HARTLE v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Filing
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OPINION and ORDER denying 11 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 13 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 7/5/16. (slh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CHRISTINE ELIZABETH HARTLE,
Plaintiff,
-vsCAROLYN W. COLVIN,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 15-1034
AMBROSE, Senior District Judge
OPINION
Pending before the court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 11 and
13). Both parties have filed Briefs in Support of their Motions. (ECF Nos. 12 and 14). After
careful consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based on my Opinion set forth
below, I am denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 11) and granting
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 13).
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brought this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security (ACommissioner@) denying her application for supplemental security income (“SSI”)
pursuant to the Social Security Act (AAct@). Plaintiff filed her application alleging she had been
disabled since August 22, 2009. (ECF No. 9-5, p. 2). Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), Wayne
Stanley, held a hearing on March 26, 2015. (ECF No. 9-3, pp. 24-74). On April 6, 2015, the
ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. (ECF No. 9-2, pp. 12-20).
After exhausting all administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed the instant action with this
court. The parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (Docket Nos. 11 and 13).
The issues are now ripe for review.
II.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
A.
Standard of Review
The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence exists in
the record to support the Commissioner=s decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir.
1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as Amore than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.@ Ventura v. Shalala, 55
F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995), quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
Additionally, the Commissioner=s findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are
conclusive. 42 U.S.C. '405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). A
district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner=s decision or re-weigh the
evidence of record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Where the ALJ's
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if
the court would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360
(3d Cir. 1999). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, however,
the district court must review the record as a whole. See, 5 U.S.C. '706.
To be eligible for social security benefits, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he cannot
engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. '423(d)(1)(A); Brewster v. Heckler,
786 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986).
The Commissioner has provided the ALJ with a five-step sequential analysis to use
when evaluating the disabled status of each claimant. 20 C.F.R. '404.1520(a). The ALJ must
determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not,
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a severe impairment,
whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P., appx. 1; (4) if the
impairment does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether the claimant=s impairments
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prevent him from performing his past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of
performing his past relevant work, whether he can perform any other work which exists in the
national economy, in light of his age, education, work experience and residual functional
capacity. 20 C.F.R. '404.1520. The claimant carries the initial burden of demonstrating by
medical evidence that he is unable to return to his previous employment (steps 1-4).
Dobrowolsky, 606 F.2d at 406. Once the claimant meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts
to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in alternative substantial gainful
activity (step 5). Id.
A district court, after reviewing the entire record may affirm, modify, or reverse the
decision with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris, 745
F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1984).
B.
Subjective Complaints of Pain
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain.
(ECF No. 12, pp. 8-10). In evaluating whether a plaintiff’s statements are credible, the ALJ will
consider evidence from treating, examining and consulting physicians, observations from
agency employees, and other factors such as the claimant's daily activities, descriptions of the
pain, precipitating and aggravating factors, type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of
medications, treatment other than medication, and other measures used to relieve the pain. 20
C.F.R. '§416.929(c), 404.1529(c); SSR 96-7p. The ALJ will also look at inconsistencies
between the claimant's statements and the evidence presented. Id. I must defer to the ALJ=s
credibility determinations, unless they are not supported by substantial evidence.
Smith v.
Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 972 (3d Cir. 1981); Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d 309, 312 (3d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 931 (1975).
In this case, Plaintiff specifically asserts that the ALJ “has simply disregarded [her]
testimony in his findings and has really not addressed it as a topic for discussion when the
Rules and Regulations and the Case Law provide that the pain must be considered.” (ECF No.
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12, p. 9). Contrary to Plaintiff’s position, the ALJ did not ignore her agoraphobia, that she is
taking medications or that she testified that she has pain in her lower back.
Rather, he
specifically addressed these issues. (ECF No. 9-2, pp. 14-19). After a review of the record, I
find that the ALJ followed the proper method to determine the Plaintiff’s credibility. As laid out in
his decision, the ALJ considered the factors set forth above. (ECF No. 9-2, pp. 14-19). For
example, while assessing Plaintiff=s credibility, the ALJ compared the medical evidence to her
complaints and found them to be contradictory. Id. The ALJ also discussed the fact that
Plaintiff=s complaints were contradicted by her daily activities and other evidence of record. Id.
Thus, I find the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff's credibility as required by 20 C.F.R. '416.929
and SSR 96-7p and, based on the entire record as a whole, I find there is substantial evidence
to support the ALJ=s decision to find Plaintiff not entirely credible. (ECF No. 9-2, pp. 12-20).
Therefore, I find no error in this regard.
An appropriate order shall follow.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CHRISTINE ELIZABETH HARTLE,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
-vsCAROLYN W. COLVIN,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 15-1034
AMBROSE, Senior District Judge
ORDER OF COURT
THEREFORE, this 5th day of July, 2016, it is ordered that Plaintiff=s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Docket No. 11) is denied and Defendant=s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket
No. 13) is granted.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Donetta W. Ambrose
Donetta W. Ambrose
United States Senior District Judge
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