WATT v. COLVIN

Filing 15

OPINION and ORDER denying 11 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 13 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 2/1/16. (slh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MARK A. WATT,
Plaintiff,
-vsCAROLYN W. COLVIN,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 15-589

AMBROSE, Senior District Judge

OPINION
Pending before the court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 11 and
13). Both parties have filed Briefs in Support of their Motions. (ECF Nos. 12 and 14). After
careful consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based on my Opinion set forth
below, I am denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 11) and granting
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 13).
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brought this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security (ACommissioner@) denying his application for supplemental security income (“SSI”)
pursuant to the Social Security Act (AAct@). Plaintiff filed his application alleging he had been
disabled since August 18, 2011. (ECF No. 7-7, p. 2). Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), John J.
Porter, held a hearing on August 9, 2013. (ECF No. 7-3). On November 22, 2013, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. (ECF No. 7-2, pp. 25-40).
After exhausting all administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed the instant action with this
court. The parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (Docket Nos. 11 and 13).
The issues are now ripe for review.

II.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
A.

Standard of Review

The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence exists in
the record to support the Commissioner=s decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir.
1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as Amore than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.@ Ventura v. Shalala, 55
F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995), quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
Additionally, the Commissioner=s findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are
conclusive. 42 U.S.C. '405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). A
district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner=s decision or re-weigh the
evidence of record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Where the ALJ's
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if
the court would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360
(3d Cir. 1999). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, however,
the district court must review the record as a whole. See, 5 U.S.C. '706.
To be eligible for social security benefits, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he cannot
engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. '423(d)(1)(A); Brewster v. Heckler,
786 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986).
The Commissioner has provided the ALJ with a five-step sequential analysis to use
when evaluating the disabled status of each claimant. 20 C.F.R. '404.1520(a). The ALJ must
determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not,
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a severe impairment,
whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P., appx. 1; (4) if the
impairment does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether the claimant=s impairments

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prevent him from performing his past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of
performing his past relevant work, whether he can perform any other work which exists in the
national economy, in light of his age, education, work experience and residual functional
capacity. 20 C.F.R. '404.1520. The claimant carries the initial burden of demonstrating by
medical evidence that he is unable to return to his previous employment (steps 1-4).
Dobrowolsky, 606 F.2d at 406. Once the claimant meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts
to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in alternative substantial gainful
activity (step 5). Id.
A district court, after reviewing the entire record may affirm, modify, or reverse the
decision with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris, 745
F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1984).
B.

Opinions of Treating Physicians and Examining Psychologist

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred in failing to give “substantial weight” to the
opinions of his treating doctors and an examining psychologist. (ECF No. 12, pp. 9-14). The
amount of weight accorded to medical opinions is well-established. Generally, the ALJ will give
more weight to the opinion of a source who has examined the claimant than to a non-examining
source. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(1). In addition, the ALJ generally will give more weight to
opinions from a treating physician, “since these sources are likely to be the medical
professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [a claimant’s] medical
impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be
obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations,
such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations.” Id. § 416.927(c)(2). If the ALJ finds
that “a treating source’s opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of [a claimant’s]
impairment(s) is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence [of] record,” he must give

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that opinion controlling weight. Id. Also, “the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a
whole, the more weight [the ALJ generally] will give to that opinion.” Id. § 416.927(c)(4).
In the event of conflicting medical evidence, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
has explained:
“A cardinal principle guiding disability determinations is that the ALJ accord
treating physicians’ reports great weight, especially ‘when their opinions reflect
expert judgment based on continuing observation of the patient’s condition over a
prolonged period of time.’” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000)
(quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999)). However, “where .
. . the opinion of a treating physician conflicts with that of a non-treating, nonexamining physician, the ALJ may choose whom to credit” and may reject the
treating physician’s assessment if such rejection is based on contradictory
medical evidence. Id. Similarly, under 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2), the opinion of a
treating physician is to be given controlling weight only when it is well-supported
by medical evidence and is consistent with other evidence in the record.
Becker v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., No. 10-2517, 2010 WL 5078238, at *5 (3d Cir. Dec.
14, 2010). Although the ALJ may choose whom to credit when faced with a conflict, he “cannot
reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.” Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Security, 577
F.3d 500, 505 (3d Cir. 2009).
In this case, the ALJ Plaintiff submits that the “reasons the ALJ has rejected these
reports is not supported by the record and the ALJ has erred.” (ECF No. 12, p. 14). In support
of the same, however, Plaintiff first seems to argue that the ALJ erred in failing to give these
opinions substantial weight simply because they were his treating physician. (ECF No. 12, pp
9-12). While the treating physician’s rule exists, as set forth above, when there are conflicting
medical opinions, the ALJ may choose whom to credit. Becker, 2010 WL 5078238 at *5; Diaz,
577 F.3d at 505. In this case, there are conflicting opinions. Consequently, there is no merit to
this argument.
Next, Plaintiff argues that there is substantial evidence from his treating physician to
support that he has very severe impairments and limitations resulting therefrom. (ECF No. 12,
pp. 11-12). To be clear, the standard is not whether there is evidence to establish Plaintiff’s
position but, rather, is whether there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding. Allen

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Thus, this support for Plaintiff’s argument is

v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir. 1989).
misplaced.

Plaintiff then states that the ALJ erred “when he indicated that Dr. Kochik was not aware
of Plaintiff’s substance use issue.” (ECF No. 12, p 12). To begin with, the ALJ does not state
that Dr. Kochik was not aware of Plaintiff’s substance use issue. See, ECF No. 7-2, pp. 29-40.
Rather, in weighing Dr. Kochik, the ALJ found that “[n]oticably absent are a diagnosis of
substance abuse indicating that Dr. Kochik was mislead (sic) about a very important part of
claimant’s medical history.” Id. at p. 36. Furthermore, I have reviewed the reasons the ALJ did
not give Dr. Kochik’s opinion great weight. (ECF No. 7-2, pp. 36-37). I find the reasons given
by the ALJ in weighing Dr. Kochik’s opinions to be appropriate (internal inconsistency,
inconsistent with other medical evidence/objective findings and undermined by Plaintiff
subjective reports of pain which the ALJ found to be not entirely credible), sufficiently explained
and supported by substantial evidence of record. (ECF No. 7-2, pp. 29-39); 20 C.F.R. §§
416.927, 404.1527 (discussing the evaluation of medical opinions). Therefore, I find no error in
this regard on the part of the ALJ.
Finally, Plaintiff specifically objects to the ALJ’s statements regarding Plaintiff’s “drugseeking behavior” and the use of such determination by the ALJ in weighing the medical opinion
evidence. After a review of the record, I find there is substantial evidence of record to support
said statements by the ALJ. (ECF No. 7-2, pp. 29-39). Additionally, I find that it was proper for
the ALJ to consider the same in weighing the medical opinions. Lastly, I find the ALJ more than
adequately evaluated and weighed the opinion evidence and that such evaluations were based
on substantial evidence of record. Id.
Consequently, remand is not warranted on this basis.

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C.

Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) 1

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ improperly determined his RFC. (ECF No. 12, pp. 1417). The entirety of Plaintiff’s argument in support thereof is that there substantial evidence to
support that he is not able to physically or mentally do the work set forth in the ALJ’s RFC
finding.2 Id. The standard is not whether there is evidence to establish Plaintiff’s position but,
rather, is whether there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding. Allen v. Bowen,
881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir. 1989).

Thus, the support for Plaintiff’s argument is completely

misplaced. Therefore, I find the argument is not sufficiently developed to place the issue clearly
before me.
Nonetheless, I have reviewed the evidence of record and, based on the same, I find
there is substantial evidence to support the RFC determination. See, ECF No. 7-2, pp. 29-39.
Consequently, remand is not warranted on this basis.
D.

Vocational Expert

Plaintiff submits that the ALJ erred by improperly disregarding vocational expert
testimony and by relying on an incomplete hypothetical question. (ECF No. 12, pp. 17-18). I
disagree. An ALJ is required to accept only that testimony from the vocational expert which
accurately reflects a plaintiff’s impairments. See, Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210 (3d Cir.
1984); Chrupcala v. Heckler, 829 F.2d 1269, 1276 (3d Cir. 1987). Based on my review of the
record, there is substantial evidence that the ALJ’s hypothetical questions accurately reflected
Plaintiff’s impairments. (ECF No. 7-2, pp. 29-40; No. 7-3, pp. 35-43). Consequently, I find no
error in this regard.

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RFC refers to the most a claimant can still do despite his/her limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a),
416.945(a). The assessment must be based upon all of the relevant evidence, including the medical
records, medical source opinions, and the individual’s subjective allegations and description of his own
limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a).
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The ALJ found Plaintiff has the RFC to perform sedentary work with exceptions. (ECF No. 7-2, pp. 2930).

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E.

Plaintiff’s Complaints of Pain

Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by improperly evaluating his complaints of pain
and discrediting those complaints. (ECF No. 12, pp. 18-20). In evaluating whether a plaintiff’s
statements are credible, the ALJ will consider evidence from treating, examining and consulting
physicians, observations from agency employees, and other factors such as the claimant's daily
activities, descriptions of the pain, precipitating and aggravating factors, type, dosage,
effectiveness, and side effects of medications, treatment other than medication, and other
measures used to relieve the pain. 20 C.F.R. '§416.929(c), 404.1529(c); SSR 96-7p. The ALJ
will also look at inconsistencies between the claimant's statements and the evidence presented.
Id.

I must defer to the ALJ=s credibility determinations, unless they are not supported by

substantial evidence.

Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 972 (3d Cir. 1981); Baerga v.

Richardson, 500 F.2d 309, 312 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 931 (1975).
Replete throughout this section, Plaintiff suggests there is evidence to show Plaintiff was
credible. (ECF No. 12, pp. 18-20). Again, the standard is not whether there is evidence to
establish Plaintiff’s position but, rather, is whether there is substantial evidence to support the
ALJ’s finding. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir. 1989). Thus, this support for Plaintiff’s
argument is misplaced.
After my own review of the record, I find that the ALJ followed the proper method to
determine the Plaintiff’s credibility. As laid out in his decision, the ALJ considered the factors
set forth above. (ECF No. 7-2, pp. 29-40). For example, while assessing Plaintiff=s credibility,
the ALJ compared the medical evidence and other evidence of record to his complaints and
found them to be contradictory. Id. Thus, I find the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff's credibility
as required by 20 C.F.R. '416.929 and SSR 96-7p. Furthermore, based on the entire record as
a whole, I find there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ=s decision to find Plaintiff not

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entirely credible.

(ECF No. 7-2, pp. 29-40).

Therefore, I find no error in this regard.

Consequently, remand is not warranted on this basis.
An appropriate order shall follow.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MARK A. WATT,

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Plaintiff,
-vsCAROLYN W. COLVIN,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 15-589

AMBROSE, Senior District Judge
ORDER OF COURT
THEREFORE, this 1st day of February, 2016, it is ordered that Plaintiff=s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Docket No. 11) is denied and Defendant=s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Docket No. 13) is granted.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Donetta W. Ambrose
Donetta W. Ambrose
United States Senior District Judge

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