NAVIGLIA v. THE BOROUGH OF SPRINGDALE et al
Filing
32
MEMORANDUM OPINION re 19 Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint filed by GENE POLSENELLI, KENNETH LLOYD, JASON FRY, JOHN MOLNAR, MIKE ZIENCIK, THE BOROUGH OF SPRINGDALE, FRANK FORBES, JULIO F. MEDEIROS, III. Signed by Magistrate Judge Cynthia Reed Eddy on 8/16/2016. (bap)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOSEPH T. NAVIGLIA,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE BOROUGH OF SPRINGDALE,
JASON FRY, JOHN MOLNAR, FRANK
FORBES, GENE POLSENELLI, MIKE
ZIENCIK, KENNETH LLOYD, and
JULIO F. MEDEIROS, III,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Civil Action No. 15-1029
United States Magistrate Judge
Cynthia Reed Eddy
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Cynthia Reed Eddy, United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff Joseph T. Naviglia (“Plaintiff”) initiated this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 asserting claims for First Amendment retaliation and Fourteenth Amendment procedural
due process, as well as claim for conspiracy under § 1985(3),2 against the following Defendants:
the Borough of Springdale (“Borough”); several of the Borough’s Councilmen: Jason Fry, John
Molnar, Frank Forbes, Gene Polsenelli, Mike Ziencik (collectively “Councilmen”); the
Borough’s Mayor Kenneth Lloyd; and the Borough’s former Chief of Police Julio F. Medeiros,
III. All of these Defendants have jointly filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint in its
1
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have voluntarily consented to have the undersigned
conduct any and all proceedings herein, including the authority to enter final judgment, with direct review
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. ECF Nos. 23, 31.
2
The amended complaint does not specifically identify this conspiracy claim as being asserted under §
1985(3). However, Defendants treat it as such, and in Plaintiff’s response in opposition to Defendants’
motion to dismiss, Plaintiff asserts that the amended complaint “has defined a conspiracy pursuant to
Farber.” Although Plaintiff does not provide any citation, or identify the defendant or the Court in that
case, he is presumably referring to Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2006), which
analyzed a § 1985(3) conspiracy claim. Accordingly, the Court will likewise treat this conspiracy claim
as being asserted under § 1985(3).
1
entirety. The motion has been fully briefed by the parties and is ripe for disposition. For the
reasons that follow, this motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
I.
Factual Allegations3
Plaintiff began his career in law enforcement as a police officer in 1986 with the
Borough. Ten years later, in 1996, he became the Borough’s Chief of Police. In July of 2012,
Plaintiff was subpoenaed to testify before a federal grand jury regarding the actions of one of his
subordinate police officers, Sergeant Mark E. Thom, Jr. (“Thom”). Thom was accused of
engaging in excessive force during an arrest when he used his stun gun upon a handcuffed
suspect in his patrol car. Plaintiff consulted with the FBI about its investigation and then advised
the Councilmen that he was going to testify against Thom.
The general response of the
Councilmen was disapproval. According to the amended complaint, the Councilmen decided not
to investigate or suspend Thom notwithstanding their knowledge of the allegations against Thom
and their knowledge that Thom was the subject of a grand jury investigation.
Plaintiff testified against Thom before the federal grand jury on July 25, 2012. He avers
that his testimony was in the “public interest.” In August 2012, Plaintiff complied with a grand
jury subpoena to provide documents relating to Thom and the Borough. During this time period
in which the documents were being produced, the Councilmen held a meeting with Plaintiff
wherein they cautioned him to support Thom while responding to the grand jury investigation.
Plaintiff rebuffed this caution and informed them that he would only respond accurately and
truthfully in the matter.
Thom continued working as an active sergeant under Plaintiff during the pendency of the
grand jury investigation. Thom was indicted by the grand jury for criminal charges involving
3
At the motion to dismiss stage, all of the well-pleaded facts are accepted as true and all reasonable
inferences are drawn in a light most favorable to Plaintiff.
2
civil rights violations in February 2013. After Thom was indicted, the Councilmen “finally”
placed Thom on administrative leave. Thom pled guilty to the civil rights violation in March
2013.
In April 2013, Plaintiff also began working for East Deer Township as a part-time police
officer. He retired as the Borough’s Chief of Police on May 31, 2013 with the understanding
with Council that he would remain an active part-time police officer for the Borough.
In June 2013, while Thom was awaiting sentencing, the Borough provided Thom with a
new job with the Borough road crew, which Plaintiff opposed. Plaintiff demonstrated his
opposition by distributing flyers against Thom’s new position. Certain Defendant Councilmen –
Fry, Molnar, and Ziencik – verbally disciplined Plaintiff for distributing the flyers. The amended
complaint alleges that a citizen, Paul Powell, had also applied for that road crew position.
Powell objected that the road crew position was given to a felon and alleged that Thom received
the job due to favoritism. The amended complaint asserts that in the past, Thom would have
been disqualified from being hired for this position due to his criminal record. More than four
months later, on October 30, 2013, Defendant Medeiros became the Borough’s Chief of Police.
Thom was sentenced by the Honorable Mark R. Hornak of this Court on January 16,
2014. During Thom’s sentencing, Judge Hornak read a letter written by Plaintiff. The letter
“brought to light Defendant Springdale Councilmen covering for Thom and retaliating against
[Plaintiff] for his prior cooperation with the FBI.” That same day, the Pittsburgh local news
station WTAE televised Plaintiff’s verbal complaints about Thom and the Borough. Judge
Hornak sentenced Thom to one year and one day in jail, and told Thom that he would “never
wear a badge again.”
Also in January 2014, Defendant Lloyd became the Mayor of the Borough.
3
The
complaint avers that while the Mayor and the Chief of Police directly supervise the police
department, they are under the control of the Councilmen Defendants. Plaintiff contends that as
a result of testifying against Thom and publicly objecting to his employment in the road crew,
Plaintiff’s hours and wages were greatly reduced as a part-time police officer. On March 13,
2014, Mayor Lloyd called Plaintiff to work the following day, which turned out to be the last day
that Plaintiff would work as a part-time officer for the Borough, notwithstanding that the Mayor
had previously promised Plaintiff that regular summer work would be available. That same day,
Councilman Ziencik, who is also alleged to be the Head Chair of Public Safety, publicly
criticized Plaintiff’s loyalty to the Borough during a public meeting. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants have removed him from the schedule altogether because of Plaintiff’s actions in
speaking out against Thom.
In June 2014, Medeiros publicly accused Plaintiff of mishandling the evidence room via
an article that was published in the Valley News Dispatch. Plaintiff publicly responded to this
accusation.
On February 13, 2015, Medeiros met with Plaintiff and was aggressive during the
meeting. Medeiros told Plaintiff that he was upset with Plaintiff appearing at a public session of
Borough Council wherein Plaintiff supported his brother, who was the Springdale Township
Chief of Police, as a canine officer. Medeiros wanted to replace Plaintiff’s brother with a
different canine officer. On March 1, 2015, Medeiros e-mailed Plaintiff and inquired as to
whether Plaintiff wanted to remain certified for part-time police officer employment with the
Borough and whether Medeiros should apply for Plaintiff’s Municipal Police Training (“MPT”)
card. Plaintiff advised Medeiros that he wanted to remain an officer, wanted work, and then
provided Medeiros with all the required information to remain an active part-time police officer.
4
Although the Borough had previously committed to pay for and endorse two classes for
eight hours each for Plaintiff, Medeiros sent a text message to Plaintiff stating that Council
President, Defendant Fry, put his updates on hold while he sought a legal opinion from the
Borough’s Solicitor. Plaintiff talked to the Solicitor on June 23, 2015 and was advised that
Medeiros told the Solicitor that Plaintiff was no longer a Borough police officer and that MPT
cards were already issued.
On July 1, 2015, Plaintiff appeared at a hearing before the Pennsylvania Liquor Control
Board. Medeiros was present to oppose Valentines Bar and Grille. Plaintiff testified in favor of
Valentines Bar and Grille and against Medeiros. On July 27, 2015, Plaintiff discovered that
Medeiros provided Plaintiff’s badge number to another officer, and Plaintiff was permanently
removed from the schedule and terminated.
The complaint alleges that in the summer of 2015, Plaintiff complained multiple times to
Mayor Lloyd and requested his MPT card, reinstatement, and/or a hearing pursuant to Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) and/or the applicable collective bargaining
agreement (“CBA”). Mayor Lloyd told Plaintiff that he was retired and that he would not be put
back on the schedule or receive a hearing of any kind. Plaintiff made similar complaints during
the summer of 2015 to the Borough Solicitor and Defendant Councilman Forbes (who is also
alleged to be head of personnel), however, never received any response. The amended complaint
alleges that Plaintiff was never disciplined; never given a pre-termination hearing; never received
any notice of the reasons he was removed from the schedule; and never had a chance to respond
before said adverse action was taken, notwithstanding the CBA requires “just cause” for a
termination.
Medeiros was terminated by the Borough as Chief of Police in August 2015 for failing to
5
follow call-off procedure and take a physical and psychological examination. However, in
contrast to Plaintiff’s termination, Medeiros was given a pre-termination hearing before he was
fired.
II.
Standard of Review
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prescribe a notice pleading standard in which a
plaintiff must come forward with “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
To satisfy this standard, the well-pleaded
factual content in the complaint must allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), and
also “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
To withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the
plaintiff need only allege sufficient facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will
uncover proof of the claims. Connelly v. Lane Cont. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016).
When analyzing a motion to dismiss, it is appropriate to separate the factual and legal elements
of the claim. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). The well-pleaded
facts are accepted as true, but legal conclusions may be disregarded. Id. at 210-11; see also
Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he court should identify
allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of
truth.”) (quotation and citation omitted). Next, a determination is made as to “whether the facts
alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’”
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211. This “plausibility” determination is “a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556
6
U.S. at 679.
III.
Discussion
1.
Section 1983 Claims
To state a viable § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must sufficiently plead that (1) the conduct
complained of was committed by a person acting under the color of state law, and (2) that said
conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States. See Groman v. Twp of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995).
“In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim against multiple defendants, a plaintiff must show that
each individual defendant violated his constitutional rights.” Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 430
F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2005).
“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal
involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of
respondeat superior.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (emphasis in
original). Therefore, “[t]he mere fact that a defendant is in a supervisory position is insufficient
to establish liability under Section 1983.” Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776, 782 (W.D.Pa.
2013).
Additionally, municipalities, like individuals, can be found liable for § 1983 claims.
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
However, a
municipality may not be found liable under a theory of respondeat superior, i.e., solely because
it employs a tortfeasor. Id. Rather, the complaint must contain well-pled allegations that a
municipal custom, practice, or policy caused the constitutional violation. Id. at 694. “To satisfy
the pleading standard, [the plaintiff] must identify a custom or policy, and specify exactly what
the custom or policy was.” McTernan v. City of York, Pa., 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009)
(citing Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008)). “Policy is made when a
7
‘decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish a municipal policy with respect to the
action’ issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.” Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d
1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986). “A
course of conduct is considered to be a ‘custom’ when, though not authorized by law, ‘such
practices of state officials [are] so permanent and well settled’ as to virtually constitute law.” Id.
(quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690). Custom may also be established by evidence of knowledge
and acquiescence. Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996).
Additionally, “it is a key element of a Monell claim” that the plaintiff identify the
individual(s) with final policymaking authority. Santiago, 629 F.3d at 135 & nn. 10, 11. State
law determines whether an individual has final policymaking authority, Mulholland v. Gov’t
Cty. of Berks, Pa., 706 F.3d 227, 237 (3d Cir. 2013), and we may not “assum[e] that municipal
policymaking authority lies somewhere other than where the applicable law purports to put it,”
City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 126 (1988). “In looking to state law, a court must
determine which official has final, unreviewable discretion to make a decision or to take an
action.” Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1481.
The amended complaint does not identify a Borough policy or a custom that caused any
of Plaintiff’s alleged constitutional deprivations. Nor does it allege that any of the individuals
named therein were final policymakers acting on behalf of the Borough in that capacity. Instead,
it vaguely asserts that the Borough took unlawful actions against Plaintiff in retaliation for his
protected conduct and denied him of a pre-termination hearing. It also nebulously asserts that
the Borough has taken similar actions in the past against other certain police officers, although it
fails to offer any details as to which Borough officials participated in said actions or what the
surrounding circumstances were. These threadbare, conclusory allegations are insufficient to
8
state a claim for municipal liability as they do not provide a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal that the Borough had in place either policies or customs that violated
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Indeed, given that the amended complaint does not identify any municipal policies or
customs, and does not identify any policymakers with final unreviewable decisonmaking
authority, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the Borough. To hold otherwise would
impermissibly subject the Borough to liability based on the actions of the Borough’s
representatives, not the Borough itself. See Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 245-46
(3d Cir. 2006) (analyzing whether a borough official was a policymaker with final and
unreviewable authority); Ross v Borough of Dormont, 937 F.Supp.2d 638, 651-52 (W.D. Pa.
2013) (dismissing a municipal liability claim for failing to identify a policy or custom of the
borough). Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss the § 1983 claims against the Borough is
granted.4
The Court will also dismiss Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against the individual
Defendants.
Courts in the Third Circuit routinely dismiss § 1983 claims asserted against
individual defendants in their official capacity as being duplicative of a claim against the
municipality, as well as to prevent the docket from being unnecessarily cluttered. See, e.g., M.S.
ex rel. Hall v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist., 43 F.Supp.3d 412, 418-19 (M.D.Pa. 2014)
(collecting cases).
As such, the claims in the amended complaints against the individual
Defendants in their official capacities are hereby dismissed as duplicative. The Court will now
address both of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the individual Defendants in their individual
capacities.
There are no other claims asserted against the Borough, given that Plaintiff’s § 1985(3) conspiracy
claim only pertains to the individual Defendants.
4
9
The amended complaint first asserts that all of the individual Defendants violated
Plaintiff’s rights under the First Amendment in retaliation for Plaintiff’s protected activity. In
order to plead a retaliation claim under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must allege: (1)
constitutionally protected conduct, (2) retaliatory action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary
firmness from exercising constitutional rights, and (3) a causal link between the constitutionally
protected conduct and the retaliatory action. Thomas v. Independence Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 296
(3d Cir. 2006).
As Defendants do not challenge whether Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged
protected conduct, the Court will, for purposes of this motion, assume that Plaintiff has satisfied
the first factor, which is a question of law. See Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 241
(3d Cir. 2006). Defendants instead contend that this claim is deficient because the amended
complaint does not satisfy the second and third factors, both of which are questions of fact. See
Curinga v. City of Clariton, 357 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2004).
With regard to Defendants Forbes, Polsenelli, and Llyod, Defendants claim that the
amended complaint does not aver with specificity that they directly participated in or acquiesced
to terminating Plaintiff’s employment for speaking out against Thom. Although the amended
complaint is not a model of clarity and at times groups the actions of individual Defendants
together, the Court finds that when accepting all of the well-pled allegations as true and drawing
all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the amended complaint contains
sufficient factual allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover proof
of the personal involvement of each of these Defendants. If it is uncovered through discovery
that any of these Defendants did not retaliate against Plaintiff in violation of the First
Amendment, however, Defendants may file a motion for summary judgment at the appropriate
time.
10
With regard to Defendants Fry, Molnar, and Ziencik, Defendants assert that their alleged
retaliatory actions of verbally disciplining Plaintiff for distributing flyers and publicly criticizing
and questioning Plaintiff’s loyalty to the Borough were de minimus, and thus not sufficient to
deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights. See McKee v. Hart,
436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006). Defendants similarly claim that Defendant Medeiros’ actions
of publicly accusing Plaintiff of mishandling the evidence room and expressing disagreement
with Plaintiff’s support of his brother for canine officer were merely de minimus. However, the
Court notes that the amended complaint also alleges that all of these individuals collectively
acted to demote and ultimately terminate Plaintiff, which clearly is sufficient to deter a person of
ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights. Therefore, Defendants have failed to
demonstrate that the amended complaint has not satisfied the second factor of this claim.5
Further, this factual dispute, which must be resolved in favor of Plaintiff at this time, precludes a
finding that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for allegedly taking actions to demote
and terminate Plaintiff for engaging in protected conduct.
The amended complaint also asserts that these individuals violated Plaintiff’s procedural
due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment when he was not given a pre-termination
Loudermill hearing. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that a State may not “deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1.
“A procedural due process claim is subject to a two-stage inquiry: (1) whether the plaintiff has a
5
The Court also notes that Defendants argue that the amended complaint does not satisfy the third factor
– causal relationship – against Medeiros because Plaintiff’s compliance with the grand jury investigation
and his distribution of flyers occurred before Medeiros became Chief of Police. However, in making this
argument, Defendants ignore that the amended complaint also alleges that Plaintiff publicly supported his
brother as canine officer when Medeiros was Chief and also testified against Medeiros regarding
Valentines Bar and Grille. Defendants have not challenged whether either of these actions constituted
protected conduct. Assuming for purposes of this motion only that this was protected conduct, a fair
reading of the complaint leads to the reasonable inference that Medeiros took actions to demote and
terminate Plaintiff based on this conduct.
11
property interest protected by procedural due process, and (2) what procedures constitute due
process of law.” Schmidt v. Creedon, 639 F.3d 587, 595 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation and internal
marks omitted). Defendants do not dispute in their motion that Plaintiff had a constitutionally
protected property interest in not being terminated from his position as a part-time police officer
without good cause.6 In Loudermill, the Supreme Court held that when an employee has a
protected property interest in continued employment, it is a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to terminate that employee before giving him “notice and opportunity for hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case.” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542. While the pre-termination
hearing is necessary, it “need not be elaborate.” Id. at 545. In this case, Plaintiff alleges that he
was terminated without ever having the benefit of a pre-termination hearing.
Defendants seek to dismiss this claim by arguing that Plaintiff did not properly exhaust
his administrative remedies under the applicable CBA prior to initiating this action.
This
argument fails, however, because “procedural due process requires a … pre-termination hearing
regardless of grievance procedures.” Sube v. City of Allentown, 974 F.Supp.2d 754, 763 (E.D.
Pa. 2013); see also Mariano v. Borough of Dickson City, 40 F.Supp.3d 411, 419 (M.D. Pa. 2014)
(“[E]ven if it were true that plaintiff failed to utilize the post-termination process afforded by the
CBA, he would still be entitled to challenge his pre-termination process.”). Therefore, the Court
rejects this argument. Moreover, as discussed above, although the amended complaint is not a
model of clarity, the Court finds that it avers sufficient facts to allow for the reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal that each of the individual Defendants participated in
conduct that caused Plaintiff’s termination and that they deprived Plaintiff of a pre-termination
hearing. While discovery may well reveal that many of these individuals were not involved in
6
See also 8 Pa.C.S. § 1190(a), formerly cited as 53 P.S. § 46190 (borough police officer may only be
removed for cause); Mariano v. Borough of Dickson City, 40 F.Supp.3d 411, 421 (M.D. Pa. 2014)
(finding that the language of § 1190 applies to, and does not exclude, part-time officers).
12
the decision to not provide Plaintiff a pre-termination hearing, at this early stage of the
proceedings, the allegations in the amended complaint are sufficient to withstand the pending
motion to dismiss.
2.
Section 1985(3) Conspiracy Claim
The amended complaint also claims that the individual Defendants are liable for
conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of his civil rights. Defendants construe this claim as being
brought under § 1985(3). In his response, Plaintiff contends that the amended complaint “has
defined a conspiracy claim pursuant to Farber [v. Patterson, 440 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2006)], which
analyzed a plaintiff’s § 1985(3) claim. Accordingly, the Court will likewise construe this claim
as being asserted under § 1985(3).
Section 1985(3) prohibits actions taken by two or more persons “for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of
the laws, or of equal privileged and immunities under the laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). In Farber
our Court of Appeals comprehensively analyzed the basic requirement in a § 1985(3) claim that
the “plaintiff must allege both that the conspiracy was motivated by discriminatory animus
against an identifiable class and that the discrimination against the identifiable class was
invidious.” Farber, 440 F.3d at 135. The amended complaint contains no factual allegations that
the Defendants were motivated by invidious discriminatory class-based animus. Therefore,
under Farber, which Plaintiff asserts governs this claim, as well applicable Supreme Court
precedent interpreting the “equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities” language of the
statute, see Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971), it is clearly apparent that the
amended complaint fails to state a § 1985(3) claim.7
7
Because it is so obvious that this claim is deficient for failing to allege any invidious discriminatory
class-based animus, the Court need not even address Defendants’ argument relating to whether the
13
IV.
Conclusion
In accordance with the foregoing, Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in
part.
The motion is denied as to the § 1983 claims asserting violations of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments against the individual Defendants in their individual capacities. The
motion is granted insofar as it seeks dismissal of the § 1983 claims against the Borough. Said
dismissal is without prejudice, however, because the Court finds that it would not be inequitable
or futile to allow Plaintiff to attempt to cure the current deficiencies by alleging facts of the
applicable municipal policies or customs and facts identifying the policymaker(s). See Phillips
v. Cty of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 246 (3d Cir. 2008) (in a civil rights case, the Court must
allow the plaintiff to amend his complaint unless such an amendment would inequitable or
futile). The motion is further granted as to the official capacity claims against the individual
Defendants and the § 1985(3) claim against the individual Defendants; both of these claims are
dismissed with prejudice, as amendment would be futile. An appropriate Order follows.
Dated: August 16, 2016
By the Court:
s/ Cynthia Reed Eddy
Cynthia Reed Eddy
United States Magistrate Judge
cc: all registered counsel via CM-ECF
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine bars this claim or whether the amended complaint is devoid of
allegations of a conspiratorial agreement or concerted action.
14
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?