MANN v. COLVIN
Filing
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OPINION and ORDER denying 11 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 15 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Donetta W. Ambrose on 11/2/16. (slh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PATRICIA MANN,
Plaintiff,
-vsCAROLYN W. COLVIN,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 15-1074
AMBROSE, Senior District Judge
OPINION
Pending before the court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 11 and
15). Both parties have filed Briefs in Support of their Motions. (ECF Nos. 12 and 16). After
careful consideration of the submissions of the parties, and based on my Opinion set forth
below, I am denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 11) and granting
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 15).
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brought this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security (ACommissioner@) denying her application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”)
pursuant to the Social Security Act (AAct@). Plaintiff filed her application alleging she had been
disabled since May 2, 2012. (ECF No. 7-6, p. 2). Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), David F.
Brash, held a hearing on March 26, 2014. (ECF No. 7-2, pp. 38-91). On June 2, 2014, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. (ECF No. 7-2, pp. 21-33).
After exhausting all administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed the instant action with this
court. The parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (Docket Nos. 11 and 15).
The issues are now ripe for review.
II.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
A.
Standard of Review
The standard of review in social security cases is whether substantial evidence exists in
the record to support the Commissioner=s decision. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir.
1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as Amore than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.@ Ventura v. Shalala, 55
F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995), quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
Additionally, the Commissioner=s findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are
conclusive. 42 U.S.C. '405(g); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). A
district court cannot conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner=s decision or re-weigh the
evidence of record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Where the ALJ's
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, a court is bound by those findings, even if
the court would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360
(3d Cir. 1999). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, however,
the district court must review the record as a whole. See, 5 U.S.C. '706.
To be eligible for social security benefits, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he cannot
engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. '423(d)(1)(A); Brewster v. Heckler,
786 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986).
The Commissioner has provided the ALJ with a five-step sequential analysis to use
when evaluating the disabled status of each claimant. 20 C.F.R. '404.1520(a). The ALJ must
determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not,
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if the claimant has a severe impairment,
whether it meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P., appx. 1; (4) if the
impairment does not satisfy one of the impairment listings, whether the claimant=s impairments
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prevent him from performing his past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable of
performing his past relevant work, whether he can perform any other work which exists in the
national economy, in light of his age, education, work experience and residual functional
capacity. 20 C.F.R. '404.1520. The claimant carries the initial burden of demonstrating by
medical evidence that he is unable to return to his previous employment (steps 1-4).
Dobrowolsky, 606 F.2d at 406. Once the claimant meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts
to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in alternative substantial gainful
activity (step 5). Id.
A district court, after reviewing the entire record may affirm, modify, or reverse the
decision with or without remand to the Commissioner for rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris, 745
F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1984).
B.
Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”)
At step one of the analysis, an ALJ must determine whether the Plaintiff is engaged in
SGA. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(b). If a person is engaging in SGA, then the person is not disabled,
regardless of the person’s medical condition, age, education, or work experience. Id. Even if
the work done was not SGA, “it may show that you are able to do more work than you actually
did.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1571.
“Substantial work activity is work activity that involves doing
significant physical or mental activities. Your work may be substantial even if it is done on a
part-time basis or if you do less, get paid less, or have less responsibility than when you worked
before.... Gainful work activity is work activity that you do for pay or profit. Work activity is gainful
if it is the kind of work usually done for pay or profit, whether or not a profit is realized.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1572. Thus, the SGA analysis is not necessarily a purely an income based
analysis. Plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating the absence of SGA. Plummer v. Apfel, 186
F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir. 1999).
In this case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had engaged in SGA throughout the relevant
period. (ECF No. 7-2, pp. 23-24). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in making this finding.
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(ECF No. 12, pp. 10-12).
In support of the same, Plaintiff first argues that the evidence
submitted shows that Plaintiff is not engaging in SGA. (ECF No. 12, pp. 10-11). To be clear,
the standard is not whether there is evidence to establish Plaintiff’s position but, rather, is
whether there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding. Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37,
39 (3d Cir. 1989). Thus, this argument is misplaced.
Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ erroneously made his decision “solely because she
(sic) was confused as to what, if any business income the AB Mann Company had and the total
amount of monies the company was paying toward her joint bills with her husband.” (ECF No.
12, p. 12). After a review of the evidence, I disagree. I do not find that the ALJ in this matter
was confused. Rather, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s testimony on the matter was not credible and
set forth the reasons he came to this conclusion. Id.
I must defer to the ALJ=s credibility
determinations, unless they are not supported by substantial evidence. Smith v. Califano, 637
F.2d 968, 972 (3d Cir. 1981); Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d 309, 312 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 931 (1975).
Here, the ALJ appropriately compared Plaintiff’s testimony with
the documentation provided and found various inconsistencies regarding, inter alia, the number
of hours worked, the amount Plaintiff was paid, how she was paid, and what bills of hers were
paid for by her husband’s company. (ECF No. 7-2, pp. 23-24). Thus, I find the ALJ’s decision
that Plaintiff failed to meet her burden that she is not engaged in SGA was based on substantial
evidence. Therefore, I find no merit to this argument.
Since I have found that the ALJ did not error in his determination that Plaintiff has
engaged in SGA throughout the relevant period and that there is substantial evidence to support
the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff is not disabled under the Act, I need not consider Plaintiff’s
additional arguments.
An appropriate order shall follow.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PATRICIA MANN,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
-vsCAROLYN W. COLVIN,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 15-1074
AMBROSE, Senior District Judge
ORDER OF COURT
THEREFORE, this 2nd day of November, 2016, it is ordered that Plaintiff=s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Docket No. 11) is denied and Defendant=s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Docket No. 15) is granted.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Donetta W. Ambrose
Donetta W. Ambrose
United States Senior District Judge
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