineffectiveness. The Court
appointed Frank Arcuri who then filed a motion to withdraw from representation on January 30,
2015. Arcuri stated he was ethically required to withdraw pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of
Professional Responsibility including, but not limited to, Rule 1.16(b)(4). Attorney Jon
Pushinsky has since been representing Williams.
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was ultimately sentenced within the guideline range to 21 months in prison, to be followed by a
three-year term of supervised release. (Tr., ECF No. 1128 at 30).
On April 6, 2015, Williams filed the pending § 2255 motion, in which he seeks relief from
his conviction and sentence. The Government filed a timely response; and the motion is now ripe
for disposition.
II.
Legal Standard
A prisoner in federal custody may move to vacate his or her sentence under 28 U.S.C. §
2255(a) if such “sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). “A prisoner seeking relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of
counsel bears the burden to demonstrate two requirements,” United States v. Seeley, 574 F.
App'x 75, 78 (3d Cir. 2014), which were initially set forth by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, (1984) superseded on other grounds by
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214. In
order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, a defendant
“must establish that (1) the performance of counsel fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness; and, (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” United States
v. Otero, 502 F.3d 331, 334 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694); see also Roe
v. Flores–Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 476–477 (2000) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694); United
States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has “endorsed the practical suggestion in Strickland
[that the Court may] consider the prejudice prong before examining the performance of counsel
prong ‘because this course of action is less burdensome to defense counsel.’” United States v.
Lilly, 536 F.3d 190, 196 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Booth, 432 F.3d 542, 546 (3d
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Cir. 2005), which quoted United States v. McCoy, 410 F.3d 124, 132 n. 6 (3d Cir. 2005)); see
also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (“If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be
followed.”).
III.
Discussion
The § 2255 petition sets forth grounds for relief based upon counsel’s alleged prejudicial
ineffectiveness. Williams alleges that he was coerced into involuntarily and unknowingly
entering a plea of guilty in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. In support of his
allegation, Williams states that he was convinced by assurances from his counsel that he would
not receive a sentence of incarceration should he waive his trial rights and plead guilty.
A.
Defendant’s Guilty Plea was Knowing and Voluntary and with the Effective
Assistance of Counsel
Williams claims that his guilty plea was coerced by his attorney’s false assurances that his
sentence would not include incarceration. Nevertheless, whatever counsel told Williams, no
prejudice befell him because he had been fully advised at the time of his plea hearing of his
constitutional rights, that his maximum potential exposure was a twenty-year term of
imprisonment and that the sentencing court had the discretion to impose a just sentence up to the
statutory maximum regardless of any other prediction or expectation. Williams stated in open
court that he understood his rights, the potential sentence and that he had not been forced to enter
a plea of guilty.
“It has long been settled as a general rule that where an adequate guilty plea hearing has been
conducted, an erroneous prediction or assurance by defense counsel regarding the likely sentence
does not constitute grounds for invalidating a guilty plea on grounds of ineffective assistance of
counsel.” Brown v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 2d 345, 355 (D.N.J. 1999) aff’d. 45 F. App’x 92
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(3d Cir. 2002). See also United States v. Shedrick, 493 F.3d 292, 299 (3d Cir. 2007) (counsel’s
deficient performance in advising defendant about sentencing exposure can be cured where a
written plea agreement clearly established maximum exposure and sentencing court’s discretion
and by “an adequate plea hearing”); United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 254 (3d Cir. 2003)
(counsel not ineffective for allegedly promising defendant a sentence of “no more than 71
months” when defendant had been advised in an open-court colloquy of the potential maximum
sentence and there were no other promises regarding sentence); United States v. Mustafa, 238
F.3d 485, 492 (3d Cir. 2001) (“any alleged misrepresentations that [defendant's] former counsel
may have made regarding sentencing calculations were dispelled when [defendant] was informed
in open court that there was no guarantee as to sentence, and that the court could sentence him to
the maximum.”); Masciola v. United States, 469 F.2d 1057, 1059 (3d Cir.1972) (per curiam)
(holding that “[a]n erroneous prediction of a sentence by defendant's counsel does not render a
guilty plea involuntary” especially when the record demonstrates that a proper plea colloquy
took place during which defendant acknowledged that he was aware of his maximum potential
sentence); United States v. Stephens, 906 F.2d 251, 253 (6th Cir. 1990) (“The mere fact that an
attorney incorrectly estimates the sentence a defendant is likely to receive is not a ‘fair and just’
reason to allow withdrawal of a plea agreement…This is especially true under the new
Sentencing Guidelines.”) (quoting United States v. Sweeney, 878 F.2d 68, 70 (2d Cir. 1989).
“The rationale is that the Rule 113 colloquy, which advises the defendant of the minimum and
maximum imprisonment range under the statute and provides other necessary information about
3.
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11(b)(1) reads in pertinent part: Before
accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the defendant personally in
open court and inform him of, and determine that he understands, the following: the nature of the
charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and
the maximum possible penalty provided by law …
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the Guidelines sentencing process, eliminates any arguable prejudice from an earlier estimate by
counsel.” Brown, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 355.
Furthermore, Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that but for counsel’s allegedly
deficient performance, a reasonable probability exists that he would not have pled guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). As the Supreme
Court has more recently clarified, the defendant “must convince the court” that a decision to go
to trial “would have been rational under the circumstances.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356,
372 (2010). Thus, a defendant’s “bare allegation” that he would have insisted on going to trial is
not enough. Parry v. Rosemeyer, 64 F.3d 110, 118 (3d Cir. 1995). To make such a showing, the
defendant must point to “objective evidence that he would not have pled guilty” and instead
proceeded to trial. Hutchings v. United States, 618 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing United
States v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d 353, 359 (7th Cir. 2005)).
This case falls within well-established precedent. Defense counsel’s predictions to his client
about sentencing are irrelevant where the written plea agreement and in-court guilty plea
colloquy clearly establish the maximum potential exposure and the sentencing court’s discretion.
In fact, Williams puts forth no facts to support his allegations that he was promised or assured of
a specific sentence, nor does he challenge the adequacy of his guilty plea colloquy. The record of
Williams’ understandings, under oath, at the time of his guilty plea, completely undermines his
claims.
At the outset of the plea hearing, Williams was informed that if he did not understand any
question during the proceeding, he should let the court know “as it is essential to a valid plea of
guilty that [he] understand each and every question before answer[ing] and that [he] answer
accurately and truthfully.” (Tr., ECF. No. 1127, at 4). At no time during the proceeding did he
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appear not to comprehend that which was being communicated. Nor did he ask for any
clarification.
The Court asked if Williams had received, read and reviewed the entire indictment pending
and he answered in the affirmative. He also stated that he had fully discussed the charge with his
attorney. Likewise, he was asked if he had received, read and signed the plea agreement to which
he answered affirmatively.
The Court also explained his constitutional right to a trial by jury and all other important
constitutional rights, which Williams indicated he had discussed with counsel, understood fully,
and wished to waive in connection with his guilty plea.
Williams affirmed that he understood all the relevant sentencing procedures and risks, how
the Sentencing Guidelines work, how departures are determined, and the maximum penalties
provided by law, all of which were explained in detail. He was also informed that the sentence
ultimately imposed may be different from any estimate his attorney may have given him. (Tr.,
ECF No. 1127 at 22). Williams was asked if anyone had made any prediction or promise as to
his sentence or whether anyone threatened him in any way as a persuasion for his guilty plea Williams did not advise the court of any promise purportedly made by counsel or of any threats.
In fact the record clearly reflects that no pressure was applied to get Williams to plead guilty. He
represented that he was pleading guilty of his own free will and that no one had threatened or
promised anything to get him to plead guilty. Furthermore, he voiced his satisfaction with the
representation of counsel, to date.
A substantial barrier against setting aside a guilty plea exists when a defendant’s solemn
declarations in open court demonstrated the lawfulness of the plea. Such testimony carries “a
strong presumption of verity.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977). Here, the entire
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plea colloquy undermines Williams’ present claims of coercion. His petition offers no reason to
reexamine his own words and understanding upon review of the record in this case.
Moreover, Williams cannot claim that he lost anything by pleading guilty instead of going to
trial. In fact, if he had gone to trial, he would have been worse off. He would have been charged
with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and distribute five kilograms or more of
cocaine and not the lesser-included offense. (Superseding Indictment Memo, ECF No. 370 at 2).
The mandatory minimum penalty he would have faced included a term of imprisonment of not
less than ten years and a term of supervised release of at least five years. Id. at 7. Additionally,
he would have lost the benefit of the three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility he had
received by pleading guilty.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons hereinabove set forth, Williams has failed to demonstrate that his
constitutional rights to effective assistance of counsel had been violated. The Court finds that
Williams decided to plead guilty following effective assistance of counsel and did so knowingly
and voluntarily. The record amply demonstrates that the petition to set aside his guilty plea
should be denied. Thus, Williams’ MOTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255 TO VACATE, SET
ASIDE, OR CORRECT SENTENCE BY A PERSON IN FEDERAL CUSTORY (ECF No.
1103) will be DENIED and Civil Action 2:15-cv-461 will be docketed as CLOSED.
A
certificate of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253 will not be issued. An appropriate order
follows.
McVerry, S.J.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
)
)
)
) 2:12-cr-162-TFM
) 2:15-cv-461-TFM
)
)
)
)
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
vs.
ALLAN WILLIAMS
Defendant.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 14th day of July, 2015, in accordance with the foregoing Memorandum
Opinion, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Defendant’s MOTION
UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255 TO VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR CORRECT SENTENCE BY A
PERSON IN FEDERAL CUSTODY is DENIED, and no certificate of appealability will be
issued because Williams has not “made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). It is FURTHER ORDERED that Civil Action 2:15-cv-461 shall
be docketed as CLOSED.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Terrence F. McVerry
United States District Judge
cc:
Jon Pushinsky
Email: jonpush@aol.com
Barbara K. Doolittle
Email: BarbaraDoolittle@usdoj.gov
Jane Dattilo
Email: Jane.Dattilo@usdoj.gov
Lee Karl
Email: Lee.Karl@usdoj.gov
(via CM/ECF)
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