COULTER v. COULTER

Filing 8

ORDER DISMISSING CASE. This case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for want of subject matter jurisdiction, and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5 ) is DENIED AS MOOT. Signed by Judge Cathy Bissoon on 4/22/16. (dcd) Staff note: a copy of this Order was sent today, via First-Class U.S. Mail, to Plaintiff's address of record.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JEAN COULTER,
Plaintiff,
v.
JAMES P. COULTER,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil Action No. 15-967
Judge Cathy Bissoon

ORDER DISMISSING CASE
Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. 3) to the Court’s Order to Show Cause is insufficient to carry
her burdens regarding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. See Order to Show Cause
dated Aug. 18, 2015 (Doc. 2, hereinafter “the SCO”). The analyses in the SCO hereby are
incorporated into this Order, as if fully restated.
The Court already has held that Plaintiff is subject to a presumption in favor of an
established domicile (Pennsylvania) over a new one (New Jersey). Id. at 2. To demonstrate that
her domicile did, in fact, change, Plaintiff was required to show two things: that she has taken
up a true, fixed and permanent home and place of habitation outside of Pennsylvania; and that
she intends to stay there. See SCO at 1-2 (citing McCann v. Newman Irrevocable Trust,
458 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 2006)). Plaintiff’s Response, signed subject to the mandates of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, establishes neither.
As to her residency in New Jersey, Plaintiff explains to this Court -- whose locus, in her
view, falls outside “a genuine Metropolitan Area” -- how the greater-Philadelphia metropolitan

area should be understood. See Pl.’s Resp. at 1-3.1 In the course of her explanation, Plaintiff
makes clear that her current place of habitation is the greater-Philadelphia area, much of which,
of course, falls in Pennsylvania. See id. Indeed, Plaintiff represents herself as having “moved to
Philadelphia,” and she indicates that “the majority of [her] friends and in many cases, business
connections, are still based in the western [i.e., Pennsylvania] side of the river.” See id. at 2-3.
The Court understands the geography of Philadelphia, and the fact that Plaintiff
purportedly resides on the “New Jersey-side” of the city is not determinative of the domicile
inquiry.2 Rather, the appropriate inquiry is whether Plaintiff credibly has manifested her
intention of making New Jersey her true and fixed place of habitation. Her explanations
regarding the geographic fluidity of the greater-Philadelphia area do not establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that she is domiciled in New Jersey.
More importantly, Plaintiff’s written statements, again, signed subject to the mandates of
Rule 11, make abundantly clear that she does not view her New Jersey-residence as a place of
permanent habitation. Rather, her Response notes, not once but twice, that she is “planning
another [geographic] move in the relatively near future.” Compare id. at 3 and id. at 4
(contemplating “[her] next move”) with McCann at 286 (an individual’s true domicile is
“[a] fixed and permanent home and place of habitation, . . . the place to which, whenever [she]
is absent, [she] has the intention of returning”). Whether Plaintiff intends to move, or since has
moved, to Pennsylvania, New Jersey or any other state is immaterial. What matters is that
Plaintiff, by her own admission, does not view her current residence as a fixed and permanent
Although immaterial to the Court’s legal analyses, the undersigned is no stranger to major
metropolitan areas, having been born and raised in Brooklyn, New York. In addition, the notion
of a multi-state area is not foreign to Pittsburgh natives, as the city is located near a tri-state area
of its own, encompassing Pennsylvania, Ohio and West Virginia.
2
The Court says “purportedly,” because Plaintiff refuses to identify an address-of-residence in
New Jersey. See Pl.’s Resp.
1

2

home and place of habitation. Under the circumstances, Plaintiff has not overcome the
presumption in favor of her continued-domicile in Pennsylvania, nor has she carried her burden
of persuasion as the proponent of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. 3
In light of the foregoing, this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for want of
subject matter jurisdiction, and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5) is DENIED AS
MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

April 22, 2016

s\Cathy Bissoon
Cathy Bissoon
United States District Judge

cc (via First-Class U.S. mail):
Jean Coulter
3000 Chestnut Street
PO Box 8094
Philadephia, PA 19101

Although Plaintiff claims that Defendant, her brother, has argued in state court that she is a
New Jersey resident, this is immaterial for the purposes of this Court’s domicile analyses.
Compare Resp. at 6 with McCann. That Plaintiff’s drivers license, health insurance and library
cards were issued by, and/or are affiliated with, New Jersey is inapposite, as is her allegedly
paying income taxes there. Cf. id. at 4-5. These incidents do not contradict Plaintiff’s clear
assertion that she is a resident of the greater-Philadelphia area; that her residency on the “[east]
side of the river” is, under her own reasoning, happenstance; and that her clear and unequivocal
intention is to vacate her current residence, thereby defeating any suggestion of permanency.
Finally, the Court notes that an examination of the objective indicia of domicile, as listed in the
SCO, is rendered superfluous by Plaintiff’s seemingly inadvertent admissions-against-interest
as relates to subject matter jurisdiction. Even were the Court to consider the enumerated factors,
a weighing of them would, at best, result in a “push.” Factor (1) is neutral (given Plaintiff’s
anticipated relocation); factors (2), (3) and (9) favor Pennsylvania (given Plaintiff’s admission
that most of her contacts are on the Pennsylvania-side of the river); factors (4) and (7) are,
based on the contents of Plaintiff’s Response, inapplicable; and factors (5), (6) and (8) favor
New Jersey. A weighing of these factors, in the Court’s view, does not show Plaintiff to have
satisfied her burden under the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. As the Court already has
explained, however, these discussions are beside the point, given Plaintiff’s admissions of nonpermanency and her intention to move.
3

3