GALLICK v. COLVIN
Filing
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OPINION and ORDER denying 6 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 8 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 4/18/16. (slh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN GALLICK, III,
Plaintiff,
-vsCAROLYN W. COLVIN,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 15-919
AMBROSE, Senior District Judge
OPINION
Pending before the court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 6 and
8). Both parties have filed Briefs in Support of their Motions. (ECF Nos. 7 and 9). After careful
consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based on my Opinion set forth below, I am
denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 6) and granting Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 8).
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brought this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security (ACommissioner@) denying his application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”)
pursuant to the Social Security Act (AAct@). Plaintiff filed his application alleging he had been
disabled since July 14, 2010. (ECF No. 4-5, p. 2). Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), Leslie
Perry-Dowdell, held a hearing on September 26, 2013. (ECF No. 4-2, p. 42-66). On November
25, 2013, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. (ECF No. 4-2, pp. 26-37).
After exhausting all administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed the instant action with this
court. The parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (Docket Nos. 6 and 8).
The issues are now ripe for review.
II.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
A.
Standard of Review
The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence exists in
the record to support the Commissioner=s decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir.
1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as Amore than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.@ Ventura v. Shalala, 55
F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995), quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
Additionally, the Commissioner=s findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are
conclusive. 42 U.S.C. '405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). A
district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner=s decision or re-weigh the
evidence of record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Where the ALJ's
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if
the court would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360
(3d Cir. 1999). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, however,
the district court must review the record as a whole. See, 5 U.S.C. '706.
To be eligible for social security benefits, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he cannot
engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. '423(d)(1)(A); Brewster v. Heckler,
786 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986).
The Commissioner has provided the ALJ with a five-step sequential analysis to use
when evaluating the disabled status of each claimant. 20 C.F.R. '404.1520(a). The ALJ must
determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not,
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a severe impairment,
whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P., appx. 1; (4) if the
impairment does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether the claimant=s impairments
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prevent him from performing his past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of
performing his past relevant work, whether he can perform any other work which exists in the
national economy, in light of his age, education, work experience and residual functional
capacity. 20 C.F.R. '404.1520. The claimant carries the initial burden of demonstrating by
medical evidence that he is unable to return to his previous employment (steps 1-4).
Dobrowolsky, 606 F.2d at 406. Once the claimant meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts
to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in alternative substantial gainful
activity (step 5). Id.
A district court, after reviewing the entire record may affirm, modify, or reverse the
decision with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris, 745
F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1984).
C.
Activities of Daily Living
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred in considering his activities of daily living (“ADLs”).
(ECF No. 7, pp. 7-8). Specifically, he suggests that the ALJ “impermissibly equated Claimant’s
ability to do daily activities with the ability to perform substantial gainful activity.”
Id. at 8.
Contrary to Plaintiff’s position, I find the ALJ did not equate his ability to do daily activities with
the ability to perform substantial gainful activity. See, ECF No. 4-2, pp. 26-32. If the ALJ had
equated his ability to do daily activities with substantial gainful activity, then the ALJ would have
found Plaintiff not disabled at step 1 and the analysis would have ended there. As the ALJ
noted, “[a]t step one, the undersigned must determine whether the claimant is engaging in
substantial gainful activity….If an individual engages in SGA, he is not disabled, regardless of
how severe his physical or mental impairments are and regardless of his age, education, and
work experience. If the individual is not engaging in SGA, the analysis proceeds to the second
step.” (ECF No. 4-2, p. 27). The ALJ’s analysis did not end at step 1. See, ECF No. 14-2, pp.
26-37.
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Additionally, an ALJ is required to consider, inter alia, a plaintiff’s activities of daily living.
See, Social Security Ruling 96-7p and 20 C.F.R. §404.1529. In this case, the ALJ did exactly
that. (ECF No. 4-2, pp. 26-37). After a review of the record, I find the ALJ’s statements
regarding Plaintiff’s ADL to be supported substantial evidence.
(ECF No. 4-2, pp. 26-37).
Consequently, I find no error in this regard.
C.
Medical Opinion Evidence
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred in assessing the medical opinion evidence as it
relates to four doctors (Drs. Holets, Michael, Urrea and Crabtree) when she determined his
residual functional capacity (RFC”).1 (ECF No. 7, pp. 8-11). The amount of weight accorded to
medical opinions is well-established. Generally, the ALJ will give more weight to the opinion of a
source who has examined the claimant than to a non-examining source. 20 C.F.R. §
416.927(c)(1). In addition, the ALJ generally will give more weight to opinions from a treating
physician, “since these sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a
detailed, longitudinal picture of [a claimant’s] medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique
perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings
alone or from reports of individual examinations, such as consultative examinations or brief
hospitalizations.” Id. § 416.927(c)(2). If the ALJ finds that “a treating source’s opinion on the
issue(s) of the nature and severity of [a claimant’s] impairment(s) is well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other
substantial evidence [of] record,” he must give that opinion controlling weight. Id. Also, “the
more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight [the ALJ generally]
will give to that opinion.” Id. § 416.927(c)(4).
In the event of conflicting medical evidence, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
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RFC refers to the most a claimant can still do despite his/her limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a),
416.945(a). The assessment must be based upon all of the relevant evidence, including the medical
records, medical source opinions, and the individual’s subjective allegations and description of his own
limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a).
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has explained:
“A cardinal principle guiding disability determinations is that the ALJ accord
treating physicians’ reports great weight, especially ‘when their opinions reflect
expert judgment based on continuing observation of the patient’s condition over a
prolonged period of time.’” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000)
(quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999)). However, “where .
. . the opinion of a treating physician conflicts with that of a non-treating, nonexamining physician, the ALJ may choose whom to credit” and may reject the
treating physician’s assessment if such rejection is based on contradictory
medical evidence. Id. Similarly, under 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2), the opinion of a
treating physician is to be given controlling weight only when it is well-supported
by medical evidence and is consistent with other evidence in the record.
Becker v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., No. 10-2517, 2010 WL 5078238, at *5 (3d Cir. Dec.
14, 2010). Although the ALJ may choose whom to credit when faced with a conflict, he “cannot
reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.” Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Security, 577
F.3d 500, 505 (3d Cir. 2009).
With regard to Dr. Holets, Plaintiff concludes that the ALJ erred in rejecting Dr. Holets’
opinion in favor of the opinion of the non-examining agency medical consultant. (ECF No. 7, pp.
8-9). The entirety of Plaintiff’s argument in support thereof is just a summary of Dr. Holets’
opinion.
Id. at 9. To be clear, the standard is not whether there is evidence to establish
Plaintiff’s position but, rather, is whether there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s
finding. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir. 1989). Thus, this support for Plaintiff’s
argument is misplaced and cannot serve as the basis for remand.
Dr. Michael is Plaintiff’s treating physician.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred
discounting his opinion based on the rationale that Dr. Michael’s opinion was unclear. (ECF No.
7, pp. 9-10).
Plaintiff also suggests that the ALJ erred in rejecting Dr. Michael’s opinion
regarding the sitting, standing and walking limitations because Plaintiff says those limitations set
by Dr. Michael are clear. Id. After a review of the record, I disagree.
Dr. Michael provided a medical source statement. (ECF No. 4-11, pp. 36-37). Therein,
Dr. Michael opined that Plaintiff could frequently lift and carry 20, 25, 50 and 100 pounds. Id at
36. He also opined that Plaintiff could only occasionally lift and carry 2-3 and 10 pounds.
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Id.
The ALJ noted that this appears to be “internally inconsistent and the doctor’s actual intentions
regarding the claimant’s weight limits are unclear.” (ECF No. 4-2, p. 33). The ALJ give Dr.
Michael’s opinion little weight as it relates to Plaintiff’s lifting and carrying capacity because it
was muddled. Id. After a review of the form, I agree with the ALJ that the Dr. Michael’s
responses are inconsistent, as well as, unclear and muddled as they relate to Plaintiff’s ability to
lift and carry. (ECF No. 4-11, p. 36). These reasons are appropriate, sufficiently explained and
supported by substantial evidence of record. (ECF No. 4-2, pp. 33-34); 20 C.F.R. §404.1527
(discussing the evaluation of medical opinions). Therefore, I find no error in this regard on the
part of the ALJ.
In the alternative, Plaintiff concludes that “even if the lifting/carrying limitations are
unclear, that is not sufficient [a] reason to reject the doctor’s opinion regarding the sitting,
standing and walking limitations, which were clear and would preclude medium work.” (ECF
No. 7, p. 10).
A review of the record reveals, however, that the ALJ did not reject the sitting,
standing and walking limitations opined by Dr. Michael because they were unclear. See, ECF
No. 4-2, pp. 33-34. Rather, the ALJ specifically gave Dr. Michael’s opinion regarding sitting,
standing and walking limitations little weight because they were not “supported by the objective
evidence or record, including the functional capacity evaluation.” (ECF No. 4-2, p. 34). This is
an appropriate reason to discount opinion evidence.
20 C.F.R. §404.1527 (discussing the
evaluation of medical opinions). Consequently, I find no merit to Plaintiff’s argument in this
regard.
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ impermissibly rejected the opinion of Dr. Urrea,
Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist. (ECF No. 7, pp. 10-11). In support thereof, Plaintiff first suggests
that Dr. Urrea’s opinion was entitled to great weight because he was his treating psychiatrist.
Id. at p. 10. Contrary to Plaintiff’s position, and as set forth more fully above, a treating doctor’s
opinion is only entitled to controlling weight if it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical
and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence
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of record. 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(2). When the opinion of a treating physician conflicts with
that of a non-treating, non-examining physician, the ALJ may choose whom to credit and may
reject the treating physician’s assessment if such rejection is based on contradictory medical
evidence. Becker, 2010 WL 5078238, at *5.
opinions.
In this case, there were conflicting medical
Therefore, contrary to Plaintiff’s position, Dr. Urrea’s opinion was not entitled to
controlling weight simply because he was a treating doctor. Rather, the ALJ was required to
weigh the medical evidence to determine the weight of Dr. Urrea’s opinion, which the ALJ did.
Then, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in giving the opinion of Dr. Urrea some weight
because “she again stated that Claimant’s ability to engage in certain activities as traveling and
shopping, were not consistent with Dr. Urrea’s opinion.” (ECF No. 7, p. 10). Similarly, Plaintiff
argues that the ALJ erred in giving the opinion of Dr. Crabtree only some weight based on
Plaintiff’s ADLs. (ECF No. 7, p. 11). To that end, Plaintiff again states that “these activities
have no bearing on Claimant’s ability to engage in full time employment.” Id. at p. 11.
I
disagree. As set forth above, ADL are relevant and it is completely appropriate for an ALJ to
consider a plaintiff’s ADL in weighing evidence and determining the RFC. See, SSR 96-7p and
20 C.F.R. §404.1529. Consequently, I find no error in this regard.
An appropriate order shall follow.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN GALLICK, III,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
-vsCAROLYN W. COLVIN,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 15-919
AMBROSE, Senior District Judge
ORDER OF COURT
THEREFORE, this 18th day of April, 2016, it is ordered that Plaintiff=s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Docket No. 6) is denied and Defendant=s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Docket No. 8) is granted.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Donetta W. Ambrose
Donetta W. Ambrose
United States Senior District Judge
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