KAROLSKI v. CITY OF ALIQUIPPA et al

Filing 74

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting Defendants' 65 Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Plaintiff's 70 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Cynthia Reed Eddy on 4/24/2018. (sms)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Clifford Joseph Karolski,
Plaintiff,
v.
Chief Davis, Assistant Chief Don
Couch, Detective Stephen Roberts,
(City of Aliquippa),
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 15-1101

United States Magistrate Judge
Cynthia Reed Eddy

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER1
Cynthia Reed Eddy, United States Magistrate Judge
Pending before the Court are cross motions for summary judgment. For the reasons
stated herein, the Defendants’ motion will be granted and Plaintiff’s will be denied.
I.

Procedural and Factual Background
Plaintiff Clifford Joseph Karolski, proceeding pro se and currently confined at SCI-Camp

Hill based on an unrelated incident, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that his
federal rights were violated by the Defendants when he was falsely charged with numerous
counts of arson, notwithstanding his alibi, and was incarcerated for approximately one month
until his charges were dismissed by a magistrate at his preliminary hearing.
Plaintiff’s second amended complaint was filed on January 27, 2017. (ECF No. 43). On
April 4, 2017 the Court dismissed defendant City of Aliquippa from this case with prejudice
(ECF No. 49), leaving as defendants Couch, Davis, and Roberts. The remaining claims are:

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Because all of the parties have voluntarily consented to have the undersigned conduct any
and all proceedings in this matter, the undersigned has authority to enter this Memorandum
Order on the pending dispositive motion. (ECF Nos. 9, 40); 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed. R. Civ. P.
73.
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wrongful arrest, malicious prosecution and false imprisonment. Discovery ended on July 21,
2017. (ECF No. 59).
On September 5, 2017, Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment with brief in
support, as well as concise statement of material facts and an appendix. (ECF Nos. 65, 66, 67,
68). Plaintiff filed his motion for summary judgment on September 13, 2017, with exhibits
attached thereto (ECF Nos. 70, 71), although he did not file a concise statement of material facts,
in derogation of the local rule and our order to do so. (ECF No. 50, citing L.R. 56). Plaintiff
also filed a response to the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on September 29, 2017.
(ECF No. 71). Defendants filed a brief in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion on February 12, 2018.
(ECF No. 73). Thus, the matter has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.
Unless otherwise stated, the following facts are not in dispute. Plaintiff’s claims arise out
of his arrest on November 8, 2013 and subsequent prosecution on arson related criminal charges
arising out of a fire on August 29, 2013 at his house in Aliquippa, Beaver County, Pennsylvania.
The Pennsylvania State Police investigated the cause and origin of the fire and determined that
the fire originated inside the house, was deliberately set, and found its cause to be “incendiary.”
Defendant Detective Steven Roberts investigated the arson on behalf of the city of Aliquippa,
and after his two-month long investigation, he filed an Affidavit of Probable Cause and Criminal
Complaint (“the Affidavit”) charging Plaintiff with offenses including arson, recklessly
endangering death and injury and arson/collect insurance, 18 Pa. C.S.A.§ 3301(a)(i) and
3301(c)(3). A magisterial district judge issued a warrant for plaintiff’s arrest and Plaintiff was
arrested and detained on November 8, 2018 pursuant to that warrant. Following a preliminary
hearing on December 12, 2013, the magisterial district judge dismissed all charges.
The affidavit of probable cause is contained in the record herein as Exhibit 11 to

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Defendants’ motion. (ECF No. 65-11 at 7). Defendant Roberts, then-detective, was the affiant.
Roberts has also filed with the court a declaration (ECF No. 65-1), which provides a summary
of the Affidavit, as well as other information.
Roberts was the Aliquippa’s only detective in 2013. He investigated the suspected arson
at 2023 McLean Street, Aliquippa, Beaver County, Pennsylvania on August 29, 2013. The
house was vacant and nearly empty of all contents. The fire's origin was in the interior of the
house in the dining room area. All utilities were off at the time of the fire. The Aliquippa Fire
Department determined that the fire was suspicious, and called for investigative help from the
Pennsylvania State Police Fire Marshal, which also confirmed the fire was suspicious in nature.
The laboratory test results for “ignitable liquids” on items collected from the fire scene came
back negative. The Affidavit did not state this. The Affidavit accurately states that the State
Police investigator concluded that despite the negative results for ignitable liquids, it was
intentionally caused by means of an “accelerant.”

The fire was classified as

"incendiary," i.e. intentionally set.
On August 29, 2013, Plaintiff came into the Aliquippa police station and informed
Defendant (then-Assistant Chief) Couch that he had worked from 2:15 p.m. until 11:45
p.m. on August 28, 2013, but that he would not make any statements regarding the fire.
The next day Detective Roberts interviewed Plaintiff’s wife, Delina D'Arcangelo. She
informed him she had had the locks changed on the house at 2023 McLean after she
obtained a p rotection from a buse order against K arolski which required him to move
out of the house. She had had new dead bolt locks installed on the front and rear doors.
She had moved out of the house in mid-July, 2013 due to the utilities being shut off.
When she moved out she gave her keys to the house to her in-laws. Plaintiff lived with

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his parents and Ms. D’arcangelo thought he would have access to the keys. She had not
made any extra copies of the keys to the house while living there due to her fears that an
extra key would somehow come into the possession of Plaintiff.
In their Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, Defendants concede there were multiple
keys to the house. (ECF No. 67 at ¶ 30, citing the Amended complaint, ECF No. 43 at p.2).
There is no dispute that Plaintiff had a key to the house. He had been seen removing items from
the house after Ms. D’Arcangelo moved out of the house.
Through Beaver County Real Estate records and a mortgage settlement agreement
provided to Roberts by Ms. D'Arcangelo, Roberts learned that the sole owner of the house at
2023 McLean Street was Plaintiff. Roberts also confirmed that the electricity at the house
had been shut off prior to the fire due to non-payment. Furthermore, Roberts learned Plaintiff
was behind in his mortgage payments; Chase Bank was in the process of taking action
against him. Ms. D'Arcangelo told Roberts that while living at 2023 McLean she had
received several letters from Chase Bank addressed to Plaintiff sent by certified mail.
Roberts searched court records and learned that civil actions had been filed at the
magistrate level for unpaid debts, suggesting that Plaintiff was having financial difficulties.
On August 31, 2013, Roberts was contacted by James Thomas of Travelers Insurance
Company, which insured the property, advising it was conducting an "origin and cause"
investigation. Travelers further advised Roberts Plaintiff had made a claim for the fire
loss. On September 17, 2013 Roberts spoke with James Thomas, investigator for
Travelers Insurance. He informed Roberts that Plaintiff provided an alibi that he was at the
Rivers Casino and that M s . D'Arcangelo was also listed as an insured on their policy.
According to the Affidavit, after speaking with the Travelers Investigator, Roberts

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spoke with M s . D'Arcangelo to inquire why she had not told him she was also listed
on the insurance policy. She informed R obe r ts that she did not know that she was on
the policy until Travelers contacted her about the claim. She learned this information
after her last conversation with Roberts. According to Plaintiff, he had told the police that his
wife was not listed on the policy; he had owned the house prior to their marriage.
Plaintiff’s attorney James Villanova advised that his client would not provide a
statement and that surveillance videotapes would show Plaintiff was at the Rivers Casino
at the time relevant to the fire. Roberts contacted the Rivers Casino to determine whether
their records would provide an alibi for Plaintiff. Rivers Casino explained that through
Plaintiff’s Player's Club Card and their video surveillance they were able to establish that
he arrived at the Casino at 1:48 a.m. on August 29, 2013, played one machine, and then left
the Casino at 2:08 a.m., twenty minutes after his arrival. Roberts subsequently confirmed
this after obtaining copies of their records and surveillance video through a search warrant.
Roberts also served a search warrant on Plaintiff’s employer, the U.S. Postal Service
Bulk Mailing Center a/k/a Logistics and Distribution Center in Cranberry Township to
obtain records of his work schedule on August 28th. Plaintiff had told Defendant Assistant
Chief Couch on the morning of August 29th that he was at work in Cranberry Township
from 2:15 p.m. until 11:45 p.m. on August 28 th. The records produced by Plaintiff's
employer showed that he did not work on August 28th.
Roberts also learned from neighbors that after Ms. D'Arcangelo moved out
neighbors saw Plaintiff go in and out of the house at 2023 McLean Street to remove items
on several occasions.

This information confirmed the information provided by Ms.

D'Arcangelo regarding Plaintiff having a key to the house. The members of the fire and

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police departments who initially responded to the fire confirmed that there was no sign of
forced entry at the home. The front and rear doors were locked. All windows and doors
were closed. In addition, the fire was started in the interior of the home. The fire
department had to break a window to gain access to the home. Therefore, the person who
started the fire had a key to the house. Through discussions with the Pennsylvania State
Police Arson Investigative Unit Roberts learned that the fire could have been started
sometime before Plaintiff arrived at the Rivers Casino, or after he left the casino. Either
time was consistent with the physical evidence.
Detective Roberts did not provide in the Affidavit information about Plaintiff’s
alleged alibi that he was at the Rivers Casino at the time of the fire, although he knew about
the alibi at the time he submitted the Affidavit. He had determined that Plaintiff could
nevertheless have committed the arson despite the alibi.
Neither Defendant Chief Andre Davis nor Assistant Chief Don Couch filed the
criminal charges against Plaintiff, nor did they participate in his arrest or testify at the
preliminary hearing.
II.

Standard of Review
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court shall grant summary

judgment in favor of the moving party only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). A fact is “material” if it is “one that might ‘affect the outcome of the suit under governing
law.’” Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, 593 F.3d 280, 284 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if it
“is one that ‘may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.’” Lomando v. United States,

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667 F.3d 363, 371 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250). The movant has the initial
“burden of identifying specific portions of the record that establish the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact.” Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2015). If the moving party
meets this initial burden, the non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is
some metaphysical doubt as to material facts,” but must show sufficient evidence to support a
jury verdict in its favor. Boyle v. Cty. of Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). If the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to [the non-movant's] case, and on which [the non-movant] will bear the burden of
proof at trial,” Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment because such a failure
“necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322–23; Jakimas v.
Hoffman–La Roche, Inc., 485 F.3d 770, 777 (3d Cir. 2007). When assessing a motion for
summary judgment, the court “must construe all evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.” Id. (citation omitted).
The standard of review for cross-motions for summary judgment is identical to the
standard applicable to routine motions for summary judgment. Lawrence v. City of Phila., 527
F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2008). “When confronted with cross-motions for summary judgment . . .
‘the court must rule on each party’s motion on an individual and separate basis, determining, for
each side, whether a judgment may be entered in accordance with the summary judgment
standard.’” Van Arsdel v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Bos., 267 F. Supp. 3d 538, 545 (E.D. Pa.
2017) (citing Erbe v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., Civ. A. No.06-113, 2009 WL 605836, at *1
(W.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2009)).

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III.

Discussion
Plaintiff brings his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983. Section 1983 does not provide

substantive rights; rather, Section 1983 provides a vehicle for vindicating violations of other
federal rights. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). In order to state a valid claim
for relief under Section 1983, a plaintiff must first allege a violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, a plaintiff must allege that the violation
was caused or committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988).
Plaintiff asserts three claims pursuant to § 1983: false arrest, false imprisonment and
malicious prosecution. The lack of probable cause is an essential element of each of these
claims.2 Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995). Otherwise stated, the
presence of probable cause is a complete bar to Plaintiff’s federal claims for false arrest, false
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.
Although the existence vel non of probable cause is normally a factual issue for the jury’s
determination, like any other factual issue it may be resolved by the court as a matter of law if no
genuine dispute exists on the record such that, if, based on the evidence as a whole, a jury could
not reasonably conclude that the officers lacked probable cause to make the arrest and institute
criminal proceedings. Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 818 (3d Cir. 1997).
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A false imprisonment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is based on the Fourteenth Amendment protection against
deprivations of liberty without due process of law. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979). To assess claims
of false arrest, the court must determine whether “the arresting officers had probable cause to believe the person
arrested had committed the offense.” Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988). Malicious
prosecution requires evidence that:
(1) the defendant[ ] initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in the plaintiff's favor;
(3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the defendant[ ] acted maliciously or for a
purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty
consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.
Andrews v. Scuilli, 853 F.3d 690, 697 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 601
(3d Cir. 2005).

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Since false arrest and malicious prosecution hinge on probable cause, the constitutional
violation question in this case turns on whether “‘a reasonable officer could have believed that
probable cause existed’ to arrest” the plaintiff at that time. Blaylock v. City of Philadelphia, 504
F.3d 405, 411 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228-29, 112 S.Ct. 534,
116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991)). Thus, the standard is an objective one and is to be applied based on the
facts available to the officers at the time of their alleged unlawful conduct. Barna v. City of
Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809, 819 (3d Cir. 1994). The fact that the charges were dismissed at the
preliminary phase of Plaintiff’s criminal case does not negate the existence of probable cause to
support his initial arrest and detention. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979). As long
as Defendants had a reasonable basis to believe that Plaintiff had committed the crimes with
which he was charged, the arrest and proceedings thereafter are justified as being based on
probable cause.
Plaintiff has challenged his arrest on the basis that the affidavit in support of the arrest
warrant contained material omissions and/or misrepresentations which, when corrected, vitiate
probable cause. Because he was arrested on a valid warrant, we focused the probable cause
analysis on whether Defendants “‘knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for
the truth, made false statements or omissions that create[d] a falsehood in applying for a
warrant.’ ” Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997). Therefore, we must
concentrate on two elements: first, whether “the officer, with at least a reckless disregard for the
truth, ‘made false statements or omissions that create[d] a falsehood in applying for a warrant,’
and second, whether those assertions or omissions were ‘material, or necessary, to the finding of
probable cause.’” Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 468–69 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing
Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786-87 (3d Cir. 2000).

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However a certain tension exists when probable cause is at issue in a motion for summary
judgment. Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 468. This is particularly so for analyses that center upon
misrepresentations and omissions in the affidavit of probable cause. Although a finding of
probable cause generally can be based on an officer's credibility determinations and independent
assessments of conflicting evidence, “it is axiomatic that at the summary judgment stage, we
view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. As a result:
[We cannot] exclude from the probable cause analysis unfavorable facts an officer
otherwise would have been able to consider. Instead, we view all such facts and
assess whether any reasonable jury could conclude that those facts, considered in
their totality in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, did not
demonstrate a “fair probability” that a crime occurred.
Id. Thus, an assertion “is made with reckless disregard when ‘viewing all the evidence, the
affiant must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statements or had obvious
reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information he reported.’” Wilson, 212 F.3d at 788 (quoting
United States v. Clapp, 46 F.3d 795, 801 n. 6 (8th Cir. 1995)). Misleading assertions can relate to
even “minor details,” and do not need a separate determination of relevance. The focus in these
instances is upon evidence demonstrating that the affiant willingly and “affirmatively distort[ed]
the truth.” Id. at 788. Omissions are made with reckless disregard where “an officer withholds a
fact in his ken that ‘[a]ny reasonable person would have known ... was the kind of thing the
judge would wish to know.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Jacobs, 986 F.2d 1231, 1235 (8th
Cir.1993)). When an officer submits a sworn affidavit of probable cause, he or she “is not free to
disregard plainly exculpatory evidence, even if substantial inculpatory evidence (standing by
itself) suggests that probable cause exists.” Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 469 (quoting Wilson, 212 F.3d
at 790).
Only after identifying such false statements or omissions will a court then consider

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whether those false statements or omissions were “material or necessary” to the finding of
probable cause. Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786-87 (3d Cir. 2000).
With these guidelines at hand, we now turn to the positions of cross-movants, and facts as
contained in the record. Prior to arresting Plaintiff, Defendants obtained an arrest warrant by
submitting to the district justice the Affidavit. Plaintiff contends that Defendants are not entitled
to summary judgment, and he is, because no genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether
the Affidavit contained false and misleading information as well as omissions. Plaintiff contends
that, if that information was properly included, or otherwise made accurate, the Affidavit does
not establish probable cause for his arrest.

Defendants contend, on the contrary, that as

contained in Detective Roberts’ Declaration and Affidavit, as well as exhibits thereto, there is no
material dispute that they did not knowingly or deliberately, or with reckless disregard for the
truth, make false statements or omissions that created a falsehood in applying for the warrant
such that statements or omissions are material or necessary to the finding of probable cause.
Plaintiff suggests that the Affidavit was “nothing but lies,” specifically focusing on three
alleged omissions or misrepresentation. First, Plaintiff claims that it was a lie to state that
Detective Roberts was told Ms. D’Archangelo was listed on the homeowner’s insurance policy,
but she was unaware of the fact. According to Plaintiff, he told multiple people she was not
listed on the policy. Second, Plaintiff contends that it is impossible to believe there was only one
key to the house and the key was in Plaintiff’s possession. The third identified “lie” was that the
Affidavit omitted the laboratory tests revealed the tests for ignitable liquids on items collected
from the scene came back negative. Plaintiff also proposes in his motion alternative hypothetical
scenarios that the doors to the house could have been stuck due to heat expansion, rather than
being locked by a perpetrator with a key, or that witness statements that the windows were open

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to the house two days prior to the fire support a theory that persons other than Plaintiff could
have entered the house and started the fire. Finally, Plaintiff argues that his alibi of being at the
Rivers Casino proves his innocence and his inability to commit the crime.
We cannot agree with this characterization of the evidence. Based on our review of the
records, the Court concludes that no genuine dispute of material fact exists as to probable cause
because, as a matter of law, Defendants had probable cause to believe Plaintiff committed the
offenses for which he was arrested and charged. Moreover, the omission of the hypothetical
scenarios as to how others could have gotten into the house do not rise to the level of false
statements or omissions that created a falsehood in applying for the warrant.
As to the notion of the number of keys in existence, evidence that other persons also had
keys to the house, which was not included in the affidavit, was not “plainly exculpatory
evidence” given that (there is no dispute) Plaintiff himself had the ability to make an unforced
entry into the house. The uncontroverted investigator’s report surmised this was the means by
which the perpetrator gained access to the house. No factfinder could conclude that this created a
falsehood in applying to the warrant. Even if it had, such an omission would not be material to
the finding of probable cause, given all the other evidence in the record and as detailed in the
Roberts Declaration and supporting documentation.
As to the omission of Plaintiff’s Rivers Casino alibi, and viewing all facts that a
reasonable jury would use to assess it, there can be no genuine dispute that such facts – even if
recklessly disregarded by Roberts at the outset—would nevertheless demonstrate a fair
probability that a crime occurred. If the alibi that plaintiff was at the Rivers Casino had been
included, and it was a material omission, the reconstructed facts would also include the fact that
Roberts investigated the alibi and found that plaintiff could have started the fire, despite having

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gone to the Rivers Casino for a brief period of time. According to his declaration, through his
discussions with the Pennsylvania State Police Arson Investigative Unit, he learned that the fire
could have been started sometime “before Mr. Karolski arrived at the Rivers Casino, or after he
left the Casino. Either time was consistent with the physical evidence.” (ECF No. 65-1 at ¶ 25).
No reasonable factfinder could conclude that there was an improper omission (a reference to an
alleged alibi) because the investigation revealed Plaintiff could have committed the arson despite
the alibi. This could not have changed the probable cause determination.
As to the laboratory results being negative for “ignitable” liquid, the information even if
initially known by Defendant would not have vitiated the probable cause that supported
Plaintiff’s arrest. The laboratory’s analysis did not change the State Police investigator’s
conclusion that the fire was started by means of an “accelerant” and the fire was “incendiary;”
the Affidavit accurately states the arson investigator’s conclusion that an accelerant was used.
No reasonable fact finder could conclude in Plaintiff’s favor that this was a false statement or
omission that created a falsehood in applying for the warrant.
Finally, we note that there is no evidence of record to support the allegation that either
Defendant Assistant Chief Don Couch or Chief Andre Davis were participants in the decision to
criminally charge, arrest, or prosecute Plaintiff, nor is there any evidence of record to support a
claim of supervisory liability for the alleged unlawful acts of Detective Roberts. Rode v.
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988); Capone v. Marinelli, 868 F.2d 102, 106 (3d
Cir. 1989). Plaintiff claims that he advised all three Defendants of his alibi and the existence of
multiple keys to the house, as well as suggested to them that the fire could be related to copper
thefts in the area. Regardless, there is no evidence in the record before us to lead a reasonable
factfinder to conclude that either Couch or Davis were personally involved in the investigation,

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the filing of charges, and his arrest. Accordingly, summary judgment in their favor is
appropriate, and plaintiffs motion will be denied as he has filed to show any genuine dispute in
this regard.
The existence of probable cause is fatal to Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims.
DiNicola, 25 F.Supp.2d at 637 (the lack of probable cause is an essential element for plaintiff’s
Fourth Amendment claims premised on alleged false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious
prosecution). Defendant Roberts had available to him credible information that Plaintiff had
committed arson. A reasonably prudent officer in his position could certainly conclude the same.
IV.

Conclusion
Based on the foregoing discussion, the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will

be granted, and plaintiff’s will be denied. An appropriate order follows.
AND NOW, this 24th day of April, 2018, upon consideration of the cross motions for
summary judgment and the record herein, it is hereby ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 65) be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 70) be DENIED, and Judgment shall be entered in favor of Chief Andre
Davis, Assistant Chief Don Couch, and Detective Steven Roberts.
Dated: April 24th, 2018.

By the Court:
s/ Cynthia Reed Eddy
Cynthia Reed Eddy
United States Magistrate Judge

cc:

CLIFFORD JOSEPH KAROLSKI
MQ 0691
SCI Camp Hill
P.O. Box 200
Camp Hill, PA 17001
All registered counsel via CM-ECF
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