JOINER v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Filing
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OPINION and ORDER denying 12 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 14 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 10/19/16. (slh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TERESA L. JOINER,
Plaintiff,
-vsCAROLYN W. COLVIN,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 15-609
AMBROSE, Senior District Judge
OPINION
Pending before the court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 12 and
14). Both parties have filed Briefs in Support of their Motions. (ECF Nos. 13 and 15). After
careful consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based on my Opinion set forth
below, I am denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 12) and granting
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 14).
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brought this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security (ACommissioner@) denying her application for supplemental security income (“SSI”)
pursuant to the Social Security Act (AAct@). Plaintiff filed her application alleging she had been
disabled since July 1, 2011. (ECF No. 10-5, p. 2). Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), John
Kooser, held a hearing on August 28, 2013. (ECF No. 10-2, pp. 32-80). On October 25, 2013,
the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. (ECF No. 10-2, pp. 12-27).
After exhausting all administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed the instant action with this
court. The parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (Docket Nos. 12 and 14).
The issues are now ripe for review.
II.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
A.
Standard of Review
The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence exists in
the record to support the Commissioner=s decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir.
1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as Amore than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.@ Ventura v. Shalala, 55
F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995), quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
Additionally, the Commissioner=s findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are
conclusive. 42 U.S.C. '405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). A
district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner=s decision or re-weigh the
evidence of record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Where the ALJ's
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if
the court would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360
(3d Cir. 1999). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, however,
the district court must review the record as a whole. See, 5 U.S.C. '706.
To be eligible for social security benefits, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he cannot
engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. '423(d)(1)(A); Brewster v. Heckler,
786 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986).
The Commissioner has provided the ALJ with a five-step sequential analysis to use
when evaluating the disabled status of each claimant. 20 C.F.R. '404.1520(a). The ALJ must
determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not,
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a severe impairment,
whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P., appx. 1; (4) if the
impairment does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether the claimant=s impairments
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prevent him from performing his past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of
performing his past relevant work, whether he can perform any other work which exists in the
national economy, in light of his age, education, work experience and residual functional
capacity. 20 C.F.R. '404.1520. The claimant carries the initial burden of demonstrating by
medical evidence that he is unable to return to his previous employment (steps 1-4).
Dobrowolsky, 606 F.2d at 406. Once the claimant meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts
to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in alternative substantial gainful
activity (step 5). Id.
A district court, after reviewing the entire record may affirm, modify, or reverse the
decision with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris, 745
F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1984).
B.
Medical Evidence
Plaintiff’s first main argument is that the ALJ failed to properly consider the medical
evidence. (ECF No. 13, pp. 5-15). The majority of Plaintiff’s basis for this argument, however,
is centered on the position that there is medical evidence that supports her claim for disability.
Id.
To be clear, the standard is not whether there is evidence to establish Plaintiff’s position
but, rather, is whether there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding.
Allen v.
Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir. 1989). Thus, Plaintiff’s argument in this regard is misplaced.
From my reading of Plaintiff’s brief, however, I believe Plaintiff is attempting to argue that
the ALJ erred in giving little weight to the opinion of her treating psychologist, Dr. Constantino,
while giving great weight to the opinions of Drs. Milke and Craig, the state agency doctors.
(ECF No. 13, pp. 10-15).
The amount of weight accorded to medical opinions is well-
established. Generally, the ALJ will give more weight to the opinion of a source who has
examined the claimant than to a non-examining source. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(1). In addition,
the ALJ generally will give more weight to opinions from a treating physician, “since these
sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal
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picture of [a claimant’s] medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the
medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from
reports of individual examinations, such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations.”
Id. § 416.927(c)(2). If the ALJ finds that “a treating source’s opinion on the issue(s) of the nature
and severity of [a claimant’s] impairment(s) is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical
and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence
[of] record,” he must give that opinion controlling weight. Id. Also, “the more consistent an
opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight [the ALJ generally] will give to that
opinion.” Id. § 416.927(c)(4).
In the event of conflicting medical evidence, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
has explained:
“A cardinal principle guiding disability determinations is that the ALJ accord
treating physicians’ reports great weight, especially ‘when their opinions reflect
expert judgment based on continuing observation of the patient’s condition over a
prolonged period of time.’” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000)
(quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999)). However, “where .
. . the opinion of a treating physician conflicts with that of a non-treating, nonexamining physician, the ALJ may choose whom to credit” and may reject the
treating physician’s assessment if such rejection is based on contradictory
medical evidence. Id. Similarly, under 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2), the opinion of a
treating physician is to be given controlling weight only when it is well-supported
by medical evidence and is consistent with other evidence in the record.
Becker v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., No. 10-2517, 2010 WL 5078238, at *5 (3d Cir. Dec.
14, 2010). Although the ALJ may choose whom to credit when faced with a conflict, he “cannot
reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.” Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Security, 577
F.3d 500, 505 (3d Cir. 2009).
In this case, there were conflicting medical opinions. Plaintiff essentially argues that the
reasons given by the ALJ in weighing the opinions of Drs. Constantino, Milke and Craig are not
supported by the record. (ECF No. 13, pp. 10-15). In weighing the opinion evidence, the ALJ
gave little weight to Dr. Constantino’s opinion dated June 2011 because it was conducted for
the purpose of a prior disability application and because it predates the alleged disability onset
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date. (ECF No. 10-2, p. 25). Thus, the ALJ found it was “not persuasive in establishing the
claimant’s level of functioning during the period relevant to the decision….” (ECF No. 10-2, p.
25). After a review of the record, I find there is substantial evidence of record to support the
same. Consequently, I find no error in this regard.
The ALJ gave Dr. Constantino’s opinion of July 2013 little weight because it was
internally inconsistent with and unsupported by the treatment records, as well as other evidence
of record. (ECF No. 10-2, pp. 17-25). I have reviewed the record and reasons the ALJ gave Dr.
Constantino’s opinion little weight. (ECF No. 10-2, pp. 17-25). I find the reasons given by the
ALJ to be appropriate, sufficiently explained and supported by substantial evidence of record.
(ECF No. 10-2, pp. 17-25); 20 C.F.R. § 416.927 (discussing the evaluation of medical opinions).
Therefore, I find no error in this regard on the part of the ALJ.
In contrast, the ALJ gave great weight to the state agency opinions of Drs. Milke and
Craig. (ECF No. 10-2, p. 17-25). State agency opinions merit significant consideration. See
SSR 96–6p (“Because State agency medical and psychological consultants ... are experts in the
Social Security disability programs, ... 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(f) and 416.927(f) require [ALJs] ...
to consider their findings of fact about the nature and severity of an individual's
impairment(s)....”). The ALJ gave their opinions great weight because they were consistent with
the medical evidence of record. (ECF No. 10-2, pp. 17-25). This is a valid and acceptable
reason. See, 20 C.F.R. §416.927 (Evaluating Opinion Evidence). After a review of the record, I
find the decision of the ALJ in weighing the conflicting opinions to be sufficiently explained and
supported by substantial evidence of record. (ECF No. 10-2, pp. 17-25). Therefore, I find no
error in this regard on the part of the ALJ.
C.
Plaintiff’s Credibility
Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by setting forth “insufficient reasons for rejecting
the claimant’s testimony as not being totally credible.” (ECF No. 13, pp. 15-18). In evaluating
whether a plaintiff’s statements are credible, the ALJ will consider evidence from treating,
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examining and consulting physicians, observations from agency employees, and other factors
such as the claimant's daily activities, descriptions of the pain, precipitating and aggravating
factors, type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medications, treatment other than
medication, and other measures used to relieve the pain. 20 C.F.R. '416.929(c); SSR 96-7p.
The ALJ will also look at inconsistencies between the claimant's statements and the evidence
presented. Id. I must defer to the ALJ=s credibility determinations, unless they are not supported
by substantial evidence.
Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 972 (3d Cir. 1981); Baerga v.
Richardson, 500 F.2d 309, 312 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 931 (1975).
Replete throughout this section, Plaintiff suggests there is evidence to show Plaintiff was
credible. (ECF No. 13, pp. 15-18). Again, the standard is not whether there is evidence to
establish Plaintiff’s position but, rather, is whether there is substantial evidence to support the
ALJ’s finding. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir. 1989). Thus, this support for Plaintiff’s
argument is misplaced.
After my own review of the record, I find that the ALJ followed the proper method to
determine the Plaintiff’s credibility. As laid out in his decision, the ALJ considered the factors
set forth above at length. (ECF No. 10-2, pp. 12-25). For example, while assessing Plaintiff=s
credibility, the ALJ compared the medical evidence and other evidence of record to her
complaints and found them to be contradictory. Id. Thus, I find the ALJ properly evaluated
Plaintiff's credibility as required by 20 C.F.R. '416.929 and SSR 96-7p. Furthermore, based on
the entire record as a whole, I find there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ=s decision to
find Plaintiff not entirely credible. (ECF No. 10-2, pp. 12-25). Therefore, I find no error in this
regard. Consequently, remand is not warranted on this basis.
D.
Vocational Expert
Plaintiff’s final sentence essentially suggests that the ALJ erred by improperly
disregarding vocational expert testimony and finding there are jobs that exist in significant
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numbers in the national economy that she can perform. (ECF No. 13, p. 18). I disagree. An
ALJ is required to accept only that testimony from the vocational expert which accurately
reflects a plaintiff’s impairments. See, Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1984);
Chrupcala v. Heckler, 829 F.2d 1269, 1276 (3d Cir. 1987). Based on my review of the record
and analysis above, I find there is substantial evidence that the ALJ’s hypothetical questions
accurately reflected Plaintiff’s impairments. (ECF No. 10-2, pp. 12-27, 76-79). Thus, I find no
error in this regard. Consequently, remand is not warranted on this basis.
An appropriate order shall follow.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TERESA L. JOINER,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
-vsCAROLYN W. COLVIN,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 15-609
AMBROSE, Senior District Judge
ORDER OF COURT
THEREFORE, this 19th day of October, 2016, it is ordered that Plaintiff=s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Docket No. 12) is denied and Defendant=s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Docket No. 14) is granted.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Donetta W. Ambrose
Donetta W. Ambrose
United States Senior District Judge
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