MAYON v. WETZEL et al

Filing 72

MEMORANDUM OPINION re 45 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by JOHN WETZEL, MARK CAPPOZZA, 47 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by COLIN FISCHETTI, GAUDENZIA, INC., 62 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by LEO L. DUNN, and DENYING 70 MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION filed by MICKY MAYON. Signed by Magistrate Judge Cynthia Reed Eddy on 4/3/2017. (ajt)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MICKY MAYON,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN WETZEL, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 2: 15-cv-1003
United States Magistrate Judge
Cynthia Reed Eddy

MEMORANDUM OPINION1
I. INTRODUCTION
Presently before the Court is Defendants Mark Cappozza, Leo Dunn and John Wetzel’s
Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 45, 62] and Defendants Colin Fischetti and Gaudenzia, Inc.’s
Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 47]. The motions are fully briefed and ripe for disposition. For the
reasons that follow, said motions are GRANTED and Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with
prejudice.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Micky Mayon (“Plaintiff” or “Mayon”) a prisoner presently confined at State
Correctional Institution (“SCI”) at Fayette and proceeding pro se, initiated this civil rights action
on August 8, 2015. [ECF Nos. 1, 4]. Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss [ECF Nos. 29, 35].
Plaintiff responded to the motions by filing an Amended Complaint and a “Notice,”
supplementing the Amended Complaint [ECF Nos. 41, 42].

Defendants filed Motions to

Dismiss the Amended Complaint [ECF Nos. 45, 47] to which Plaintiff filed an Omnibus
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All parties have consented to jurisdiction before a United States Magistrate Judge;
therefore the Court has the authority to decide dispositive motions, and to eventually enter final
judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636, et seq.

1

Response [ECF No. 59]. On February 6, 2017, the Court ordered supplemental briefing [ECF
no. 65], which the parties provided. [ECF Nos. 66, 67, 70].
All defendants are named solely in their official capacities and Plaintiff seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief only. [ECF Nos. 41, ¶¶ 1- 5, 64, 65; 42].
Mayon is presently a Pennsylvania state prisoner incarcerated at the State Correctional
Institution (“SCI”) at Fayette. The allegations which give rise to this Complaint occurred while
Mayon was incarcerated at SCI-Pittsburgh, prior to his transfer to SCI-Fayette in March 2014.
According to Plaintiff, while incarcerated at SCI-Pittsburgh, in order to qualify for parole,
Mayon entered a rehabilitative program called Therapeutic Community (“T.C.”). He alleges that
he was denied parole because he did not survive T.C.2 Mayon refers to T.C. as “The Pogroms.”
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Mayon alleges that participation in T.C. violates his First Amendment rights, the Eighth

Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000cc-2000cc-5. He alleges that there is nothing rehabilitative about T.C. and that his
participation in T.C. violates his beliefs because, inter alia:
At an early age, Plaintiff was inoculated with a healthy
skepticism of big oppressive governments (Revelation 13:1-9) and
other Christian tenets like tattling is a sin (II Timothy 3:1-4,
Proverbs 30:10-14). Plaintiff retains these beliefs to this day.
Without regard for Plaintiff or his beliefs, the Defendants forced
him to say and do the reverse.
[ECF No. 41, ¶ 30].

2

Plaintiff brought a similar claim in another lawsuit filed with this Court at 2:14-CV-01203 in
which the Court granted summary judgment to defendants on Plaintiff’s claim that he was denied
parole due to a negative parole recommendation due to Plaintiff’s failure to administratively
exhaust his grievances.
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Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines pogrom as “an organized massacre of helpless people;
specifically: such a massacre of Jews.” The Court does not find this reference appropriate,
amusing or clever and will not use the term.
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III.

Standards of Review
1. Pro Se Litigants
Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than more formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972). As such, a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be construed liberally,
Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 243 (3d Cir. 2002), so “as to do substantial justice.”
Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). In other words, if the
court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it
should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax
and sentence construction, or the litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v.
MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552,
555 (3d Cir.1969) (petition prepared by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read
“with a measure of tolerance”). Notwithstanding this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved
of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See, e.g., Taylor
v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002). Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant,
this Court may consider facts and make inferences where it is appropriate.
2. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
The applicable inquiry under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is well settled.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a complaint may be dismissed for “failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

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plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint that merely alleges entitlement to relief,
without alleging facts that show entitlement, must be dismissed. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,
578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). This “‘does not impose a probability requirement at the
pleading stage,’ but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence of’ the necessary elements.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515
F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Nevertheless, the court need
not accept as true “unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences,” Doug Grant, Inc. v.
Great Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d 173, 183–84 (3d Cir. 2000), or the plaintiff's “bald assertions”
or “legal conclusions,” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court's role is limited to determining
whether a plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of his claims. See Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). The court does not consider whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail.
See id. A defendant bears the burden of establishing that a plaintiff's complaint fails to state a
claim. See Gould Elecs. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000).
IV. DISCUSSION
The Court must begin by addressing whether this case, or any aspect of the relief
requested by Plaintiff, has become moot. See Donovan ex rel. Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area
Sch. Bd., 336 F.3d 211, 216 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that the issue of mootness must be
addressed sua sponte because it affects the court’s Article III jurisdiction). “If developments
occur during the course of adjudication that eliminate a plaintiff’s personal stake in the outcome
of a suit or prevent a court from being able to grant the requested relief, the case must be
dismissed as moot.” Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-699 (3d Cir. 1996).

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The Plaintiff sued the Defendants in their official capacity seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief, requesting that the court declare that “the acts and omissions described herein
violated Plaintiff’s rights under the constitution and laws of the United States.” He also requests
[a] preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining Defendants John Wetzel, Mark Cappozza,
Gaudenzia Inc., and Colin Fischeti from operating [T.C].; and enjoining Defendant Leo Dunn
from denying parole unless prisoners survive [T.C.].” [ECF No. 41 ¶¶ 64, 65]. All of Plaintiff’s
claims in this lawsuit arise from incidents which allegedly occurred while he was incarcerated at
SCI-Pittsburgh. He was transferred to SCI-Fayette after the incidents and prior to filing this
lawsuit. There is nothing in the Amended Complaint to suggest there is a reasonable probability
of Plaintiff’s return to SCI-Pittsburgh.
In general, an inmate’s claim for injunctive and declaratory relief becomes moot on his
release from or transfer from the prison that was the location of the alleged violation. Cobb v.
Yost, 342 Fed. App’x 858, 859 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d
Cir. 2003) (“An inmate’s transfer from the facility complained of generally moots the equitable
and declaratory claims.”). A prisoner lacks standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief if he
is no longer subject to the alleged conditions he attempts to challenge. See Weaver v. Wilcox,
640 F.2d 22, 27 n. 13 (3d Cir. 1981) (prisoner’s transfer from the prison moots claim for
injunctive relief and declaratory relief with respect to prison conditions). The mootness doctrine
recognizes a fundamental truth in litigation: “[i]f developments occur the course of adjudication
that eliminates a plaintiff’s personal stake in the outcome of a suit or prevent a court from being
able to grant the request relief, the case must be dismissed as moot” Blaciak v. Allegheny
Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1996). While there is a “narrow exception” when a
case presents a question capable of repetition yet evading review, Plaintiff does not meet this

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narrow exception, as “[s]peculation that [Plaintiff] could return to prison does not overcome the
mootness doctrine.”

Cobb v. Yost, 342 Fed. App’x 858, 859 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Abdul-

Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 206 (3d Cir. 1993)).
Further, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to bring this action on behalf of other prisoners
currently housed in SCI-Pittsburgh or other prisons in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, he
does not have standing to do so. Courts have consistently held that an inmate does not have
standing to sue on behalf of other prisoners. Weaver, supra. at 22. A prisoner must allege a
personal loss and seek to vindicate a deprivation of his own constitutional rights, not others. See
Singleton v. Wolff, 528 U.S. 106 (1976).
Accordingly, all of Plaintiff’s claims in the amended complaint against Defendants in
their official capacity for injunctive and declaratory relief are moot by virtue of his transfer from
SCI-Pittsburgh, and he does not have standing under Article III of the Constitution to assert such
claims on behalf of other inmates at SCI-Pittsburgh, or elsewhere. To the extent that Plaintiff
alleges that he is subject to the T.C. Program at SCI Fayette, he cannot supplement his claims
through briefing and there are no such factual allegations in this complaint regarding T.C. at SCI
Fayette, nor is SCI Fayette a party to this action and it is inappropriate for the court to consider
unpleaded allegations against non-parties which are separate and independent from the claims in
the present complaint. See Pa. ex rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir.1988).
Lastly, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to bring a class action for his claims, it is wellestablished that an individual proceeding pro se cannot adequately represent the interests of the
class, particularly where he has been transferred from the institution he seeks to recover from,
and his motion for class certification is denied. See e.g., Alexander v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 160
F. App'x 249, 249 n. 1 (3d Cir.2005) (citing Oxedine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th

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Cir.1975)).
V.

CONCLUSION
If a civil rights complaint is subject to 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district must permit a curative

amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Alston v. Parker, 363
F.3d 299, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). A district court must provide the plaintiff with this opportunity
even if the plaintiff does not seek leave to amend. Id.
For the reasons discussed supra, Plaintiff will not be granted leave to amend his
Amended Complaint, as it would be futile.
Therefore, for the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF No. 45, 47
and 62) are GRANTED and this case is dismissed, with prejudice.
An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: April 3, 2017
s/Cynthia Reed Eddy
Cynthia Reed Eddy
United States Magistrate Judge
cc:

MICKY MAYON, JT - 8095
SCI Fayette
P.O. Box 9999
LaBelle, PA 15450-0999
(via U.S. First Class Mail)
Sandra A. Kozlowski
Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General
(via ECF electronic notification)
Erin J. Dolfi
Robb Leonard Mulvihill LLP
(via ECF electronic notification)
Amy L. Vanderveen
Robb Leonard Mulvihill LLP
(via ECF electronic notification)
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