STORY v. COLVIN
Filing
11
MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER denying 6 plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 8 defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The decision of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. See Memorandum Judgment Order for further details. Signed by Judge Gustave Diamond on 5/23/16. (kw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DANIEL STORY,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROL YN W. COLVIN,
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 15-684
MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER
AND NOW, this
21 Jf4ly of May, 2016, upon consideration of the parties' cross-
motions for summary jUdgment pursuant to plaintiffs request for review of the decision of the
Acting Commissioner of Social Security ("Acting Commissioner") denying his application for
disability insurance benefits ("'DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act, IT IS ORDERED
that the Acting Commissioner's motion for summary judgment (Document No.8) be, and the same
hereby is, granted and plaintiffs motion for summary judgment (Document No.6) be, and the same
hereby is, denied.
As the factfinder, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") has an obligation to weigh all of
the facts and evidence of record and may reject or discount any evidence if the ALJ explains the
reasons for doing so. Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422,429 (3d Cir. 1999). Where the ALJ's
findings offact are supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court is bound by those findings,
even ifit would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34,
38 (3d Cir. 2001). Moreover, it is well settled that disability is not determined merely by the
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presence ofimpairments, but by the effect that those impairments have upon an individual's ability
to perform substantial gainful activity. Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991). These
well-established principles preclude a reversal or remand of the ALl's decision here because the
record contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ's findings and conclusions.
Plaintiff filed his application for DIB on December 22, 2011, alleging disability beginning
on January 28, 2008, due to spinal surgery, J-pouch surgery and ulcerative colitis. Plaintiffs
application was denied. At plaintiffs request, an ALJ held a hearing on August 20, 2013, at which
plaintiff appeared and testified while represented by a non-attorney representative. On November
18, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff is not disabled. The Appeals Council
denied plaintiff s request for review on March 25, 2015, making the ALl's decision the final
decision of the Acting Commissioner. The instant action followed.
Plaintiff, who has a high school education, was 50 years old on his date last insured for DIB
purposes, and is classified as an individual closely approaching advanced age under the regulations.
20 C.F .R. §§404.1563(d). Plaintiffhas past relevant work experience as a carpenter and a painter's
helper, but he has not engaged in substantial gainful activity at any time since his alleged onset
date.
After reviewing plaintiff s medical records and hearing testimony from plaintiff and a
vocational expert at the hearing, the ALJ concluded that plaintiffis not disabled within the meaning
of the Act. The ALJ first found that plaintiff suffers from the severe impairments of ulcerative
colitis with J-pouch surgery and a history ofa spinal fusion; however, those impairments, alone or
in combination, do not meet or equal the criteria of any of the listed impairments set forth in
Appendix 1 of20 C.F.R., Subpart P, Regulation No.4 ("Appendix 1").
The ALJ next found that plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity to perform light
work with a sit/stand option every hour and a number of additional limitations. Plaintiff is
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restricted to lifting and carrying up to 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, and he can
occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but he is unable to climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds. In
addition, plaintiff can frequently balance and occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl. Further,
plaintiff is restricted to understanding, remembering and carrying out simple instructions and
making judgments on simple work related decisions. Finally, plaintiff is capable of interacting
appropriately with supervisors and co-workers in a routine work setting and he is able to respond
to usual work situations and changes in a routine work setting (collectively, the "RFC Finding").
The ALJ concluded that plaintiff is unable to perform his past relevant work because it
exceeds his residual functional capacity. However, based upon testimony by a vocational expert,
the ALJ determined that plaintiff is capable of performing other work that exists in significant
numbers in the national economy, such as a packer, sorter/grader or assembly worker. Accordingly,
the ALJ found that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act.
The Act defines "disability" as the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity by
reason of a physical or mental impairment that can be expected to last for a continuous period of
at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(l)(A). The impairment or impairments must be so
severe that the claimant "is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age,
education and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists
in the national economy ...." 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A).
The Social Security Regulations specify a five-step sequential evaluation process for
determining whether a claimant is disabled. The ALJ must assess: (I) whether the claimant
currently is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether he has a severe impairment;
(3) if so, whether his impairment meets or equals the criteria listed in Appendix 1; (4) if not,
whether the claimant's impairment prevents him from performing his past relevant work; and (5)
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if so, whether the claimant can perform any other work that exists in the national economy, in light
of his age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity.l
20 C.F.R.
§404.1520(a)(4). If the claimant is found disabled or not disabled at any step, further inquiry is
unnecessary. Id.
In this case, plaintiff argues that the ALl's step 5 finding is not supported by substantial
evidence because the ALl failed to properly consider and weigh an opinion issued by lennifer
Darkowski, a physician's assistant who treated plaintiff on several occasions. For reasons explained
below, this claimed error is without merit.
Ms. Darkowski completed two questionnaires related to plaintiffs physical residual
functional capacity. (R. 498-501,509-512). According to Ms. Darkowski, plaintiff was incapable
of performing even low stress work, he could only sit, stand and walk 2 hours during an 8-hour
workday and she predicted that he would miss work more than four days per month. (R. 499, 501,
510, 512). Ms. Darkowski indicated that plaintiff s limitations began "prior to seeing [her]." (R.
501,512).
In assessing opmIOn evidence, the ALl must consider all relevant evidence from
"acceptable medical sources," which include licensed physicians, psychologists, optometrists and
podiatrists, as well as qualified speech pathologists. 20 C.F.R. §404.1513(a). The ALl also may
consider evidence about a claimant's impairments and ability to work from other sources who are
not deemed an "acceptable medical source," such as a physician's assistant like Ms. Darkowski.
20 C.F.R. §404.1513(d)(1).
Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 06-03p clarifies how opinions from sources who are not
lResidual functional capacity is defined as that which an individual still is able to do despite the
limitations caused by his impairments. 20 C.F.R. §404.1S4S(a)( I). In assessing a claimant's residual
functional capacity, the ALJ is required to consider the claimant's ability to meet the physical, mental,
sensory and other requirements of work. 20 C.F.R. §404.1S4S(a)(4).
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"acceptable medical sources" should be considered. See SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at * 1.
SSR 06-03p explains that opinions from treatment providers who are not "acceptable medical
sources" may be used to show the severity of an impairment and how it affects an individual's
ability to function. ld. at *2. When evaluating evidence from these sources, the Ruling suggests
consideration ofthe same factors as are used to evaluate evidence from acceptable medical sources,
including the following: the nature and extent of the relationship between the source and the
individual; how well the source explains the opinion; the source's area ofspecialty or expertise; the
degree to which the source presents relevant evidence to support her opinion; whether the opinion
is consistent with other evidence; and any other factors that tend to support or refute the opinion.
Id. at **4-5. SSR 06-03p also explains that "[nlot every factor for weighing opinion evidence will
apply in every case," id. at *5, but the ALJ "generally should explain the weight given to opinions
from these 'other sources,' or otherwise ensure that the discussion of the evidence in the
determination or decision allows a ... subsequent reviewer to follow the [ALJ' s] reasoning ...."
Id. at *6.
Here, although the ALJ did not specifically cite SSR 06-03p, the ALJ's decision makes clear
that she considered and evaluated Ms. Darkowski's opinion as required by that Ruling. After first
noting that Ms. Darkowski is not an "acceptable medical source", the ALJ nonetheless evaluated the
opinion she offered and concluded it was entitled to little weight. (R. 84-85). The ALJ based her
determination on the following factors: (1) Ms. Darkowski' s opinion was inconsistent with other
medical evidence which the ALJ identified by extensive citation to the record; and (2) Ms.
Darkowski's opinion regarding plaintiff's limitations applied prior to the time period she treated
plaintiff, which the ALJ found undermined its validity. (R. 84).
Not only did the ALJ consider Ms. Darkowski's opinion as required by SSR 06-03p and
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specify that it was entitled to little weight, the ALJ also provided sufficient explanation to ensure that
a subsequent reviewer could follow her reasoning. For these reasons, we find no error in the ALJ's
consideration and evaluation of Ms. Darkowski's opinion.
In sum, after carefully and methodically considering the medical evidence in this case, the
ALJ determined that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. The ALl's findings
and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence and are not otherwise erroneous. Therefore,
the decision ofthe Acting Commissioner must be affirmed.
~~
Gustave Diamond
United States District Judge
cc:
Robert W. Gillikin, Esq.
Rutter Mills, LLP
160 W. Brambleton Ave.
Norfolk, VA 23510
Colin Callahan
Assistant U.S. Attorney
700 Grant Street
Suite 4000
Pittsburgh, P A 15219
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