NAVIGLIA v. THE BOROUGH OF SPRINGDALE et al

Filing 44

MEMORANDUM ORDER denying 36 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by THE BOROUGH OF SPRINGDALE. Signed by Magistrate Judge Cynthia Reed Eddy on 10/20/2016. (bap)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOSEPH T. NAVIGLIA,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE BOROUGH OF SPRINGDALE,
JASON FRY, JOHN MOLNAR, FRANK
FORBES, GENE POLSENELLI, MIKE
ZIENCIK, KENNETH LLOYD, and
JULIO F. MEDEIROS, III,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 15-1029

United States Magistrate Judge
Cynthia Reed Eddy

MEMORANDUM ORDER1
Cynthia Reed Eddy, United States Magistrate Judge
This is a civil rights action initiated by Plaintiff Joseph T. Naviglia under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 alleging that the above-captioned Defendants violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. On August 16, 2016, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ thenpending motion to dismiss. See ECF Nos. 19, 32, 33. Relevant here, the Court granted the
motion relating to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the Borough of Springdale (“Borough”) for
failing to state a Monell claim, and granted Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint to
cure the deficiencies identified in the Court’s Opinion. ECF Nos. 32, 33.
In said previous Opinion, the Court provided the following basis for dismissal of the
Monell claim:
The amended complaint does not identify a Borough policy or a custom that
caused any of Plaintiff’s alleged constitutional deprivations. Nor does it allege
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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have voluntarily consented to have the undersigned
conduct any and all proceedings herein, including the authority to enter final judgment, with direct review
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. ECF Nos. 23, 31.

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that any of the individuals named therein were final policymakers acting on behalf
of the Borough in that capacity. Instead, it vaguely asserts that the Borough took
unlawful actions against Plaintiff in retaliation for his protected conduct and
denied him of a pre-termination hearing. It also nebulously asserts that the
Borough has taken similar actions in the past against other certain police officers,
although it fails to offer any details as to which Borough officials participated in
said actions or what the surrounding circumstances were. These threadbare,
conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim for municipal liability as
they do not provide a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal that the
Borough had in place either policies or customs that violated Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights.
Indeed, given that the amended complaint does not identify any municipal
policies or customs, and does not identify any policymakers with final
unreviewable decisonmaking authority, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against
the Borough. To hold otherwise would impermissibly subject the Borough to
liability based on the actions of the Borough’s representatives, not the Borough
itself. See Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 245-46 (3d Cir. 2006)
(analyzing whether a borough official was a policymaker with final and
unreviewable authority); Ross v Borough of Dormont, 937 F.Supp.2d 638, 651-52
(W.D. Pa. 2013) (dismissing a municipal liability claim for failing to identify a
policy or custom of the borough). Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss
the § 1983 claims against the Borough is granted.
ECF No. 32 at 8-9 (footnote 4 omitted).
Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on August 26, 2016. ECF No. 34. He
abandoned his Monell claim with respect to his First Amendment retaliation claim, but reasserted
his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim against the Borough. Id.
In support of his Fourteenth Amendment claim against the Borough, he points to the fact
that there are several pending federal lawsuits brought by former Borough police officers
alleging that the Borough and the same individual Defendants similarly violated their procedural
due process rights.2 At this early stage, the Court concludes that these additional allegations
against the Borough sufficiently raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover proof
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See Corr v. Springdale Borough, 2:15-cv-637; Griffin v. Springdale Borough, 2:15-cv-1152; and
Medeiros v. Springdale Borough, Pennsylvania, 2:16-cv-1370. Although the Medeiros action is not
specifically referenced in the amended complaint, Plaintiff identifies it in his brief in opposition, and
given that it is a matter of public record, the Court may take notice of it. See Mayer v. Belichick, 605
F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010).

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that the Borough had in place an unlawful policy or custom of depriving its employees of pretermination Loudermill hearings.3 See Connelly v. Lane Cont. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir.
2016). Accordingly, the Court likewise concludes that the second amended complaint cured the
deficiencies that were present in the previous pleadings such that this Monell claim survives
Defendant’s renewed motion to dismiss (ECF No. 36) under the applicable Twombly and Iqbal
standard.
AND NOW, this 20th day of October 2016, upon consideration of Defendant’s renewed
motion to dismiss (ECF No. 36) and supporting Brief (ECF No. 37), as well as this Court’s prior
Memorandum Opinion and Order (ECF Nos. 32, 33), the second amended complaint (ECF No.
34), and Plaintiff’s response in opposition to the pending motion (ECF No. 42), it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant’s renewed motion to dismiss is DENIED. In accordance with Rule
12(a)(4)(A), Defendant’s responsive pleading is due fourteen (14) days after the date of this
Memorandum Order.

By the Court:
s/ Cynthia Reed Eddy
Cynthia Reed Eddy
United States Magistrate Judge
cc: all registered counsel via CM-ECF

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The Court acknowledges that the Defendants in those actions are vigorously defending these
assertions lodged against them. Nevertheless, when drawing all reasonable inferences in a light most
favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has nudged his Monell claim across the line to
plausible. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

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